Totalitarianism
전체주의
A term for a form of rule in which state power seeks to control politics, the economy, education, culture and private life through a single official ideology, and the concept in political science and history that groups such regimes together. The Italian anti-fascist Giovanni Amendola used it in 1923 to condemn Mussolini's regime, and the Fascists took it up as their own name; from the late 1930s it joined National Socialist Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, and in the Cold War it became a key word of Western political science and foreign policy. It has been disputed from the start. Critics have argued that it lumps together regimes with different aims on the strength of their outward techniques of rule, that it served Cold War anti-communism, and that it cannot explain change; defenders reply that comparison is not equation and that the word helps compare structures of rule.
In depth
Where did the word "totalitarianism" come from?
When someone says "that country is a totalitarian state", what does the word explain and what does it hide? Today it is usually used as the name for the worst kind of dictatorship. But the word has a clear date of birth, and over the following hundred years its meaning changed several times depending on who used it. This entry follows the history of the word and the criticism it has received as a concept. The scholarly dispute over how to write Soviet history is treated in the entry "Totalitarian and Revisionist schools".
The first person to use the word is usually taken to be the Italian liberal politician Giovanni Amendola. In 1923, in an article in Il Mondo, the newspaper of his political grouping, he called the Fascist regime that Benito Mussolini had just set up a "totalitarian system" (sistema totalitario) and defined it as "the promise of absolute domination and of complete and uncontrolled high-handedness in the field of political and administrative life" ("promessa del dominio assoluto e dello spadroneggiamento completo ed incontrollato nel campo della vita politica ed amministrativa").
At first the word was a warning and an accusation. Amendola himself was beaten by a Fascist squad and died of the after-effects in 1926. At the same time the Catholic People's Party led by Luigi Sturzo used the word to put Fascists and Communists in the same camp, on the grounds that both rejected parliamentary democracy. The idea of joining fascism and communism under one word thus existed almost from the moment the word was born.
Then the Fascists took the accusation as their own name. In a 1925 speech at La Scala in Milan, Mussolini summed up the state he wanted to build in the slogan "Everything within the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State" ("Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato").
The philosopher Giovanni Gentile used the word in a positive sense from about 1926. "The Doctrine of Fascism", published in 1932 under Mussolini's signature in the article "Fascism" of the Enciclopedia Italiana, was written in its first part by Gentile, who wrote there: "for the Fascist, everything is within the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, let alone has value, outside the State. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian" ("per il fascista tutto è nello Stato e nulla di umano e spirituale esiste e tantomeno ha valore fuori dallo Stato. In tal senso il fascismo è totalitario").
In Germany the right-wing constitutional lawyer Carl Schmitt spoke in 1931, in The Guardian of the Constitution, of a "total state" (totaler Staat) uniting state, society, culture and religion. Joseph Goebbels said in a 1933 speech that the party had always aspired to the totalitarian state, but Nazi ideologues on the whole used the word less and preferred the term Volksstaat ("people's state"). Of Italy, Germany and the USSR, only Fascist Italy made the word an official self-description; Nazi Germany used it to a lesser extent, and the USSR did not use it at all. This is the reverse of the later practice of totalitarianism theorists, who took the USSR as the prime example of the concept. Franco in Spain also called his regime "totalitarian" during the Civil War and stopped using the word in December 1942.
How did the left and the liberals use the word in the 1930s and 1940s?
In the interwar period the word was a term for criticising and analysing the dictatorships of the day. It was not yet understood as one side of a "liberal versus totalitarian" dichotomy or as the opposite of liberal democracy.
In the 1930s left-wing critics of Stalin's regime began to apply it to the Soviet Union. The first to do so was the left-wing writer Victor Serge, in a letter published in France shortly before his re-arrest in March 1933. Leon Trotsky used the word in The Revolution Betrayed (1936) to analyse the Soviet regime. Explaining how the hierarchy of party secretaries had come to rule over everything, he wrote (site translation from the Russian): "This regime had acquired a 'totalitarian' character several years before the word arrived from Germany." Elsewhere he traced its origin: "The historic role of the Stalin faction lay in abolishing this duality by subordinating the party to its own apparatus and merging the latter with the state apparatus. That is how the present totalitarian regime was created."
