Sociology of scientific knowledge
과학지식사회학
A field of research that treats the content of scientific knowledge itself as the product of social activity and seeks to explain it sociologically. It emerged in Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s; its best-known form is the "strong programme" of David Bloor and Barry Barnes's Edinburgh school, which demanded that successful and failed theories be explained by the same kinds of causes. Boris Hessen's 1931 London paper on Newton is cited as a forerunner of the sociology of science.
In depth
Is science not right simply because nature is that way?
In the nineteenth century phrenology, the claim that a person's character and abilities could be read from the shape of the skull, passed for science. Today we know phrenology was wrong. So why did people believe it then? The usual answer is the researchers' prejudices and their hidden political or economic interests. But why were successful theories accepted? Here the usual answer is that they had revealed a fact of nature.
The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) questions this asymmetry. It studies science as a social activity. It traces the development of a scientific field to find the points of contingency or interpretative flexibility where things could have gone more than one way, and it tries to explain, by external social and historical circumstances, why one interpretation rather than another prevailed. Such variations may be linked to political, historical, cultural or economic factors. Accounts of the field stress that its aim is neither to promote relativism nor to attack the scientific project.
The sociology of scientific knowledge is a branch of the sociology of knowledge in the broad sense. It extended even to mathematics: Sal Restivo and David Bloor argued that mathematical knowledge too is socially constructed and has irreducible contingent and historical factors woven into it.
What did the strong programme demand?
David Bloor called the approach that applies sociological explanation only to erroneous beliefs the "weak programme", and his own approach, which holds that social factors influence all beliefs, the "strong programme". A weak sociology explains failed theories by the researchers' biases but holds that sociology has little to say about successful ones, which succeeded because they revealed a fact of nature. The strong programme proposed instead that "true" and "false" scientific theories be treated the same way: both are caused by social factors or conditions, such as cultural context and self-interest. Bloor set out the idea in Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976).
As Bloor formulated it, the strong programme has four indispensable components.
| Tenet | Content |
|---|---|
| Causality | It examines the psychological, social and cultural conditions that bring about claims to a certain kind of knowledge. |
| Impartiality | It examines successful as well as unsuccessful knowledge claims. |
| Symmetry | It uses the same types of explanation for successful and unsuccessful knowledge claims alike. |
| Reflexivity | It must be applicable to sociology itself. |
Because the programme originated at the Science Studies Unit of the University of Edinburgh, it is sometimes called the Edinburgh school. Bloor and Barry Barnes were its major figures in the 1970s. In the same period a Bath school centred on Harry Collins made similar proposals under the name of the Empirical Programme of Relativism. Where the Edinburgh school emphasised historical approaches, the Bath school made microsocial studies of laboratories and experiments. Collins has written on the sociology of gravitational-wave physics for over thirty years. Collins's student Trevor Pinch and the Dutch sociologist Wiebe Bijker extended the strong programme to technology in the "social construction of technology" approach.
Landmark studies in the strong-programme vein include Andrew Pickering's 1984 study of competing professional interests in the interpretation of high-energy particle physics experiments, and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), on the controversy between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes over experiments with vacuum pumps. Shapin and Schaffer asked why one does experiments in order to arrive at scientific truth. In the 1660s both Boyle's experimentalism and Hobbes's natural philosophy were respected methods, and the reasons Boyle prevailed would not have been obvious to contemporaries; so they set out to weigh both sides' arguments equally.
Where did the idea come from?
A forerunner often cited for attempts to explain scientific knowledge socially is the paper of the Soviet physicist Boris Hessen. At the Second International Congress of the History of Science in London in 1931, Hessen, as part of a Soviet delegation led by Nikolai Bukharin, delivered "The Socio-Economic Roots of Newton's Principia". He argued that Newton's main work was created to cater to the goals of seventeenth-century industry and economy, and that the Principia was the solution of the technical problems of the bourgeoisie. The paper is credited with becoming foundational in the history of science and with leading to modern studies of scientific revolutions and to the sociology of science. Russian sources note that it gave an important stimulus to the "externalist" approach, which writes the history of science in terms of its social and economic conditions. The British crystallographer John Desmond Bernal met Bukharin and Hessen at the congress, which fundamentally changed his world view, and in 1939 he published The Social Function of Science, probably the earliest text on the sociology of science.
