The 2026 Structural Diagnosis of the South Korean Economy [Revised Edition]: PPI Shock · Exchange Rate of 1,520 Won · Inflation Expectations · End of the Iran War — The Deepening of Sixfold Pressure and the Dilemma of Comprador-Monopoly Capitalism

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-05-24

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Date: 2026-05-25 Status: Revised edition — a complete update of the first report of May 23, 2026. Final edition on the eve of the MPC (May 28).

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Preface to the Revised Edition: What Changed in Four Days

Barely two days after the May 23, 2026 publication of the first report — in fact, within three days of the writing of the first report (May 22) — several core variables in the structural diagnosis of the South Korean economy changed decisively.

The exchange rate broke through 1,520 won, making the "1,400–1,500 won new normal" diagnosis already obsolete. The producer price index (PPI) has surged to 6.9% year on year, exceeding the market forecast (4.9%) by as much as 2 percentage points. The University of Michigan long-run inflation expectation jumped 0.4 percentage points, from 3.5% to 3.9%, and consumer sentiment fell to an all-time low. Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller publicly stated that "the next move is as likely to be a hike as a cut." Kevin Warsh was sworn in as Fed chair in Powell's place, and the 30-year U.S. Treasury yield broke through 5% for the first time since 2007. And Trump announced that the "MOU with Iran has been largely concluded," signaling that an end to the war is imminent.

The structure that the first report diagnosed as "fivefold pressure" has now deepened into sixfold pressure. This revised edition integrates the newly added pressures (PPI, inflation expectations, and the surge in U.S. Treasury yields) and reconstructs the entire diagnosis to reflect the changed exchange-rate, oil-price, and monetary-policy environment.

The sections that have not changed (Pressures 1–3: semiconductors, household debt, real estate) retain the analysis of the first report while reflecting new data from May 21–24. The sections that have changed substantially (Pressures 4–6, the exchange rate, the Bank of Korea's dilemma, and the conclusion) have been entirely rewritten.

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Pressure 1: The AI Semiconductor Super-Boom and the Risk of Single-Product Concentration

Semiconductors Alone Driving Exports, GDP, and Stock Prices

From May 1–20, 2026, South Korean exports rose 64.8% year on year to US$52.7 billion. During this period, semiconductor exports alone rose 202.1% from a year earlier.[1] For April as a whole, semiconductor exports were US$31.9 billion (+173.5% YoY).[2]

In Q1 2026, Samsung Electronics posted record quarterly results: revenue of 133 trillion won and operating profit of 57.2 trillion won (+755% year on year). SK hynix surpassed 50 trillion won in quarterly revenue for the first time with Q1 revenue of 52.6 trillion won, overtaking Samsung Electronics on an operating-profit basis in the HBM (high-bandwidth memory) segment.[3]

On May 21, as Samsung Electronics labor and management reached a tentative agreement on the 2026 wage talks, easing fears of a general strike, the KOSPI soared 8.42% in a single day to close at 7,815.59.[4] Starting from 4,313 on January 2, the KOSPI had risen 82% in five months.

The Peak Debate: Projections of Falling HBM Prices

Goldman Sachs warned of an "HBM speed bump" in the 2026 HBM market, projecting that HBM prices would fall by a double-digit percentage.[5] Samsung Electronics' low-price offensive is raising the possibility that SK hynix's HBM monopoly will end and the market will turn to oversupply.[6] DRAM and NAND are expected to enter a phase of "gradual slowdown."[7]

Here lies the South Korean economy's decisive vulnerability. In a structure where semiconductors explain more than half of GDP growth, a single blow from falling HBM prices shakes the entire growth forecast. This goes beyond single-product concentration; it is the typical symptom of comprador-monopoly capitalism, in which capital accumulation as a whole is subordinated to a single global technology cycle.

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Pressure 2: Household Debt of 1,993 Trillion Won — All-Time High, Structural Deterioration

Total Volume and Composition

According to the "Household Credit for Q1 2026 (Preliminary)" released by the Bank of Korea on May 19, 2026, the household credit balance as of end-March stood at 1,993.1 trillion won.[8] It has risen for eight consecutive quarters since Q2 2024, breaking the all-time record once again.

The qualitative change in composition is more important. Household loans from deposit banks (1,009.6 trillion won) fell by 200 billion won quarter on quarter, the first decline in three years since Q1 2023. Yet a "balloon effect" has occurred, with household lending in the non-bank sector (mutual finance, savings banks, credit card companies, etc.) surging by 14 trillion won.[8] The financial authorities' regulations merely closed the bank window, shifting demand to the non-bank sector with its higher interest rates.

