The Privatization of Japanese National Railways and the Dissolution of Sohyo
Why did the National Railway Workers' Union, once Japan's largest union, lose the 1975 strike for the right to strike and collapse in the 1980s breakup of the national railways, and why did railway reform lead to the dissolution of Sohyo and the founding of Rengo?
Defeated in the 1975 strike for the right to strike, the railway unions were on the defensive thereafter. In 1981 the Suzuki cabinet's Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform recommended breaking up and privatizing JNR, and the Nakasone cabinet, citing debts of more than 37 trillion yen, split it into the JR Group in April 1987. Doro turned to cooperation, while Kokuro held out and was broken by mass resignations and the non-hiring of its members. Sohyo, built around Kokuro, dissolved into Rengo in November 1989, and the unions that refused founded Zenroren and Zenrokyo.
Why were the railway unions at the centre of the Japanese labour movement?
Japanese National Railways (JNR) was set up as a public corporation in 1949 and carried the main burden of transport in postwar Japan. The National Railway Workers' Union (Kokuro), founded in February 1946, once organized more than 70 percent of the railway staff, and even in April 1985, with 187,592 members, it was the largest union in Japan. Kokuro was the core of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), founded in 1950, and Sohyo was the largest base of support of the Japan Socialist Party. Together with the postal workers' and the teachers' unions, Kokuro was counted among Sohyo's "big three." The National Railway Motive Power Union (Doro), centred on locomotive engineers, split from Kokuro in 1951 but was even more militant, earning the nickname "demon Doro." 1 2 3 4 5 6
Railway employees were barred from striking by the Public Corporation Labour Relations Act, a ban that went back to Cabinet Order 201 issued under the occupation authorities in July 1948. Kokuro and Doro defied it again and again with work-to-rule actions and strikes. When in 1970 JNR management used its productivity campaign (the Maru-sei movement) to encourage workers to leave the unions, the two unions took it to the public corporations' labour commission, which in October 1971 found unfair labour practices by management. Emboldened by this victory over Maru-sei, the unions began campaigns denouncing workplace supervisors and made the recovery of the right to strike their goal. 7 8
Kokuro was never of one mind. The left and right wings of the Socialist Party and the Communist-aligned activists clashed from its founding, and over time the Socialist Association and the New Left Chukaku and Kakumaru factions also entered it. In Doro, Akira Matsuzaki, a top Kakumaru leader, took control by way of the youth section; in reaction the Communist-aligned Zendoro split off in 1974, and in 1979, after disputes over the struggle against Narita airport, the Chukaku-aligned Doro-Chiba. These divisions later underlay the different roads each union took when faced with the breakup. 2 6
Meanwhile the railways' finances were collapsing. JNR went into deficit in 1964. With the spread of the motor car its share of passenger traffic fell from 55 percent in fiscal 1955 to 23 percent in 1986, and of freight from 52 to 5 percent. Unprofitable lines were built around the country for political reasons, and personnel costs reached 82 percent of operating revenue. Passengers' anger grew too: on 13 March 1973, when a work-to-rule action delayed trains, passengers at Ageo station in Saitama rioted, smashing a driver's cab and the stationmaster's office. 1 3 9
Why was the 1975 strike for the right to strike defeated?
In the 1974 spring offensive the government and the Sohyo side agreed to set up a ministerial panel on the right to strike and to reach a conclusion "as soon as possible." In 1975 Prime Minister Takeo Miki spoke of dialogue, and Korokyo, the council of unions in the public corporations, expected the government to recognize the right to strike, if only with conditions. But the LDP mainstream, the Tanaka faction and party secretary-general Yasuhiro Nakasone, insisted there would be no compromise with an illegal strike, a line confirmed when Nakasone met Miki on 22 November. 7
Korokyo struck from 26 November. Only about 3 percent of passenger trains ran and freight almost wholly stopped. But most goods for daily life had already shifted to trucks, and prices in Tokyo began to fall from the fourth day. On 1 December Miki, bowing to opinion in his party, declared that the government "will not yield to the strike," and on 3 December Korokyo called it off with nothing gained. Over eight days 142,502 passenger and 41,317 freight trains were cancelled. Mitsuo Tomizuka, the Sohyo secretary-general who led the strike, was judged to have misread the situation. 7 10
The price of defeat was high. In February 1976 JNR sued Kokuro and Doro for 20.2 billion yen in damages, and fifteen workers were dismissed. Strike days on the railways fell from 23 in 1974 to 8 in 1976 and 6 in 1977. In 1978 Doro's "stable freight declaration" took freight trains out of its strikes. Meanwhile the government expert panel's call to "review the form of management of the three public corporations and five state enterprises" carried over into the debate on how the railways should be run. The economist Hiroshi Kato, who later drove the breakup, said this panel was where his idea of division and privatization began. 7 11
How did the Rincho make railway reform a national task?
