An Allied commander caught between military gains and civilian cost
On 27 July 1953, Mark W. Clark signed the Korean Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom for the United Nations Command.
Mark W. Clark was a United States Army general who commanded in both world wars and the Korean War, combining staff work with field command in coalition warfare. In Italy he led the capture of Rome and accepted the German surrender, but his decisions around the Rapido-Garigliano crossing and the bombing of Monte Cassino remained subjects of criticism. As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command during the final phase of the Korean War, he combined military pressure with armistice negotiations and signed the agreement on 27 July 1953 for the UNC side. His career shows how the pursuit of American military advantage could expose both the workings of coalition command and the destructive costs of war.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1917Second lieutenant, U.S. Army Infantry
- 1942Deputy commander, Allied forces for Operation Torch
- 1943–1944Commanding General, U.S. Fifth Army, Italian campaign
- 1944–1945Commander, 15th Army Group, Italy
- 1945–1947Commander in Chief, U.S. occupation forces in Austria
- 1947–1949Commanding General, U.S. Sixth Army
- 1949–1952Chief, U.S. Army Field Forces
- 1952–1953Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and Far East Command
Related historical events
- 1943–1945The Italian Campaign and the Fall of MussoliniCommander of the Fifth ArmyAfter the Anzio breakout, he ordered the main effort toward Rome instead of Valmontone and presented the June 1944 entry into Rome as an Allied achievement.
- 1950–1953The Korean WarUN Command CommanderSucceeded Ridgway in May 1952, ordered the bombing of Pyongyang, and signed the armistice for the UNC.
The Gari River Crossing and the 1946 Congressional Inquiry
The battle that became Clark's most contested command decision was fought not on the Rapido but on the Gari River, below Monte Cassino, from 20 to 22 January 1944. As Fifth Army commander, Clark ordered two regiments of the 36th Infantry Division across the river as a diversion before the Anzio landing. The assault collapsed: German fire destroyed bridging equipment, armour could not follow, and after some twenty hours of fighting both regiments were withdrawn. The 36th Division's casualties in the January crossing numbered 1,681. No ground was gained and the stated purpose of drawing German forces away from Anzio was not achieved.
The reckoning came from the soldiers themselves. On 20 January 1946 the 36th Infantry Division Veterans' Association unanimously petitioned Congress for an inquiry, asking it to correct 'a military system that will permit an inefficient and inexperienced officer, such as General Mark W. Clark, in a high command to destroy the young manhood of this country.' Two resolutions reached the House of Representatives; one called the crossing 'one of the most colossal blunders of the Second World War... a murderous blunder.'
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson replied that the action was 'a necessary one' and that Clark had 'exercised sound judgment' in planning and ordering it. Colonel Miller Ainsworth, the association's president, testified against that conclusion, criticising what he saw as Clark's attempt to evade scrutiny of his conduct. The House absolved Clark of blame, and he never commented publicly on the episode. Clark had publicly criticised Major General Fred Walker's execution of the plan; Walker answered that the plan he had protested was almost certain to fail. The dispute over who bore responsibility for the losses outlived the war.