1978–1979

The Sino-Vietnamese War

Why did two socialist states that had fought France and America together go to war with each other in 1979?

After reunification in 1975 Vietnam allied with the Soviet Union, drove out ethnic Chinese and at the end of 1978 invaded Cambodia, ruled by China’s Khmer Rouge allies. Just after visiting the United States, Deng Xiaoping vowed to “teach a lesson” and on 17 February 1979 sent some 200,000 troops into northern Vietnam. The PLA took Lạng Sơn on 6 March, declared its punishment complete and withdrew by the 16th, while border clashes went on through the 1980s.

ChinaVietnamThe alliance frays

Relations between China and the Vietnamese Communists went back a long way. The newly founded People’s Republic helped the Viet Minh in the First Indochina War, and between 1950 and 1975 supplied arms, military training and essential supplies to the Vietnamese Communists fighting France, the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. Over 300,000 Chinese troops, mostly in anti-aircraft divisions, reportedly served in North Vietnam between 1964 and 1969, and Chinese aid from 1960 to 1978 came to some $20 billion, none of it a loan to be repaid. Even so, the Vietnamese Communists remained suspicious of China’s perceived attempts to increase its influence over Vietnam. 1 2

The rift began with the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s. Mao Zedong condemned Khrushchev’s Secret Speech of 1956 and his line of “peaceful coexistence” as a distortion of Marxism–Leninism, and as the Vietnamese Communists declined to side with China against the Soviets, China’s role shrank. During the Vietnam War North Vietnam relied heavily on Soviet arms and aid. After the Zhenbao Island clash of 1969 China was in a state of open hostility with the Soviet Union, with up to 1.5 million troops on the border, and it feared that a Vietnam close to Moscow would encircle it from the south. In the early 1970s China turned towards the United States, receiving Kissinger and Nixon, and after Mao’s death and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s rise it combined reform and opening with co-operation with Washington against the Soviet Union. 2 3

Within the Vietnamese leadership too the centre of gravity shifted. A pro-Soviet group around the party general secretary Lê Duẩn took power, and pro-Chinese figures such as Trường Chinh were increasingly sidelined. The Third Congress of the Workers’ Party in 1960 had already removed references to Mao Zedong Thought from the party statutes. Hoàng Văn Hoan, Hanoi’s first ambassador to China in the 1950s, was dropped from the Politburo and the Central Committee at the Fourth Party Congress in December 1976 as the party formalised its pro-Soviet orientation. Having won the war with the fall of Saigon in April 1975, Vietnam called itself the world’s third-largest military power after the United States and the Soviet Union, a claim that heightened Chinese apprehension. 3 4 2 5

China saw Vietnam as pursuing regional hegemony over all of Indochina, binding Laos and Cambodia to itself. The suspicion hardened when Vietnam called for a “special relationship” among the three Indochinese countries, a demand the Khmer Rouge regime of Democratic Kampuchea rejected. China had backed Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge since their civil war against Lon Nol and, after they took power on 17 April 1975, gave them extensive political, logistical and military support. In the South China Sea, China gained control of the Paracels after the naval battle of 1974, and after reunification in 1975 Hanoi took over the South Vietnamese positions in the Spratlys and changed its official position on the islands. 2 3

VietnamChinaThe Hoa and the border, 1976–1978

The conflict first erupted over the ethnic Chinese, the Hoa. In February 1976 Vietnam carried out a registration in the south that required the Hoa to take Vietnamese citizenship or leave, and in early 1977 it applied what it called a purification policy in the border areas to push Chinese residents to the Chinese side. The socialist transformation of the south in March 1978 was decisive. An announcement of 24 March outlawed all wholesale trade and large businesses, closing some 30,000 businesses overnight, and a further one banned all private trade. Đỗ Mười, who directed the campaign, signed a decree on behalf of the prime minister on 31 March forbidding private property, and more than 60,000 youth groups went round the country closing businesses. The measures targeted all “bourgeois elements”, but they hurt the Hoa, who dominated commerce, hardest, and clashes in Saigon’s Chợ Lớn (Cholon) left the streets “full of corpses”. 2 6 7

As a result the majority of the Hoa left the country. More than 170,000 fled overland into Guangxi from the north, and the rest left by boat from the south. China received 4,000–5,000 refugees a day, while Southeast Asian countries saw 5,000 boat people arrive each month. China sent unarmed ships to evacuate refugees, but Vietnam denied any persecution and refused exit permits after as many as 250,000 Hoa had applied for repatriation. When China closed its land border in 1978, departures by sea jumped, with as many as 100,000 reaching other countries by the end of the year. By now the Vietnamese government encouraged the exodus and profited from it, charging five to ten taels of gold, or $1,500–3,000, per person. Ethnic Chinese made up 60–70 per cent of the refugees reaching Hong Kong in 1978 and close to 80 per cent in 1979. 6 3 8