The Special Measures Act for the reconstruction of JNR passed in December 1980, but the deficit did not shrink: from fiscal 1980 the railways lost more than a trillion yen every year even after state subsidies of several hundred billion. In March 1981 the Suzuki cabinet, pledging "fiscal reconstruction without tax increases," launched the Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform (Rincho) under Toshiwo Doko, honorary chairman of the Keidanren business federation. The commission set the goals of ending deficit-financing bonds by fiscal 1984 and eliminating the "3K deficits" of rice, the railways (kokutetsu) and health insurance. 3 1 12 13
The real deliberation on railway reform took place in the Fourth Subcommittee under Hiroshi Kato, and the commission shaped opinion as well as deliberating. In April 1982 Kato published "The JNR Must Be Broken Up" in Gendai, and the commission's adviser Taro Yayama published an essay branding JNR management and unions traitors to the nation in Bungei Shunju. In January 1982 a scoop revealed allowances paid to crews who did not ride the Blue Train sleepers, and the press ran daily exposés of workplace practices. According to the Labour Year Book of Japan, these reports on unauthorized allowances, phantom overtime and sudden absences treated weak workplace managers, and the workplace consultation system that protected that weakness, as the root of all evil, and the cooperative Railway Workers' Union (Tetsuro) fed them examples by informing on Kokuro and Doro members. 3 4
On 30 July 1982 the commission's basic report declared that "JNR should be divided and privatized within five years," and on 24 September the Suzuki cabinet decided to follow it. The Nakasone cabinet took office on 27 November with administrative reform as its banner, and on 10 June 1983 the JNR Reconstruction Supervisory Committee was set up under Masao Kamei of Sumitomo Electric. Inside the LDP Hiroshi Mitsuzuka led the party's JNR reconstruction subcommittee. By its final report of March 1983 the commission had recommended privatizing the three public corporations, the railways, the telephone corporation and the tobacco monopoly, and the latter two became NTT and JT on 1 April 1985. 3 13 14 15
The two corporations privatized before the railways showed another path. For telecommunications, the Telecommunications Business Law and the NTT Law of 1984 opened the field to new carriers and liberalized terminals and lines, over objections that remote areas would lose telephone service. For tobacco, JT took over the manufacturing monopoly and the salt monopoly, and the government was to hold at least a third of its shares. The telecom union Zendentsu, under its chairman Akira Yamagishi, met privatization with "yes to privatization, no to breakup," preserving its organization and keeping NTT whole: the opposite of Kokuro, which opposed both division and privatization to the end. 16 17 18 19
Was the aim of the breakup to clear the debt or to break the unions?
The government's stated reasons were managerial. In fiscal 1986 JNR lost 1.4 trillion yen on revenue of 3.9 trillion, and by the transport ministry's figures its final long-term debt was 37.1 trillion yen (some sources give 37.3 trillion). The supervisory committee's final report of 26 July 1985 proposed six passenger companies and counted 93,000 to 94,000 of about 277,000 employees as "surplus." Political interference and blurred responsibility under the public-corporation system, and the inefficiency of a single nationwide organization, were cited as well. 1 20 3
Yet those who drove it named another aim. The supervisory committee chairman Masao Kamei wrote in the September 1985 Bungei Shunju that "Kokuro and Doro must be dismantled. Through dividing JNR we aim at the end of the history of the postwar labour movement." Nakasone later said: "I meant to bring Sohyo down. I did it clearly aware that if Kokuro collapsed, Sohyo would collapse too." The Japanese Wikipedia article on Nakasone likewise says the privatization was meant to break Sohyo and the Socialist Party that rested on it. 4 2 21
Judgments differ. Yoshiyuki Kasai, one of the "JNR reform trio" who pushed the breakup from inside the railways, answered Nakasone's remark: "to us it did not matter what became of the unions; to call that the aim is to mistake the essence." Critics of the breakup call the exclusion of Kokuro "unfair labour practice by the state" and regard the workplace-discipline campaign as a pretext for it. Others hold the reverse, that the cause of clearing the huge debt was itself the pretext for breaking the union. 2 3
How did the railway unions split apart?
