A marshal who served Fascism before steering Italy's turn
When the armistice was announced on 8 September 1943, Badoglio's government left Rome and headed south for Allied protection.
Pietro Badoglio was an Italian royal army officer and colonial commander who enforced imperial violence in Libya and Ethiopia. A central military official under Mussolini, he resigned after the failure of the 1940 Greek campaign and later helped the monarchy remove the dictator. As prime minister after Mussolini's fall in 1943, he arranged Italy's armistice with the Allies, but the confused announcement and flight of the royal government left Italian forces unprepared for German disarmament and the collapse of state authority.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1890Commissioned as an artillery officer in the Italian Royal Army
- 1916Directed the capture of Monte Sabotino in the First World War
- 1925–1940Chief of the Italian General Staff
- 1929–1933Governor of Libya, directing repression and internment policies
- 1935–1936Commander of the invasion of Ethiopia, capturing Addis Ababa
- 1943–1944Prime minister after Mussolini's fall, signing Italy's armistice with the Allies
- 1944Resigned as prime minister and withdrew from political life
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarCommander in the capture of Monte SabotinoHe directed the capture of Monte Sabotino in the First World War.
- 1943–1945The Italian Campaign and the Fall of MussoliniHead of the armistice governmentAfter Mussolini's fall, he led the government and signed the armistice with the Allies.
The Ethiopian war and chemical warfare
When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Badoglio was appointed commander in chief of the Italian forces on the northern front. Italian forces used poison gas during the war. In a study drawing on International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Italian records, historian Rainer Baudendistel reports that Mussolini renewed authorization on 28 March 1936 for Badoglio to use gas of any type and on any scale. An Italian document dated the following day records this authorization. The evidence shows that Badoglio was authorized to use chemical weapons and remained in command; by itself, however, this record does not establish that he personally ordered particular attacks or directed each operation.
The war was a practical instance of chemical warfare prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. ICRC field delegates sent reports and eyewitness information about Italian gas use; Marcel Junod's report of witnessing a gas attack near Korem was among the information conveyed to the ICRC delegation visiting Rome. Baudendistel's study says the ICRC made only a general reference to mustard gas during a brief audience with Mussolini and did not formally raise the issue during its Rome visit. Badoglio's military command and Italian chemical warfare belong in the context of the Fascist state's violence in its conquest of Ethiopia.