Unternehmen Taifun · 1941.09.30–12.05

Operation Typhoon (1941)

태풍 작전 (1941)

Operation Typhoon (Unternehmen Taifun) was the code name of the offensive in which the German Army Group Centre tried to take Moscow in the autumn of 1941. Prepared under Adolf Hitler's Directive No. 35 of 6 September and given its name on 19 September, it opened on 30 September with an attack by Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. The plan was to destroy the main Soviet forces in a double encirclement by three panzer groups at Vyazma and Bryansk and then advance on Moscow. The encirclements of early October were a great success, but from mid-October mud, supply failures and Soviet resistance brought the offensive to a halt. The renewed offensive of 15 November also failed to envelop Moscow from north and south, stalling in early December, and on 5 December the Soviet counter-offensive began.

In depth

How was Operation Typhoon planned?

When the Battle of Smolensk ended in July 1941, the German leadership was divided over what came next. Walther von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the army, Franz Halder, chief of the army general staff, and Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Centre, wanted to strike straight at Moscow to draw out and destroy the main Soviet forces. Hitler wanted the economic resources of Ukraine and Leningrad first; he reportedly told Brauchitsch that "only ossified brains" could think of a direct drive on Moscow. Halder warned that postponing Moscow would give the enemy time, and that a late offensive would be stopped by the onset of winter, so that the aim of Operation Barbarossa would not be reached. German historians call this quarrel the "August crisis". Directive No. 34 of 12 August said that Moscow, as a "centre of state, armaments and communications", had to be taken before winter, but still put Leningrad and Ukraine first, and the 2nd Army and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Centre turned south into the encirclement east of Kiev.

When the collapse of the Soviet Southwestern Front at Kiev came in sight, Hitler issued Directive No. 35 on 6 September. It ordered first the destruction of the enemy east of Smolensk "in a double envelopment aimed in the general direction of Vyazma", and only then a pursuit by Army Group Centre towards Moscow, its right flank on the Oka and its left on the upper Volga. On 10 September Halder issued the army high command's "directive for the continuation of operations", which quietly changed this order of events: forces were to advance on the capital at the same time as the encirclement, and the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group, still tied down at Kiev, were to strike from around Romny towards Oryol as a third attack group. Army Groups South and North had to give up corps headquarters, panzer and motorised divisions; from Army Group North came the whole of Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group.

Where to close the ring was also disputed. Hitler wanted the panzer pincers aimed directly at Vyazma; Bock wanted to encircle much further east at Gzhatsk, and Halder backed him. On 19 September the plan received the code name "Typhoon", and on 24 September the commanders of the armies, panzer groups and the 2nd Air Fleet met Bock and Halder in Smolensk for a final conference. Guderian, arguing that his sector had hardly any paved roads and that he had to reach the paved roads at Oryol quickly, got his way and was allowed to start on 30 September, two days before the rest. The final orders went out on 26 September. Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group, under Günther von Kluge's 4th Army, was to break through along the Roslavl-Moscow road and then wheel towards the Smolensk-Moscow highway on both sides of Vyazma; Hermann Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group, under the 9th Army, was to break through south of Bely, take the Vyazma-Rzhev road and turn in west of Vyazma. The 2nd Army was to cover the flank towards Sukhinichi, and the 2nd Panzer Group, directly under Bock, was to roll up the Soviet front from the south and destroy the enemy around Bryansk together with the 2nd Army. The rest of the attack was to begin on 2 October at 5.30 a.m. At a conference on 29 September Bock stressed that Moscow had to be taken before winter, by 7 November, the anniversary of the revolution. In his order of the day of 2 October Hitler told the soldiers of the Eastern Front that this was "the last great decisive battle of this year", which would destroy the enemy before winter.

What forces took part, and what was missing?

On 2 October Army Group Centre had 78 divisions (46 infantry, 14 panzer, 8 motorised infantry, 6 security and others) with 1,929,406 men. It was larger than on the first day of Barbarossa, but not all of it took part in the attack, and men and equipment had been in action for over three months without rest. By the count of the German army general staff, on 4 September 30 per cent of the panzer divisions' tanks were total losses and 23 per cent under repair. Hitler held back large numbers of new tanks for use after the Soviet collapse; only 125 were promised as replacements, and Halder's request for another 181 was refused. At the start the 2nd Panzer Group therefore had 50 per cent of its establishment in tanks, the 3rd 70 to 80 per cent, and only the 4th, just arrived from the north, a little under 100 per cent. Soviet historiography claimed that the German attack forces were fully equipped with 1,700 tanks; the German historian Klaus Reinhardt put the real figure at 1,220. Motor vehicles were more than 22 per cent short and tractors 30 per cent, and most of the vehicles left had been running since June and were patched up. The plenipotentiary for motor vehicles, Adolf von Schell, warned that without immediate authorisation for new production the army would stall deep in Russia when winter came; Hitler never gave it.