In the United States Robert K. Merton helped create the sociology of science with Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (1938). Much as Max Weber linked the Protestant ethic with capitalism, Merton proposed a positive correlation between Puritanism and early experimental science. In 1942 he named four institutional imperatives that make up the ethos of modern science: communism, universalism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism.
SSK arose in the 1970s in self-conscious opposition to this Mertonian sociology of science. Merton's was a "sociology of scientists", which left the cognitive content of science out of the sociological account; SSK set out to give sociological explanations of scientific ideas themselves. It took its lead from the work of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas Kuhn, from the cultural anthropology of Durkheim and Mauss, and from the late Wittgenstein.
How are scientific facts made in the laboratory?
From the late 1970s came "laboratory studies", which looked at scientists' workplaces as an anthropologist would. In Laboratory Life (1979) Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar studied Roger Guillemin's neuroendocrinology laboratory at the Salk Institute. They said their work concerned the way in which the daily activities of working scientists lead to the construction of scientific facts, and they described the complex relations between routine lab practices, the publication of papers, scientific prestige, research finances and other elements of laboratory life. Karin Knorr Cetina reported on a year-long study of a plant science laboratory at UC Berkeley. In later work these scholars argued that their studies showed philosophical analyses of rationality, evidence, truth and knowledge to be irrelevant to understanding scientific knowledge.
Why did Latour and Bloor part ways?
Laboratory Life inspired actor-network theory (ANT). Developed by Michel Callon, Madeleine Akrich, Latour, the sociologist John Law and others, the theory holds that everything in the social and natural worlds exists in constantly shifting networks of relationships, and that nothing exists outside those relationships. Objects, ideas and processes are as important as humans in creating social situations. The theory is best known for its controversial insistence on the capacity of nonhumans to act. It also holds that social forces do not exist in themselves and therefore cannot be used to explain social phenomena.
This collided head on with the strong programme. ANT theorists criticised SSK for sociological reductionism and a human-centred universe, saying it relied too heavily on human actors and on social rules and conventions to explain how scientific controversies are settled. Bloor strongly disagreed with the claim that humans and nonhumans should be treated in an equivalent manner, going so far as to write a 1999 article titled "Anti-Latour". Latour replied the same year. Collins and Steven Yearley joined the debate with an essay titled "Epistemological Chicken".
Who criticised the sociology of scientific knowledge?
Critics held that the strong programme adheres to a form of radical relativism. The programme argues that in the social study of institutionalised beliefs about "truth" it would be unwise to use "truth" as an explanatory resource: doing so would include the answer as part of the question and produce a "whiggish" history, a narrative of history as an inevitable march towards truth. Scientists and philosophers fiercely criticised this stance for ignoring the objective reality of nature and for wanting the history of science written without regard for whether the theories involved were actually correct.
In Fashionable Nonsense (1997) the physicists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont criticised the strong programme, associating it with the broader concept of social constructionism. In their view its main error was to ignore that scientists primarily use nature, and mathematicians logic, not social pressures, to validate their findings. The philosopher Joseph Agassi argued that it is impossible to explain science by social circumstances alone and that demanding that history do so is irrational. It has also been argued that the strong programme has incited climate denial.
This conflict later became known as the science wars, and it was escalated by Higher Superstition (1994), a book by the biologist Paul R. Gross and the mathematician Norman Levitt. Even so, SSK established itself through international associations such as 4S and EASST, with groups more recently founded in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Latin America. The strong programme's influence on science and technology studies (STS) worldwide is credited as being unparalleled.