Kriterium der Praxis / критерий практики · 1845–present

Criterion of practice

실천의 기준

The principle of Marxist epistemology that whether a piece of knowledge is true is not to be disputed in words but to be tested in human activity: experiment, production and social struggle. Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach is the starting point, Engels invoked the synthesis of alizarin against Kant's thing-in-itself, and Lenin made it the first standpoint of the theory of knowledge. It runs on to Mao's On Practice and China's truth criterion debate of 1978. Lenin himself added the proviso that practice can never fully confirm any judgment.

In depth

Why does "try it and see" become philosophy?

Someone says they know how to fix a broken radio. How do you check? Let them fix it. In daily life everyone tests knowledge this way. But philosophy's old question goes deeper. How do we know that our knowledge matches the world itself? There seems to be no place from which to set a thought side by side with the world and compare them. Scepticism and agnosticism draw their strength from this.

The criterion of practice proposes to relocate the question. We cannot compare thought and world from outside, but we are already working with thoughts inside the world, and if a thought is wrong, the work fails. So the problem of truth has to move from a comparison on the desk to the results of activity.

What did Marx write?

The second thesis on Feuerbach is the classic statement. "The question whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question."

Die Frage, ob dem menschlichen Denken gegenständliche Wahrheit zukomme – ist keine Frage der Theorie, sondern eine praktische Frage.

It goes on to say that in practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking, and declares a dispute isolated from practice purely scholastic. "This-worldliness" is a philosophical word for belonging to this world: thought really has force here. Marx's "practice" does not mean only a laboratory test. As the first thesis says, it is the whole of human sensuous activity that changes the world, revolutionary activity included.

What did Engels's alizarin prove?

In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Engels turned this principle on the agnosticism of Hume and Kant. "The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely experiment and industry."

Die schlagendste Widerlegung dieser wie aller andern philosophischen Schrullen ist die Praxis, nämlich das Experiment und die Industrie.

His example came from the advanced chemistry of the time. The red dye alizarin had long been obtained from the root of the madder plant. Carl Graebe and Carl Liebermann synthesized it in 1868, and the industry obtaining the dye from coal tar displaced madder. Engels set this against Kant's "thing-in-itself", the thing as such that we can never know: for instance alizarin, the dye of madder, "which we no longer grow in the fields in madder roots but produce from coal tar far more cheaply and simply." If you can make it, you know it.

der Farbstoff des Krapps, das Alizarin, das wir nicht mehr auf dem Felde in den Krappwurzeln wachsen lassen, sondern aus Kohlenteer weit wohlfeiler und einfacher herstellen.

The second example is a planet. The Copernican system was a hypothesis for three hundred years, he wrote, and it was proved when Leverrier calculated from it the position of an unknown planet and Galle found Neptune there. So not only making but also correctly predicting can be a test of practice.

Within Marxism the sharpest attack on this argument came from Lukács. In History and Class Consciousness he set out this very alizarin passage and answered in three ways. First, for Hegel "in itself" and "for us" are not opposites but correlatives, so Engels confused the terms. Second, Kant held that even complete knowledge of phenomena cannot overcome the structural limits of knowledge, so the progress of chemistry does not touch Kant. Third, Engels's deepest misunderstanding was his belief that industry and scientific experiment constitute praxis in the dialectical, philosophical sense. An experiment, artificially fixing conditions to watch laws at work, is rather contemplation at its purest, and the capitalist running industry is only a puppet of economic laws.

Why did Lenin add a proviso?

In Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Chapter 2, Section 6, "The Criterion of Practice in the Theory of Knowledge", Lenin raised this principle to a system. "The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."

Точка зрения жизни, практики должна быть первой и основной точкой зрения теории познания.

What matters is the proviso that immediately follows. It must not be forgotten that the criterion of practice "can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely."

практики никогда не может по самой сути дела подтвердить или опровергнуть полностью какого бы то ни было человеческого представления.

The criterion, Lenin wrote, is "indefinite" enough not to let human knowledge become absolute, and definite enough to wage a ruthless fight on idealism and agnosticism. One failed experiment does not bring down a whole theory, and one successful practice does not prove a whole theory. This fits the scheme described under "Objective, relative and absolute truth".

What did Mao and 1978 add?

Mao's On Practice (1937) used the principle as a weapon against dogmatism inside the Communist Party. Knowledge starts in practice, rises to theory and returns to practice: "Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth." Whether a formula memorized from books fits the Chinese revolution has to be tested in the Chinese revolution.

通过实践而发现真理,又通过实践而证实真理和发展真理。

After Mao's death the same principle was turned on Mao's own words. In May 1978 the Guangming Daily article "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" became the argument that brought down the "Two Whatevers", the policy of following whatever Mao decided and instructed. The story is under "Truth criterion debate (1978)".

Where does the criterion run into trouble?

Taking practice as the criterion does not by itself fix a position. Lenin himself noted that American pragmatism too "recognizes practice as the sole criterion" yet derives God from it, and wrote that its difference from Machism is trifling. For him what practice tests had to be agreement of knowledge with the objective world.

What counts as the result of practice is also at issue. The 1959 demotion of Yang Xianzhen, who had criticized the "exaggeration wind" of the Great Leap Forward, shows how the test is blocked when power controls the reporting of results.

Related people

Sources

  1. mlwerke.de
  2. leninism.su
  3. Marxists Internet Archive
  4. de.wikipedia.org
  5. Wikipedia (EN)
  6. Wikipedia (EN)
  7. zh.wikipedia.org
  8. Marxists Internet Archive
  9. libcom.org
  10. news.sina.com.cn