Logical positivism
논리실증주의
A philosophical movement of the 1920s and 1930s centred on the Vienna Circle. It analysed the language of science with newly developed mathematical logic and sought to clear away metaphysics by holding that sentences which can neither be verified by experience nor are logical tautologies are not true or false but meaningless. It was led by Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and others, and some, like Neurath and Carnap, who were close to the socialist movement, presented science as a tool for the liberation of the workers and the reshaping of society. Scattered in the 1930s by Nazism and Austrian fascism, it left a large mark on English-language philosophy of science, and by the 1960s, under criticism from within and without, it had ended as a movement.
In depth
How can meaningful talk be told from meaningless talk?
"Water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level." Whether this is true can be checked with a pot and a thermometer. "Absolute Spirit returns to itself in history." What observation could confirm or refute that? The logical positivists answered that the second sentence is not false but simply meaningless. A sentence for which one cannot say what would make it true and what would make it false says nothing, however grammatical it is.
This is the idea called the "verification principle". A sentence is cognitively meaningful only if it can be verified by empirical observation or is a tautology true by the meanings of its words alone, like "a bachelor is an unmarried man". Measured by this standard, most of the great questions of theology and traditional metaphysics become not problems awaiting an answer but questions wrongly posed from the start, "pseudo-problems".
Nineteenth-century positivism also proposed to set metaphysics aside. Logical positivism added two things: the new mathematical logic developed by Frege and Russell, and the idea that the task of philosophy is not to make new claims about the world but to analyse the sentences of science logically. Hence the movement is also called "logical empiricism".
Who was the Vienna Circle, and what did it want?
It began around 1907 with three men discussing the philosophy of science in Vienna: the mathematician Hans Hahn, the physicist Philipp Frank and the economist Otto Neurath. In 1922 the German physicist Moritz Schlick took over the chair of natural philosophy at the University of Vienna once held by Ernst Mach, and in 1924, at the suggestion of his students Friedrich Waismann and Herbert Feigl, a regular discussion group began to meet under his chairmanship. In 1926 Rudolf Carnap came to the University of Vienna as a private lecturer and joined it, and younger scholars such as Kurt Gödel became members of the inner circle.
They were influenced by Mach, the mathematician David Hilbert, the conventionalism of Poincaré and Duhem, Frege, Russell and Einstein. Above all, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), read in the seminars Hahn organised with Kurt Reidemeister, inspired them. The book draws the boundary between what can and cannot be meaningfully said, and its last proposition reads: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.
Wittgenstein, however, was not a member of the Circle; like Popper, he was a figure on its periphery in regular contact with it. From 1927 Schlick, Waismann, Carnap and Feigl met him separately for discussions.
In 1928 the Ernst Mach Society was founded with Schlick as chairman to spread the "scientific world-conception" through public lectures. In 1929 came the manifesto The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle, under a name Neurath had coined. The pamphlet was dedicated to Schlick and its preface signed by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap. The Circle published the journal Erkenntnis, edited by Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, held its first international conference together with the Berlin Circle in 1929, and went on to hold congresses in Prague, Königsberg, Paris, Copenhagen, Cambridge and elsewhere.
What problems did the verification principle meet?
Even within the Circle the verification principle was never settled. English Wikipedia sums up that Schlick endorsed it while Carnap and Neurath rejected it. Above all, it was pointed out early that the principle itself is neither an observationally verifiable sentence nor a tautology. And scientific laws such as "all metals expand when heated" speak of infinitely many cases and so cannot be completely verified by finitely many observations.
A deeper dispute concerned what lies at the very bottom of knowledge. In The Logical Structure of the World (1928) Carnap tried to build up all scientific concepts logically from immediate experience. The Circle called the simplest sentences recording an observation "protocol sentences" and debated whether they could serve as a secure foundation for knowledge. Neurath thought not: sentences can only be compared with other sentences, not with a "directly given" outside language.
Neurath put this in a famous image. We are like sailors who cannot bring their ship into dock, take it apart and rebuild it from new parts, but must repair it on the open sea. Science, too, does not start from a secure bedrock; it changes one part at a time while relying on the whole body of knowledge it already has. The idea later led into Quine's holism.