Border disputes compounded the quarrel. The land frontier drawn by China and France after the Sino-French War of 1885 was poorly demarcated, and 164 places totalling 227 square kilometres were in dispute. The two sides engaged in retaliatory land grabs and violence, and border clashes rose every year from 125 in 1974 to 2,175 in 1978. Two rounds of border talks failed. On 25 August 1978, while vice-ministerial talks on the Hoa were under way, the Youyi Pass (Friendship Pass) incident took place. English-language accounts say Vietnamese troops and police drove 2,500 refugees across the border and beat and stabbed refugees, including nine Chinese border workers; official Chinese figures counted four dead and ten wounded, with more than 1,600 people fleeing into China through the pass. After the talks failed China began overflights of the border area and the Gulf of Tonkin. 2 3

VietnamSoviet UnionCambodiaThe break of 1978: Soviet alliance and the invasion of Cambodia

1978 was the year of the break. In June China withdrew its consul-general for Ho Chi Minh City and told Vietnam to close three of its consulates in China. On 28 June Vietnam joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), and Soviet military aid rose from $75–125 million in 1977 to $600–800 million in 1978. On 8 July the General Political Department of the Vietnam People’s Army ordered an offensive strategy against China, including attacks and counterattacks within and beyond the border, and two weeks later the Vietnamese party leadership named China a “direct and dangerous enemy” and a “new combat target”. That same July the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party discussed military action to disrupt Soviet deployments, and by the end of the month China had ended all aid to Vietnam and recalled its experts. 2 3

On 3 November Lê Duẩn and Phạm Văn Đồng signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Brezhnev and Kosygin in Moscow. Its Article 6 provided that if either party became the object of an attack or a threat of attack, the two would immediately consult to remove the threat and take “appropriate and effective measures”. The treaty made Vietnam the linchpin of the Soviet drive to contain China. President Tôn Đức Thắng had already approached the Soviet Union in early 1978 for help in deposing the Khmer Rouge, and Moscow, assuming that Vietnam would win easily, saw a chance to weaken China’s only ally in Southeast Asia. 9 2 5 10

Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge had once co-operated, but after Democratic Kampuchea was founded in 1975 repeated Khmer Rouge raids into Vietnam and massacres of border villagers turned the relationship into enmity. In May 1978 Khmer Rouge defectors fleeing the purge of the Eastern Zone formed the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation in Vietnam, led by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge divisional commander. On 25 December Vietnamese forces launched a full invasion. Lê Trọng Tấn commanded the Vietnamese forces on the southern border from December 1978 to February 1979, and Lê Đức Anh, later commander of the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia in the 1980s, is regarded as the architect of the offensive. Phnom Penh fell on 7 January 1979 and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea was proclaimed the next day. The offensive took China by surprise, and its Phnom Penh embassy fled into the jungle with the Khmer Rouge, where it stayed for fifteen days. 3 11 2 12 13 14

ChinaUnited StatesDeciding on a “lesson”: Beijing and Washington

China’s military action was being prepared before the invasion of Cambodia. In September 1978 the PLA General Staff agreed on a campaign against Vietnam to force it out of Cambodia, check Soviet and Vietnamese regional ambitions and stop border encroachments. On 7 December the Central Military Commission, chaired by Hua Guofeng, met in enlarged session in the Great Hall of the People and adopted the proposal of Deng Xiaoping, its vice-chairman and chief of the General Staff; on the 8th it ordered the Guangzhou and Kunming military regions to be ready by 10 January 1979. The first plan was to strike county towns near the border within three to five days and destroy one or two Vietnamese divisions. A war council on 31 December, just after the invasion of Cambodia, raised the targets to provincial capitals, lengthened the operation to 15–20 days and set three to five divisions as the goal. On 7 January Yang Dezhi, commander of the Wuhan Military Region, swapped posts with the Kunming commander Wang Bicheng to take charge of the western front. 2 3 15

From the autumn of 1978 Deng toured Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and other countries to gauge reactions to the Vietnam question. On his first visit to the United States at the end of January 1979 he set out his plan to Carter in a small meeting at the White House on the evening of the 29th. According to the American record, Deng said Vietnam had become totally Soviet-controlled and was playing the role of Cuba, and that it was necessary “to put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited lesson”. The lesson would be short, he said, and in winter the Soviets in the north would find large operations difficult. Carter replied that an invasion would be a “very serious destabilizing action” and that it would be difficult for the United States to encourage violence. The next morning Carter read Deng a handwritten note calling a punitive strike “a serious mistake” and saying that the United States could not support it. 2 16 17

