Positivism
실증주의
The philosophical position that accepts as genuine knowledge only facts confirmable by experience and the laws connecting them, and holds that metaphysics, the search for essences or ultimate causes behind phenomena, should be abandoned. The French thinker Auguste Comte named and systematised it in the nineteenth century; it continued in the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius and in the logical positivism of the twentieth-century Vienna Circle. In Materialism and Empirio-criticism Lenin criticised the current as Hume's agnosticism in new dress.
In depth
What did the word "positive" promise?
Suppose we ask why people fall ill. Long ago the answer was that a god had sent a punishment. Later the answer invoked an invisible essence or force, such as an imbalance of the humours inside the body. Today a doctor establishes by observation and experiment which germ spreads by which route and under what conditions symptoms appear. The doctor can prevent the disease without answering what life is. Positivism is the idea of making this last attitude the model for all knowledge.
"Positive" (French positif) means what is given tangibly, what can be confirmed. A positivist accepts as knowledge only facts confirmable by experience and the laws that record in what order and with what likeness those facts recur. What may lie hidden behind them, and where the world comes from and where it is going, are set aside as questions that cannot be answered.
The idea looks simple but has large consequences. It pushes the whole of metaphysics, the belief that philosophy can deal with questions science cannot, out of the domain of knowledge. And it holds that human society, like stars or chemical substances, can be observed and its laws found. These two strands attracted intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and at the same time drew many objections.
Through what stages did Comte think knowledge passes?
The first to make the name into a system was the Frenchman Auguste Comte. As a young man he worked from 1817 to 1824 as secretary to Henri de Saint-Simon, known as a utopian socialist; after parting from him over disagreements he published the six volumes of his Course of Positive Philosophy from 1830 to 1842. In its first lesson he put forward a law of the development of the human mind: "each of our principal conceptions, each branch of our knowledge, passes successively through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive state."
chacune de nos conceptions principales, chaque branche de nos connaissances, passe successivement par trois états théoriques différens: l'état théologique, ou fictif; l'état métaphysique, ou abstrait; l'état scientifique, ou positif.
In the theological state the mind seeks the inner nature of things and their first and final causes, and comes to think that supernatural beings produce everything. The metaphysical state merely replaces those beings with abstract forces such as "nature" or "vital force". Comte described the last, positive state like this: recognising that it cannot obtain absolute notions, the human mind "gives up seeking the origin and destination of the universe and knowing the inner causes of phenomena, to apply itself solely to discovering, by a well-combined use of reasoning and observation, their actual laws, that is, their invariable relations of succession and similarity."
renonce à chercher l'origine et la destination de l'univers, et à connaître les causes intimes des phénomènes, pour s'attacher uniquement à découvrir, par l'usage bien combiné du raisonnement et de l'observation, leurs lois effectives, c'est-à-dire leurs relations invariables de succession et de similitude.
Comte thought the sciences pass through the three stages at different speeds. Mathematics and astronomy reached the positive state first, then physics, chemistry and biology. What remained was society. He declared that the special aim of the Course was to found a "social physics", and he later called this science "sociology". The word sociology comes from Comte, and he placed the discipline at the top of the hierarchy of the sciences.
Why did positivism become a political movement?
For Comte positive philosophy was not a lecture-room theory. He sought to cure the social disorder left by the French Revolution with a new social doctrine based on science. When the revolution of 1848 broke out he judged that the time for action had come and in March that year formed the Positivist Society, and in his last years he founded a "Religion of Humanity". French Wikipedia records that, after having been very critical of Louis-Napoléon, he hoped to convert the emperor to positivism and went through a "conservative turn". His motto "order and progress" travelled to Brazil, where it still stands on the national flag as "Ordem e Progresso".
The positivist method survived apart from Comte's religion. Émile Durkheim discarded most of the details of Comte's philosophy but kept the method, the claim that the social sciences can study society with the same objectivity as the natural sciences, and founded modern sociology on it. At the same time in Germany sociologists such as Max Weber opposed positivism, arguing that human action must be understood through its meanings and values. Whether society can be observed like nature is still argued over in the social sciences.
Why are Mach and empirio-criticism called the "second positivism"?