Supply was a bigger problem. Filling the forward depots at Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Vitebsk required 27 supply trains a day in September and 29 in October. They came only in the first 13 days; at the end of September and in October 22 trains a day arrived, and 20 in November. The armed forces high command, expecting the operation to be over in October, promised only three trains a day for November. Converting the broad Russian gauge to the European standard was unfinished, and there were hardly any paved roads. German war planning rested from the start on the assumption that the operation would be short.

Facing them were Ivan Konev's Western Front, Semyon Budyonny's Reserve Front and Andrei Yeryomenko's Bryansk Front. The Soviet figures summarised in Russian Wikipedia give about 1.25 million men and 990 tanks; other Soviet publications range from 800,000 to 1.25 million, and German Wikipedia notes that there are no reliable figures. Of the Western Front's 479 tanks only 45 were of modern types, and experienced staff officers and signals equipment were scarce.

Were the two months spent on Kiev the cause of failure?

The claim most often heard in German generals' post-war memoirs is that a direct drive on Moscow in August would have won. After the December counter-offensive Bock wrote in his diary: "Last August, the road to Moscow was open; we could have entered the Bolshevik capital in triumph and in summery weather", and blamed the high command for a terrible mistake in forcing his army group onto the defensive that August. Yet the participants were not consistent. In late August Halder sent Guderian to the Führer's headquarters to argue for Moscow; Guderian, who had fiercely opposed Hitler's southern plan, unexpectedly sided with Hitler there, angering Halder and Bock. Bock himself, by the end of August, considered Guderian's southward move irreversible and wanted to finish the southern offensive.

There are arguments on the other side. The Kiev encirclement destroyed the Southwestern Front with more than 600,000 Soviet losses and removed the threat to Army Group Centre's southern flank, while its infantry recovered and caught up with the armour. The assessment summarised in English Wikipedia is that the southern turn delayed the advance on Moscow by about a month and dragged the operation into winter, but that the Red Army also lost large forces it could have used to defend Moscow. Georgy Zhukov thought that without the Ukrainian operation Army Group Centre might have been even worse off, since the Stavka reserves used in September to plug the gap in the south-west could have struck the flank and rear of the German armies advancing on Moscow. The armed forces high command had already concluded in a memorandum of 26 August, which Hitler accepted, that the eastern campaign could not be finished that year. On this view the "lost two months" were one side of a larger problem: an army built for a short war.

What went to plan at Vyazma and Bryansk?

The first stage succeeded beyond the plan. Guderian set off east of Glukhov on 30 September, and on 3 October the German 4th Panzer Division took Oryol, which through the local commander's negligence was almost undefended. On 6 October Bryansk fell with its Desna bridges, cutting the Bryansk Front's supply and communications. In the north, at 10.30 a.m. on 7 October the XXXX Motorised Corps of the 4th Panzer Group took Vyazma, and that morning the LVI Motorised Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group arrived: the ring was closed. Inside were more than five armies, among them Mikhail Lukin's 19th, the 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies, Ivan Boldin's group and the troops of the 16th Army handed earlier to the 20th. Major breakout attempts continued until 12 October; the last units surrendered only around 20 October. Soviet figures for Vyazma alone are over 380,000 killed and wounded and over 600,000 captured.

The Wehrmacht report claimed 663,000 prisoners, 1,242 tanks and 5,412 guns from the two pockets. Yet according to Helmut Arntz, Halder later told him and others that the double battle had not encircled the Soviet forces but let them escape eastward, and that the army high command therefore considered the war against the Soviet Union unwinnable as early as October 1941. Soviet command errors helped the first success: limited counter-attacks ordered by Stalin up to the eve of the offensive ran straight into German assembly areas and cost heavy losses, and when Yeryomenko of the Bryansk Front asked to switch to a flexible defence he was told to hold every metre. The German historian Joachim Hoffmann concluded that the errors and omissions of the Soviet leadership were a major reason why Army Group Centre broke through so quickly at the decisive points.

