Wissenssoziologie · 1920s–present

Sociology of knowledge

지식사회학

The branch of sociology that studies how human thought and knowledge are connected with the social context in which they arise, and what effects prevailing ideas and beliefs have on societies. It starts from the hypothesis that knowledge is shaped through, and anchored in, its social context. In 1920s Germany Max Scheler gave it its name and Karl Mannheim made it widely known with Ideology and Utopia (1929). Marx and Engels's The German Ideology is counted as its direct forerunner.

In depth

Does thought have a social address?

It is common for a worker and an employer to read the same newspaper report in completely different ways. One sees a wage demand as claiming a fair share; the other sees it as damaging competitiveness. Is one of them lying? Not necessarily. Each may simply be seeing what is visible from where they stand. How, then, is a person's thinking connected with the place that person occupies in society: class, generation, region, occupation? That is the question of the sociology of knowledge.

The sociology of knowledge studies how knowledge arises, spreads, is used and is preserved within groups, communities and societies. Its basic hypothesis is that knowledge is shaped through its social context and anchored in it. On this view knowledge, and more generally thought itself, is socially conditioned, and cognition is not an autonomous process. The sociology of scientific knowledge is one branch of the sociology of knowledge.

The idea has long roots. Francis Bacon's doctrine of the idols singled out the prejudices and errors that cloud true knowledge, and Giambattista Vico held that human beings construct their own history in a social context. Friedrich Nietzsche counts as a forerunner because he exposed the dependence of "truth" on interests. The most direct forerunners were Marx and Engels. In The German Ideology (1846) they argued that people's ideas are rooted in their class interests and in the social and economic circumstances in which they live. They started from the ideological illusion of whatever way of thinking is dominant at a given time, and, setting Hegel on his feet, said that it is not consciousness that determines being but being that determines consciousness.

In France, Émile Durkheim pioneered the field at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the 1903 essay "Primitive Classification", written with Marcel Mauss, he argued that classification systems are collectively based and that their divisions derive from social categories. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) he held that the categories of logical thought, such as space and time, have a social origin. Neither Durkheim nor Mauss, however, coined the term "sociology of knowledge".

What did Scheler propose?

The term "sociology of knowledge" came into wide use in the German-speaking world in the 1920s. It was first introduced by the phenomenologist and philosopher Max Scheler. He introduced it in 1924 in Attempts at a Sociology of Knowledge (Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens), and in 1926 he expanded the project into Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft (The Forms of Knowledge and Society).

Scheler divided the factors that drive social life into two kinds. One kind is the "real factors" (Realfaktoren), such as relations of economics and power and relations of kinship and reproduction; the other is the "ideal factors" (Idealfaktoren), such as religion, metaphysics, science, art and law. For Scheler the highest aim of sociology was to discover the order in which these two kinds of factor act at each point in time. His position was that real history by no means determines the positive meaning of the works of the mind, but it hinders or releases, delays or speeds up the realisation of that meaning in works and in reality. Scheler put it in an image:

"It opens and closes, in a definite manner and order, the sluice gates of the stream of the mind."

Sie öffnet und schließt in bestimmter Art und Ordnung die Schleusen des geistigen Stromes.

He also divided knowledge into three kinds: knowledge of salvation or redemption (Heilswissen, Erlösungswissen), knowledge of culture or formation (Bildungswissen), and knowledge of achievement (Leistungswissen), which serves to master nature and get things done. Each kind of knowledge corresponds to a particular attitude of interest.

Scheler dealt with Marxism head on. When lower layers of thought justify themselves by borrowing the doctrines of higher ones, he wrote, the mixed formations called "ideologies" arise, and the most powerful example in modern history is Marxism as a kind of "ideology of the oppressed". To subordinate the genesis of all knowledge to the laws by which ideologies come into being, he held, is a specific thesis of the economic interpretation of history.

How did Mannheim extend Marx's theory of ideology?

Karl Mannheim was a Hungarian sociologist born in Budapest. In 1915 he became the youngest founding member of the Sunday Circle around György Lukács. During the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 he taught at the Pedagogical Institute of the University of Budapest under Lukács's patronage, but he did not share Lukács's conversion to communism. After Horthy came to power both men had to go into exile, and Mannheim lived in Germany from 1920 to 1933.

In 1929 Mannheim published Ideology and Utopia. Tracing the history of the concept of ideology, he distinguished two stages. The first is the "particular" conception, which suspects opponents of deliberately obscuring facts. The second is the "total" conception, most prominent in Marx, which holds that a social group's whole way of thinking is shaped by its social position: the beliefs of the proletariat, for example, are conditioned by its relation to the means of production. Mannheim held that one further step was needed. One reaches the "general form of the total conception of ideology"

"when one has the courage to see not only the opponent's standpoint but in principle all standpoints, and so one's own as well, as ideological."

wenn man den Mut hat, nicht nur die gegnerischen, sondern prinzipiell alle, also auch den eigenen Standort, als ideologisch zu sehen.

