Soviet debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics
소련의 양자역학 해석 논쟁
A dispute from 1947 into the 1950s among Soviet physicists and philosophers over the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics, especially Niels Bohr's complementarity. It did not deny quantum mechanics itself but disputed how a theory already taught at universities and confirmed by experiment fits materialism. Answers divided, as with Dmitry Blokhintsev, who put forward the ensemble interpretation; Vladimir Fock, who argued with Bohr and rewrote complementarity in materialist terms; and Lev Landau's textbook, which left philosophy out altogether. There was no official answer.
In depth
Where was the electron before it was measured?
We do not know the result of a die before it is thrown because of our ignorance. The die simply moves according to physical law. But what about measuring an electron's position and obtaining a result? Was the electron somewhere all along, without our knowing, or had it no definite position before measurement? In the latter case, does the act of the person measuring not make reality? And then what becomes of the materialist statement that the world exists independently of our consciousness?
The Copenhagen interpretation on Niels Bohr's side answered roughly as follows. Statements about the atomic world cannot be made apart from interaction with measuring devices, and mutually exclusive descriptions such as position and momentum are together needed to account fully for phenomena. This is called complementarity. Werner Heisenberg spoke of the impact of the observer and uncontrollable disturbance, and Pascual Jordan went so far as to say that quantum mechanics had refuted materialism. Since Lenin had already criticised physicists' philosophical conclusion that "matter has disappeared" in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Soviet philosophy could not stay indifferent to this.
The first misconception to correct in reading this debate is this. Western Soviet studies in the Cold War spread the impression that Soviet ideology attacked quantum mechanics itself. Alexei Kojevnikov regards this as a mistaken account. Quantum mechanics had been enthusiastically accepted in the Soviet Union twenty years earlier and by the 1940s was a standard course in all universities, and the theory itself was not doubted in the discussion that followed. What was doubted was its interpretation. And he stresses that there was no "party line" on quantum philosophy even in the Soviet Union.
How did the debate begin?
The roots go back to the 1930s. In 1930 the Marxist philosopher Boris Hessen wrote on causality in quantum mechanics, and Alexander Pechenkin counts him with Nikolsky and Leonid Mandelstam among the authorities on the side of the ensemble interpretation. They developed the idea that quantum probabilities are statistics of collections of particles and not of individual ones. Hessen was executed in 1936.
The public debate was a direct result of the "1947 Soviet philosophy discussion". In his speech Andrei Zhdanov mentioned the "Kantian contortions" of modern atomic physicists and demanded that philosophers generalise natural science. The second issue of the new journal Voprosy filosofii printed Moisei Markov's "On the nature of physical knowledge". Markov tried to defend Bohr as far as possible, changing only subjective-sounding words such as "disturbance" and "observer". He wrote that the physical reality of quantum theory includes an element of human activity and that the observer is physically a "macro-instrument". Sergei Vavilov supported him, but the ensuing discussion was fierce. Markov was criticised for dressing up the idealism of Heisenberg and Bohr as materialism, and one discussant said that quantum mechanics had no need of complementarity.
How did physicists answer?
Setting three answers side by side shows the breadth of this debate.
The first was to leave philosophy out. Lev Landau and Evgeny Lifshitz's textbook Quantum Mechanics (1948) treated the uncertainty relation fully but did not even name complementarity, spoke of the measuring device in place of the observer, and did not mention dialectical materialism. Kojevnikov reads this omission as a kind of defiance by the standards of the time. Pechenkin holds that what was actually used in the Soviet Union was the classical Copenhagen approach.
The second was the ensemble interpretation. In the revised 1949 edition of his textbook Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Dmitry Blokhintsev defined the wave function as describing not an individual particle but a collection of identically prepared systems, an ensemble. Measurement is a division of the collection into sub-collections, regardless of any observer's mind. In this way, he held, Lenin's criterion that nature exists independently of the observer is satisfied, and he concluded that from the point of view of dialectical materialism quantum mechanics is the most important development of atomism in the twentieth century. Kojevnikov judges that Blokhintsev's Marxism was not forced packaging but a conviction interiorised since his student days. In this period Blokhintsev was also in charge of developing the Soviet nuclear power station.
