Mao's designated successor and the military genius who won the Chinese Civil War, third among the Ten Marshals
Told that the public saw him as 'Mao's best student,' Lin Biao was pleased and said: 'I don't have any talent. What I know, I learned from Chairman Mao.'
Lin Biao was one of the Chinese Communist Party's most brilliant military commanders, who led the Liaoshen and Pingjin campaigns in Manchuria to annihilate the Kuomintang's main forces and marched the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. Ranked third among the Ten Marshals in 1955, he became Minister of National Defense and spearheaded Mao Zedong's personality cult while vigorously advancing the Cultural Revolution. In 1966 he was made the Party's sole Vice Chairman and Mao's designated successor, reaching the apex of power before falling out with Mao in the early 1970s. After a failed coup attempt, he died in a plane crash over Mongolia on 13 September 1971 while fleeing toward the Soviet Union.
Also known as: Lin Piao · Yurong · Yu Jung
Activities and affiliations
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1926–1927
Republic of China state institutionsNational Revolutionary Army officer (Northern Expedition)
Military command -
1927–1949
Chinese Communist revolutionary forces (before 1949)Red 1st Army Group, 115th Division and Northeast Field Army commander
Military command -
1954–1971
People’s Republic of China state institutionsVice Premier
Government and administration -
1958–1971
Political and party leadership
- CCP Vice Chairman and Politburo Standing Committee member1958–1971
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People’s Republic of China state institutionsMinister of National DefenceMain
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1925Entered Whampoa Military Academy; joined the CCP
- 1926–1927Rose to battalion commander in Ye Ting’s regiment on the Northern Expedition
- 1932Commander, 1st Red Army Corps
- 1937Commander of the 115th Division; victory in the Pingxingguan ambush
- 1945–1948Commanded Communist forces in the Northeast Military District
- 1948–1949Northeast Field Army commander; won Liaoshen and Pingjin campaigns, entered Beijing
- 1954–1971Vice Premier
- 1955Marshal of the PRC, third among the Ten Marshals
- 1958Politburo Standing Committee member and party Vice Chairman
- 1959Minister of National Defense; led the cult of Mao and the politicization of the PLA
- 1966–1971Sole Vice Chairman of the CCP, Mao's designated successor
- 1971.09Lin Biao incident; killed in a plane crash at Öndörkhaan, Mongolia
Related historical events
- 1924–1927The first united front, the Northern Expedition and the catastrophe of 1927Whampoa cadet who rose to battalion commanderEntered Whampoa after the May Thirtieth Movement, fought in the expedition in Ye Ting's regiment and took part at Nanchang.
- 1927–1936From Jinggangshan to Yan’an: the soviet bases and the Long MarchCommander of the First Army GroupCommanded the vanguard army group of the Long March.
- 1937–1945The war with Japan and the second united front115th Division commander, victor of PingxingguanWon the first victory in September 1937, then was wounded and treated in the Soviet Union.
- 1945–1949The Chinese Civil WarNortheast Field Army commander at Liaoshen and PingjinConquered Manchuria and took north China, the decisive phase of the victory.
- 1949–1956From New Democracy to socialist transformationMarshal who backed Gao GangHe backed Gao with Peng Dehuai and was exonerated after pleading that he had thought Gao had Mao’s approval.
- 1950–1953The Korean WarMao's first choice to command, who refusedMao first named Lin to command the PVA, but Lin declined citing ill health and left for medical treatment in the Soviet Union. Whether he opposed the intervention itself remains debated.
- 1956–1969The Sino-Soviet SplitIssuer of "Order Number One"In October 1969 he ordered the whole army onto emergency alert.
- 1958–1962The Great Leap Forward and the Great FamineReplaced Peng Dehuai as defence ministerTook over the army after Lushan and brought the Mao cult into it.
- 1966–1976The Cultural RevolutionSuccessor who built the Mao cult, killed in the 1971 crashBacked the Cultural Revolution through the army; died in Mongolia in September 1971.
How did a young Whampoa cadet come to command the Red Army's best corps at twenty-four?