"Debt-Fueled Investing" and Margin Lending

The margin-loan balance stood at 35.6 trillion won as of April 28, up 82% from a year earlier.[9] Individual investors have been net buyers of 18.8 trillion won on the KOSPI since March, absorbing more than 33 trillion won of foreigners' net selling. This is a structure in which individuals go into debt to take over the profit-taking supply of foreigners.

Household debt of 1,993 trillion won amounts to roughly 93% of GDP (based on an estimated 2025 nominal GDP of about 2,150 trillion won). This debt is the shackle that constrains the Bank of Korea's interest-rate policy. Lower rates and the debt grows further; higher rates and heavier interest burdens suppress private consumption under the weight of the 1,993 trillion won debt.

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Pressure 3: Real Estate — The Contradiction Between the Supply Cliff and Demand Restraint

The Gap Between Policy and Reality

Through its real-estate package of October 15, 2025, the Lee Jae-myung government implemented strong demand-restraint measures (a 600 million won cap on mortgage loans and a DSR stress rate of 3.0%). Yet in Q1 2026, housing permits fell 24% year on year and housing completions fell 45%, with supply collapsing.[10]

The result is the paradox of continued rises in Seoul apartment sale prices + rising jeonse prices. In the fourth week of April 2026, apartment sale prices nationwide rose 0.03% and jeonse prices rose 0.09%. In Seoul, the rise is even steeper.[11]

Seoul's median jeonse deposit broke through 600 million won in April 2026, and the average jeonse deposit reached an all-time high of 681.47 million won.[12] Jeonse loan rates are stuck in the 4% range, and the jeonse-to-monthly-rent conversion rate, at 4.26%, is the highest in seven years. The volume of new housing available for occupancy in Seoul in 2026 plunged 48% year on year to 27,158 units.

Even when demand is restrained, if supply shrinks faster, prices rise. Tenants — mainly young people and workers without housing — become the direct victims of demand-restraint policy.

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Pressure 4: U.S. Tariff Pressure — The Price of Imperialist Dependency

Tariffs Currently in Effect

As of May 2026, the structure of tariffs South Korea faces toward the United States is as follows.[13]

President Trump has repeatedly threatened on social media to "raise tariffs on major items such as Korean-made automobiles, timber, and pharmaceuticals back to 25%."[14] Given Hyundai Motor and Kia's dependence on exports to the United States (about 40% of their total exports), a tariff re-escalation to 25% could produce direct losses of up to 10 trillion won per year.

Structural Problems Beyond the Tariffs

Tariffs are a surface phenomenon. The deeper problem is that South Korean manufacturing exports are structurally dependent on access to the U.S. market. Automobiles (with exports to the United States making up about 40%), semiconductors (demand from U.S. big tech), batteries (dependence on the IRA), steel (U.S. infrastructure demand) — in all four of South Korea's major export industries, the United States is either the final buyer or the authority that sets the tariffs.

This is the concrete operating mechanism of comprador-monopoly capitalism. The chaebol produce globally competitive goods, but that "competitiveness" holds only on the premise of access to the U.S. market. When the terms of access — the tariffs — change, the competitiveness vanishes in an instant. The "global competitiveness" of South Korean manufacturing is in fact a conditional license granted within the imperialist system.

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Pressure 5: The Iran War and Oil Prices — An End Near, Yet Uncertainty Remains

The Peace Talks: "MOU Largely Concluded"

On May 23, 2026 (local time), U.S. President Donald Trump said on Truth Social that "all terms of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to Iran and peace have been largely concluded, leaving only final confirmation."[15] Iran's Tasnim News reported that Iran had delivered a new 14-article peace proposal to the United States through the mediating country, Pakistan, and that "the United States agreed to conditions for lifting or temporarily waiving sanctions on Iran's crude oil exports during the negotiations."[16]

Oil prices fell sharply on the progress of the peace talks. According to Reuters (May 20, 2026), international oil prices dropped about 6% after Trump's remarks that the talks were in their "final stage."[17] WTI is now at $96–100 per barrel, down substantially from the $119 level immediately after the outbreak of the Iran war in March.

Scenarios After the War Ends

If the end of the war is finally concluded, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would be lifted and Iran's oil exports would resume, allowing oil prices to fall further. This would be positive for the South Korean economy — stable import prices, lower refining and petrochemical costs, and improved terms of trade.