The third was to rewrite Copenhagen. Vladimir Fock was the leading representative of Soviet quantum theory, and had early opposed Nikolsky's statistical interpretation on the ground that quantum mechanics cannot be reduced to statistics. In 1951 he published "Critique of Bohr's views on quantum mechanics" in Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk. Criticising Bohr's views as rooted in positivism, he compared the state to a "tuning" of the object and explained it as something real, though determining it means disturbing it. In the 1957 article he wrote that attempts to refer the wave function to collections of particles misunderstand probability, and that probability is fixed by the internal properties of the individual object and external conditions. This is where he parts from the ensemble interpretation.
What passed between Fock and Bohr?
The 1951 article bore the title of a critique, but Fock's thought was more complicated. "On the interpretation of quantum mechanics" in Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk in 1957 sets out the position he reached. For him the novelty of quantum mechanics is threefold. The description is probabilistic, so "the potentially possible" must be distinguished from "the realised"; relativity to the means of observation must be taken into account; and a new understanding is needed by which the principle of causality applies directly to probabilities and not to individual events. Pechenkin stresses that Fock accepted complementarity as a "firmly established law of nature".
In this way he accepted relativity to the means of observation and treated potential possibilities as properties of an objective state. At the same time he stood against those who wished to return to the old determinism. Calling the hopes of Louis de Broglie's school groundless, he wrote: "He who tries in the name of materialism to deny new ideas and restore old ones does materialism a bad service."
Тот, кто пытается во имя материализма отрицать новые идеи и реставрировать старые, оказывает материализму плохую услугу.
This sentence holds the point of the debate for the theory of knowledge: materialism is not the defence of some particular picture in physics. Soviet authors, following "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", distinguished the advances of science from the philosophical labels attached to them. Yet where that distinction was to be drawn was just what was disputed.
And the hidden variables side?
There was a fourth branch too. Yakov Terletsky, a professor at Moscow University and member of its party bureau, attacked the Copenhagen interpretation and complementarity. He has often been remembered as an ideological watchdog and a supporter of Blokhintsev. But according to Andrea Battocchio's 2025 research presentation, his personal position was a realistic view of the wave function and a causal interpretation; through Vigier he met the de Broglie–Bohm theory, went to Paris and wrote articles with them, and also edited the Russian publication of Bohm's papers. Even after the Soviet mainstream had turned to supporting complementarity he publicly defended this interpretation.
Similar divisions existed among Western Marxists. As Kojevnikov sets out, Paul Langevin in France, Fock in the USSR and Mituo Taketani in Japan rewrote Copenhagen to bring it closer to materialism, Léon Rosenfeld defended Bohr, and David Bohm built an alternative. His thesis is that Marxism was a motive for several interpretations more than it imposed one. In other words, opposed physical interpretations came from the same philosophy. He holds further that the Soviet cultural milieu, believing in progress and rationality, produced different interpretive preferences from those of Weimar Germany.
How did it end, and what remains?
The majority of Soviet voices later shifted toward supporting complementarity. Pechenkin judges that the ensemble interpretation became a dead end for the development of interpretation in Russia. In 1956 Blokhintsev became the first director of the international nuclear institute at Dubna. His textbook also came out in German (1953).
Something remains on the philosophical side as well. Alexander Zinoviev in Logical Physics and elsewhere criticised the claim that the microworld needs a separate quantum logic, and turned many problems into problems of terminology. That the debate produced no official answer has meaning in itself. According to Kojevnikov the ideological authorities neither chose nor prescribed any particular interpretation but pressed physicists to engage with philosophy. This contrasts with "Lysenkoism" in Soviet genetics.
Judgements depend on one's standpoint. Cold War literature portrayed this debate as ideological interference. Kojevnikov holds that without just that political intervention the ensemble interpretation would have stayed buried in a few articles. The question for the theory of knowledge stays as it was. How can speaking of a world independent of observation stand together with the fact that physical quantities cannot be fixed without observation?