But Trotsky's usage differed from the later Cold War theory. Scholars argue that for him the word was a term of abuse, not a sociological concept equating fascism and socialism as it was for the Cold War theorists. It has also been said that he would have rejected the tendency to depict totalitarian societies as monolithic and unchanging, the anti-communist perspective, and the description of Lenin as a totalitarian dictator.
The Austrian writer Franz Borkenau is a case of someone who started on the Marxist side and moved to the anti-communist camp of the Cold War. In his 1936 biography of Vilfredo Pareto he offered an early theory of totalitarianism from a Marxist perspective; in The Communist International (1938) he wrote that the word united the Soviet and German dictatorships more than it divided them; and in The Totalitarian Enemy (1940) he compared National Socialism and Bolshevism. In the Cold War he was very active in the anti-communist Congress for Cultural Freedom.
The Frankfurt School used the word too. In "The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State", published in the Institute's journal in 1934, Herbert Marcuse dealt with fascism and put forward the thesis that liberalism "'produces' the total-authoritarian state out of itself: as its own consummation at a more advanced stage of development" ("den total-autoritären Staat aus sich selbst ‚erzeugt': als seine eigene Vollendung auf einer fortgeschrittenen Stufe der Entwicklung"). He saw the totalitarian state not as the opposite of liberalism but as what liberalism develops into.
Franz Neumann, in Behemoth (1942), called the Nazi economy "totalitarian monopoly capitalism", treating the Nazi regime as a form of capitalism. At the same time he portrayed Nazi Germany not as a well-ordered state but as "a Behemoth, a non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness, disorder, and anarchy". Enzo Traverso and Andrew Vincent later cite this description as evidence that the totalitarian model of a monolith controlled tightly from the top does not fit Nazi Germany either.
In November 1939 the American Philosophical Society held a first symposium on the "totalitarian state". In the same year, after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, it became accepted, at least until 1941, to present Stalin and Hitler as "twin dictators", Nazism as "brown Bolshevism" and Stalinism as "red fascism". When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 and the USSR became an ally, the concept was dropped for a time.
How did Arendt, Friedrich and Brzezinski build the concept?
The leading work that turned the word into a systematic theory after the war was Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). Arendt analysed Nazism and Stalinism as the main totalitarian movements of the first half of the twentieth century and saw them as a new form of government, not updated versions of old tyrannies. She took terror to be the decisive feature of a totalitarian system, together with the link to an ideology, the will to world domination and fanatical mass movements based on the leader principle. Yet she drew the boundaries narrowly. She counted only Nazism and Stalinism as totalitarian systems of rule, and regarded Mussolini's Fascism and the Soviet Union after Stalin's death and its "satellite states" as non-totalitarian dictatorships. Of Italian Fascism she wrote that even Mussolini, who was so fond of the term "totalitarian state", did not attempt to establish a full-fledged totalitarian regime and "contented himself with dictatorship and one-party rule". Her definition, the argument of the book and her warning about Cold War anti-communism are treated in detail in the section "The Origins of Totalitarianism and the unfinished study of Marx" of the Hannah Arendt card.
More widely used in political science was the model of Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, published in 1956 by Carl Joachim Friedrich and his student Zbigniew Brzezinski. They defined totalitarianism by six interlocking, mutually supporting features: an elaborate guiding ideology, a one-party state, state terror, a monopoly on the control of weapons, a monopoly on the control of mass media, and a centrally directed and controlled planned economy. This "totalitarian model" became a key paradigm of so-called Kremlinology, the study of Soviet leadership politics. The French sociologist Raymond Aron also set out five criteria in 1968: a one-party state, an official ideology, a monopoly on information, a state-controlled economy and ideological terror. In the 1950s Friedrich argued that communist states such as the Soviet Union and China were ruled through the features of the model. Communist states after Stalin, which Arendt had excluded from totalitarianism, were thus brought inside the model.
What did the word do in the Cold War?
On 12 March 1947, announcing the Truman Doctrine in a speech to Congress, Harry S. Truman used the word for the threat to the world's freedom: "The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will."
Asking for $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey, he said that the seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. In the United States of the 1950s, McCarthyite politicians claimed that left-wing totalitarianism was an existential threat to Western civilisation.
