zugerechnetes Bewußtsein · 1920

Imputed consciousness

귀속의식

A concept used by György Lukács in History and Class Consciousness: not what the members of a class actually think, but the consciousness "imputed" to that class, which they would have if they fully grasped their situation and interests within society as a whole. Lukács held that class consciousness is neither the sum nor the average of individual consciousnesses. In his 1967 preface he criticised the concept himself: it had aimed at Lenin's consciousness "brought from outside" but had turned into a contemplative result cut off from practice.

In depth

Can a survey reveal class consciousness?

Suppose a thousand workers at a factory are surveyed and most answer, "If the company does well, so do we." Is this these workers' class consciousness? Common sense says yes: if you want to know what people think, you ask them. Lukács opposed this common sense. A survey yields only the thoughts these people have now; it does not tell what the position they occupy actually means.

Imputed consciousness (German zugerechnetes Bewußtsein) is the term that came to fill this gap. "To impute" (zurechnen) is a word for attributing responsibility or a result to someone. Lukács called the "rationally appropriate reaction" to the typical position a class occupies in the production process its class consciousness. That consciousness is not measured in people's heads; it is derived theoretically from the position and attributed to the class.

How did Lukács define it?

In the essay "Class Consciousness" in History and Class Consciousness, Lukács said one must not stop at describing what people actually think. When consciousness is related to society as a whole, the thoughts and feelings appear that people in a given situation would have if they were able to grasp that situation, and the interests arising from it, completely. He called this the "category of objective possibility". Then came the definition: "The rationally appropriate reaction which is in this way imputed to a particular typical position in the process of production is class consciousness."

Die rationell angemessene Reaktion nun, die auf diese Weise einer bestimmten typischen Lage im Produktionsprozeß zugerechnet wird, ist das Klassenbewußtsein

The next sentence is the key: "This consciousness is therefore neither the sum nor the average of what the individuals who make up the class think, feel and so on."

Dieses Bewußtsein ist also weder die Summe noch der Durchschnitt dessen, was die einzelnen Individuen, die die Klasse bilden, denken, empfinden usw.

Lukács nevertheless held that the historically significant action of a class is ultimately determined by this consciousness, not by the thinking of individuals. So a distance opens between imputed class consciousness and people's actual thoughts, which psychology can describe. In a footnote he noted that the method resembles efforts of bourgeois science such as Max Weber's ideal types, without going into the relation.

Why is the consciousness of the proletariat special?

For Lukács the imputed consciousness of every class does not carry the same weight. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy sums it up, bourgeoisie and proletariat both face a reified social reality and form correct beliefs about it in the form in which it is immediately given. Such beliefs are incomplete, however, because they cannot explain the role each element plays within society as a whole. The bourgeoisie must remain "imprisoned" in this immediacy, while the proletariat, which sells its own labour power as a commodity, is "forced" to go beyond it. The summary stresses that this does not mean the proletariat has the superior understanding merely by virtue of its position, only that it is capable of achieving it. So the imputed consciousness of the proletariat coincides with true knowledge of society as a whole, and its becoming actual consciousness is the revolution.

Here a large epistemological claim emerges: the capacity to know what is true differs with social position. The idea connects with the proletarian standpoint theory in the entry "Reification", and it is why feminist standpoint theory later took Lukács as one starting point of its lineage.

Who closes the gap between actual and imputed consciousness?

The distance between imputed and actual consciousness led straight into politics. If workers have not yet reached that consciousness, who tells them of it? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that in Lukács's essay on organisation the distinction between "empirical" and "imputed" class consciousness was never fully resolved, and non-reified consciousness remained only an objective possibility. As a result the communist party takes on the role of expressing and disciplining forms of consciousness already reached.

In the 1967 preface Lukács spelled out the connection himself: "But I could only arrive at the formulation of an 'imputed' class consciousness."

Ich konnte aber doch nur zur Formulierung eines »zugerechneten« Klassenbewußtseins gelangen.

What he had meant, he wrote, was what Lenin said in What Is to Be Done?: unlike spontaneous trade-unionist consciousness, socialist class consciousness is brought to the workers from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers. But what was for Lenin the result of analysing a practical movement became in his book a purely intellectual result, something contemplative, so that the turn of imputed consciousness into revolutionary practice appeared as "the pure miracle", he criticised.

What criticisms and continuations followed?

Criticism came from several directions. One came from empirical social research: if a theorist attributes to people a consciousness they do not actually have, how can its correctness be tested? Lukács said in the preface that he had wanted to keep class consciousness apart from just such "opinion research" and to give it practical objectivity, but admitted that the result was contemplation. Another was political: if the party is the one that knows the imputed consciousness, it gains grounds to dismiss workers' actual thoughts as "false consciousness". On the other hand the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also presents the reading that Lukács, because of the sharp critique of bureaucracy in the reification essay, did not simply take over the Leninist conception of the party.

The concept itself spread widely. Lucien Goldmann, who regarded Lukács as his master, joined Lukács's Marxism with Jean Piaget's genetic epistemology and read literary and philosophical works in relation to the worldview of a social group. The problem of knowledge tied to social position came back in other forms in Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and in feminist standpoint theory. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy counts Lukács among the first defenders of what later came to be called a "standpoint theory" and an important forerunner of feminist epistemology.

Related people

Sources

  1. archive.org
  2. plato.stanford.edu
  3. de.wikipedia.org
  4. Wikipedia (EN)
  5. Wikipedia (EN)