There was resistance inside management too. President Iwao Nisugi and other top officials opposed division, and the reformist "trio" of Masatake Matsuda, Yoshiyuki Kasai and Masataka Ide had at one point been sidelined. When an executive director's off-the-record remarks to a reporter, attacking the trio and Kamei and claiming that the groundwork against division had been laid, reached Nakasone through Kasai and Taro Yayama, Nakasone ordered the removal of eight top officials who opposed division. In June 1985 Nisugi resigned, Takaya Sugiura of the transport ministry became president, and the trio returned to headquarters and took control. 3 22
On the union side it was Doro that turned first. Having concluded after 1975 that strikes no longer worked, Doro under its chairman Akira Matsuzaki switched to supporting the breakup on a policy of "protecting members' jobs." On 13 January 1986 President Sugiura summoned the union leaders and offered a "labour-management joint declaration" as the condition of job-security agreements. Doro, Tetsuro and Zenshiro accepted and signed on 21 January; Kokuro and Zendoro refused, saying it denied "the basis on which a labour union exists." Doro said it would hold to its stance "for the sake of securing jobs, whether we are called snakes or Buddhas." Management cancelled its job-security agreement with Kokuro, and in August 1986 it withdrew the 20.2-billion-yen suit against Doro alone. 6 3 23 11
The opponents divided over how to hold out. At its July 1985 congress Sohyo made the railways its main task and launched a "50 million signatures" petition aimed at a majority of voters, collecting 35,120,857 by March 1986. On 5 August 1985, around the supervisory committee's report, 67,000 Kokuro members held a one-hour strike. Doro-Chiba, the Chiba motive-power union aligned with the Chukaku faction, struck against the breakup on 29 November 1985 under its chairman Hiroshi Nakano, and that same day the Chukaku faction cut signal cables in the "simultaneous guerrilla attacks on the national railways," paralysing commuter lines around Tokyo and Osaka for a day. Even the Communist Party condemned it, and public opinion swung further toward the breakup. 24 25 26 3
Why did Kokuro collapse, and why were 1,047 workers left behind?
On 1 July 1986 JNR opened "human resource utilization centres" for its "surplus" staff. Of those assigned to the 1,438 centres set up across the country by 1 October, 81 percent were Kokuro members. On 6 July the LDP, which had promised to privatize the public corporations and state enterprises, won a landslide in the double election to both houses, and the breakup was all but settled. Members kept leaving, and Kokuro's share of the workforce fell from 70.4 percent in December 1985 to 49.8 percent in October 1986. 27 3 23
Kokuro's mainstream leadership proposed turning to labour-management cooperation and accepting privatization. But at the extraordinary congress held at Shuzenji on 9 October 1986, the Socialist-left and Communist-aligned minority factions joined to keep the union against the breakup; chairman Shunichi Yamazaki was forced out and Satoshi Roppongi took his place, and the mainstream faction left and later formed Tessan Soren. By the breakup more than 200,000 people had left Kokuro, including those who quit the railways, and its membership had fallen to 62,000. The eight JNR reform laws passed on 28 November with the votes of the LDP, Komeito and the Democratic Socialists; the Socialist Party opposed division while accepting privatization, and the Communists opposed both. 3 2 28
The law made JNR and the JR companies separate entities, so JR had no duty to hire JNR staff: employees had to resign and apply to the new companies, from lists drawn up by JNR. About 75,000 people left the railways and about 201,000 were hired. Kokuro members were hired at a rate of 99 percent on Honshu and Shikoku but 43 to 48 percent in Hokkaido and Kyushu, and sources put the number not hired at 5,009 or 5,049; almost no one from the Doro side was refused. Of the roughly 7,000 sent to the JNR Settlement Corporation, 70.8 percent were Kokuro members, and 1,047 were still there when the corporation dismissed them in 1990. Their struggle for reinstatement ended on 28 June 2010 in a political settlement paying about 19.9 billion yen to 904 households, including bereaved families, but no one was reinstated. 3 2 29 30
What became of the railway unions and the dismissed workers after JR began?
