Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft · 1790

Kantian aesthetics

칸트 미학

The theory of aesthetics Immanuel Kant set out in the first part of his Critique of Judgment (1790). He held that the "judgment of taste" that calls something beautiful is subjective, made without concepts or interest, yet demands everyone's agreement, and he grounded it in the "free play" of imagination and understanding. Alongside beauty he treated the sublime, the feeling before overwhelming size or power, and located it not in nature but in the mind that confronts it. By separating aesthetic experience from use and desire the theory became the starting point of modern aesthetics, and its "disinterestedness" became a target for Nietzsche and for materialist aesthetics.

In depth

Why is "the people's sweat" the wrong answer to whether a palace is beautiful?

Kant gives this example. Someone asks me whether the palace I see before me is beautiful. I might answer that I do not care for such buildings, made only to be gaped at; or, like the Iroquois sachem, that nothing in Paris pleased me more than the eating-houses; or, in Rousseau's manner, I might rail at the vanity of the great, who spend "the sweat of the people" on such superfluous things. I might even say that if I were on a desert island and could conjure up such a palace by a mere wish, I would not trouble to do so as long as I had a comfortable hut.

Kant grants that all these answers may be right. They are simply beside the point. Asking whether the palace is beautiful does not ask whether it is useful, whose money built it, or whether I want it. It asks only "whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied in me by satisfaction, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object". Hence the title of section 2 of the Critique of Judgment: "The satisfaction which determines the judgment of taste is without any interest."

Man will nur wissen, ob die bloße Vorstellung des Gegenstandes in mir mit Wohlgefallen begleitet sei, so gleichgültig ich auch immer in Ansehung der Existenz des Gegenstandes dieser Vorstellung sein mag.

The example shows both the strength and the weakness of Kant's aesthetics. By separating beauty from desire and use, he was the first to pin down precisely what is peculiar to aesthetic experience. For that very reason, though, the people's sweat that built the palace is pushed aside as "beside the point" for the question of beauty. This is exactly where later materialist aesthetics wrestled with Kant.

How did Kant analyse the judgment of beauty?

The Critique of Judgment (1790) is Kant's third critique, after the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Its first part deals with aesthetic judgment, its second with the teleology of nature. In the first part Kant examined the judgment "this is beautiful" under four headings (quality, quantity, relation and modality) and drew four definitions from them.

First, in quality, satisfaction in the beautiful is disinterested; this is the palace example. Second, in quantity, beauty claims universality. Kant distinguishes the agreeable from the beautiful. If someone says "Canary wine is agreeable" and another corrects him, "you should say it is agreeable to me", he readily accepts the correction, since tastes of the palate differ. But someone who calls a thing beautiful does not merely expect that others will feel the same; he demands it. In Kant's words, "he says the thing is beautiful, and does not count on others agreeing because he has often found them agreeing with him, but demands it of them." Hence the second definition: "The beautiful is that which pleases universally without a concept."

Schön ist das, was ohne Begriff allgemein gefällt.

How can there be universality without a concept? Kant's answer is that when we see something beautiful our cognitive faculties, imagination and understanding, enter a state of "free play". No determinate concept ties the imagination down, as it would when we are trying to know something, so the two faculties enjoy harmonising with each other. Since these faculties are common to all human beings, we can demand that the pleasure be shared by all. Kant called this common sense sensus communis, and Hannah Arendt suggested that it might ground a political theory quite different from Kant's moral philosophy.

Third, in relation, beauty is "the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as it is perceived in it without the representation of a purpose". A flower looks as though it had been arranged for some end, and we are drawn to its arrangement without knowing what it is for. Fourth, in modality, the beautiful is recognised without a concept as the object of a "necessary" satisfaction.

How does the sublime differ from the beautiful?

Before Kant, Edmund Burke in 1757 had been the first to separate the beautiful and the sublime systematically into distinct categories. Kant took up the distinction in the Analytic of the Sublime, the second book of the first part of the Critique of Judgment. His definition is brief: "We call that sublime which is absolutely great", not great in comparison with something, but that in comparison with which everything else is small.

Erhaben nennen wir das, was schlechthin groß ist.

Kant divides the sublime in two: the mathematical sublime, which overwhelms by size, like a boundless sea or a starry sky, and the dynamical sublime, which overwhelms by power. Of the latter he wrote: bold overhanging rocks that seem to threaten, thunderclouds piling up in the sky with lightning and crashes, volcanoes in all their destructive violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave, the boundless ocean in uproar, the high waterfall of a mighty river. Before these our power of resistance is a trifle; yet "provided we are in safety", the more fearful the sight, the more it attracts us.

Kühne überhangende gleichsam drohende Felsen, am Himmel sich auftürmende Donnerwolken, mit Blitzen und Krachen einherziehend, Vulkane in ihrer ganzen zerstörenden Gewalt

Why does it attract us? Our senses and imagination collapse before the magnitude and might of nature, but at that very moment we discover in ourselves another faculty that does not bow to nature: reason and moral freedom. Hence Kant's conclusion: "sublimity is contained in no thing of nature, but only in our mind." The beautiful and the sublime have both been read as pointing to an order beyond the senses, and so to the possibility of a self with free will.

Also ist die Erhabenheit in keinem Dinge der Natur, sondern nur in unserm Gemüte enthalten

Who followed Kant, and who opposed him?

Kant's aesthetics was the starting point for German idealism as a whole. Schiller saw art as uniting the basic human drives in a kind of play; Schelling argued that art reconciles opposites and reveals the underlying unity of self and nature; and Hegel saw artistic beauty as the sensory manifestation of truth (see Hegel's aesthetics). Combining Kant with Indian philosophy, Schopenhauer understood disinterested aesthetic experience as a suspension of the will. Nietzsche, by contrast, rejected both the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience and the autonomy of art from the other domains of life.

The earliest materialist objection came from Russia. In his 1855 dissertation Nikolai Chernyshevsky answered the formulas of Kant and the Hegelian school on the sublime by writing that when we contemplate the sublime "it is the object itself that appears sublime to us, not any thoughts the object calls up." Mount Kazbek is majestic in itself, and so is the sea. The difference between Kant, who puts the sublime in the mind, and Chernyshevsky, who puts it in external reality, shows how the "basic question of philosophy", idealism versus materialism, divides in aesthetics (see The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality).

возвышенным представляется нам самый предмет, а не какие-нибудь вызываемые этим предметом мысли

How is Kant's aesthetics read today?

The boundary Kant drew, that beauty differs from use and desire, is read as the starting point of arguments for the "autonomy" of art, its separation from other domains and its value of its own; it was precisely this disinterestedness and autonomy that Nietzsche rejected. For those who accept it, Kant first formulated the ground on which art need not be swallowed by the market or by politics. The Western Marxist Adorno, who criticised the commodification of art while holding that art can express alienation and challenge social norms, stands in the line of this question.

Many within Marxist aesthetics saw it otherwise. To them "disinterested satisfaction" was an attitude available only to people freed from the worry of making a living, and the demand not to think of the people's sweat before the palace cut aesthetic experience off from social relations. From the standpoint described in this dictionary's entry on ideology (Marxism), Kant's claim to a universal taste can be read as presenting the taste of a particular educated stratum as that of humanity in general. Yet the question Kant posed, how a judgment that can be shared arises from senses that differ from person to person, remained one that Marxist aesthetics could not avoid either.

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