Building an Alternative Economy, Session 3: When the Public Reclaims Ownership — Global Trends in Energy Democracy and Remunicipalisation

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-28

1. Beyond Nationalisation: Toward a New Imagination of 'Public Ownership'

In Session 2, we examined the cooperative model where workers directly own the means of production. This session deals with a different axis: the question of who owns and controls public-goods infrastructure like electricity, gas, and water.

Since the 1980s, the neoliberal wave has privatised public services across the globe. Thatcher's government in the UK handed electricity, gas, water, and railways to private hands; Latin American countries, under IMF structural adjustment conditions, transferred water and electricity to the private sector. Efficiency and competition were the stated goals, but the reality was rising tariffs, declining service quality, and the exclusion of vulnerable groups.

However, since the 2000s, a counter-current has emerged. Remunicipalisation — the movement to bring once-privatised public services back into public hands — is occurring in many parts of the world. This is not a simple return to nationalisation. It experiments with new forms of public ownership that combine local-level democratic control, citizen participation, and integration with cooperative models.

This session examines that trend along three axes: the UK's public energy company experiment, Germany's citizen energy cooperative boom and Hamburg's remunicipalisation, and Latin America's struggle for water remunicipalisation. All three cases provide concrete institutional experiences, conflicts, and outcomes that can be directly referenced in South Korea's alternative economy debates.

2. The UK: Great British Energy — The Return of a Public Energy Company, But...

2.1. The Birth and Design of GBE

In 2025, the UK Labour government established Great British Energy (GBE), a publicly owned clean energy investment company, through the Great British Energy Act. This marked the first time since Attlee's nationalisation of coal and steel in the 1940s that a state-led public company had emerged in the fuel and energy sector.

GBE's five-year strategy (2026–) sets out the following goals:

  • Secure 15 GW of clean energy generation and storage capacity
  • Supply electricity to 10 million households
  • Attract £15 billion (approx. 27 trillion KRW) in private capital

As its slogan "Clean, Secure, Yours" indicates, GBE makes public ownership a core part of its identity. Yet its operating model differs fundamentally from past nationalisation. GBE's mission is not to crowd out private capital but to act as a 'catalyst to unlock private capital'. Instead of a public entity directly owning and operating everything, it is a hybrid model that leverages government funds to draw in private investment.

2.2. The Local Power Plan — A New Possibility for Local Energy Democracy

In February 2026, GBE launched the Local Power Plan (LPP). This programme is hailed as the largest-ever public investment in local and community energy in UK history.

Key elements include:

  • Total investment of £1 billion (approx. 1.8 trillion KRW) in local and community clean energy
  • Installation of solar PV on local libraries, public leisure centres, social welfare facilities, etc.
  • Implementation through contracts with local authorities (Combined Authority, Mayoral Authority)
  • Pursuit of both energy cost reduction and local job creation

Dan McGrail, GBE interim CEO, explains the philosophy of the LPP: "Complement, not compete." It is a partnership model where local authorities take the lead and GBE provides financial and technical support.

2.3. What Are the Advances and What Are the Limitations?

GBE and the LPP represent clear progress. During 40 years of neoliberalism, 'public ownership' was nearly taboo in UK political mainstream. Breaking that discourse and establishing a public energy company is itself a political achievement. The LPP's £1 billion community energy investment provides concrete numerical support for the local energy transition.

But there are points for sober assessment.

First, the substance of public ownership is problematic. GBE is designed as a private capital-dependent model. Even if ownership lies with the public, if actual investment decisions and profit distribution are governed by the logic of private financial capital, publicness may remain formalistic. Compared to the 1940s nationalisation, which had a clear political orientation of 'state control for the people', GBE's 'public ownership' is closer to a depoliticised technocratic publicness.

Second, there is a lack of democratic control. The avenues for substantive participation by local residents or workers in GBE's decision-making structure are weak. Contracts with local governments represent an administrative partnership, not democratic energy governance. It is qualitatively different from the model of direct citizen ownership and operation seen in Germany's citizen energy cooperatives.

Third, there is internal tension within the Labour Party. GBE is a compromise between the Labour left, which demanded a 'fully publicly owned energy company', and the market-friendly party mainstream. Depending on future political terrain, GBE's identity could be severely shaken.