The fate of the men captured lay outside the operational plan but was its consequence. The capture of nearly 1.5 million prisoners in the encirclements of Kiev, Vyazma and Bryansk in September and October overwhelmed the makeshift German arrangements. On 21 October the army's quartermaster general, Eduard Wagner, cut the daily ration for non-working prisoners to 1,487 calories, and at a meeting in November acknowledged that the non-working prisoners, all but one million of the 2.3 million then held, would die. From October prisoners were carried in open cattle wagons, and many died of cold. Of nearly six million Soviet prisoners taken by Germany, around three million died in captivity. Bock was one of the few German officers to protest against the systematic maltreatment of Soviet prisoners, but took few steps to improve conditions in his own area. As for Moscow's inhabitants, on 12 October Hitler ordered that the city be encircled and shelled and that its capitulation not be accepted even if offered.

What did Bock, Guderian and Halder quarrel about?

The first success sharpened the quarrels in the German command. When Oryol fell on 3 October, Bock ordered Guderian on to Tula, but within hours the army high command reversed this and sent him against the Bryansk pocket. Bock protested that the area between Oryol and Tula was almost empty of Soviet troops and that Tula could be taken within hours, but gave way. On 7 October, the day the Vyazma ring closed, Halder and Bock met at Army Group Centre headquarters and, judging that the enemy had no significant forces left to defend Moscow, decided to clear the pockets and pursue towards Moscow at the same time.

The direction of the pursuit was disputed. Hitler demanded that the 2nd Panzer Army take Kursk, and that the 3rd Panzer Group and part of the 9th Army turn north to destroy Soviet forces around Ostashkov together with Army Group North. Bock opposed this splitting of his forces, but the next day a Führer order confirmed the northward turn of the 3rd Panzer Group. As a result, in mid-October the direct pursuit towards Moscow was carried by little more than the LVII Motorised Corps and two infantry corps. The 4th Panzer Group was tied to the Vyazma pocket until mid-October, and the 3rd took Kalinin on 14 October but was then pinned down by the counter-attacks of the Soviet Kalinin Front and forced onto the defensive. Walter Chales de Beaulieu, chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Group, was among the sharpest post-war critics of the turn towards Kalinin.

In November the quarrel changed. As the ground began to freeze, many front-line commanders wanted to go over to the defensive and choose good winter positions, but the army high command believed that one last "effort" would achieve the aim of the campaign. At a conference of the senior commanders in Orsha on 13 November the decision to resume the attack was taken. Bock had been one of the strongest advocates of an offensive on Moscow that autumn, arguing that when two opponents are equally exhausted the one with the stronger will decides the outcome. When Bock reported his troops' exhaustion and the dangerous situation on 23 November, Army Group Centre was ordered to continue the offensive with its "last ounce of strength". The German command believed that both sides were down to their last battalion.

How decisive were mud and supply?

On 6-7 October the first snow fell in the 2nd Panzer Army's sector, and from the following night autumn rain poured over the whole of Army Group Centre. The rasputitsa, Russian for "roadlessness", had begun. On 9 October Army Group Centre headquarters noted that panzer units could not move off the main roads and that fuel shortages had appeared. The effect on the fighting was felt from about 13 October, when fuel and ammunition could no longer be guaranteed. On 12 October the 2nd Panzer Army's motorised units were moving at one kilometre an hour, and on 19 October the whole 5th Infantry Division had to repair the Vyazma-Moscow highway, wrecked by demolitions, bombing and overuse. Supplies reaching the attacking divisions fell from 900 tonnes a day to about 20.

Losses mounted. From the start of the operation to 17 October Army Group Centre lost 47,430 men and 1,791 officers; the 6th Panzer Division was down to 60 tanks, and the 4th Panzer Division, after fighting the Soviet 1st Guards Rifle Corps at Mtsensk, to 38. On 1 November Bock ordered that there be no further major advance for the time being, that supply problems be solved as quickly as possible, and that the attack resume as soon as good weather, that is frost, set in. German Wikipedia's article on the double battle of Vyazma and Bryansk regards Operation Typhoon as having practically ended with this order. Light frost on 3 November began to harden the roads, but bringing up ammunition and fuel took almost two weeks, and when hard frost came on 6 November the soldiers still had no winter clothing.

