Protecting Ships and Protecting Sea Routes

On November 10, the State Council passed a revised consent motion expanding the Cheonghae Unit's operational area from the Gulf of Aden to the southern tip of Duqm Port in Oman. From Duqm Port to the Strait of Hormuz is 650 kilometers as the crow flies. Troops increase from 320 to 395, and a P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, a 30-person explosive ordnance disposal team, unmanned minesweepers, unmanned submersibles, and remotely operated underwater vehicles go along. A new mission item was attached: support for restoring freedom of navigation on international maritime traffic routes.

Two sentences are needed to read this consent motion. One is the defense minister's statement. He said that the previous day at the National Assembly he had made clear the principle of non-involvement and non-interference in war. The other is an explanation from a defense ministry official. If the US-Iran war ends or the two countries sign a memorandum of understanding to create a so-called permissive environment, then our unmanned mine countermeasure forces, which have little accumulated knowledge and equipment operation experience, need to be deployed even as a preliminary preparation. The first sentence is the current principle and the second is post-war preparation. And the name of that preparation is freedom of navigation.

Why the name freedom of navigation is needed is the real issue this week. According to what the Wall Street Journal reported on October 20 citing data from ship tracker Kpler, Middle East crude oil shipments exceeded 24 million barrels per day, already surpassing the pre-war 23.3 million barrels. Crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz was 14 million barrels per day, 82 percent of the pre-war level. What sustains that flow is Saudi Arabia and the UAE's pipeline bypass, ship-to-ship transfers off the coast of Oman, shuttle operations that turn off location tracking signals and pass through dangerous sections, and US military air cover for shipping routes along the Omani coast. The route protecting waters where mines remain has already been created. Ships and crude oil pass over it. What is missing is not the route but South Korea's name from the list of countries that jointly guard the route. Not clearing mines now but being assigned a place to clear them in the future. That is what this consent motion demands of the National Assembly.

So the basis for opposition and the basis for support is not the crude oil price on the world market. Protecting South Korean merchant ships south of Oman and claiming a guaranteed route for those ships to pass are different things. The former is defense and the latter is camp registration. On September 18, the president said there would be no troop deployment involving or intervening in war, and in the same place added that minimal activity to protect the lives and safety of the people is necessary. This consent motion presupposes that both sentences are valid. The problem is that it judges for itself the conditions under which the principle applies. As long as the authority to determine when the permissive environment was established remains within the consent motion, the principle becomes not a condition but a sentence awaiting self-interpretation.

Relying on another report from the same day, there is one more thing to point out. Samsung Securities' semiconductor back-end process report drew a diagram of the path by which HBM encroaches on domestic back-end process facilities while general-purpose memory back-end processes are pushed overseas. The total investment of Samsung Electronics' Vietnam subsidiary is 4.08 billion dollars, and the environmental permit lists 712 burn-in testers and 332 testers. Hanamicro increases the monthly production capacity of its Bac Giang plant to 180 million units by the end of the year and 200 million units next year. However, at the reshoring forum on November 5, Nepes received a presidential citation for moving major production facilities from its Philippine site to Ochang. The same back-end process returns home in one company and leaves the country in another. What determines the direction is not tax support, special exceptions for special zones, or national plans. It is whether there is space to vacate for HBM lines in the country. While the Special Zones Act distributes 157 special exceptions by super-wide area units, the investment decisions to be distributed have already been made elsewhere.

We also already know what companies demand. In October, Samsung Electronics requested an international school, an eight-lane round-trip access road, and process reuse water at the location of its new business site, and among them, educational infrastructure was to be prepared using special exceptions of the Special Act on Integrated Special Cities. The logic of special zones, which was supposed to disperse concentration in the capital area, is split within it into each company's settlement conditions. The law distributes special exceptions by space, companies demand conditions as items, and whether those items are implemented remains a regional decision. This is also why the possibility is raised that the Special Zones Act can pass with labor provisions removed. If labor provisions are removed from the law, nothing remains, but settlement and infrastructure continue to be enforced outside the law.

On the 13th, the 8th working consultative body will put industrial safety and health and working hours and health rights on the agenda for the first time. The special committee's activity deadline is the end of January next year, and the government announced that day that it aims to designate at least one per each of the 5 poles and 3 special zones in the first half of next year. The day safety and working hours first come to the meeting room is the day the same agenda item is already on the voting schedule. Unless this order is reversed, whatever is agreed in the meeting, the law will pass with the sentences from before the agreement arrived.