Episteme (Foucault)
에피스테메 (푸코)
A concept Michel Foucault used in The Order of Things (1966) for the unseen system of rules that lies beneath the various sciences of an age and fixes what can be thought of as knowledge and what can be said to be true. In the history of Western knowledge he distinguished a Renaissance episteme organised by resemblance, a Classical one organised by representation and classification, and a modern one in which "man" first became an object of knowledge. He called the method of digging out these breaks "archaeology". Because it put the changing conditions of possibility of knowledge in place of individual consciousness and continuous progress, it drew fierce objections from existentialists and Marxists alike.
In depth
What question does it answer?
Old herbals were full of reasoning such as: the walnut looks like a brain, so it is good for the head. Today we laugh at this as superstition, but for its age it was a serious way of doing learning. So a question arises. Why does what plainly passed for knowledge in one age stop looking like knowledge at all in another? Did people suddenly become cleverer, or did the very standard for what counts as knowing change?
Michel Foucault answered: the second. People in an age pursue different sciences and make different claims, but what they can ask and what they accept as an answer is fixed in advance by common rules they are not aware of. Foucault called this system of rules the episteme.
The word originally meant "true knowledge" in ancient Greek. Plato set episteme against common belief or opinion, doxa. Foucault borrowed the word for a quite different meaning. As English Wikipedia summarises it, for him the episteme is a historical a priori that grounds truth and discourses within an epoch and forms the condition of their possibility: a frame given before experience yet changing from age to age. Foucault himself said in an interview: "All these phenomena of relation between the sciences, or between the different discourses in the various scientific sectors, are what constitute what I call the episteme of an epoch."
Ce sont tous ces phénomènes de rapport entre les sciences ou entre les différents discours dans les divers secteurs scientifiques qui constituent ce que j’appelle épistémè d’une époque
What did The Order of Things show?
The Order of Things (Les Mots et les Choses) appeared from Gallimard in 1966 with the subtitle "an archaeology of the human sciences". It opens with a long analysis of Velázquez's Las Meninas. In this picture, where the gazes of the painter, the figures in the picture and us outside it are intricately crossed, Foucault reads "something like the representation of Classical representation".
Peut-être y a-t-il, dans ce tableau de Velásquez, comme la représentation de la représentation classique
The main part follows how three branches of learning changed. Knowledge of language went from general grammar to linguistics, knowledge of life from natural history to biology, and knowledge of money and wealth from the analysis of wealth to economics. Foucault's point is that these changes were not separate advances in each field. At the same time the rules beneath all three changed together. By these rules he divided three ages. The Renaissance episteme read the world through resemblance and similitude; the Classical episteme ordered it through representation and order, through classification and tables of identity and difference. The modern episteme opened after Kant.
The greatest event of modernity was the appearance of "man" as an object of knowledge. People in the Classical age talked about human beings, but there was no science of man as a finite being who labours, lives and speaks. Foucault wrote: "He is a quite recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago." The book's last sentence foresaw that, with a new episteme, the figure of man might be erased "like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea".
C’est une toute récente créature que la démiurgie du savoir a fabriquée de ses mains, depuis deux cents ans.
comme à la limite de la mer un visage de sable
Difficult as it was, the book sold twenty thousand copies in its first year. Appearing the same year as Lacan's Écrits and Barthes's Criticism and Truth, it was read as a symbol of structuralism, but Foucault rejected the label.
What kind of method is "archaeology"?
Foucault called his method archaeology: laying bare the strata beneath an age's knowledge as one digs to expose layers of earth. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it, the key idea of archaeology is that systems of thought and knowledge (epistemes or discursive formations) are governed by rules beyond grammar and logic, rules that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects. So the historian looks less at what an individual scholar intended than at what could be said in that age.
Foucault set out the method in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), with the concepts of the statement (énoncé) and the discursive formation: the same sentence may or may not be a meaningful statement depending on the rules of the discourse in which it is placed.
The method had a limit. Archaeology could set the knowledge systems of different ages side by side, but could not explain why one way of thinking gave way to another. In the 1970s Foucault filled this gap with genealogy, borrowed from Nietzsche, and moved the question of how knowledge arises into the question of power and institutions. From then on he allowed that several epistemes might coexist in one period, and he preferred the word "apparatus" (dispositif), which ties together discourse, institutions and practices. In a 1977 interview he called the episteme the "specifically discursive" kind of apparatus. The rest of the story continues under power/knowledge.
How does it differ from the critique of ideology?
The episteme looks on the surface like the Marxist concept of ideology. Both hold that people's thoughts in an age do not arise as they please but are bound to conditions they are not conscious of. But the starting points differ. Marxism explains dominant ideas from the material interests of the ruling class and from the relations of production, and criticises them for reflecting reality upside down. Foucault's episteme does not come from anyone's interest; it is the ground on which an age's whole knowledge stands, and the very standard dividing true from false is fixed within it.
Foucault was aware of the difference. As English Wikipedia reports, he held that ideology may infiltrate and shape a science but need not, and that one must show how ideology actually formed the science in question; contradictions or a lack of objectivity are not by themselves evidence of ideology.
How did it collide with Marxism?
The Order of Things placed Marx inside an episteme too. Foucault treated Ricardo as the condition of possibility of Marx's work: however revolutionary Marx's critique of political economy, it stood on the same nineteenth-century ground as Ricardo. English Wikipedia reports that, against the criticism of Sartre and Beauvoir, Foucault retorted that Marxism exists in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water and cannot breathe anywhere else.
The backlash was fierce. In the October 1966 issue of L'Arc Jean-Paul Sartre called Foucault "the last barricade the bourgeoisie can still put up against Marx" and accused the book of refusing history. Foucault replied that if the bourgeoisie needed him as a barricade, it had already lost power.
le dernier barrage que la bourgeoisie puisse encore dresser contre Marx
On the Marxist side things were not simple. Foucault had been taught at the École Normale Supérieure by Louis Althusser, and The Order of Things came out a year after Althusser's For Marx. French Wikipedia notes that the book's closing prophecy of the disappearance of man set off a controversy over "theoretical anti-humanism". In removing the human subject from the centre of history Foucault and Althusser stood together against Sartre's existentialist Marxism, but they parted ways: Althusser sought to establish Marxism as a science, while Foucault placed all knowledge, science included, inside the rules of an age. The "epistemological break" Althusser found within Marx's thought and the breaks Foucault found between ages have similar names but do different work.
How was it read afterwards?
Jean Piaget compared the episteme with Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift. The two resemble each other in seeing the history of knowledge as made of breaks rather than smooth accumulation. Foucault's episteme, however, was presented not as the theory of one field but as a ground common to the various fields of knowledge of an age, and the emphasis fell on its fixing what can be thought and what can be affirmed as true.
The word flowed on into postcolonial and feminist epistemology. Asking which knowledge is recognised as knowledge and which is pushed aside as "not knowledge", as in Gayatri Spivak's epistemic violence or Miranda Fricker's epistemic injustice, carries on in different ways Foucault's question that the conditions of possibility of knowledge are not independent of power. Foucault himself used the word less after the 1970s and turned to the ways power and knowledge interlock.