Why did the offensive renewed on 15 November stop in early December?

The new plan revived the original "second encirclement". The Germans assembled 51 divisions (13 panzer, 7 motorised). In the north the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were to pass Klin and Solnechnogorsk and envelop Moscow from the north; in the south Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army was to bypass Tula and drive on Kashira and Kolomna, the two pincers meeting east of Moscow at Noginsk. The 4th Army in the centre was to pin the Western Front. The northern attack began on 15-16 November, the southern on 18 November. Much of the 2nd Air Fleet had already left for the Mediterranean, so air support was short.

Neither pincer closed. The northern pincer took Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Istra, crossed the Moscow-Volga canal at Yakhroma on 27 November only to be thrown back the next day, and reached Krasnaya Polyana and the edge of Khimki. Khimki, reached by a German pioneer patrol on 2 December, is 23.7 kilometres from the Kremlin, the closest the Wehrmacht came; the story that German soldiers saw the Kremlin towers is considered untrue given the distance, the buildings in between and the camouflage. The southern pincer never took Tula and was thrown back before Kashira. On 1 December the 4th Army made a last frontal attempt along the Minsk road at Naro-Fominsk and withdrew four days later. In November Army Group Centre lost 45,735 killed and 300 tanks and assault guns. On 5 December the Kalinin Front and on 6 December the Western Front attacked, and a few days later the German army high command ordered a halt to all offensive operations. The counter-offensive and what followed belong to the Battle of Moscow.

When did Operation Typhoon end?

Where Operation Typhoon ends depends on who is counting. German accounts, German Wikipedia among them, treat it as the October double battle of Vyazma and Bryansk and the pursuit that followed, practically ended by Bock's halt order of 1 November, and regard the offensive resumed in mid-November as a new phase of the Battle of Moscow. Russian accounts group the 67 days from 30 September to 5 December into one "Moscow strategic defensive operation".

Zhukov addressed the question directly in his memoirs. He rejected the view in some military histories that the October battles of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts did not belong to the Battle of Moscow and that the Germans, fully stopped on the Mozhaisk line, had to prepare a new "general offensive". The German reinforcement and regrouping of armour in November, he argued, is done in every strategic offensive and cannot mark the beginning or end of an operation; from the start the German command had planned a single operation in two stages, a first encirclement at Bryansk and Vyazma and a second through Klin and Kalinin and through Tula and Kashira, closing at Noginsk.

How has the failure been debated?

The post-war memoirs of German generals mainly blamed mud, frost and Hitler's decisions. The research summarised in German Wikipedia cuts the weather explanation down. The German command knew the rasputitsa would come in mid-October but ignored it because the operation was supposed to be over by then, and no meteorologists were consulted in the planning. Precipitation in October 1941 was in fact below average, and frost came earlier than usual, shortening the muddy season; the thesis of a surprising change in the weather can thus be seen as an attempt to blame one's own failure on a higher power. Memoirs also contain many errors of date and fact, as when Guderian wrote that the Bryansk pocket was cleared earlier than it was and left out the breakout of Soviet units.

Zhukov pointed to miscalculation. The German high command, he wrote, seriously underestimated the Red Army and overestimated its own forces; what it had assembled was enough only to break through at Vyazma and Bryansk and push the Soviet fronts back to the line Kalinin-Yakhroma-Krasnaya Polyana-the Nara-Tula. Its flank group at Tula was weak and short of infantry, its reliance on armour failed as the panzer units took heavy losses and lost their punch, and it did not strike the centre of the Western Front at the same time, so the Soviets could move reserves from quiet sectors to the flanks. He also cited the partisans who cut German supply lines stretching over a thousand kilometres.

Soviet accounts had their own gaps. Early post-war Soviet publications barely mentioned the encirclement and destruction of large forces at Vyazma and Bryansk; later a heroic narrative took hold in which the sacrifice of the five encircled armies held German divisions for about two weeks and saved the capital. German Wikipedia notes that this narrative leaves out that the German command at the same time diverted the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army towards Kalinin. In the end, the failure of Operation Typhoon is usually explained not by the weather alone or by Hitler alone but by the combination of force and supply plans made for a short war, conflicting aims inside the German command, and a Soviet resistance that, after enormous losses, still produced new defence lines and reserves.

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Sources

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