China nonetheless read the American response as acquiescence. Brzezinski said Carter reserved judgment, and Chinese diplomats took this as tacit approval; the scholar Suisheng Zhao argues that timing the attack so close to normalisation was meant to bluff the Soviets with a nonexistent American endorsement. Deng returned home on 8 February and on the 9th made the final decision to attack. On the 11th the Guangxi and Yunnan commands were ordered to attack on the 17th, and on the 12th the Central Military Commission issued its order for the self-defensive counterattack on the Sino-Vietnamese border. On 15 February, the first day on which China could formally announce the termination of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Deng announced a limited attack on Vietnam. Against Soviet intervention China put all its forces on the Sino-Soviet border on emergency alert, set up a new military command in Xinjiang and evacuated some 300,000 civilians from the border. The front page of People’s Daily on 17 February accused Vietnam of discriminating against the Hoa and provoking incidents on the border. 2 3

ChinaVietnam17 February: across the border

At dawn on 17 February 1979 the People’s Liberation Army entered northern Vietnam along a front of some 500 kilometres, its first major operation since the Sino-Indian War of 1962. English-language accounts give the force as about 200,000 men with 200 Type 59, 62 and 63 tanks; Chinese accounts list nine armies with 29 infantry divisions and others, some 220,000 men. The eastern, Guangxi direction, commanded from a forward headquarters in Nanning by Xu Shiyou of the Guangzhou Military Region, aimed at Cao Bằng, Lạng Sơn and Quảng Ninh; the western, Yunnan direction under Yang Dezhi, headquartered at Kaiyuan, aimed at Lào Cai and the provinces of Hà Tuyên, Hoàng Liên Sơn and Lai Châu. The navy and air force were confined to patrolling and support on the Chinese side. Vietnam claimed to have only about 60,000 troops in the north, including several regular divisions; Chinese accounts count six front-line infantry divisions and others, around 100,000 regulars, plus large numbers of militia. 2 3 18 15

Vietnam held back its regular divisions, keeping some 300,000 men for the defence of Hanoi, and met the attack with the guerrilla tactics of border militia and provincial forces. The PLA had seen no major combat since the early 1950s and most of its weapons and vehicles were obsolete, while the Vietnamese were battle-hardened and armed with modern American and Soviet weapons. At Đồng Đăng, after more than 6,000 shells fell at five in the morning on the 17th, the 55th Army overran Hill 386, but at the Thâm Mô line further south massed charges were repulsed again and again, and only a switch to small-unit flanking attacks broke it on the 22nd; Đồng Đăng fell on the 23rd. Vietnamese accounts say that of the 700 soldiers, militiamen and police defending the Đồng Đăng fort only six survived, and put Chinese losses there at 2,220, including 531 dead. In the west the 14th Army took the town of Lào Cai on the 19th. 2 19 20 3

At Cao Bằng the plan went badly astray. The 41st Army, advancing from the north, ran into the Vietnamese 677th Regiment and took Trà Lĩnh only on the 22nd, five days in, while at Sóc Giang a battle planned for two days lasted five. The 42nd Army to the southeast missed its 24-hour schedule, and Wu Zhong, who commanded in this direction, was removed for investigation on the 20th. On the 23rd, learning that Cao Bằng was held by only a few troops, Xu Shiyou ordered an immediate assault, and the town fell on 24–25 February. Yet the PLA failed to find and destroy the main Vietnamese regular units: apart from Sóc Giang most of the fighting was against militia and citizen-soldiers, who inflicted heavy losses and slowed the advance. On 3 March Chinese forces took Đức Long on Highway 4, linking the Cao Bằng and Lạng Sơn areas of operation. 21 3

ChinaVietnamSoviet UnionThe fall of Lạng Sơn and the withdrawal

The centre of the war was Lạng Sơn. The General Staff gave the task of taking it to the 55th Army of the Guangzhou Military Region, backed by the 54th and 43rd Armies of the Wuhan region and three regiments from Chengdu, some 130,000 men in all. Facing them were about 13,000 Vietnamese: the veteran 3rd Division (about 9,950 men), provincial troops and armed police. After advancing 15–20 kilometres the Chinese attack lost momentum and eight more divisions were committed. Having taken the heights north of Lạng Sơn, the PLA paused before the city to lure Vietnamese regular units back from Cambodia, the main ploy of a war plan in which Deng wanted to avoid escalation with the Soviet Union. But the Vietnamese high command, tipped off by Soviet satellite intelligence, saw through the trap and committed its reserves only to Hanoi. In the west Yang Dezhi fell suddenly ill on the night of 25 February and was flown to Beijing the next day, and the deputy commander of the Kunming region, Zhang Zhixiu, took over the western front. 22 2 3 23