The concept also spread through Cold War cultural policy. In 1950 anti-communist intellectuals founded the Congress for Cultural Freedom in West Berlin; in 1966 former CIA agents confirmed that the CIA had been instrumental in its establishment and funding, and in 1967 the US magazine Ramparts and others reported the CIA's funding. According to the English Wikipedia's account, in Italy and France, where the Communist parties had played a leading role in the anti-fascist resistance, the totalitarianism theory of Arendt, Brzezinski and Friedrich was often ignored or not even translated, and it was the CIA-backed Congress for Cultural Freedom that promoted it there. There was conflict inside the Congress as well. When the draft founding declaration sought to declare that followers of any "totalitarian" ideology had no citizenship in the free republic of the spirit, A. J. Ayer and Hugh Trevor-Roper objected that this was an attempt to bring McCarthyism into the world of European intellectuals.
The official Soviet position was the opposite. In the Soviet Union totalitarianism was officially held to be a feature only of bourgeois states of the imperialist era, above all Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and applying the word to socialist states was called slander and anti-communist propaganda.
A leading example of the concept's use in Cold War diplomacy is Jeane Kirkpatrick's distinction. In her essay "Dictatorships and Double Standards", published in Commentary in November 1979, she contrasted traditional autocrats, who do not disturb the habitual rhythms of people's lives, with revolutionary communist regimes, which "claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society".
The essay led to her becoming an adviser to Ronald Reagan and then ambassador to the United Nations, and her distinction, by which the Soviet bloc was "totalitarian" while pro-Western dictatorships were merely "authoritarian", became known as the Kirkpatrick Doctrine. The doctrine was used to justify US support for anti-communist dictatorships in the Third World during the Cold War, and the Reagan administration gave varying degrees of support to military dictatorships in Guatemala (until 1985), the Philippines (until 1986) and Argentina (until 1983). Her prediction that totalitarian regimes were more stable than authoritarian ones and that the Soviet system would last for decades was criticised after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute replied that the traditional authoritarian regimes the United States supported had come to power by overthrowing democracies, and so posed the more lethal threat to functioning democracies.
What criticisms has the concept met?
That it lumps different things together
The oldest criticism is that the concept groups regimes with entirely different aims and content on the strength of their outward appearance. Socialist historians called totalitarianism theory a "totalitarianism doctrine" and criticised it as an ideological construct of the Cold War meant to defame the countries of actually existing socialism. In their view the concept ignores the aims and content of political systems and the motives of the actors and looks only at outward forms such as repression and persecution. Shared features such as a single party, a vast apparatus of power, a monopoly of communication, a leader cult and terror are not enough, they argue, to call governments of different ideologies totalitarian. Critics in the same line argue as follows. Marxism–Leninism proclaimed the building of socialism and the abolition of class division as its aim, while fascism denied social equality and Nazism demanded the extermination of "inferior" races. Totalitarianism theory does not take this difference of aims into account, and so amounts to an attempt to discredit socialism by likening it to Nazism. Revisionist historians, too, opposed the equation of Nazism and communism and stressed the humanist and egalitarian origins of communist ideology.
The Italian Marxist philosopher Domenico Losurdo pushed this criticism further philosophically. He held that totalitarianism is a polysemic concept with roots in Christian theology, and that applying it to politics requires an operation of "abstract schematism" that uses elements isolated from historical reality to place fascist regimes and the Soviet Union side by side. The concept thus served the anti-communism of Cold War intellectuals rather than intellectual inquiry. He distinguished the Nazi extermination camps, where there was an explicit will to kill, from the Gulag, presented as re-education through labour, where there was not. Taking up what Arendt herself had said in The Origins of Totalitarianism, he argued that the true original sin of the twentieth century lay in the colonial empires of the late nineteenth century, where totalitarianism and the world of the camps first appeared. He located the first appearance of totalitarianism in colonial empire.
