Pragmatism (philosophy)
실용주의 (철학)
A philosophical tradition that treats thought and language not as a mirror of the world but as tools for prediction, problem solving and action. It judges the meaning of a concept by the effects it would have in practice, and the truth of a belief by how well it is verified and works in experience. Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey opened it in the United States in the 1870s. Lenin criticised it as an idealism of the same family as Machism.
In depth
How can we tell that an idea is right?
William James tells this story. A camping party in the mountains fell into a dispute over a squirrel. The squirrel clings to one side of a tree trunk; a man on the opposite side moves quickly round the tree to catch sight of it, but the squirrel moves just as fast the other way and always keeps the tree between them. Does the man go round the squirrel or not? James's answer was that it depends on what you practically mean by "going round". If you mean passing from the north of it to the east, south and west, he does go round; if you mean being first in front of it, then on its right, behind it and on its left, he does not. Make the distinction and there is nothing left to dispute.
James offered this trivial story as the simplest example of "the pragmatic method". The pragmatic method, he said, is primarily a way of settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise go on for ever. It asks what practical difference it would make to our lives whether one idea or another were true, and if there is none, it treats the dispute as idle.
The name pragmatism comes from the Greek pragma, deed or act. In today's definition, pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that views language and thought as tools for prediction, problem solving and action rather than as describing or mirroring reality. Pragmatists hold that most philosophical topics, such as knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief and science, are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. In Korean the word silyongjuui is used more often in its everyday sense of "results over ideology" in politics and business, so this entry treats the philosophical current separately from that word.
Pragmatism began in the United States around 1870. Its starting point is usually placed in the "Metaphysical Club", a conversation circle that Peirce, James, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and others formed in January 1872 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The name first appeared in print in 1898 in a text by James, who credited Peirce with coining it in the early 1870s. The three who opened the current are Peirce, James and Dewey.
What did Peirce propose?
In January 1878 Charles Sanders Peirce published "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in Popular Science Monthly. James later wrote that this article first introduced pragmatism into philosophy. In it Peirce set out a rule for making concepts clear, later called the pragmatic maxim:
"Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."
Peirce's first example was hardness. What we mean by calling a thing hard is that it will not be scratched by many other substances. The whole conception of the quality lies in its conceived effects, and so long as they are not brought to the test there is no difference between a hard thing and a soft one. In the same essay Peirce said that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action: a belief is not a picture in the head but a rule for how to act.
Peirce explained truth in the same frame. Investigators who set out from opposed views are carried by the progress of inquiry to one and the same conclusion. "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate," he wrote, "is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real."
Peirce's truth, then, is not "what is useful now" but the opinion that would survive if inquiry were carried to the end. Historians of philosophy today associate Peirce with the idea that true beliefs are those that will withstand future scrutiny. He accepted fallibilism, the view that our knowledge can always prove wrong, while rejecting scepticism. When James and the British philosopher F. C. S. Schiller used the word pragmatism in their own ways, Peirce coined the new name "pragmaticism" in 1905 to keep his original definition.
How did James restate truth?
It was James who made Peirce's idea widely known. He lectured at the Lowell Institute in Boston in November and December 1906 and at Columbia University in New York in January 1907, and published the lectures as Pragmatism (1907), subtitled "A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking". James restated the question pragmatism puts to truth: granted that an idea is true, what concrete difference does its being true make in anyone's actual life? His answer: "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot."
James asked that each word be made to yield its "practical cash-value" and set to work within the stream of experience. He put it even more briefly: "'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving."
In the same book he said that saying of an idea "it is useful because it is true" or "it is true because it is useful" means exactly the same thing. He also left the door open to religion: if theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. Borrowing an image from the Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini, James likened pragmatism, which has no dogmas and only a method, to a corridor in a hotel: in one room someone writes an atheistic book, in another someone prays, in a third a chemist experiments, but all must pass through the corridor.
This view of truth soon drew heavy criticism. G. E. Moore in Britain criticised it in 1908 and Bertrand Russell in 1909 and 1910. Russell's famous objection was that by James's standard, since belief in Santa Claus gives pleasure, "Santa Claus exists" would have to be true. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy today judges the objection unfair: James held only that the happiness a belief gives is relevant to its truth, and would not call it "wholly true" unless it also fitted the rest of experience.
What did Dewey take knowledge to be?
John Dewey extended pragmatism into education and social reform. As a professor at the University of Chicago he founded the Laboratory Schools to test his ideas about teaching, and from 1904 until he retired in 1930 he taught philosophy at Columbia University.
Dewey's target was the old idea of the knower as spectator. In Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) he wrote that the idea that knowledge is a mere beholding of reality was handed down as an unquestioned axiom. We tend to think of knowledge after the model of a spectator viewing a finished picture rather than of the artist producing the painting, and all the questions of epistemology arise from that habit. For him thinking is a plan for clearing up a blocked situation, and ideas are the instruments for carrying out the plan, which is why his position is also called "instrumentalism". In the same book he wrote: "The hypothesis that works is the true one; and truth is an abstract noun applied to the collection of cases, actual, foreseen and desired, that receive confirmation in their works and consequences."
After criticism from Russell and others Dewey changed his wording. In Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) he put forward "warranted assertibility" in place of "truth" and "knowledge" as the goal of inquiry, and explained the term again in a 1941 reply to Russell.
Dewey's influence spread beyond the United States. In 1919, invited by Peking University, probably at the urging of his former students Hu Shih and others, he arrived in Shanghai just before the May Fourth demonstrations and lectured across China until 1921, with Hu Shih as his interpreter.