On 27 February Chinese forces took Khau Mã Sơn, a strategic height northwest of Lạng Sơn, and on the morning of 1 March the 55th Army fired more than 9,900 shells in thirty minutes from 306 guns of nineteen artillery battalions, wrecking the city’s barracks, station, power plant and government buildings. After three days of street fighting the northern part of the city fell on the 2nd and the part south of the Kỳ Cùng River on the 4th; the 163rd Division’s push to Pac Meng, five kilometres south of Lạng Sơn, was the deepest advance towards Hanoi. English-language accounts usually date the fall of Lạng Sơn to 6 March. In the west the 149th Division took Sa Pa on the 3rd. On 5 March China declared its punitive aims achieved and announced its withdrawal, and the same day Vietnam proclaimed a nationwide general mobilisation in the name of President Tôn Đức Thắng. China said that “the gate to Hanoi was open”, but Lạng Sơn is farther from Hanoi than from the Chinese border, and at least five Vietnamese divisions waited in the Red River Delta to counterattack. 22 3 20 2

The Soviet Union did not intervene directly. It supplied intelligence and equipment and airlifted Vietnamese troops from Cambodia to the north, sending 400 tanks and armoured personnel carriers, 500 mortars and anti-aircraft guns, 50 BM-21 rocket launchers, 400 portable surface-to-air missiles, 800 anti-tank missiles and 20 jet fighters. Between 5,000 and 8,000 Soviet military advisers were in Vietnam in 1979, and the Pacific Fleet sent fifteen ships to the Vietnamese coast to relay Chinese battlefield communications to the Vietnamese. It also deployed troops on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders to tie down Chinese forces. But the distances were too great, any reinforcements would have had to cross territory held by China or American allies, and the only realistic option was to reopen the border conflict with China. As Beijing had promised both Moscow and Washington a limited war and a quick withdrawal, and Deng kept the navy and air force out of the fighting to show it, Moscow chose to “wait and see”. China publicly proclaimed that the Soviet Union had broken its promises to help Vietnam. 2

From 6 March the Chinese forces withdrew in leapfrogging stages, mopping up as they went. The retreating units systematically destroyed bridges, roads, railways, mines and factories and carried off livestock and materials. Vietnamese records list 428 hospitals and 735 schools destroyed, 80,000 hectares of farmland ruined and 400,000 cattle seized or killed. Vietnam accused the Chinese 42nd Army of massacring 43 civilians at the village of Tổng Chúp in Hòa An district, Cao Bằng, on 9 March, but with no Western correspondents able to reach the border the allegation could not be verified, and Xinhua denied it. The Lạng Sơn front completed its withdrawal on the 12th and the Yunnan front on the 13th, and when the last vehicle crossed the border on the night of 16 March China announced that the withdrawal was complete. Both countries declared victory. 3 21 2

VietnamCambodiaSoviet UnionAfter the war: purges, refugees and the occupation of Cambodia

Prisoner exchanges began on 21 May at the “kilometre zero” point in front of the Friendship Pass. In the first round China unilaterally handed over 120 wounded Vietnamese prisoners and received 43 Chinese, and by the end of May and June all 1,636 Vietnamese and 238 Chinese prisoners had gone home. Citing possible collaboration, Vietnam sent some 8,000 Hoa from Hanoi to southern “New Economic Zones” in spring 1979 and moved part of the Hmong and other minorities out of the northernmost provinces; a Chinese account puts the Han and Hmong forcibly moved from north to south at about 80,000. Confiscation of Chinese property and expulsions continued. 3 2

Purges followed inside the party. In July 1979 Hoàng Văn Hoan, travelling to East Germany for medical care, slipped his escorts at a stop in Karachi, took refuge at the Chinese consulate and flew to Beijing; at a press conference in August he denounced Vietnam’s persecution of the Hoa and accused its leaders of subservience to a foreign power. Vietnam branded him a traitor and sentenced him to death in absentia. The party weeded out pro-Chinese elements and those who had surrendered to the Chinese during the war, expelling 20,468 members in 1979 alone. Lê Duẩn’s policies and the two wars with Cambodia and China sharply lowered living standards: monthly income per head in the north fell from $82 in 1976 to $58 in 1980. 4 2 5

