herméneutique du soupçon · 1965–present

Hermeneutics of suspicion

의심의 해석학

A style of interpretation that distrusts the surface meaning of texts and social phenomena and seeks to expose a hidden or repressed truth beneath them. The French philosopher Paul Ricœur coined it in his 1965 book on Freud, grouping Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as "masters of suspicion" who viewed consciousness as false. Ricœur set it beside a "hermeneutics of faith" that seeks to restore meaning and meant it descriptively, but in later Anglo-American literary criticism it became something like the default stance of criticism; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Rita Felski criticised its becoming criticism's only method.

In depth

What did Marx, Nietzsche and Freud share?

Marx held that economic relations shape the ideas and morals people believe. Nietzsche interrogated received morality and beliefs through their genealogy. Freud held that thought and behaviour are deeply shaped by an unconscious that consciousness does not know. The three said very different things, but they had something in common: they did not take the visible surface of consciousness and culture at face value, and dug beneath it for deeper structural truths.

In his 1965 book on Freud, De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation), the French philosopher Paul Ricœur called the three the "masters of suspicion." For all three, as Ricœur put it, the fundamental category of consciousness is the relation of hidden and shown, simulated and manifested; what unites them is a general hypothesis about how false consciousness comes about and a method for deciphering it, the man of suspicion reversing the falsification carried out by the man of guile. Ricœur also said that the three, through the genealogy of morals (Nietzsche), the theory of ideology (Marx) and the theory of ideals and illusions (Freud), represent "convergent procedures of demystification." The three never used the phrase "school of suspicion"; the name is Ricœur's.

Why did Ricœur distinguish suspicion from faith?

Ricœur's philosophy was a hermeneutics centred on the problem of interpretation. A Protestant, he dealt with biblical interpretation and with the interpretation of psychoanalytic symptoms, and his analysis of symbols led him into dialogue with psychoanalysis. He distinguished two forms of hermeneutics: a hermeneutics of faith that aims to restore the meaning of a text, the philological and theological "hermeneutics of recovery of meaning," and a hermeneutics of suspicion that tries to decode disguised meanings.

Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick pointed out that Ricœur's intent was descriptive and taxonomic rather than imperative. For him suspicion was one way of interpreting among others, and he sought to hold restoration and suspicion together. Rita Felski, in Uses of Literature, urged critics to heed Ricœur's advice to combine a willingness to suspect with an eagerness to listen.

How did suspicion become a basic skill of criticism?

Ricœur's term had a long after-life in religious studies, philosophy and intellectual history, and an especially vigorous one in Anglo-American literary and cultural studies. Felski defined the hermeneutics of suspicion as a distinctively modern style of interpretation that circumvents obvious or self-evident meanings to draw out less visible and less flattering truths. The name, she noted, is usually given to reading texts against the grain and between the lines, cataloguing their omissions, laying bare their contradictions, rubbing in what they fail to know and cannot represent. In that sense it is close to ideology critique.

There were voices against the current already in the 1960s. In "Against Interpretation" (1964) the American critic Susan Sontag called the doctrines of Marx and Freud "aggressive and impious theories of interpretation" and argued that modern interpretation, digging beneath the work for a hidden meaning, tames art.

What did Sedgwick object to?

In "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading," first published in 1997, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argued that American criticism had come to treat the hermeneutics of suspicion as nearly synonymous with criticism itself. Where Marx, Nietzsche and Freud were taken as a sufficient genealogy for New Historicist, deconstructive, feminist, queer and psychoanalytic criticism, suspicion was understood as a mandatory injunction rather than one possibility among others. She compared it to the slogan with which Fredric Jameson opened The Political Unconscious (1981), "Always historicize!":

The phrase now has something like the sacred status of Fredric Jameson’s “Always historicize” — and, like that one, it fits oddly into its new position in the tablets of the Law.

Sedgwick questioned the "always" in Jameson's slogan; it reminded her of bumper stickers instructing other drivers to "Question Authority," excellent advice perhaps wasted on anyone who does what a strip of paper glued to a car tells them. She also noted how strangely trusting the hermeneutics of suspicion is about the effects of exposure: Ricœur's description of the three as convergent procedures of demystification already shows a faith, inexplicable in their own terms, that exposing something will change it. Exposure may have meant a great deal in the 1960s, she argued, but bringing such "news" to a scene where everyone is already cynically in the know is a very different act. Her alternative is treated under "Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading."

How was it used in the postcritique debate?

In the twenty-first century Ricœur's concept took a central place in "postcritique," the attempt to find forms of reading beyond critique, critical theory and ideological criticism. The American literary theorist Rita Felski assessed the hermeneutics of suspicion as a mood and method of literary studies in The Limits of Critique (2015), drawing on the French sociologist Bruno Latour's actor-network theory; she stressed that the book was not conceived as a polemic against critique.

The objections were strong. The American critic Bruce Robbins charged postcritique with "shameless caricature" and asked where the teachers of literature were who did nothing all day but interrogate, demystify and unmask. He argued that postcritique tends to political quietism, and that for African Americans and other marginalised groups paranoia is a perfectly acceptable language for the experience of systemic injustice. The critic Merve Emre held that Felski and others overstated the dangers of paranoid reading through a misunderstanding of Sedgwick, and that critique remains a legitimate way of reading that can inspire social action.

Marx's critique of ideology counts as one of the three pillars of the hermeneutics of suspicion; the Marxist concept of ideology is treated under "Ideology (Marxism)."

Related people

Sources

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