Lin Biao was born on 5 December 1907 into a prosperous merchant family in Huanggang, Hubei; his childhood name was Lin Yurong. His father's small handicraft workshop was forced to close by local warlords' heavy taxes, and his father then worked as a purser on a river steamer. Lin cared more for student politics than formal schooling. At fifteen he moved to Gongjin Middle School in Wuchang, joined a Communist Youth League affiliate before graduating, and after taking part in the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925 entered the newly founded Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou, the officers' school the Kuomintang set up with Soviet help.
At Whampoa he admired the character of the academy's commandant, Chiang Kai-shek, and also studied under Zhou Enlai of the political department. After graduating in 1926 he was assigned to a regiment led by the Communist Ye Ting for the Northern Expedition and rose within months from deputy platoon leader to battalion commander. He joined the Communist Party around this time and by 1927 held regimental rank. When the united front broke in 1927, Ye Ting and He Long launched the Nanchang Uprising of 1 August, and Lin took part as a company commander in a regiment led by Chen Yi. After the rising failed he stayed with Zhu De's remnant force and joined Mao Zedong at Jinggangshan in 1928.
He rose quickly in the Jiangxi Soviet. In 1932, at twenty-four, he took command of the First Red Army Corps, which with Peng Dehuai's Third Corps formed the Red Army's two main forces. The First Corps excelled at mobility and flanking manoeuvres, and by one assessment captured twice as many prisoners and as much equipment between 1930 and 1933 as the Third and Fifth Corps combined. The Comintern adviser Otto Braun dismissed him as "a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased", but after Mao was pushed aside in 1932 by the party leadership of the so-called 28 Bolsheviks, Lin continued to voice Mao's views at strategy meetings.
Against Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth Encirclement Campaign of 1933-1934 he urged protracted guerrilla warfare that wore the enemy down through ambushes, encirclements and surprise attacks rather than Braun's positional defence, and he was among the first commanders to argue openly for abandoning the base. On the Long March the First Corps usually led the way, and at the Zunyi Conference of January 1935 Lin supported Mao. Yet that year, voicing the troops' frustration with endless evasive marches, he proposed that Peng Dehuai take overall command of the army, and Mao rebuked him for it.
The American journalist Edgar Snow, who met him in northern Shaanxi in 1936, wrote in Red Star Over China that where Peng mixed with his men, Lin kept his distance and talked only business, and that in more than a hundred battles he had never been wounded. Snow noted that Lin had never been abroad and read no language but Chinese, yet before turning thirty had won a reputation through military articles republished in Nanjing, Japanese and Soviet journals. In Yan'an he became head of the newly founded Anti-Japanese Military and Political University.
Why did the victor of Pingxingguan spend most of the war against Japan away from the front?
When full-scale war with Japan began in July 1937 and the Red Army was reorganised as the Eighth Route Army that August, Lin became commander of its 115th Division and marched into Shanxi, where the Eighth Route Army was to help the forces of the Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan halt the Japanese invasion. On 25 September 1937, at Pingxingguan, a narrow pass in northern Shanxi, he ambushed the supply and rear units of the Japanese 5th Division and dealt them a heavy blow. It was not a large battle, but as a rare victory amid the string of Chinese defeats early in the war it had great propaganda value across the country and became a symbol that the Communist forces were really fighting Japan. Afterwards part of the 115th Division stayed in the Wutai mountains under Nie Rongzhen and became the nucleus of the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei) base behind Japanese lines.
His war against Japan did not last long. In early 1938 Japanese prisoners who had joined his command presented him with a captured Japanese officer's coat and sword, and Lin, who lacked a winter coat, put them on and rode off alone. A marksman of Yan Xishan's army saw a lone "Japanese officer" in the hills and shot him; the bullet grazed his head deeply enough to mark his skull, and he injured his back falling from his horse. The wound is often cited as the start of the health problems that dogged him for the rest of his life.