Neurath also championed physicalism, the view that all the sciences can be united in one language about physical things and events, and "unified science". The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, which he edited as chief editor with Carnap and Charles Morris, ran from 1938 to 1970.
Why was it bound up with socialism?
Logical positivism is often remembered as a pure logical philosophy indifferent to politics. Yet the Circle's public activity was explicitly political. According to English Wikipedia, Hahn and Neurath were socialists who believed the rejection of magic was a necessary component of the liberation of the working classes, and the Circle linked Marx and Nietzsche to its anti-metaphysical views.
Neurath's career shows this well. In 1919 he proposed the creation of a Central Economic Office in the Bavarian Soviet Republic and became its president, attempting to install a moneyless economy. After the republic was crushed he was sentenced to eighteen months for aiding high treason and was freed after the Austrian government intervened. When he argued that the economy could be planned in physical units, Ludwig von Mises answered in 1920 with "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth". Neurath then took part in the Austro-Marxist movement in "Red Vienna", working on housing policy and workers' education, and created Isotype, a way of showing statistics through picture symbols. Carnap, too, joined the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1918 after the horrors of the First World War, and belonged to the left wing of the Circle.
This political character made the Circle a target. After the Austrian civil war of 1934 the Ernst Mach Society was dissolved for political reasons, and Neurath fled to the Netherlands. On 22 June 1936 Schlick was shot dead on a staircase of the University of Vienna by his former student Hans Nelböck. At his trial Nelböck invoked his world-view to excuse the deed, claiming that Schlick's anti-metaphysical philosophy had shaken his moral convictions. When Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938 the Circle vanished from Vienna, and most of its members scattered to Britain and the United States.
How did Marxists view the movement?
The Marxist critique had already been prepared in Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-criticism. The logical positivists presented themselves as Mach's heirs, and Lenin's critique of Mach, that the stance of recognising only experience is an agnosticism that does not ask about the reality of the external world, was aimed at them just as well. Dismissing as a "pseudo-problem" the question of what experience is experience of looked like covering over, without answering it, the basic question of philosophy, the opposition of materialism and idealism.
Maurice Cornforth, a philosopher of the Communist Party of Great Britain, had been an analytic philosopher taught by Wittgenstein at Cambridge in the early 1930s before he joined the Communist Party and became the school's critic. He published Science versus Idealism (1946), and in In Defense of Philosophy he attacked empiricist philosophies such as Carnap's linguistic analysis and William James's pragmatism for divorcing science from the search for a truer understanding of the really existing universe.
In Western Marxism the Frankfurt School attacked from another angle. In Eclipse of Reason (1947) Horkheimer linked positivist and instrumental reason with the rise of fascism: if only the ordering of facts counts as knowledge, there is no room left to ask why society is as it is and how it ought to change. That Neurath and Carnap, inside the Circle, were themselves socialists makes this opposition less simple. German Wikipedia calls the view of Carnap as an apolitical positivist a widespread prejudice.
How did it end, and what did it leave?
Emigration moved the movement into the English-speaking world. In Britain A. J. Ayer brought logical positivism to English readers with Language, Truth and Logic in 1936, and Carnap, Reichenbach and Hempel settled in America. In post-war America the movement lost the radical zeal to remake traditional philosophy and became a respectable member of a new subdiscipline, the philosophy of science. But by the 1950s the problems with its central tenets, such as the verifiability criterion, the analytic-synthetic distinction and the observation-theory distinction, came to be seen as intractable. Karl Popper, a graduate of the University of Vienna, criticised the movement from the start and in The Logic of Research (1934) put forward falsifiability, not verification, as the criterion separating science from non-science (falsificationism). Quine was a trenchant critic too, and Carl Hempel, who had grown up within the movement, criticised the thesis that empirical knowledge is restricted to observation statements.
In 1967 the philosopher John Passmore pronounced logical positivism "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes".
dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes
Paradoxically, the classic work that went beyond logical positivism appeared in that movement's own vessel. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) was first published as a volume of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science that Neurath had begun. Using the history of science as evidence, Kuhn shook the picture of science progressing through observation and logic alone, and the philosophy of science entered an era of debate that led on to the paradigm (Kuhn), the scientific research programme and epistemological anarchism.