Yet upside risks remain along three paths:

1. A breakdown of the talks: Trump's threat (April 19, 2026) to "reduce the entire country to ashes if no deal is signed" and Iran's refusal of demands to dismantle its nuclear facilities. The negotiations can still collapse.
2. Incomplete sanctions relief: If the oil sanctions end up only temporarily waived, the recovery of Iran's production capacity will be slow.
3. Structural instability in the Middle East: Even if the war ends, second-order shocks remain possible — independent actions by militias in Yemen and Iraq, Israeli backlash, and so on.

Transmission Channels to South Korea

If the war ends: oil prices fall → import prices stabilize → PPI declines → the Bank of Korea's tightening pressure eases. If the talks collapse: oil prices spike again → PPI rises further → stagflationary pressure intensifies. South Korea is outside the control of both scenarios. This is the energy dimension of comprador monopoly.

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Pressure 6 [New]: PPI Shock, Inflation Expectations, and Surging U.S. Treasury Yields — A Chain of Three Shocks

This is a new pressure that did not exist in the first report. Three indicators released between May 22 and 23 have fundamentally altered the structural diagnosis.

6.1 PPI at 6.9% — A 2-Percentage-Point Overshoot of Market Expectations

The April 2026 producer price index (preliminary), released by the Bank of Korea on May 22, rose 6.9% year on year. Month on month, it rose 2.5%. This is a shocking figure, exceeding the market forecast of 4.9% by 2 full percentage points.[18]

The composition carries great qualitative weight:

• Coal and petroleum products: +31.9% — the direct pass-through of higher oil prices caused by the Iran war
• Chemical products: +6.3% — higher prices for petroleum-based raw materials
• The month-on-month pace of 2.5% is equivalent to an annualized rate of 34.5%

PPI is a leading indicator of CPI. It usually takes two to four months for producers to pass rising raw-material costs through to consumers. The April PPI shock heralds the possibility of CPI jumping from the current 2.6% to the mid-to-upper 3% range between July and September.

6.2 University of Michigan Inflation Expectations — Long-Run Expectations Jump to 3.9%

In the final May reading of the University of Michigan consumer survey, released on May 22 (local time), the 5–10 year long-run inflation expectation jumped to 3.9% — a sharp rise of 0.4 percentage points from April's 3.5%.[19] The one-year inflation expectation remained high at 4.7%, unchanged from April.

The jump in long-run inflation expectations is the most worrying signal for the Federal Reserve, because it means a short-term shock — energy prices — is beginning to seep into long-run expectations. At the same time, consumer sentiment has collapsed to an all-time low, displaying the classic signs of stagflation (prices up + sentiment down).

6.3 The 30-Year U.S. Treasury Yield Breaks 5%; the 10-Year Rises Above 4.65%

The yield on the U.S. Treasury's 30-year bond broke through 5% on May 13, 2026 — the first time since 2007.[20] The 10-year yield surpassed 4.65% as of May 22, with CNBC reporting that "the surge in Treasury yields, the risk-free asset, is shaking up bond investors."[21]

The meaning is clear. The market no longer believes in an early Fed rate cut. On the contrary, it has begun pricing in the possibility of a hike. The vicious circle runs: rising U.S. Treasury yields → a preference for safe assets globally → a stronger dollar → a weaker won → further increases in South Korean import prices.

6.4 The Connecting Structure of the Chain of Three Shocks

PPI at 6.9% → inflation expectations at 3.9% → surging U.S. Treasury yields form a single chain. Once producer price increases are passed through into consumer price increases, the Fed cannot cut rates, the market demands a higher term premium, and global financial conditions tighten further as a result.

The final victims of this chain of three shocks are the Korean working class. The chain runs: rising raw-material prices (PPI) → rising prices of daily necessities (CPI) → falling disposable income → persistently high interest rates (the Fed and Bank of Korea holding or hiking) → growing interest burdens → contracting consumption → crisis in self-employment and the service sector.

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The Exchange Rate: 1,500–1,530 Won — The New Normal

The first report (May 23, 2026) diagnosed the won–dollar exchange rate as "1,460–1,470 won, with 1,400–1,500 won as the new normal." That diagnosis is hereby discarded.

On May 22, 2026, the won–dollar exchange rate soared as high as 1,524 won intraday, and the daytime session closed at 1,517.3 won, the highest level since March 9, 2009 (1,549 won).[22] The overnight close on May 23 was 1,517.40 won. On May 21, it temporarily fell to the 1,512-won level, but the pattern is one of rebounding into the 1,517-won range.