That it is Cold War ideology
Michael Parenti (1997) and James Petras (1999) argued that the concept of totalitarianism was employed politically, for anti-communist purposes. Petras held that the CIA funded the Congress for Cultural Freedom to attack "Stalinist anti-totalitarianism". In Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (2001), Slavoj Žižek compared the concept to a green-tea advertisement that promises to neutralise harmful "free radicals" and called it, ironically, an "ideological antioxidant". For him the notion of "totalitarianism" is not an effective theoretical concept but a stopgap: instead of helping us to a new insight into historical reality, "it relieves us of the duty to think, or even actively prevents us from thinking".
Some turned the word back on the West. In One-Dimensional Man (1964), Marcuse argued that the advanced industrial society of the West, though it claims to be democratic, is in fact totalitarian, because technological rationality has imposed itself on every aspect of culture and public life. In Totalitarian Space and the Destruction of Aura (2019), Saladdin Ahmed wrote of Pinochet's Chile, which falls outside Friedrich and Brzezinski's criteria because it had no official ideology, that it would be absurd to exempt it from the class of totalitarian regimes for that reason. He criticised the concept for being applied only to "opposing ideologies" and never to liberalism.
That it cannot explain change
Criticism from the social sciences centred on the model being static. When Khrushchev's Thaw began, the theory fell into a serious crisis because it could not explain how the regime loosened from within. Sovietologists of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Robert Tucker, Stephen Cohen, Moshe Lewin and others) argued that "totalitarianism" was too narrow a concept for understanding the specifics of Soviet history and proposed replacing it with "Stalinism". In a 1980 review the scholar of authoritarianism William Zimmerman wrote: "We have come to realize that models which were, in effect, offshoots of totalitarian models do not provide good approximations of post–Stalinist reality." When the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of the 1980s and the start of the 1990s, the claim that totalitarian regimes cannot themselves initiate radical reform was also shown to be wrong.
What history from below showed
From the 1970s the so-called revisionist historians of social history questioned the picture of control from above as such. The course of that debate is treated in the entry "Totalitarian and Revisionist schools"; here only the points about the concept are noted. Sheila Fitzpatrick judged that totalitarian-model scholarship "was in effect a mirror image of the Soviet self-representation, but with the moral signs reversed (instead of the party being always right, it was always wrong)." J. Arch Getty, working on the Smolensk Archive, wrote of a "technically weak and politically divided party whose organizational relationships seem more primitive than totalitarian". In 1999 the sociologists Randall Collins and David Waller grouped the concept of totalitarianism among the "theories that were completely wrong". Eric Hobsbawm, too, wrote that although Stalin wanted total control of the population he did not establish an actual totalitarian system, which "throws considerable doubt on the usefulness of the term."
Similar criticism came from historians of Nazi Germany. In the 1970s the German functionalist school described the Nazi regime as a "polycratic" system of several entangled centres of power: the party, the army, the economic elites and the state bureaucracy. Hans Mommsen and Ian Kershaw stressed the bureaucratic incoherence of the Nazi system and were critical of the concept of totalitarianism. Mommsen called it "a descriptive concept, not a theory" with "little or no explanatory power".
What did the Historians' Dispute and the memory politics of "two totalitarianisms" leave behind?
The political weight of the concept showed in the West German Historians' Dispute (Historikerstreit) of 1986–1987. On 6 June 1986 Ernst Nolte published "The Past That Will Not Pass" in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, presenting the Holocaust, in the form of rhetorical questions, as the Nazis' reaction to the preceding mass crimes of Stalin's purges and the Gulag system. He suggested that a "causal nexus" probably linked the Bolshevik and Nazi mass murders. On 11 July 1986 the philosopher Jürgen Habermas replied in the weekly Die Zeit with "A Kind of Settlement of Damages", criticising "the apologetic tendencies in German contemporary historiography" (its subtitle) in essays by Michael Stürmer, Andreas Hillgruber, Klaus Hildebrand and above all Nolte. In the dispute Karl Dietrich Bracher complained that the totalitarianism thesis had been made taboo, and Bracher and Richard Löwenthal argued for a compromise: comparing different totalitarian systems was a valid intellectual exercise, but the Holocaust should not be compared to other genocides.