The unions that cooperated with the breakup, Doro, Tetsuro and Zenshiro, together with Shin-Kokuro, a breakaway from Kokuro, came together on 2 February 1987 in a council of JNR reform unions, and after privatization they formed a federation of company unions, Tetsudo Roren (later JR Soren), which joined Zenminrokyo on 1 April. Its founding congress adopted a special resolution declaring that it would "never accept that employees who opposed and obstructed privatization, shedding neither sweat nor tears, should be hired locally, while our comrades accepted secondments and transfers across the country for its success." The Labour Year Book of Japan remarked that the resolution amounted to an invitation to unfair labour practices by a union. Only 29 members of Tetsudo Roren were not hired. 29 2
The alliance of cooperating unions did not last. Former Tetsuro and former Doro currents fell out, the Tetsuro-minded unions at JR Central, JR West, JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu left JR Soren, and on 18 May 1992 they joined Tessan Soren, which had split from Kokuro, to form the Japan Railway Trade Unions Confederation (JR Rengo). JR Soren, heir to Doro, remained strong at JR East and elsewhere. In a 2010 written answer to the Diet the government stated that Kakumaru faction activists had "considerably penetrated" JR Soren and the JR East union; JR Soren denies it. 29
The 1,047 dismissed workers formed 36 Kokuro struggle groups across the country and lived by selling goods while they fought. Prefectural and central labour commissions found unfair labour practices and ordered JR to hire them, but in 1998 the Tokyo District Court annulled the orders on the ground that JNR and the JR companies were separate entities, and on 22 December 2003 the Supreme Court confirmed that "JR bears no responsibility." In 2005 the Tokyo District Court found that the successor of the Settlement Corporation had discriminated against the union and awarded 5 million yen in damages per person. After the settlement of 28 June 2010 the government asked the JR companies to hire the workers, but in 2011 the seven companies refused, saying there was "no room to consider hiring" them. Kokuro ended its "24-year struggle" that year; Doro-Chiba rejected the settlement as legitimizing "unfair labour practice by the state with a little money, without apology or withdrawal of the dismissals." 2
Why did Sohyo dissolve, and how was the labour front rearranged?
Kokuro's fall sped up the "unification of the labour front." The large private-sector unions formed Zenminrokyo on 14 December 1982. On 19 November 1987 Domei, the Democratic Socialist-aligned confederation, and Churitsu Roren dissolved, and the next day the private-sector Rengo was launched with 55 industrial unions and 5.39 million members; Shinsanbetsu dissolved and joined in October 1988. Sohyo, with its many public-sector unions, held back, then at its September 1989 congress confirmed its dissolution for November. Its secretary-general Eikichi Magara chose to join, saying the question was "not right or left, but forward." 31 32
On 21 November 1989 the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) was founded with 78 public and private organizations and about eight million members; its first president was Akira Yamagishi of the telecom workers' union. In the 1985 telephone privatization Yamagishi had taken a "yes to privatization, no to breakup" stance and kept NTT whole, in contrast to Kokuro, which opposed both to the end. Sohyo, founded in 1950, dissolved into Rengo; its last chairman was Takeshi Kurokawa. The Labour Ministry called the founding of Rengo, which united about two-thirds of organized workers, a historic event for the labour world. 32 31 19 5 33
The unions that rejected Rengo divided in two. On the same 21 November, unions supporting the Communist Party founded the National Confederation of Trade Unions (Zenroren, claiming 1.4 million members), denouncing Rengo as a "rightward realignment of the labour world." On 9 December Kokuro, the Tokyo metropolitan workers' federation and other Socialist-left unions formed the National Trade Union Council (Zenrokyo, claiming 500,000) as "an organization that will not, and cannot, go to either side." Its parent body was the Labour Research Centre set up by former Sohyo chairman Kaoru Ota, former secretary-general Akira Iwai and others, and support for the 1,047 in the "JNR struggle" became one pillar of its work. Japanese labour thus settled into three streams: Rengo, Zenroren and Zenrokyo. 32 34 35
Judgments of Rengo differ as well. The Labour Ministry saw its founding as a great turn for the labour movement, but the estimated unionization rate, 25.9 percent in 1989, was still falling. Rengo has since held almost no strikes, and its critics call it a company union in collusion with capital. Zenroren, which the majority unions of the large basic industries did not join, has had little influence on the going rate in the spring wage offensive, while Zenrokyo, calling itself a "liaison council" rather than a national centre, kept up its defence of the constitution, its opposition to war and its support for the railway workers' struggle. 32 31 34 35
How are the results of the breakup judged?