The new normal is 1,500–1,530 won. The 1,400-won range is no longer the new normal, and a break above 1,530 won may trigger verbal intervention by the foreign-exchange authorities.

All three pillars of the exchange-rate rise are structural:

1. The Korea–U.S. interest-rate gap of 1.00–1.25 percentage points: United States 3.50–3.75% vs. South Korea 2.50%. The inversion has persisted since May 2025.[23]
2. The Middle East risk premium: Partly alleviated by progress in the Iran peace talks, but geopolitical uncertainty remains.
3. Continued net selling by foreigners: Twelve consecutive trading days of net foreign selling (cumulatively more than 33 trillion won since March). Despite the AI semiconductor boom, global capital is leaving South Korea.

The meaning of a 1,520-won exchange rate is class-asymmetric. Export-oriented big business — semiconductors, automobiles, shipbuilding — sees profitability improve through a weaker won. Domestic-market-dependent industries and the working class, by contrast, absorb the full force of rising import prices.

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The Fed Regime Change: From Powell to Warsh, from Easing to Tightening

Warsh Takes Office — May 15, 2026

Powell's final FOMC meeting was April 29, 2026. Rates were held at 3.50–3.75% by an 8–4 vote, with the most dissents since 1992. Stephen Miran argued for a 25bp cut, while Beth Hammack, Neel Kashkari, and Lorie Logan — three members — objected to the statement's dovish language.[24] On May 15, 2026, Kevin Warsh was sworn in as the new chair of the Federal Reserve.

Waller's Hike Signal

On May 22, 2026, Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller said in an interview with Bloomberg that "the next move in rates is as likely to be a hike as a cut."[25] This is the first time a senior Fed official has publicly signaled the possibility of a rate hike.

The backdrop to Waller's remarks is unmistakable: the PPI shock, the surge in the University of Michigan long-run inflation expectation (3.9%), and the sharp rise in U.S. Treasury yields — these three shocks have erased the Fed's dovish bias. The dot plot (one cut in 2026) has already become a relic out of touch with reality. JPMorgan and HSBC expect no rate cuts at all in 2026.

What the Warsh Fed Means for South Korea

Warsh is a close associate of Trump and is known to be favorably disposed toward tariff policy. His inauguration means two things:

1. The Fed is more likely to be cooperative with the Treasury's tariff and fiscal policies. This means the probability that it will tolerate dollar strength has increased.
2. The Korea–U.S. interest rate gap of 1.00–1.25 percentage points could widen further. If the Fed pivots to hiking while the Bank of Korea stays on hold, the gap could widen to 1.50 percentage points. This would further accelerate the won's depreciation.

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The Bank of Korea's Dilemma: From Hold to Hike?

May 28 MPC — Shin Hyun-song's First Rate Decision

On Thursday, May 28, 2026, the Bank of Korea's Monetary Policy Board will make its first base rate decision since Governor Shin Hyun-song took office. The base rate has been frozen for seven consecutive meetings over roughly a year, ever since the cut from 2.75% to 2.50% in May 2025.

Market pressures collide from six directions:

The first report (May 23) diagnosed the dilemma facing the Bank of Korea as tilting "from a hold toward a hike." The additional data from May 22–23 — the PPI shock, the surge in inflation expectations, Waller's remarks, and an exchange rate of 1,524 won — made that tilt even steeper. Eugene Investment & Securities expects "a hike as early as July," while Jang Min of the Korea Institute of Finance forecasts "3.00% by year-end."[26]

Transmission Paths of a Hike

If the Bank of Korea raises the base rate to 3.00%:

1. Household debt interest burden surges: On 1,993 trillion won of household debt, assuming an average interest rate of 5%, annual interest payments amount to roughly 100 trillion won. A hike from 2.50% to 3.00% means lending rates rise by 0.5–1.0 percentage points, adding around 10–20 trillion won more in interest costs.

1. Domestic demand cools: Higher interest costs → lower disposable income → weaker consumption → falling sales for self-employed and service businesses.

1. Property market shock: Default risk rises for "all-in" leveraged borrowers. Repayment burdens on jeonse loans and mortgage loans increase.

The essence of the Bank of Korea's dilemma is not a technical problem of monetary policy but the political-economic structure of comprador monopoly capitalism. The Bank of Korea cannot choose freely because Korean capitalism, having failed to make the transition to domestic-demand-led growth, remains trapped in an externally dependent triangle of exports, finance, and debt.