The war did not force Vietnam out of Cambodia. Vietnam occupied the country until 1989, and Heng Samrin’s regime had to consult Hanoi on every major decision. But by threatening a second invasion and backing the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, China made Vietnam pour resources into the border and the occupation. China rallied the deposed king Sihanouk, the anti-communist leader Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge into the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea of 1982; the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea sentenced Pol Pot and his deputy prime minister and foreign minister Ieng Sary to death in absentia, but the regime went unrecognised outside the Soviet bloc, and Cambodia’s United Nations seat stayed with Democratic Kampuchea, held from 1982 in the name of the coalition. Lê Đức Anh, commander of the Vietnamese forces in Cambodia in the 1980s, designed the K5 plan to seal the whole Thai border with trenches, wire and minefields. Isolated, Vietnam leaned further on Moscow, leasing it the base at Cam Ranh Bay rent-free for 25 years from 1979. 2 14 24 13 25

ChinaVietnamA decade of border war: from Laoshan to Johnson South Reef

On withdrawing, China said it did not want “a single inch” of Vietnamese territory, but in fact it held some 60 square kilometres of disputed land that Vietnam had controlled before the war. Some, like the area around the Friendship Pass, had little military value but great symbolic weight; others were strategic springboards for attack. This occupation produced a decade of border clashes. In June and July 1980 China shelled Cao Bằng province in retaliation for Vietnamese troops crossing into Thailand in pursuit of the Khmer Rouge; from October 1980 to May 1981 Zhang Zhixiu’s Kunming troops attacked Luojiaping and Koulinshan in Yunnan, and in May 1981 Chinese forces struck Fakashan on the Guangxi side. Through the 1980s 600,000–800,000 Vietnamese regulars and paramilitaries faced 200,000–400,000 Chinese troops along the border. 26 27 23

The largest fight was the Battle of Laoshan in 1984, known in Vietnam as the Battle of Vị Xuyên. To relieve pressure on the Khmer Rouge bases that Vietnamese dry-season offensives were overrunning on the Thai border, China fired more than 60,000 shells into sixteen districts of Lạng Sơn, Cao Bằng, Hà Tuyên and Hoàng Liên Sơn between 2 and 27 April. At dawn on 28 April the 40th Division of the 14th Army attacked Laoshan west of the Lô River while other units attacked Zheyinshan to the east, and by 15 May they held the heights. Zhang Zhixiu directed this “two mountains” campaign in person. The Vietnamese chief of the General Staff Lê Trọng Tấn and others planned the MB84 counteroffensive with Soviet advisers, and the assault of 12 July, the largest Vietnamese attack since 1979, broke on Chinese artillery. China put Vietnamese dead that day at 1,080, later revised to 3,000; Vietnam admitted 600 killed in the 356th Division alone. Deng Xiaoping treated the front as a place to “touch the tiger’s butt” for combat experience, rotating at least fourteen armies through it between 1984 and 1989. 28 26 23

In 1985 China fired about a million shells into the Vietnamese border regions, over 800,000 of them into Vị Xuyên. In 1986 Gorbachev called for Sino-Vietnamese normalisation in his Vladivostok speech and Cambodia entered the Sino-Soviet talks, yet in October 1986 and January 1987 heavy shelling and attacks continued at Vị Xuyên; Carlyle Thayer called this period, quiet on the rest of the border, a “phony war”. On 14 March 1988 a naval battle at Johnson South Reef (Chigua Reef to the Chinese) in the Spratlys left at least 64 Vietnamese dead and three Vietnamese vessels lost, and China took six features including the reef. Over two million shells fell on Hà Giang province alone between 1984 and 1989. Vietnam acknowledged 4,000 killed and 9,000 wounded in the area, and China confirmed 4,100 casualties, including over 2,000 dead. 26 29 30

ChinaVietnamFrom Chengdu to the border treaty: normalisation

The turn began inside Vietnam. After Lê Duẩn’s death in 1986, the Sixth Party Congress in December elected Nguyễn Văn Linh general secretary and adopted Đổi Mới (renovation). Linh withdrew Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, and armed clashes on the border ended that year. When the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe fell in 1989 and the West sanctioned China after Tiananmen, both parties came to fear the collapse of their systems and Western pressure alike. Isolated as Soviet aid shrank, the Vietnamese leadership dropped its denunciations of Chinese “hegemony” and “expansionism” and turned to China as an ideological partner. At the Beijing Asian Games of 1990 the deputy prime minister Võ Nguyên Giáp represented the Vietnamese government. 3 31 32