The government counts it a success. In its 2017 review "Thirty years since the division and privatization of JNR," the transport ministry said the reliability and comfort of JR rail services had greatly improved, and that with the three Honshu companies and JR Kyushu fully privatized, the reform was achieving its intended aims. The seven JR companies made an ordinary profit of about 500 billion yen in fiscal 2005 and paid about 240 billion yen in corporate and other taxes. The same review concedes that JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku and JR Freight do not yet earn stable enough profits to be listed. 1 3
The debt remained in another form. Of the final long-term debt of 37.1 trillion yen, the three Honshu companies, JR Freight and the Shinkansen holding body took on 11.6 trillion, and the remaining 25.5 trillion went to the JNR Settlement Corporation, to be repaid by selling land and JR shares. The sales did not go as planned, and by 1998 the debt had grown to 28.3 trillion yen; the state took over 24.2 trillion of it, to be borne by taxpayers. Of the debt the state took over, 17.8 trillion yen was still outstanding at the end of fiscal 2015. 1
The criticism continues. JR Hokkaido and JR Shikoku, whose management stabilization funds earned far less in an era of low interest rates, fell into difficulty, and loss-making local lines were closed one after another. LDP politicians such as Shizuka Kamei, transport parliamentary vice-minister in the Nakasone cabinet, and Taro Aso have called the division a failure. Some critics trace JR West's Fukuchiyama Line derailment and its punitive "re-education" of staff to safety being slighted in favour of market principles. Seen from the labour movement, the breakup brought down Japan's largest union and opened the road to the dissolution of Sohyo and the founding of Rengo. 3
Consequences
The seven JR companies began on 1 April 1987 and the JNR Settlement Corporation took the remaining debt, which grew to 28.3 trillion yen by 1998 and was mostly assumed by the state. Kokuro became a minority union, and the dispute over the 1,047 workers dismissed in 1990 ended in 2010 with a settlement but no reinstatement. Sohyo dissolved into Rengo in 1989, and Japanese labour was reorganized into three streams: Rengo, Zenroren and Zenrokyo.
Timeline & Map
- 11973.03.13Ageo incident
When a work-to-rule action delayed trains, passengers at Ageo station on the Takasaki Line rioted, breaking a driver's cab and the stationmaster's office.
- 21975.11.26Strike for the right to strike begins
Korokyo struck to win back the right to strike; only about 3 percent of JNR passenger trains ran.
- 31975.12.01Miki cabinet: "we will not yield to the strike"
Prime Minister Takeo Miki, bowing to opinion in his party, declared that the right to strike would not be granted.
- 1975.12.03Korokyo calls off the strike
After eight days Korokyo called off the strike with nothing gained; strikes on the railways fell sharply afterwards.
- 1976.02.14Suit for 20.2 billion yen in damages
JNR sued Kokuro and Doro for 20.2 billion yen in damages over the strike.
- 1980.12.27JNR reconstruction special measures act passed
A special measures act for JNR's reconstruction passed, but the deficit did not shrink.
- 41981.03Second Rincho launched
The Suzuki cabinet launched the commission under Toshiwo Doko to achieve "fiscal reconstruction without tax increases."
- 1982.07.30Rincho basic report: divide and privatize within five years
The commission reported that JNR should be divided and privatized within five years; the Suzuki cabinet adopted this on 24 September.