Critics of the concept saw its danger in this dispute. In their view, comparing the structure and practice of Stalinism and National Socialism inevitably leads to relativisation, makes the Holocaust one crime among others, and obscures the antisemitic core of Auschwitz. In the 1990s this current continued in other forms. The French historian François Furet called Nazism and Stalinism "totalitarian twins" in 1995, and Nolte portrayed the clash of the two totalitarianisms as a "European Civil War" begun by Bolshevism, which produced Nazism as an "inverted Bolshevism". In 1997 came The Black Book of Communism, edited by Stéphane Courtois. Hobsbawm judged that Furet's work "reads like a belated product of the Cold War era". Enzo Traverso, Arno J. Mayer and Losurdo accepted the frame of a "European Civil War" but dated its beginning to 1914 and interpreted it otherwise than as a struggle between two totalitarianisms.
From the 2000s the concept entered the official memory politics of Europe. The Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism, signed on 3 June 2008 at the end of a conference initiated by the Czech government by Václav Havel, Joachim Gauck and others, drew heavily on the theory of totalitarianism and called for an all-European understanding that "both the Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes [...] should be considered to be the main disasters, which blighted the 20th century".
On 23 September 2008, 409 members of the European Parliament signed a declaration proclaiming 23 August the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. The Parliament then adopted on 2 April 2009, by 533 votes to 44 with 33 abstentions, a resolution on "European conscience and totalitarianism" calling for 23 August to be observed as the Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism (see the entry "Black Ribbon Day"), and on 19 September 2019, by 535 votes to 66 with 52 abstentions, a resolution on "the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe". The 2019 resolution stated that the Nazi and communist regimes had carried out mass murders, genocide and deportations on a scale unseen in human history, and condemned the Russian leadership for whitewashing the crimes of the Soviet totalitarian regime. It is considered part of the emergence of an anti-communist political culture in the European Union.
This memory politics drew opposition from several directions. Vladimir Putin called the 2019 resolution "absolutely unacceptable". Efraim Zuroff of the Simon Wiesenthal Center called the Prague Declaration "the main manifesto of the false equivalency movement", and the Seventy Years Declaration, signed by 70 parliamentarians in January 2012, rejected "attempts to obfuscate the Holocaust by diminishing its uniqueness and deeming it to be equal, similar or equivalent to Communism as suggested by the 2008 Prague Declaration." The Communist Party of Greece and the Communist Party of Britain also opposed the declaration. Some scholars have criticised the Eastern European "double genocide" theory as a form of Holocaust trivialisation. The American ethnographer Kristen Ghodsee interpreted the push, during the 2008 financial crisis, to institutionalise the commemoration of the victims of communism as a response by economic and political elites to fears of a leftist resurgence amid devastated economies and extreme inequality.
What do the concept's defenders answer?
Defenders of the concept reply as follows. The historical uniqueness of Nazi crimes does not mean that political structures and practices may not be compared, and comparing systems and their crimes is not equating them. Whatever the differences of ideology and of the number of victims, research on totalitarianism has advanced knowledge of the structures and mechanisms of rule of totalitarian dictatorships. They also argue that condemning the concept as a Cold War construct overlooks that its terms and basic claims had already been formed in the late 1930s. The historian Stanley Payne held that "totalitarianism is both valid and useful if defined in the precise and literal sense of a state system that attempts to exercise direct control over all significant aspects of all major national institutions."
Others accept the criticism while keeping the word. In 2010 the historian John Connelly held that the 1950s "theory" is defunct among scholars but the word is still useful. Asking "Who are we to tell Václav Havel or Adam Michnik that they were fooling themselves when they perceived their rulers as totalitarian?", he wrote: "Problems arise when people confuse the useful descriptive term with the old 'theory' from the 1950s."
Mommsen, too, granted that the concept "allows comparative analysis of a number of techniques and instruments of domination, and this, too, must be seen as legitimate in itself". In 2017 Traverso called the term "both useless and irreplaceable" for political science and history. Beyond being a Western banner, he argued, it stores the memory of a century that experienced Auschwitz and Kolyma, and therein lies a legitimacy that needs no academic recognition.
In sum, "totalitarianism" was born as an anti-fascist accusation, became the Fascists' name for themselves, passed through use as a term of abuse by left critics of Stalin's regime, became a term of Cold War diplomacy and a political-science model, and has today found a place in Europe's official memory politics. At each stage it was disputed which regimes belong in the category and which do not.
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Sources
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