How did Peirce, James and Dewey differ on truth?
The three share the name pragmatism but think about truth rather differently. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarises them as follows.
| Thinker | What truth was tied to | Key text |
|---|---|---|
| Peirce | Belief that will withstand future scrutiny; the opinion inquiry will finally converge on | "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) |
| James | Belief that is dependable and useful | Pragmatism (1907) |
| Dewey | Well-verified claims; warranted assertibility | Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) |
As the table shows, Peirce placed truth in the long-run convergence of a community of inquiry and stood close to realism, while James stressed what works in an individual's life. The criticisms of Lenin and Russell were aimed mainly at James's side.
How did Marxists see pragmatism?
Lenin dealt with pragmatism directly in a footnote to Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909). He called it almost the "latest fashion" of the newest American philosophy and wrote: "Pragmatism ridicules the metaphysics both of materialism and idealism, acclaims experience and only experience, recognises practice as the only criterion, refers to the positivist movement in general, especially bases itself on Ostwald, Mach, Pearson, Poincaré and Duhem, and on the claim that science is not an 'absolute copy of reality'."
What Lenin objected to came next: from all this pragmatism deduces God, for practical purposes. His evidence was James's Pragmatism. Lenin concluded: "From the standpoint of materialism the differences between Machism and pragmatism are as insignificant and unimportant as the differences between empirio-criticism and empirio-monism." For Lenin pragmatism belonged to the same stem as empirio-criticism and Bogdanov's empiriomonism.
There is an easy confusion here. Marxism too puts forward the criterion of practice. What then is the difference? In the same book Lenin drew it this way: "For the materialist the 'success' of human practice proves the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive. For the solipsist 'success' is everything I need in practice, which can be regarded separately from the theory of knowledge."
For Lenin, then, practical success was evidence that thought agrees with the outside world, not itself the meaning of truth. The distinction leads on to the entries Reflection theory and Objective, relative and absolute truth.
The Frankfurt School criticised pragmatism too. Max Horkheimer, influenced by Max Scheler, opposed reducing all knowledge to purposive action that no longer questions its own aims. In Eclipse of Reason (German title Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft) he took aim above all at James and Dewey: it was a mistake, he held, to transfer the method of the natural sciences to the whole of philosophy merely because of its success. This critique connects with the entry Instrumental reason. In the postscript to The Destruction of Reason (1954) György Lukács cast Wittgenstein and the pragmatists as proponents of a subjectivism that had helped a new form of fascism; the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy counts this among the book's particularly problematic claims.
Where did Dewey meet Trotsky, and Hu Shih meet Li Dazhao?
Pragmatism did not meet Marxism only on paper. In March 1937 the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky set up a commission to investigate the charges made against Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, and the seventy-eight-year-old Dewey agreed to chair it. The commission held thirteen hearings at Trotsky's home in Coyoacán, Mexico, in April 1937, and on 21 September announced in New York that it had cleared Trotsky of all the charges. It is known as the Dewey Commission.
The next year, in Their Morals and Ours (1938), Trotsky answered the charge that revolutionaries think the end justifies any means. "Dialectical materialism," he wrote, "knows no dualism of means and end."
Dewey soon wrote a reply. He accepted Trotsky's analysis that ends and means are interdependent, but held that Trotsky committed a logical fallacy in deducing the means from a single law, the class struggle. Dewey's student Sidney Hook stood between them. Hook was an expert on Marx who had attended Karl Korsch's lectures in Berlin in 1928 and done research at the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow; he helped with the Dewey Commission, and later became an anti-communist.
China saw a similar parting of ways. In July 1919 Hu Shih, Dewey's student, published "More Study of Problems, Less Talk of Isms" in Weekly Critic, and in August Li Dazhao answered with "Problems and Isms Again". Li argued that there had to be a fundamental solution if there was to be hope of solving the concrete problems one by one. This exchange of the New Culture Movement years is called the "problems and isms" debate. In the 1950s the Chinese Communist Party ran a campaign criticising Hu Shih's thought.
Where did pragmatism go next?
In mid-twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy pragmatism was eclipsed by logical positivism. It drew attention again in the 1960s when Willard Van Orman Quine and Wilfrid Sellars criticised logical positivism with a renewed pragmatism. From the 1970s Richard Rorty opened "neopragmatism": he attacked the idea of knowledge as a mirror of nature, that is, representationalism, and proposed giving up the idea of truth as correspondence to reality. Against him, "new pragmatists" such as Susan Haack and Cheryl Misak sought to rehabilitate the ideals of objectivity of Peirce and Dewey.
Pragmatism also became material for thinkers on the Marxist side. Jürgen Habermas, of the Frankfurt School's second generation, drew on George Herbert Mead's pragmatist account of the self in building his theory of communicative action. In the United States Cornel West put forward a "prophetic pragmatism" drawing on both Christian and Marxian thought. Karl Mannheim, a founder of the sociology of knowledge, also sought to synthesise elements of Anglo-American pragmatism with German historicism, Marxism and phenomenology, and Max Scheler weighed the value and limits of pragmatism in Erkenntnis und Arbeit (1926). This current is covered in the entry Sociology of knowledge.
In short, pragmatism resembles the Marxist emphasis on practice in holding that knowledge is not separate from action. Where they part is over what that action tests. Pragmatism asks whether an idea works in experience; Lenin's materialism asks whether its working shows agreement with a world independent of thought.
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