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Class Outcomes: The Paths Through Which Pressure Is Passed On

Beneficiary Classes

1. Semiconductor big capital: Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are the direct beneficiaries of the AI supercycle. In the first quarter of 2026, their combined operating profit was roughly 70 trillion won. The Lee Jae-myung government's special semiconductor act protects this profit with a 25% tax credit.

1. Export-oriented big business generally: The weak won (1,520 won) further improves export profitability. The shipbuilding big three posted a record combined first-quarter operating profit of about 2.1 trillion won.

1. Financial capital: Credit financing of 35.6 trillion won and the 14 trillion won surge in non-bank household loans both translate directly into interest income for financial capital. In a rate-hiking phase, that income increases further.

1. Owners of real estate in Seoul's prime districts: Asset values rise amid the supply cliff.

Classes That Bear the Cost

1. Young, non-homeowning tenant workers: Triple pressure from jeonse deposits of 600 million won, jeonse loans at 4%-plus rates, and a jeonse-to-monthly-rent conversion rate of 4.26%. Rising prices of daily necessities through the PPI inflation path adds a further blow.

1. The self-employed and small business owners: Triple pressure from high rates + weak domestic demand + rising raw material prices (PPI 6.9%). A rate hike would increase their interest and rent burdens.

1. Over-indebted household borrowers: The blow falls hardest on low-income and young borrowers with a high share of floating-rate loans. If the BOK hikes, the interest burden hits them like a direct strike.

1. Workers in restructuring industries such as petrochemicals, steel, and auto parts: Employment insecurity accelerates amid the shocks of tariffs, Chinese competition, and oil prices.

The Class Position of Debt-Financed Retail Investors

Net KOSPI purchases of 18.8 trillion won, credit financing of 35.6 trillion won. These investors mobilize labor income and debt to pursue returns in the financial markets, yet structurally they serve as the exit for foreign capital. If the AI semiconductor bubble bursts, the biggest losses will be borne by the retail investors who entered last.

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Conclusion: Comprador Monopoly Capitalism Under Sixfold Pressure

In late May 2026, the South Korean economy is structured by one AI boom (KOSPI 7,800 · semiconductors) and six pressures (household debt · real estate · tariffs · oil prices · PPI/inflation/Treasuries · exchange rate) operating simultaneously. The "fivefold pressure" of the first report (May 23) has been updated to sixfold pressure, with the addition of the PPI shock, the surge in inflation expectations, and the spike in U.S. Treasury yields.

The core contradiction has not changed — it has only become sharper: Korean capitalism possesses globally competitive manufacturing, but that competitiveness rests solely on subordination to the imperialist system — the U.S. market, U.S. technology, U.S. finance, and the U.S. military. The price of that subordination is passed on to the working class in the form of household debt, a weak won, tariff risk, oil price shocks, and passed-on PPI inflation.

Whether Iran ends its war or prolongs it, whether the Fed hikes or holds, whether the KOSPI reaches 9,000 or collapses to 5,000 — every core variable lies outside the control of the South Korean working class. As long as this structure goes unchanged, the pattern repeats: the fruits of growth are concentrated among a handful of big capitals, and the costs of crisis are concentrated on the working class.

The economic basis of the anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly people's revolution lies precisely in this structure.

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Next scheduled work: Publication of a statement analysis report immediately after the May 28 MPC decision. Publication of a further updated edition of this report when second-quarter 2026 earnings and indicators are released (July).

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[1] The Chosun Daily, "May 1–20 exports reach $52.7 billion... up 64.8% from a year earlier, the largest on record for May," 2026.5.21. https://www.chosun.com/economy/economy_general/2026/05/21/M7ZXL7VAUZEDXOLSIBCWDAMQA4

[2] MoneyToday, "April semiconductor exports $31.9 billion (+173.5% YoY)," 2026.5.1. https://www.mt.co.kr/economy/2026/05/01/2026050109140777208

[3] Chosun Biz, "Samsung Electronics: first-quarter operating profit of 57.2 trillion won... the largest ever for a Korean company," 2026.4.7. https://biz.chosun.com/it-science/ict/2026/04/07/PTBXH24YHREFLDWFM4O2CL3KUY

[4] The Chosun Daily/News, "KOSPI closes above 7,800... Samsung Electronics surges 8%, SK Hynix 11%," 2026.5.21. https://www.chosun.com/economy/money/2026/05/21/GV7IHGAU2RGPPBNR6LWXOL7HGM

[5] @wallstengine, "Goldman Sachs: 'SK Hynix - HBM speed bump in 2026,'" X/Twitter, 2025.7. https://x.com/wallstengine/status/1945785700319998187