Nevertheless, GBE raises an important question: what form can 'public ownership' take in a capitalist democratic state? What is 21st-century public ownership, as opposed to 20th-century nationalisation? One key to answering that question lies in Germany's citizen energy movement.

3. Germany: Energy in Citizens' Hands — A Land of a Thousand Cooperatives

3.1. Explosive Growth of Energy Cooperatives

Germany's energy cooperatives (Energiegenossenschaften) are considered the world's most successful example of citizen-owned renewable energy. According to a 2024 survey by the German Cooperative Association (DGRV):

  • 1,038 energy cooperatives have been established since 2006
  • Approximately 220,000 members
  • Total capital invested in renewable energy: €3.6 billion (approx. 5.4 trillion KRW)
  • Currently about 880 citizen energy cooperatives are active

These numbers indicate more than just scale. They mean that an ecosystem has developed over 20 years in which German citizens pool money, install wind turbines and solar panels, generate and sell electricity for profit, and reinvest that profit locally.

The Münsterland region in North Rhine-Westphalia is a microcosm of this ecosystem. Residents operate 11 village solar plants, 5 wind turbines, and 3 biogas facilities as cooperatives. Annual revenue is approximately €6 million (approx. 90 billion KRW), which is reinvested in local public facilities or village common funds.

3.2. The Institutional Conditions That Enabled Success: The EEG

No discussion of Germany's energy cooperative success is complete without the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). Introduced in 2000, the core of this law is the Feed-in Tariff (FIT), which mandates a fixed price purchase of electricity generated from renewables for 20 years.

The FIT was decisively favourable for energy cooperatives for a simple reason. Small-scale investors and citizens could participate with just a few solar panels or a single wind turbine. With a guaranteed fixed price for 20 years, bank loans were accessible. Predictable revenue and low entry barriers sparked explosive citizen participation.

This was combined with Germany's unique institutional foundations: cooperative legislation, regionally rooted financing from local savings banks (Sparkassen), and active provision of idle public land by local governments. The German case clearly shows that energy democracy is not realised by citizen will alone, but is the product of institutional conditions that enable it.

3.3. When the System Changed, Citizen Space Disappeared: The Paradox of the EEG Amendment

But then the system changed. The most important lesson from the German case lies here.

The 2014 EEG amendment converted the feed-in tariff (FIT) into an auction system. The government set renewable energy capacity targets, and project developers bid on price; the lowest bid won the right to build.

On the surface, this was meant to increase market efficiency. But the result was devastating. Large energy companies gained an overwhelming advantage in price competition, and new entry by small citizen energy cooperatives plummeted. Complex bidding documents and legal advice became necessary, creating entry barriers beyond the capacity of small cooperatives.

A partial exemption for citizen energy cooperatives was introduced in the 2017 EEG amendment, but the fundamental reversal was not undone. The ecosystem of citizen participation, once broken, was not easily restored.

This is the core lesson of the German case. Energy democracy depends entirely on political conditions — laws and institutions. What enabled a thousand energy cooperatives was not German 'civic consciousness' but the FIT provision of the EEG. When the system changed, citizen space shrank in an instant. The enemy of energy democracy is not technical limitations but political power.

3.4. Hamburg — Citizens Vote to Reclaim the Energy Grid

Another landmark event in German energy democracy is the remunicipalisation of Hamburg's energy grid.

On 22 September 2013, citizens of Hamburg made a historic decision through a referendum. A citizens' initiative to fully remunicipalise the electricity, gas, and district heating distribution networks passed with 50.9% approval. This was a mandate to return the ownership of distribution grids held by large private energy companies (Vattenfall, E.ON, etc.) to citizens' hands.

This referendum was the result of years of preparation by the Hamburg citizens' group 'Our Hamburg-Our Grid (Unser Hamburg - Unser Netz)'. Facing the impending expiration of distribution grid operating contracts from 2011, citizens launched a signature campaign to block the city government's attempt to renew contracts with private firms and to push through public ownership. They succeeded in gaining a majority in the referendum.

Following the vote, the city of Hamburg gradually purchased the electricity, gas, and district heating distribution grids from Vattenfall and E.ON. Since 2019, the municipal company Hamburg Energie has been operating them integrally. According to a 2024 study by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), after remunicipalisation, the proportion of grid revenue reinvested locally increased, as did local employment.