Wounded and ill with tuberculosis, he went to Moscow at the end of 1938 and stayed until February 1942, serving as the CCP's representative to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and writing for its publications. His marriage to Liu Ximin, whom he had married in Yan'an, deteriorated there, and he proposed to Zhou Enlai's adopted daughter Sun Weishi, who was studying in Moscow. Returning alone to Yan'an in 1942, he divorced Liu and in 1943 married Ye Qun, who would later manage nearly every aspect of his political life.
Back in Yan'an he worked mainly on troop training and indoctrination during the Rectification Movement. Although he spent most of the war away from the front, his Red Army record earned him sixth place in the Central Committee elected by the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, a standing that helped put him in charge of the decisive Manchurian theatre after Japan's surrender.
His health matters for understanding what came later. Mao's physician Li Zhisui recalled that Lin suffered from neurasthenia and hypochondria and feared wind, water, light and noise, and Soviet doctors are said to have diagnosed manic depression in 1953. His medical records have never been released, however, so his exact condition is unknown, and Li's account differs from the official Chinese one.
How did Lin Biao recover from defeat in Manchuria to drive back the Nationalists, and what happened at Changchun?
When Japan surrendered the Communists sent large forces into Manchuria, and Lin took command of the newly formed Northeast Democratic Allied Army. The Soviet troops occupying the region handed captured Japanese weapons to the Communists, making Lin's army the best-equipped Communist force in China. By the end of 1945 he had 280,000 men, though by Nationalist estimates only about 100,000 were regulars. He avoided decisive battles and preserved his strength.
In 1946 Mao, wanting a stronger hand in negotiations, ordered him to hold Siping in Jilin and "not give up an inch". Holding cities ran against the Red Army's traditional strategy and Lin objected, but he obeyed. When the Nationalist commander Du Yuming counter-attacked, Lin held on for more than a month until he was finally allowed to withdraw on 19 May, narrowly escaping encirclement, and fell back north of the Songhua River. Even Communist sources put his losses at 15,000, and Nationalist sources claim far more desertions and surrenders. In June a ceasefire brokered by the American George Marshall halted the fighting, and Lin refused Mao's order to counter-attack that winter, saying his troops were exhausted.
In 1947 he changed tactics, sending small forces across the Songhua again and again to wreck railways, bridges and power lines, strike isolated garrisons and ambush relief columns. His Summer Offensive in May won him most of the Manchurian countryside except the railways and a few large cities. But in June his assault on Siping, backed by only seventy guns, broke into the city twice and was driven back with more than 30,000 losses, and Lin wrote a self-criticism. He merged surviving regiments and raised local militia to regular status, building his strength to 510,000 by autumn, and his Winter Offensive took Siping in March 1948. By then the Nationalists held little in Manchuria beyond Changchun, Shenyang and the railway corridor to Beiping.
Mao wanted him to strike farther south, but Lin, unwilling to leave a strong enemy behind him, first isolated Changchun. From 23 May 1948 the Northeast Field Army surrounded the city completely and cratered the airfield runway to stop supplies being flown in. The blockade lasted about 150 days, and its darkest side concerned civilians. To exhaust the defenders' food faster, the PLA kept residents from leaving until early August, and many starved in the city and in the zone between the city and the siege lines. Civilian deaths are estimated at around 150,000, though no precise count exists. In the end some 150,000 refugees got out, and after Jinzhou fell in October the Nationalist 60th Army in Changchun changed sides and the New 7th Army surrendered, ending the siege.
The scale of the suffering was barely known in China until the former army writer Zhang Zhenglong published White Snow, Red Blood in 1989, a book later banned. Official histories presented Changchun as a "liberation without bloodshed", but the historian Harold Tanner writes that its huge civilian toll "casts a shadow" over the party's legitimacy. Militarily, the sieges in Manchuria greatly reduced the Nationalists' best troops and shifted the balance of the civil war, culminating in the Liaoshen Campaign of autumn 1948.
How did Lin Biao win Manchuria in the Liaoshen Campaign?
The Liaoshen Campaign (12 September - 2 November 1948) was the first of the Chinese Civil War's three great campaigns and the summit of Lin Biao's military maturity. As commander of the Northeast Field Army, he destroyed the three isolated Kuomintang strongholds in Manchuria, Jinzhou, Changchun and Shenyang, one by one.