With the appearance of this general form, Mannheim wrote, the sociology of knowledge arises out of the mere theory of ideology. The truth that had been discovered within one party's intellectual weaponry but grasped only partially, namely that all living thought is bound to existence (Seinsgebundenheit), is lifted out and made the subject of scholarly research. The relation to the Marxist theory of ideology is treated more fully under Ideology (Marxism).

Mannheim named social class, location and generation as the greatest determinants of knowledge. His book was the most widely debated work by a living sociologist in Weimar Germany. Its reviewers included Hannah Arendt, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Paul Tillich, Otto Neurath, Karl August Wittfogel and Leo Strauss. An expanded English edition followed in 1936 and became a standard of American-style sociology.

If all thought is bound to its position, what about the sociology of knowledge itself?

Mannheim's generalisation raised an awkward question at once. If all knowledge and belief are products of socio-political forces, is that claim not itself merely such a product, with no claim to truth? Mannheim saw that relativism of this kind defeats itself. He therefore distinguished "relativism" (Relativismus) from "relationism" (Relationismus). Relativism arises when the new insight that all historical thought is bound to a standpoint is combined with an older theory of knowledge that recognises as true only what is true for all times and places. Relationism holds that something true only in certain times and places is not for that reason any less true. Pragmatism influenced this idea. Mannheim's answer was that the recognition of different perspectives according to time and social location appears arbitrary only to an abstract and disembodied theory of knowledge.

Who, then, can synthesise the different perspectives? Mannheim looked for the answer in a stratum of intellectuals only loosely anchored to the class structure of society. Borrowing Alfred Weber's term, he called this stratum the "socially free-floating intelligentsia" (sozial freischwebende Intelligenz). Its members may attach themselves by choice to one of the warring classes, or they may reflect on their own roots and seek a mission as advocates of the intellectual interests of the whole. Mannheim held that they could create a "dynamic synthesis" of the ideologies of the different groups.

Who criticised the sociology of knowledge?

Suspicion on the Marxist side came early. While Mannheim was professor of sociology at Frankfurt from 1929 to 1933, some members of the Institute for Social Research directed by Horkheimer saw the rising popularity of the sociology of knowledge as a neutralisation and betrayal of Marxism. Mannheim and Horkheimer argued it out in faculty forums such as the Kant Society and Paul Tillich's Christian Socialist discussion group. As Mannheim himself put it, he sought to turn a concept born in one party's intellectual weaponry into a research method applied equally to every side.

From the other side came Karl Popper's criticism. In his 1961 Tübingen paper, which opened the positivism dispute, Popper said it was entirely mistaken to think that the objectivity of science depends on the objectivity of the individual scientist. For him objectivity lay solely in the critical tradition, in the social relations through which scientists criticise one another. A sociology of knowledge that looks for objectivity in the behaviour of individual scientists and explains its absence by their social position, he argued, misses the decisive point. His thirteenth thesis put it ironically:

"What the sociology of knowledge has overlooked is nothing other than the sociology of knowledge itself: the theory of scientific objectivity."

Was die Soziologie des Wissens übersehen hat, ist nichts anderes als eben die Soziologie des Wissens: die Theorie der wissenschaftlichen Objektivität.

According to Popper, scientific objectivity is explained by competition, by the critical tradition, by social institutions such as competing journals and congresses, and by the political toleration of free discussion. Such things as the social or ideological position of the researcher always play a part in the short run but in time eliminate themselves.

Where did the sociology of knowledge go next?

In 1933 Mannheim was dismissed from his chair under the Nazis' antisemitic civil service law and went into exile in Britain. He taught at the London School of Economics, became the first professor of sociology at the University of London's Institute of Education in 1946, and died in London in 1947. In his British period he argued for a shift from laissez-faire capitalism to "planned democracy". Norbert Elias, his assistant in Frankfurt, later developed a sociology of knowledge of his own that treats the generation of knowledge and the development of the sciences as long-term social processes.

In the United States Robert K. Merton surveyed the field in 1937 in an essay titled "The sociology of knowledge". But while functionalism dominated sociology in the middle of the twentieth century, the sociology of knowledge stayed on the margins of the mainstream. In the 1960s Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann reinvented it and applied it closely to everyday life in The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Their "new sociology of knowledge" deals not only with scholars' theories or ideologies but with everything that passes for knowledge in a society, including the everyday knowledge of ordinary people.

The genealogical and archaeological studies of Michel Foucault also have considerable influence on the sociology of knowledge today. Foucault's discourse analysis, with its principle that knowledge and power are inseparable, can itself be read as a sociology of knowledge in the classical sense of Mannheim and Scheler. Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, too, works as a sociology of knowledge by relating "the structure of society and its semantics", and refers explicitly to Mannheim. In the 1970s the sociology of scientific knowledge emerged in Britain, seeking to explain not only the society of scientists but scientific ideas themselves in sociological terms.

Related people

Sources

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