On 3–4 September 1990 a secret summit was held at Chengdu in Sichuan. Vietnam sent the general secretary Nguyễn Văn Linh, the chairman of the Council of Ministers Đỗ Mười and the Central Committee adviser Phạm Văn Đồng; China sent the general secretary Jiang Zemin and the premier Li Peng. It was the first meeting of Vietnam’s top leader with Chinese leaders since the 1979 war, and its agreements have never been published. At the end of the year Lê Đức Anh briefed the Cambodian Politburo, including Hun Sen, in Phnom Penh: the United States and the West wanted to wipe out communism as they were doing in Eastern Europe, so an ally was needed, and “this ally is China”. When Đỗ Mười became general secretary in June 1991, Jiang Zemin congratulated him and said he hoped for normal relations between the two parties and the two states. On 5 November Đỗ Mười and the prime minister Võ Văn Kiệt issued a joint communiqué with Jiang and Li in Beijing, formally ending thirteen years of confrontation. 32 31 7 1 3

Settling the border came later. The PLA gradually pulled back from Laoshan and Zheyinshan from 1989 and completed its withdrawal by 1992, and from 1993 it carried out large-scale mine clearance to open border trade. In 1999 the two countries signed a land border treaty. The adjustment left part of the land China had occupied in the war, including the Friendship Pass (Ải Nam Quan to the Vietnamese) and half of the Bản Giốc falls, some 80 square kilometres in all, on the Chinese side, causing widespread resentment in Vietnam, where a saying runs “from Nam Quan to the Cà Mau cape” and the whole gate now lay inside China. The Vietnamese sector of Laoshan was delineated and returned under the border agreement of 2009. The maritime disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys remain unresolved. 26 2 3 33

Assessment

Even the name is contested. The Chinese government calls the war the “self-defensive counterattack operations on the Sino-Vietnamese border” or the “self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam to protect the border” (broadly covering the border clashes of 1979–1989), shortened in popular use to the “self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam”. Vietnam calls it the “war to defend the northern border” or the “war against Chinese expansionism”, and the neutral names are the Sino-Vietnamese War and the Vietnamese–Chinese border war. Western historiography treats it, together with the Cambodian war, as part of the Third Indochina War. It was a rare open war between socialist states in the Cold War. 2 3

Neither country has published official casualty figures, and estimates vary widely. The most widely cited figure for Chinese dead is 6,954, including support militia, with more than 14,800 wounded, from leaked PLA sources such as the work summary of the Kunming Military Region’s logistics department. The deputy chief of the General Staff Wu Xiuquan told a French military delegation that China had suffered 20,000 casualties and Vietnam 50,000. The Vietnam News Agency claimed over 44,000 Chinese casualties just after the withdrawal, and other Vietnamese sources 62,500, figures Western analysts at the time thought greatly inflated. The BBC estimated about 27,000 Chinese and about 80,000 Vietnamese casualties. On the Vietnamese side, China estimated 57,000 soldiers and 70,000 militia killed, and the party paper Nhân Dân reported more than 10,000 civilian deaths. Even for single battles the gap is large: Vietnam said it put 19,000 Chinese out of action at Lạng Sơn, while the PLA 55th Army’s after-action report recorded 1,271 killed and 3,779 wounded. 3 2 34 22

Strategic assessments differ too. The war’s cost of 3.45 billion yuan delayed China’s 1979–1980 economic plan, and it failed to pull Vietnam out of Cambodia. But it forced Vietnam to keep an army of 1.2 million on standby, a heavy drag on its economy, and showed that the Soviet Union could not protect its ally. Lee Kuan Yew wrote that the Chinese punitive action the Western press wrote off as a failure “changed the history of East Asia”; Kissinger judged that China had exposed the limits of Soviet strategic reach and that the wish to compensate for that ineffectuality contributed to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a year later. Zhang Xiaoming reads the war as Deng’s pledge of loyalty to the United States, proving by action the break with Moscow and the resolve to ally with America against the Soviet Union. Zhang Lifan, on the other hand, calls it a losing bargain that traded soldiers’ blood for a diplomatic realignment, and some have speculated that Deng meant to keep the army occupied away from internal power struggles. 2 3

Militarily the war exposed the PLA’s backwardness. Years without combat and the loss of training during the Cultural Revolution left its command clumsy; the absence of military ranks made it hard to settle command relations when units were reorganised on the battlefield; Type 59 and 62 tanks suffered heavily in the mountains, and infantry without armoured carriers rode into battle on the outside of tanks. Critics add that it threw away its superiority in firepower by clinging to close-infiltration tactics such as the “three-three” formation, causing needless casualties. Deng used the poor showing to overcome resistance in the military leadership and push through reform. For the socialist movement the war carries a heavy meaning: two Communist parties that had fought imperialism together fought each other amid national interests and the triangle of the Sino-Soviet split, one aligned with the United States and the other with the Soviet Union. Today both governments rarely mention the war, and its memories, from the war songs Vietnamese radio played daily in the 1980s to the Chinese film Wreaths at the Foot of the Mountain (1984) and Cui Jian’s anti-war song “Last Shot” (1987), have been pushed outside the official narrative. 3 2

Consequences

Both sides declared victory, but Vietnam did not leave Cambodia. China made Vietnam pour resources into the border and the occupation, and Vietnam became more dependent on Moscow. The two countries normalised relations in November 1991. A war between socialist states showed how the triangle created by the Sino-Soviet split worked in Asia.

