Theoretical practice (Althusser)
이론적 실천 (알튀세르)
A concept used by the French philosopher Louis Althusser in the early and mid-1960s, which treats scientific knowledge as a distinct practice that produces new knowledge by applying the means of a theory to a raw material of existing concepts. Knowledge, on this view, is not a subject abstracting the essence of an object but a transformation that takes place in thought, and philosophy should be the theory of this practice. From the late 1960s Althusser criticised this formula himself as "theoreticism" and redefined philosophy as "class struggle in theory".
In depth
What does science work on?
Old medicine explained why a person was listless and sluggish by an excess of "phlegm" in the body. Medicine today explains the same symptoms by pathogens carried in the blood or by endocrine disorders. How did this change happen? The usual answer is that doctors observed more patients, more accurately: gather enough facts and the truth reveals itself.
Louis Althusser thought this answer was wrong. Science does not start from raw facts. It always starts from existing concepts, words like "phlegm" or "unemployment", and these concepts are mixed with ideology. The work of science is the labour of applying the concepts of a theory, such as the theory of blood circulation and infection, to transform those concepts into scientific ones. Althusser called this labour "theoretical practice". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives the change from "phlegmatic humors" to the idea of blood-borne pathogens as its example.
What did Althusser argue?
In the 1960s Althusser led a rereading of Marx in and around the French Communist Party. In 1965 he published the essay collection For Marx, and in the same year Reading Capital together with his students. Underlying them was the epistemology of theoretical practice.
First, he held that the two main ways of reading Marx at the time, humanist Marxism and orthodox Marxism-Leninism, made the same mistake. Both were "empiricist", holding that a subject comes to know an object according to its essence through observation and abstraction. Empiricism here is meant broadly, taking in not only British empiricism but Locke, Kant and Hegel alike. For humanism the free human subject, for orthodoxy the objective gaze of the proletariat, is the place where truth is grasped.
Second, he used the metaphor of production. Alongside economic production, political practice and ideological practice, society has theoretical practice. It consists of a raw material (existing general concepts), means of production (the conceptual system of a science's theory) and a product (scientific knowledge). In Althusser's words as quoted by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the process transforms an "ideological generality into a scientific generality". This transformation takes place entirely in thought. Hence Althusser strictly distinguished the "object of knowledge" from the "real object".
Third, this also fixed the place of philosophy. For him most "philosophy" is ideological production that repeats, in abstract form, ideas that sustain existing social relations. Genuine philosophy, as the "Theory of theoretical practice", separates ideological from scientific concepts within the sciences and clarifies scientific concepts. He held that Marx, too, produced scientific knowledge when writing Capital without being fully conscious of what his concepts were.
How does it connect with the epistemological break?
Theoretical practice is the counterpart of the "Epistemological break". Althusser named three great transformations in which ideological concepts were replaced by scientific ones: Galileo's modern physics, Greek mathematics, and Marx's founding of the science of historical materialism out of classical political economy. The turning point is the epistemological break. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy points out that Althusser drew the idea from the French philosophers of science Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, which is also why it resembles Thomas Kuhn's notions of normal science and scientific revolution.
This epistemology clashed sharply with other currents in Marxism. Althusser criticised theoretical humanism and historicism as ideological deviations within Marxism. Seen from Lukács's History and Class Consciousness and from Gramsci's "absolute historicism", the "Philosophy of praxis", the claim that knowledge is produced only in thought cut the unity of practice and knowledge. Seen from Althusser's side, conversely, handing truth over to a subject of history or to the gaze of a class was itself empiricism.
What criticisms came, and what did Althusser change?
The criticism took several lines. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the leadership of the French Communist Party objected that Althusser's reading said little about the relation between Marxist theory and political practice. Critics, among them his former students, argued that the very attempt to establish a definitive epistemological criterion separating science from ideology was untenable: strictly separating the real object from the object of knowledge removes any way of validating knowledge claims about reality. The English historian E. P. Thompson, in The Poverty of Theory (1978), attacked Althusserianism as a new idealism that imposes a ready-made schema on the real flow of history, and said that his dismissal of "experience" was a rejection of the historian's craft. For the dialectical materialism of the Soviet Union and East Germany, too, an epistemology that left "Reflection theory" and the "Criterion of practice" behind was hard to accept.
Althusser himself revised his views from the late 1960s, prompted by the events of May 1968, the Cultural Revolution in China and his students' criticisms. He admitted that his earlier definition of philosophy as the "theory of theoretical practice" had been "theoreticist" and "positivist", treating philosophy as a science above the other sciences that guarantees their truth. Instead he redefined philosophy as, in the last resort, "class struggle in the domain of theory". This self-criticism was set out in Elements of Self-Criticism (1974). French Wikipedia writes that, criticising this "theoreticist deviation", he turned to the study of Machiavelli in order to think politics anew.
What did the concept leave behind?
Theoretical practice is now rarely defended as it stood, but the questions it raised remain: the ideas that science is not the accumulation of observed facts but the labour of reworking concepts, and that theory has its own history and material conditions. Roy Bhaskar named Althusser among the influences on his early work, and the "transitive dimension" of "Critical realism (Bhaskar)", knowledge as something socially produced, overlaps with this concern. Several of Althusser's students abandoned the distinction between science and ideology altogether and moved on to post-structuralism.