The pivot of the campaign was the fortress city of Jinzhou in western Liaoning. Commanding the neck of the Liaoxi Corridor, Jinzhou linked Manchuria to the North China Plain; once it fell, the Nationalist forces in Manchuria would be cut off from the interior and ripe for annihilation. Lin initially concentrated on besieging Changchun and was hesitant to strike Jinzhou, but Mao Zedong persuaded him with the idea of taking Jinzhou to shut Manchuria's door and destroy the enemy inside. When Chiang Kai-shek sent reinforcements to Jinzhou, Lin wanted to turn back to Changchun, but Mao overruled him and ordered a decisive battle. On 14 October 1948 Lin launched the general assault on Jinzhou with 250,000 troops and the bulk of his artillery and armour; after nearly twenty-four hours of fighting the city fell, and the garrison commander Fan Hanjie and some 80,000 to 90,000 men were captured.
The fall of Jinzhou triggered a chain collapse. In Changchun the Nationalist 60th Army changed sides and the New 7th Army surrendered; in Shenyang the garrison of 140,000 crumbled almost without resistance. Liao Yaoxiang's 9th Army Group, sent west to retake Jinzhou, was checked and encircled around Heishan and destroyed on 28 October. After 52 days all of Manchuria was in Communist hands, giving the PLA strategic numerical superiority over the Kuomintang for the first time since its founding.
The victory was the culmination of the mobile and encirclement warfare Lin had refined since the start of the civil war. He rebuilt forces born in rural guerrilla war into a regular army capable of street fighting and large-scale encirclement-and-annihilation operations. His argument with Mao over whether to strike Jinzhou first also shows a commander extremely cautious about logistics and losses. Flush with the Liaoshen victory, Lin led a million men into the Pingjin Campaign in North China, opening the sequence of three great campaigns that sealed the Kuomintang's collapse.
How did the civil war's victorious general become the architect of Mao's personality cult?
Having won Manchuria in the Liaoshen Campaign, Lin led a million men through Shanhaiguan into north China. In the Pingjin Campaign that began at the end of November 1948 he surrounded the main Nationalist forces in the region and took Tianjin by storm, and on 22 January 1949 Fu Zuoyi agreed to surrender Beiping and his 400,000 troops without a fight; the PLA entered the city on 31 January. The campaign removed some 520,000 Nationalist troops from the field, meaning Lin had led two of the three great campaigns that broke the Kuomintang. With 1.5 million men he crossed the Yangtze in spring 1949 and swept through central and southern China, finishing the mainland campaign with the capture of Hainan Island in 1950. In 1955 he became the youngest of the Ten Marshals.
After 1949, however, he largely withdrew from front-line politics and command on grounds of illness. In the 1950 debate on entering the Korean War he shared the reservations of most leaders, fearing devastation if the Americans used the atomic bomb, and declined to command the volunteers because of his health. Peng Dehuai took command instead, and Lin went to the Soviet Union with Zhou Enlai, joined talks with Stalin on Soviet support, and stayed for treatment. Most of the high offices he held in the 1950s were honorary. He joined the Politburo in 1955 and became a member of its Standing Committee and a party vice-chairman in 1958.
When Peng Dehuai was purged for criticising the Great Leap at the 1959 Lushan Conference, Lin privately agreed with Peng but publicly denounced him as "a careerist, a conspirator and a hypocrite". At Mao's insistence he became Minister of Defence. His military reforms reversed Peng's: he abolished ranks and their privileges, purged officers considered pro-Soviet, set soldiers to part-time farm and factory work, strengthened the political commissars and indoctrinated the whole army in Mao Zedong Thought. Some testimony says he privately feared the reforms would weaken the army. At the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference of 1962, when many leaders criticised the Leap, he publicly defended Mao.