Timeline & Map

Lạng Sơn Nanning Vị Xuyên (Laoshan) Cao Bằng Lào Cai Đồng Đăng Hanoi Phnom Penh Johnson South Reef 2 Beijing 5 Beijing 4 Washington 16 Chengdu 13 Koulinshan 14 Vị Xuyên (Laoshan) 15 Vị Xuyên (Laoshan) 6 Cao Bằng 9 Cao Bằng 7 Lào Cai 1 Youyi Pass (Ải Nam Quan) 12 Friendship Pass 17 Friendship Pass 8 Đồng Đăng 10 Lạng Sơn 11 Lạng Sơn 3 Phnom Penh
  1. 1978.03VietnamChina
    Policy against the Hoa

    After a discriminatory policy many Hoa fled to southern China.

  2. 1978.06.28VietnamSoviet Union
    Vietnam joins Comecon

    Soviet military aid rose sharply.

  3. 1978.07ChinaVietnam
    China ends aid

    China cut off aid and recalled its experts.

  4. 11978.08.25VietnamChina
    Youyi Pass incident

    Vietnamese troops and police drove 2,500 refugees into China.

  5. 1978.11.03Soviet UnionVietnam
    Soviet–Vietnamese defence treaty

    A 25-year alliance treaty was signed.

  6. 21978.12.07China
    Military Commission decides on war

    An enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission under Hua Guofeng adopted Deng’s proposal and next day ordered the Guangzhou and Kunming regions to be ready by 10 January.

  7. 31978.12.25VietnamCambodia
    Vietnam invades Cambodia

    Phnom Penh fell on 7 January 1979.

  8. 1979.01.29ChinaUnited States
    Deng visits the United States

    He told Carter China would teach Vietnam a lesson.

  9. 41979.01.30United StatesChina
    Carter’s warning

    Carter read Deng a handwritten note calling a punitive strike a serious mistake that the United States could not support.

  10. 51979.02.15ChinaSoviet Union
    Limited attack announced

    On the first day China could give notice to end the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, Deng announced a limited attack on Vietnam.

  11. 61979.02.17ChinaVietnam
    Chinese invasion

    Some 200,000 troops crossed the border on eastern and western fronts.

  12. 71979.02.19ChinaVietnam
    Lào Cai taken

    On the western front the 14th Army took Lào Cai, capital of Hoàng Liên Sơn province.

  13. 81979.02.23ChinaVietnam
    Đồng Đăng falls

    Đồng Đăng fell the day after the Thâm Mô line broke; Vietnamese accounts say six of the fort’s 700 defenders survived.

  14. 91979.02.25ChinaVietnam
    Cao Bằng falls

    Cao Bằng fell after Xu Shiyou, learning it was lightly held, ordered an immediate assault (Chinese accounts give the 24th).

  15. 101979.03.04ChinaVietnam
    Southern Lạng Sơn taken

    After the bombardment of 1 March and three days of street fighting the north of the city fell on the 2nd and the part south of the Kỳ Cùng on the 4th; English accounts date the fall to the 6th.

  16. 111979.03.05ChinaVietnam
    Withdrawal announced; Vietnam mobilises

    China declared its punitive aim achieved and announced its withdrawal; the same day Vietnam ordered general mobilisation in President Tôn Đức Thắng’s name.

  17. 1979.03.16ChinaVietnam
    Chinese withdrawal complete

    After scorched-earth tactics the PLA crossed back.

  18. 121979.05.21ChinaVietnam
    Prisoner exchange begins

    At kilometre zero before the Friendship Pass 120 wounded Vietnamese and 43 Chinese prisoners were exchanged.

  19. 1979.07VietnamChina
    Hoàng Văn Hoan defects

    He fled to the Chinese consulate in Karachi and on to Beijing.

  20. 131981.05.05ChinaVietnam
    Fakashan and Koulinshan

    Chinese troops attacked Fakashan (Hill 400) on the Lạng Sơn border and Koulinshan (Hill 1688) in Yunnan; hundreds died on each side.