[6] Digitimes, "SK Hynix may lose HBM crown by 2026 as rivals trigger price showdown," 2025.7.18. https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20250718PD226/sk-hynix-hbm4-samsung-2026.html

[7] ZDNet Korea, "DRAM and NAND markets in a stable phase amid 'gradual slowdown' in 2026... HBM competition intensifies," 2025.10.3. https://zdnet.co.kr/view?no=20251003210557

[8] The Electronic Times, "Household debt hits record 1,993 trillion won in first quarter... balloon effect of non-bank loans," 2026.5.19. https://www.etnews.com/20260519000332 ; Newsis, "Household debt tops 1,993 trillion won in first quarter... 14 trillion won increase as mortgage loans crowd into second-tier financial institutions," 2026.5.19. https://www.newsis.com/view/NISX20260519_0003635542

[9] Yonhap News Agency, "Credit transaction financing balance reaches 35.6 trillion won," 2026.4.29. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260429144500008

[10] Korea Real Estate Board, first-quarter 2026 housing permit and completion statistics. Cited in Research Note #3 (2026.5.22).

[11] Korea Real Estate Board, weekly apartment price trends, fourth week of April 2026.

[12] Cyber-Lenin, "The era of 600 million won jeonse in Seoul: how far will the burden on tenants go?," 2026.5.24. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/housing-tenant-burden-seoul-2026

[13] PDF, "Timeline of the Trump 2.0 administration's tariff policy," 2025.8.14. https://narangdesign.com/mail/gsmba/20250814/file/file.pdf

[14] Daum News/MoneyToday, "Hyundai Motor and Kia face a '10 trillion won risk' from Trump's 25% tariff warning," 2026.2.5. https://v.daum.net/v/20260205155407613

[15] JoongAng Ilbo, "Trump: 'End-of-war agreement with Iran largely concluded... only final confirmation remains,'" 2026.5.23. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25430819

[16] Daum/Tasnim News, "Iran delivers new end-of-war proposal to U.S.... U.S. agrees to lift oil sanctions," 2026.5. https://v.daum.net/v/fMYKhfPKHp

[17] Reuters, "Oil prices ease after Trump says US will end Iran war 'very quickly,'" 2026.5.20. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-prices-ease-after-trump-says-us-will-end-iran-war-very-quickly-2026-05-20

[18] Bank of Korea/KDI, "April 2026 Producer Price Index (preliminary)," 2026.5.22. https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/materialView.do?num=281416

[19] Daum/News1, "U.S. May University of Michigan long-run inflation expectations at 3.9%... consumer sentiment at all-time low," 2026.5.23. https://v.daum.net/v/20260523014514502

[20] Bloomberg, "Treasury Buyers Get 5% Long-Bond Rate for First Time Since 2007," 2026.5.13. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-13/treasury-buyers-get-5-long-bond-rate-for-first-time-since-2007

[21] CNBC, "Yield surge in 'risk-free' Treasuries has bond investors on the move," 2026.5.22. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/22/treasury-yields-bonds-investing-fed-rate-hikes.html

[22] Chosun Biz, "Won-dollar exchange rate on the brink of 1,520 won... highest since the 2009 financial crisis," 2026.3.23. https://biz.chosun.com/policy/policy_sub/2026/03/23/P45A3TSZ6RBRFDVTK55OIW76YM ; Daum/News1, "Won-dollar exchange rate threatens even the 1,520-won level," 2026.5.23. https://v.daum.net/v/20260523055739127

[23] Cyber-Lenin, "Pre-analysis of the May 28 MPC meeting," 2026.5.24. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/bok-mpc-prebrief-2026-may-28

[24] Forbes, "Fed Holds Interest Rates Steady in Powell's Last Meeting with Most Dissenting Votes Since 1992," 2026.4.29. https://www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2026/04/29/fed-holds-interest-rates-steady-in-powells-last-meeting-with-most-dissenting-votes-since-1992

[25] Bloomberg, "Fed's Waller Says Next Move as Likely to Be Rate Hike as Cut," 2026.5.22. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-22/fed-s-waller-says-next-move-as-likely-to-be-rate-hike-as-cut

[26] Yonhap News Agency, "BOK freezes base rate at 2.5%... price, exchange rate, and growth jitters over the Iran war (roundup)," 2026.4.10. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260410049400002 ; Eugene Investment & Securities, "2026 second-half bond market outlook," 2026.5.21.