Thing-in-itself
물자체
Kant's concept of a thing as it is in itself, apart from how it appears to us. Kant held that we cognise only phenomena and cannot cognise the thing-in-itself, though we can think it. Jacobi and the German idealists attacked the coherence of the concept, and Engels and Lenin countered that practice and the advance of knowledge turn the "thing-in-itself" into a "thing for us".
In depth
What question gave rise to the thing-in-itself?
To someone born wearing blue spectacles they could never take off, the world would look entirely blue. Could such a person know the colour of the world without them? Might the human eye and brain not be spectacles of that kind? If a bat and a person experience the same cave quite differently, which is the cave's "real look"? What do things look like when no one is seeing them? These are the questions Kant took up with the term thing-in-itself.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) separates things as they appear to us (phenomena) from things as they are in themselves. Forms such as space, time and causality belong to our cognitive faculty, so we always know things only through those forms. Things apart from those forms therefore cannot be objects of cognition.
That did not lead him to say the thing-in-itself does not exist: "We must at least be able to think these same objects as things in themselves, even if we cannot cognise them. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is appearance without anything that appears."
daß wir eben dieselben Gegenstände auch als Dinge an sich selbst, wenn gleich nicht erkennen, doch wenigstens müssen denken können*. Denn sonst würde der ungereimte Satz daraus folgen, daß Erscheinung ohne etwas wäre, was da erscheint.
What exactly is it, and why do Kant scholars disagree?
Several similar words must be sorted out. Alongside the thing-in-itself Kant uses "noumenon" (what is only thought by the understanding). In its negative sense the noumenon only means what is not an object of our sensible intuition, a "limiting concept" that marks a boundary.
Kant scholars dispute to this day whether phenomena and things-in-themselves are two different worlds or two aspects of one and the same thing. P. F. Strawson gave an influential reading that takes Kant's transcendental idealism as in effect Berkeleyan and judges it a blunder. Others defend Kant by reading the distinction as one between considering the same thing with or without regard to the conditions of cognition.
Why did Kant's contemporaries attack at once?
Criticism began as soon as the book appeared. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's terse objection is famous: without the thing-in-itself one cannot enter Kant's system, and with it one cannot stay inside. According to Kant causality applies only to phenomena, yet to say the thing-in-itself "affects" our senses applies causality beyond them.
In 1792 Schulze, in the anonymous book Aenesidemus, borrowed the name of an ancient sceptic to argue that Kant had not overcome Hume's doubt. Fichte went on from here to drop the thing-in-itself: if everything comes from the activity of the I, nothing else is needed. Hegel held that to call it unknowable renounces philosophy's claim to truth. In section 44 of the Encyclopaedia he explains the thing-in-itself as what remains when everything that appears to consciousness has been abstracted away, and says it is easy to see what is left: "the complete abstraction, the wholly empty, determined only as a beyond."
das völlige Abstraktum, das ganz Leere, bestimmt nur noch als Jenseits
This caput mortuum is itself only the product of thought that has advanced to pure abstraction. What is called unknowable is in fact a blank we made ourselves. That story continues under German Idealism. Schopenhauer on the contrary interpreted the thing-in-itself as will, and the neo-Kantians reinterpreted it in various ways.
Why did Engels say the thing-in-itself was finished?
In Ludwig Feuerbach Engels breaks through Kant's fence with practice: "If we can prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, producing it from its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to Kant's ungraspable 'thing-in-itself'."
Wenn wir die Richtigkeit unsrer Auffassung eines Naturvorgangs beweisen können, indem wir ihn selbst machen, ihn aus seinen Bedingungen erzeugen, ihn obendrein unsern Zwecken dienstbar werden lassen, so ist es mit dem Kantschen unfaßbaren "Ding an sich" zu Ende.
His example is alizarin, the red dye of the madder root. Until organic chemistry synthesised it the dye was a "thing-in-itself" hidden in the plant, but once it was made from coal tar, the "thing-in-itself" became a thing for us.
damit wurde das "Ding an sich" ein Ding für uns
Lenin drew a sweeping conclusion: "There is definitely no difference of principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there cannot be any. The difference is simply between what is known and what is not yet known."
Решительно никакой принципиальной разницы между явлением и вещью в себе нет и быть не может. Различие есть просто между тем, что познано, и тем, что еще непознано
On his diagnosis Kant attempted a reconciliation: "The basic feature of Kant's philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination in one system of heterogeneous and opposed philosophical trends."
Основная черта философии Канта есть примирение материализма с идеализмом, компромисс между тем и другим, сочетание в одной системе разнородных, противоположных философских направлений.
To admit that something outside us exists is to be a materialist, and to declare it unknowable is to be an idealist. So Lenin divides the attacks on Kant in two. Materialists criticise Kant for calling the thing-in-itself unknowable. Mach, Bogdanov and Bazarov, by contrast, criticise the term as superfluous and in effect erase reality beyond sensation. Fighting Kant from the left, as Lafargue did, differs from fighting him from the right, as Schulze did. Lenin's rebuke of Plekhanov for calling sensations "hieroglyphs" belongs to the same context. In Helmholtz's "theory of symbols" sensation was not a copy of things but only a sign, which Lenin thought gave agnosticism an opening.
Is the dispute over?
The sharpest objection came from within Marxism. In section II, "The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought", of "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" in History and Class Consciousness, Lukács added an excursus criticising Engels's alizarin argument. His first point is terminological. For Hegel "in itself" and "for us" are not opposites but correlatives, and the opposite of "in itself" is "for itself".
His second point concerns Kant. Kant did not take the thing-in-itself as a barrier to the expansion of knowledge. He tailored his epistemology to the most advanced natural science of the day, Newton's astronomy, and assumed its method could expand without limit. His critique is aimed at the fact that even complete knowledge of all phenomena would be only knowledge of phenomena. So chemistry's synthesis of alizarin leaves Kant's problem untouched.
The third point goes straight at Engels's argument. Lukács says that experiment and industry are not practice in the dialectical sense. The experimenter creates an artificial, abstract milieu in order to observe the undisturbed working of laws, so scientific experiment is contemplation at its purest. In the previous section he likens the use-values neglected by economics to "things-in-themselves", moving the problem into that of Reification.