  21. 141984.04ChinaVietnam
    Battle of Laoshan

    Chinese troops took the heights at Vị Xuyên, Hà Giang.

  22. 151984.07.12VietnamChina
    MB84 counteroffensive

    Vietnam’s largest offensive since 1979 tried to retake the Laoshan heights and broke on Chinese artillery.

  23. 1988.03.14ChinaVietnam
    Johnson South Reef skirmish

    China took six reefs in the Spratlys.

  24. 1989VietnamCambodia
    Withdrawal from Cambodia

    Nguyễn Văn Linh’s leadership withdrew Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and armed clashes on the border ended.

  25. 161990.09.03–04ChinaVietnam
    Secret Chengdu summit

    Nguyễn Văn Linh, Đỗ Mười and Phạm Văn Đồng met Jiang Zemin and Li Peng and agreed on normalisation; the terms were never published.

  26. 1991.11ChinaVietnam
    Relations normalised

    Relations were normalised following the secret Chengdu summit of 1990.

  27. 171999ChinaVietnam
    Land border treaty

    The adjustment left some 80 square kilometres, including the Friendship Pass, on the Chinese side, causing resentment in Vietnam.

Related people 39

China and its Cambodian allies16

Participants11

Chinese minister of defenceXu Xiangqian1901–1990

As defence minister stood at the head of the war effort.

Former Politburo member, pro-ChineseHoàng Văn Hoan1905–1991

Defected to China after the war and denounced Vietnam’s persecution of the Hoa.

Khmer Rouge leaderPol Pot?–1998

China’s ally, ousted by Vietnam’s invasion, fought on as a guerrilla with Chinese backing.

Former Cambodian kingNorodom Sihanouk1922–2012

One pillar of the coalition China rallied against the Vietnamese occupation.

General Secretary of the CCPJiang Zemin1926–2022

Met the Vietnamese leaders at Chengdu in 1990 and issued the normalisation communiqué in November 1991.

Premier of ChinaLi Peng1928–2019

Took part in the Chengdu summit and the 1991 normalisation talks.

Anti-communist resistance leaderSon Sann1911–2000

One pillar of the coalition China rallied against the Vietnamese occupation.

Chinese leader during the Sino-Soviet splitMao Zedong1893–1976

Led the break with Khrushchev’s line, the split that set off the rift with Vietnam.

Kunming commander before the warWang Bicheng1912–1989

Was replaced in January 1979 and was no longer the incumbent commander when the invasion began in February.

Deputy chief of the Chinese general staffWu Xiuquan1908–1997

Served in the Chinese military leadership and publicly reported casualty figures for the war.

Foreign minister of Democratic KampucheaIeng Sary1925–2013

Directed diplomacy for the Khmer Rouge regime, which opposed Vietnam and received Chinese support.

Vietnam and its allies17

Participants13

Soviet leaderLeonid Brezhnev1906–1982

Allied with Vietnam but limited Soviet help to supplies and airlift without direct intervention.

Head of the People’s Republic of KampucheaHeng Samrin1934–

Became head of the regime installed by Vietnam’s invasion.

Prime minister of VietnamPhạm Văn Đồng1906–2000

Signed the 1978 treaty with the Soviet Union alongside Lê Duẩn and attended the 1990 Chengdu summit as party adviser.

Chairman of the Soviet Council of MinistersAlexei Kosygin1904–1980

Signed the Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow on 3 November 1978.

Sidelined pro-Chinese veteranTrường Chinh1907–1988

Increasingly sidelined as Lê Duẩn’s pro-Soviet group took power.

Vietnamese deputy prime ministerVõ Nguyên Giáp1911–2013

Represented the Vietnamese government at the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, a signal of rapprochement.

Prime minister of VietnamVõ Văn Kiệt1922–2008

Visited Beijing with Đỗ Mười in November 1991 and issued the normalisation communiqué.

Leader of the People’s Republic of KampucheaHun Sen1952–

Was briefed by Lê Đức Anh at the end of 1990 on the Chengdu summit and the line that “this ally is China”.

General Secretary of the CPSUMikhail Gorbachev1931–2022

Called for Sino-Vietnamese normalisation in his 1986 Vladivostok speech.

Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchev1894–1971

His Secret Speech and peaceful coexistence line began the Sino-Soviet split.

Vietnamese leader during normalizationNguyễn Văn Linh1915–1998

As party general secretary, attended the 1990 Chengdu meeting to advance normalization with China.

Vietnamese prime minister during normalizationĐỗ Mười1917–2018

Attended the 1990 Chengdu meeting.

Vietnamese president during the warTôn Đức Thắng1888–1980

Held the presidency during the 1979 war.

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34