Carter's National Security Advisor who drew the Soviet Union into the Afghan trap
That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap… The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war.
Polish-born American political scientist and strategist, National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981). He drove the human-rights campaign against the Soviet Union, normalization with China, and the Camp David Accords, and articulated the Carter Doctrine committing U.S. force to the Persian Gulf. On July 3, 1979, he signed the finding authorizing covert aid to the Afghan mujahideen while warning Carter it could induce Soviet intervention; in 1998 he called it an 'excellent idea' that drew the USSR into 'its Vietnam war,' fueling the debate over whether the U.S. deliberately trapped the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After the Cold War, his book The Grand Chessboard (1997) championed Eurasian geostrategy and NATO expansion, exerting a lasting influence on American statecraft.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1977–1981National Security Advisor
- 1973–1976Director, Trilateral Commission
- 1966–1968Member, Policy Planning Council, State Department
- 1960–1972Professor, Columbia University; Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs
- 1953–1960Professor, Harvard University
- 1981–2017Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS; Counselor, CSIS
Related historical events
- 1978–1979The Sino-Vietnamese WarUS national security adviserRecorded Carter’s reservation of judgment.
- 1979–1989The Soviet-Afghan WarCarter's NSA, architect of anti-Soviet mujahideen aidIn July 1979, six months before the Soviet invasion, he authorized covert aid to the mujahideen; in a 1998 interview he acknowledged it as a deliberate strategy to draw the Soviets into 'their Vietnam.'
Covert Aid to Afghan Insurgents
On July 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter authorized the CIA to spend up to $695,000 in support of Afghan insurgents. The assistance was limited to cash, non-military supplies, and propaganda. On October 23, the Special Coordination Committee, chaired by Brzezinski, unanimously agreed to expand aid that winter, despite the State Department representative’s proposal to wait until spring. The record noted uncertainty about winter fighting and the possibility of greater Soviet involvement as risks. The program then included cash and medical supplies, two radio-broadcasting stations, and production of propaganda materials; the committee pursued additional cash, communications equipment, and non-military supplies through Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Its record described the existing program as limited and said it was too early to assess its effects precisely.\n\nThe claim that Brzezinski sought to draw the Soviet Union into Afghanistan spread through a translated 1998 interview in a French weekly. The interview’s translation and retranslations are imprecise and contain omissions, and Brzezinski denied making the alleged prediction. An H-Diplo review of diplomatic historian Conner Tobin’s documentary study summarizes its conclusion that the small covert program of 1979 does not establish that Carter and Brzezinski actively sought to ensnare Moscow. The July aid authorization and subsequent decision to expand it are documented, but an intention to provoke the Soviet invasion cannot be treated as established fact.