What the Hamburg case shows is that direct political participation by citizens can be a decisive weapon to achieve public ownership. While GBE is public ownership from above, designed by the central government, Hamburg represents public ownership from below, through citizen initiative and referendum. Both are public ownership, but their democratic quality is entirely different.

4. Latin America: The People Who Reclaimed Water

4.1. Cochabamba, 2000 — The Memory of the Water War

Alongside energy, the other axis of remunicipalisation is water. Its starting point was the Bolivian city of Cochabamba.

In 1999, under pressure from the World Bank, the Bolivian government privatised Cochabamba's water services to Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the US corporation Bechtel. The company's first move was a massive increase in water tariffs. For some households, water bills reached one-third of their income. Even the rainwater harvesting structures traditionally used by peasants were incorporated into the company's ownership.

Citizens of Cochabamba took to the streets. The protests, which lasted from January to April 2000, were called the 'Water War', a broad resistance uniting peasants, workers, indigenous people, and the urban poor. Despite violent government repression and casualties, citizen resistance did not break. In April 2000, the Bolivian government cancelled the contract with Bechtel and returned water services to the public entity SEMAPA.

The Water War transcended mere opposition to privatisation; it became a global symbol of reclaiming democratic ownership of a public good through people's power. This experience spread a new concept of publicness around the world — not the outdated schema of 'public services naturally belong to the state', but 'the right of citizens to organise directly and control public goods'.

4.2. Uruguay, 2004 — Protecting Water in the Constitution

If Bolivia's Water War is a symbol of resistance, Uruguay is a model of institutionalisation.

On 31 October 2004, Uruguay enshrined the public ownership of water services in its constitution through a national referendum. The amended constitution stipulates:

  • Water supply and sanitation services can only be provided by public entities
  • The government must establish sustainable water resource management policies
  • Citizen participation in water resource management must be guaranteed
  • Water is a human right and cannot be subject to privatisation

This constitutional amendment is an unprecedented achievement globally. No other country has so firmly inscribed the right to water and public ownership into its constitutional text.

The background to the amendment was pressure to privatise Uruguay's water company during Argentina's 2002 economic crisis. In response, trade unions, environmental groups, and civil society formed the 'National Commission for Water and Life', gathered over 300,000 signatures required for a constitutional amendment, and pushed through the referendum. The Uruguayan case demonstrates the political power to make public ownership not a one-off policy but an institution so robust it is not easily reversible.

4.3. The Paradox of Buenos Aires — Reclaimed Then Lost Again

Buenos Aires, Argentina, offers a paradoxical case showing how fragile remunicipalisation can be.

In 1993, the water services of Buenos Aires were privatised under a 30-year contract to the consortium Aguas Argentinas, led by France's Suez. Promised investments were not fulfilled, and over 20% of the urban poor were excluded from water services.

In 2006, President Néstor Kirchner cancelled the contract with Suez and remunicipalised water services under the public enterprise AySA (Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos). Subsequently, AySA achieved considerable results in expanding pipe networks and stabilising tariffs.

However, in 2024, President Javier Milei pushed for the full privatisation of public services including AySA, declaring that "every state-owned enterprise in this country is up for sale." This was a 180-degree reversal. The public good reclaimed through remunicipalisation faced privatisation again in less than 20 years.

The Buenos Aires case offers a harsh lesson: Remunicipalisation is not a permanent victory. It can be reversed at any time when political power changes. What makes public ownership sustainable is law, institutions, and above all, the sustained political power of citizens to defend it.

4.4. Remunicipalisation in a Global Flow

The Transnational Institute (TNI) in the Netherlands has tracked remunicipalisation cases worldwide. According to TNI's data, from 2000 to 2024, remunicipalisation of public services — water, energy, waste, transport, etc. — has occurred in over 200 cities in more than 50 countries. These include major cities such as Accra (Ghana), Berlin (Germany), Budapest (Hungary), and Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia).

According to TNI's analysis, the main drivers of remunicipalisation are:

  • Citizen dissatisfaction with tariff increases and declining service quality
  • Failure of private operators to fulfil investment promises
  • Accumulated empirical evidence that public sector efficiency is not necessarily lower than private
  • Organised campaigns by civil society and trade unions

Remunicipalisation is no longer an isolated phenomenon. As the failures of neoliberal privatisation accumulate, a reconstruction of publicness is underway simultaneously across the globe. What matters is the direction of that reconstruction: a return to centralised nationalisation of the past, or a move toward new forms of public ownership that combine citizen participation and local control.