- 51982.11.27Nakasone cabinet takes office
The Nakasone cabinet took office with administrative reform as its banner.
- 1983.06.10JNR Reconstruction Supervisory Committee set up
The supervisory committee was set up in the Prime Minister's Office under Masao Kamei.
- 1985.04.01NTT and JT privatized
The telephone corporation and the tobacco monopoly became NTT and JT.
- 61985.06.21Nisugi removed; Sugiura becomes president
Nakasone removed the JNR leaders who opposed division and installed Takaya Sugiura as president.
- 1985.07.26Final report: six passenger companies
The supervisory committee's final report proposed six passenger companies.
- 71985.11.29Doro-Chiba strike and guerrilla attacks on the railways
On the day Doro-Chiba struck against the breakup, the Chukaku faction cut signal cables and paralysed commuter lines around Tokyo and Osaka.
- 81986.01.21Labour-management joint declaration signed
Doro, Tetsuro and Zenshiro signed the joint declaration presented on 13 January; Kokuro and Zendoro refused.
- 1986.07.01Human resource utilization centres opened
Centres for "surplus" staff opened at 1,438 sites; 81 percent of those assigned were Kokuro members.
- 1986.07.06LDP landslide in the double election
The LDP, pledged to privatization, won a landslide, all but settling the breakup.
- 91986.10.09Kokuro's Shuzenji congress
Kokuro held to its opposition and elected Satoshi Roppongi chairman; the mainstream faction left.
- 101986.11.28Eight JNR reform laws passed
The eight JNR reform laws passed with the votes of the LDP, Komeito and the Democratic Socialists.
- 111987.04.01JR Group launched
JNR was split into six passenger companies, one freight company and others, and the remnant became the Settlement Corporation; many Kokuro members in Hokkaido and Kyushu were not hired.
- 1987.11.20Private-sector Rengo launched
Domei and Churitsu Roren dissolved, and the private-sector Rengo was founded with 55 industrial unions and 5.39 million members.
- 121989.11.21Rengo and Zenroren founded; Sohyo dissolved
Sohyo dissolved and Rengo was founded with about eight million members; Communist-aligned unions founded Zenroren the same day.
- 1989.12.09Zenrokyo founded
Kokuro and other unions that joined neither Rengo nor Zenroren founded Zenrokyo.
- 131990Settlement Corporation dismisses 1,047
The 1,047 workers still at the Settlement Corporation were dismissed, beginning a 23-year dispute.
Related people 18
Government, LDP and the Rincho7
Leadership3
As LDP secretary-general in 1975 he took the hard line against the strike; as prime minister he carried out the breakup, and later said he had meant to bring down Sohyo by bringing down Kokuro.
Prime Minister of Japan (1980 to 1982)Zenko Suzuki1911–2004Launched the Second Rincho and adopted its 1982 basic report.
Chairman of the Second RinchoToshiwo Doko1896–1988Led the commission that recommended privatizing the three public corporations.
Implementers & commanders3
Drafted the breakup plan and wrote "The JNR Must Be Broken Up" in Gendai.
Chairman of the JNR Reconstruction Supervisory CommitteeMasao Kamei1916–2002Proposed the six-way split and said Kokuro and Doro had to be dismantled.
Head of the LDP JNR reconstruction subcommittee; transport ministerHiroshi Mitsuzuka1927–2004Pushed the breakup inside the party and became transport minister in 1985.
JNR management3
Implementers & commanders2
Cooperation and labour unification (Doro, Rengo)3
Leadership2
Unions against the breakup (Kokuro, Doro-Chiba, Zenrokyo)5
Leadership3
Directed the 1975 strike and was judged to have misread the situation.
Kokuro chairman from 1986Satoshi Roppongi1930–2005Became chairman at the Shuzenji congress and kept up the opposition to the breakup.
Chairman of Doro-ChibaHiroshi Nakano1940–2010Led the strike against the breakup in November 1985.
Participants2
The Labour Research Centre he formed with Akira Iwai and others became the parent body of Zenrokyo in 1989.
Former Sohyo secretary-general; Labour Research CentreAkira Iwai1922–1997With Kaoru Ota and others, helped gather the unions that stayed out of Rengo.
Related terms
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35