Russian-language histories of philosophy divide positivism into waves: the "first positivism" of the early nineteenth century centred on Comte; the "second positivism", which in the German-speaking lands took in elements of Kantianism, namely the empirio-criticism of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach; and the neopositivism of the twentieth century. The philosophy of science that arose in the English-speaking world after the Second World War, that of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend and others, is called "post-positivism".
The second wave drove positivism deeper into the theory of knowledge. Where Comte said we should not ask about causes, Mach held that since only sensations are given to us, bodies and the self alike are relatively stable bundles of sensations, and that the laws of science are tools for summarising experience most economically. Around 1900 this view spread among Russian Marxists too and provoked Lenin's counter-attack, which the entry on empirio-criticism describes in detail.
The third wave arose in Vienna in the 1920s. The Vienna Circle, which gathered around the "Ernst Mach Society" named after Mach, took up the newly developed mathematical logic as its weapon and argued that sentences which cannot be verified are neither true nor false but meaningless. That current is covered in the entry on logical positivism.
How did Marx and Lenin see positivism?
In the afterword to the second edition of the first volume of Capital (1873), presenting conflicting judgements of his method, Marx mocked the Comtean school: "Thus the Paris Revue Positiviste reproaches me on the one hand with treating economics metaphysically, and on the other hand, guess what!, with confining myself to the merely critical analysis of what is given, instead of writing recipes (Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future."
So wirft mir die Pariser "Revue Positiviste" vor, einerseits, ich behandle die Ökonomie metaphysisch, andrerseits - man rate! -, ich beschränke mich auf bloß kritische Zergliederung des Gegebnen, statt Rezepte (comtistische?) für die Garküche der Zukunft zu verschreiben.
Lenin dealt with positivism head-on in Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909). His point was that the positivist stance of "accepting only sensations" does not differ from Hume's agnosticism: "Let us note, then, for our Machists that the agnostic (the Humean) also starts from sensations and recognises no other source of knowledge. The agnostic is a pure 'positivist'."
Итак, отметим для наших махистов, что агностик (юмист) тоже исходит из ощущений и не признает никакого иного источника знаний. Агностик — чистый «позитивист»
Refusing to ask whether there is a world beyond sensations and independent of them was, in Lenin's view, not neutrality but taking the side that the world cannot be known. So he did not accept the claim that positivism is a "third way" that is neither materialist nor idealist. His diagnosis: "positivism in general and Machism in particular have been much more occupied with the subtle falsification of epistemology, imitating materialism and hiding idealism behind supposedly materialist terminology".
позитивизм вообще и махизм в частности гораздо больше занимались тонкой фальсификацией гносеологии, подделываясь под материализм, пряча идеализм за якобы материалистическую терминологию
Positivists and Lenin agreed in respecting science and experience. Where they parted was the question of what experience is experience of. Positivism stops at experience itself; Lenin's reflection theory treats experience as the material world outside consciousness reflected in sensation. For Lenin, therefore, practice was not the ordering of bundles of sensations but the testing of thought against the outside world, and this is the criterion of practice.
How was the word "positivism" used afterwards?
In the twentieth century "positivism" increasingly became a word used by critics. German Wikipedia notes that Marx already used it in a broad, critical sense not limited to the Comtean school, and that it later came to denote unquestioning faith in science and social engineering. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School attacked as positivism a view of science that records facts without asking about society as a whole. Habermas criticised purely instrumental rationality, and the positivism dispute that followed the confrontation of Adorno and Popper at the German Sociological Association in 1961 represents this opposition.
Those criticised often shunned the name. Popper, who had been a critic of the Vienna Circle, called his being classed as a positivist the "Popper legend". In Soviet philosophy too positivism was a target of criticism. In his posthumous Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism (1980) Ilyenkov argued, against the reading of Materialism and Empirio-criticism as a mere primer of materialism, that the book already treated dialectics as logic and theory of knowledge.
When reading the word, then, one must look at who is using it. Comte's doctrine, Mach's empirio-criticism and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle are different doctrines. What binds them into one lineage is a shared attitude: accepting as knowledge only what experience confirms, and treating philosophy that asks beyond experience as meaningless. From the materialist side, it is precisely that attitude that is criticised for leaving the objective reality of the world unasked about.