He turned the army into a loudspeaker for Mao's personality cult. The "Learn from Lei Feng" campaign he launched in 1963 was the most successful of these, and it has been suggested that the Diary of Lei Feng on which it rested was forged. He had Mao's writings excerpted into the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, the "Little Red Book", which spread from the army to become an essential item throughout the country. Long Live the Victory of People's War!, published under his name in 1965, cast the poor nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America as "the world's countryside" and the rich West as "the world's cities", extending Mao's strategy of the countryside encircling the cities to the whole globe. It made no promise that China would fight other peoples' wars, however, and advised foreign revolutionaries to rely on "self-reliance".
Victory in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and Lin's army reforms impressed Mao, and the "Learn from the PLA" campaign that followed widened into the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In these years his wife Ye Qun managed much of his daily life, and Mao gave her unusual authority to act on Lin's behalf. It was Ye who attacked the chief of staff Luo Ruiqing in 1965; Lin was angry when he found out but could not undo Luo's fall.
How did Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms and successor" end up dead on the Mongolian steppe?
When Liu Shaoqi was branded a "capitalist roader" in 1966, Lin emerged as his replacement. Many accounts say he tried to avoid the promotion and privately called Liu and Deng Xiaoping "good comrades", but the Eleventh Plenum in August made him the party's sole vice-chairman and de facto successor. Thereafter he tried to survive by offering no opinion until Mao's was clear and by appearing at Mao's side in public with the Quotations always in hand. His associates called this the rule of "three nos": no responsibility, no suggestions, no blame.
Directives issued in his name caused great harm. In 1966 he urged Red Guards to smash the "Four Olds", old ideas, culture, customs and habits, and in October he had classes at military academies suspended so that their students could join the Cultural Revolution. One count holds that from 1967 to 1969 some 80,000 officers were purged in the army alone, 1,169 of whom died from torture, starvation or execution. As Defence Minister he directed the response to the clash with the Soviet Union on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in March 1969, and in October, citing war preparations, he issued "Order Number One", which dispersed senior leaders from Beijing. The Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 wrote him into the party constitution as "Comrade Mao Zedong's closest comrade-in-arms and successor", and of the Politburo's twenty-one members, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, Ye Qun and Chen Boda were counted as his people.
The rift surfaced at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee at Lushan in August-September 1970. Lin's camp pressed for reviving the post of head of state, vacant since Liu's fall, for Mao to fill, and attacked Zhang Chunqiao for opposing the inclusion of Mao's "genius" in the new constitution. Mao suspected an attempt to enlarge Lin's own power and refused; rather than strike Lin directly, he brought down Chen Boda. Mao then demanded self-criticisms from Lin's generals, reshuffled their posts and, on a southern tour in summer 1971, made remarks plainly aimed at Lin.
According to the official account, in the early hours of 13 September 1971, after the failure of a coup plan, the "Outline of Project 571" (571 sounds like "armed uprising" in Chinese) drawn up by his son Lin Liguo and associates, Lin boarded Trident No. 256 at Shanhaiguan airfield with Ye Qun and Lin Liguo and fled toward the Soviet Union, but the plane ran short of fuel and crashed near Öndörkhaan in eastern Mongolia, killing all nine aboard. Soviet forensic examination confirmed that the bodies included Lin and his family. The Tenth Party Congress in 1973 condemned him as a traitor to party and country, followed by the campaign to "criticise Lin Biao and Confucius", and the party's 1981 historical resolution grouped him with Jiang Qing as the "two counter-revolutionary cliques" that had used the Cultural Revolution to seize supreme power.
Much of the affair remains unverified. Many records were destroyed, and the official narrative leans on confessions of purged associates that scholars outside China generally consider unreliable. The interpretation most widely held abroad is that Lin Liguo, aware of Mao's growing hostility to his father, rather than Lin himself, drove the coup plan; it has also been suggested that Ye Qun and Lin Liguo forced Lin aboard, and one investigation found the plane was heading away from the Soviet Union when it crashed. The Soviet investigators could not establish the cause of the crash but judged there was enough fuel to reach Irkutsk. What is certain is that the flight and death of the official successor shattered the party's myth that Mao was always right.