5. Questions for South Korea

5.1. Where Does Our Energy Democracy Stand?

Where does South Korea stand in terms of energy democracy? Frankly, in the early stages.

The 'Sunshine Income Village' model (covered in Session 1) is clearly a meaningful start. The model of villagers organising cooperatives to jointly own solar plants and share profits resembles a scaled-down version of German energy cooperatives. South Korea has its version of a FIT system through RECs (Renewable Energy Certificates), and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety announced expansion plans in 2026.

However, compared with Germany's 1,038 cooperatives and 220,000 members, South Korea's energy cooperatives are still in their infancy. The decisive difference lies in institutional stability. Germany's 2000 EEG FIT guaranteed a fixed price for 20 years, providing predictability for the cooperative ecosystem, whereas South Korea's REC system has high price volatility and low trust in policy continuity.

5.2. Is the Remunicipalisation Agenda Present in South Korea?

South Korea's electricity, gas, water, and railways are maintained through a system of state-owned enterprises like KEPCO, KOGAS, K-Water, and KORAIL. On the surface, they appear not to have been privatised. However, the reality is different.

The continuous 'advancement of public enterprises' and 'private sector opening' since the 1990s have gradually subordinated public services to market logic. The power generation sector has already seen substantial entry by private generators; gas direct importation has been opened to large corporations; railways have introduced a competitive system through the separation of Suseo High-Speed Railway (SR). Substantive privatisation is already well advanced, and pressure for full privatisation continues.

In South Korea, the remunicipalisation agenda has not yet sufficiently ignited as a political agenda. A movement like Hamburg's citizens reclaiming the distribution grid through a referendum is unfamiliar in South Korea. However, let us recall the lesson of Buenos Aires. The state-owned enterprise system is in a vulnerable state — it can be privatised at any time with a change in political power. The task is to organise citizens' power to defend it and develop it toward more democratic public ownership.

5.3. What Can Be Learned?

The experiences of the three regions examined in this session pose the following questions for South Korea's alternative economy debates:

First, the issue of institutional design. Germany's EEG FIT and the shift to auctions provide a stark lesson that institutional design determines the expansion or contraction of citizen participation. For South Korea's 'Sunshine Income Village' model to grow into a sustainable ecosystem, institutional support such as stabilising the REC system, regularising low-interest loans, and simplifying administrative procedures is essential.

Second, the separation of ownership and control. GBE is a case of public ownership without robust democratic control. Hamburg is a case where citizen voting exercised substantive control. Formal transfer of ownership alone is insufficient. Who makes decisions, how profits are distributed, and through what channels local residents participate determine the democratic quality of public ownership.

Third, the problem of political power. Remunicipalisation is not a project that can rely on the goodwill of a government. The fact that the public water utility bequeathed by Kirchner's government in Buenos Aires faced full privatisation under Milei's government starkly reveals the vulnerability of remunicipalisation achieved only through executive decision without institutional protection. Uruguay's entrenchment of water's publicness in the constitution demonstrates the importance of institutionalisation that withstands political change.

Fourth, the power of citizens. Cochabamba's Water War, Hamburg's referendum, and Uruguay's constitutional referendum were all events where citizen direct action changed the ownership of public goods. Public ownership is not an administrative domain but a political one, and the subject of that politics is organised citizens.

6. Toward Session 4

In Session 3, we examined global trends in energy democracy and remunicipalisation. The UK's GBE and Local Power Plan, Germany's thousand energy cooperatives and Hamburg's remunicipalisation, Latin America's water remunicipalisation struggles and their paradoxes — all point to one common conclusion:

Public ownership is not a technical problem but a problem of power. Under which institutions, by which actors, and in what way ownership is exercised depends on the configuration of political power. Therefore, designing an alternative economy is not merely about creating a 'good economic model'; it is inseparable from the question of how to form the political power that makes that model possible.

In Session 4, we extend this question into the digital realm. Platform cooperatives, data commons, open-source production — what forms can democratic ownership of the means of production take in the digital space newly created by 21st-century capitalism? We will examine concrete experiments such as apps owned by platform workers, citizen-controlled data infrastructure, and cooperative-style artificial intelligence.