Unternehmen Wintergewitter · 1942.12.12–23

Operation Winter Storm

겨울폭풍 작전

Operation Winter Storm (Unternehmen Wintergewitter) was the offensive of 12–23 December 1942 in which Erich von Manstein's German Army Group Don tried to relieve the German 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad. The LVII Panzer Corps of Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army (the 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, later joined by the 17th) drove north-east from Kotelnikovo and won a bridgehead on the Myshkova River, but was stopped 35 to 55 kilometres short of the pocket by the Soviet 51st Army and the 2nd Guards Army, which had been turned south to meet it. The breakout of the 6th Army from inside, codenamed Thunderclap (Donnerschlag), was never ordered, and when Operation Little Saturn broke Army Group Don's left wing Manstein halted the attack on 23 December.

In depth

What was Operation Winter Storm meant to do?

The Soviet Operation Uranus, launched on 19 November 1942, surrounded the German 6th Army, part of the 4th Panzer Army and Romanian units around Stalingrad within a few days. The number trapped differs by source: English Wikipedia gives some 300,000 German and Romanian soldiers, Russian Wikipedia about 240,000. Winter Storm was the relief offensive in which German forces outside the pocket attacked from the south-west to link up with the 6th Army again. The German codename Wintergewitter means "winter thunderstorm"; English writing renders it as Winter Storm.

Two different aims were bound up in the operation from the start. For Hitler, relief meant reopening a supply line to the 6th Army while Stalingrad continued to be held. For the commanders on the spot, above all Erich von Manstein who ran the operation, it meant getting the 6th Army out of the pocket. English Wikipedia explains that Manstein was gambling on Hitler accepting in the end that a breakout was the only way to save the 6th Army. This mismatch unsettled every decision until the attack was halted.

Why did the 6th Army not break out at once?

As the ring closed in late November, the commanders inside wanted to get out straight away. According to Russian Wikipedia, the 6th Army commander Friedrich Paulus asked the commander of Army Group B, Maximilian von Weichs, on 21 November for permission to fall back between the Don and the Chir, and Weichs agreed at once. That evening, however, Hitler ordered by radio an all-round defence to be held at any cost. According to German Wikipedia, the commander of the LI Army Corps, Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, drew up a breakout plan for 25 November, and the other corps commanders and the 6th Army staff shared his view; 130 tanks and 17,000 men stood ready for the first wave and 40,000 for the second. The Chief of the Army General Staff, Kurt Zeitzler, also supported an immediate breakout.

What reached the 6th Army on 24 November was an order from Hitler, passed over the head of Army Group B, to hold out for the time being. German and Russian Wikipedia both name the reason: the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, had promised that his air force could supply the 6th Army. The promise was not kept. According to English Wikipedia, the 6th Army needed some 680 tonnes of supplies a day but received less than 20 percent of that, and in early December more German transport planes were lost to accidents than to Soviet fighters.

How was the relief force put together?

Hitler grouped the southern front around the pocket into a new Army Group Don and gave it to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, until then commander of the 11th Army. Russian Wikipedia dates the Army High Command order creating the army group 21 November; German Wikipedia gives 25 November as the day Manstein took command. The army group comprised the encircled 6th Army, the 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, and its task was to strike north from the south, open a "corridor" to the 6th Army and rebuild the broken front. According to German Wikipedia, Manstein considered the task impossible as set; he argued for a joint relief attack by Army Groups Don and A, a simultaneous breakout by the 6th Army and a withdrawal of the front to the Donets and the Mius, but could not carry his view at Hitler's headquarters.

The first plan, laid down in Army Group Don's order of 1 December, had two prongs. Army Group Hoth under Colonel General Hermann Hoth (the 4th Panzer Army and the Romanian 4th Army) would make the main thrust from Kotelnikovo east of the Don, while the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Hollidt would strike from the bridgehead at Nizhne-Chirskaya on the lower Chir. But when the Soviet 5th Tank Army attacked along the Chir from 30 November, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was tied down defending it and the second prong vanished. Promised units also failed to arrive on time. According to Russian Wikipedia, two infantry divisions meant for Hollidt had already been committed on the Romanian 3rd Army's front and a mountain division was sent to another army group; according to English Wikipedia, Army Group A held back the 17th Panzer Division and let it go only ten days after it had been asked for.

The actual attack therefore fell to General Friedrich Kirchner's LVII Panzer Corps. According to Russian Wikipedia its core was the 6th Panzer Division, just arrived from France (160 tanks and 40 self-propelled guns), and the 23rd Panzer Division from the Caucasus (30 tanks). German Wikipedia notes that the Romanian troops covering the flanks were poorly equipped and had been badly thinned and demoralised in the previous fighting. Figures for the force vary widely. German Wikipedia speaks of about 50,000 men and 250 tanks against Soviet forces about three times as strong; Russian Wikipedia gives about 76,000 men, 510 guns and mortars and more than 500 tanks and assault guns. The Stavka representative Aleksandr Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that on the first day the Soviet 51st Army in front of the attack had 34,000 men and 77 tanks against 76,000 men and 500 tanks; Russian Wikipedia gives the 51st Army 105 tanks.

The attack was first set for no earlier than 8 December and was put off because the units had not assembled. The Germans also waited for frost to harden the ground for their tanks, and it came from 10 December. According to English Wikipedia, Manstein told Paulus that day that the relief would begin within 24 hours.

How did the attack get from Kotelnikovo to the Myshkova?

On 12 December Hoth attacked without waiting for the 17th Panzer Division. The 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions drove north-east on both sides of the Kotelnikovo–Stalingrad railway, scattered the Soviet 302nd Rifle Division on the first day and reached the south bank of the Aksai by evening. How far the Soviet side had expected this direction is told differently. Russian Wikipedia writes that the South-Western Front commander Nikolai Vatutin expected the Germans to strike by the shortest route from Nizhne-Chirskaya and that the Soviet command misread the main axis. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that by early December he already knew large armoured forces, among them the 6th Panzer Division from France, were gathering at Kotelnikovo. English Wikipedia says the Stavka had not expected the offensive to begin so soon.

On the 13th the 6th Panzer Division crossed the Aksai and reached the village of Verkhne-Kumsky. It lay on the most convenient north–south road to the Myshkova, and the snow-filled ravines around it left large armoured forces no way past. The Soviets sent Vasily Volsky's 4th Mechanised Corps, the 13th Tank Corps and anti-tank units there, and the village changed hands several times between 14 and 19 December. According to German Wikipedia, the 6th Panzer Division had lost 23 tanks by the 15th, and its war diary rated the fight of the 18th as possibly decisive for breaking the ring. The Soviets towed anti-tank guns behind their tanks and fell back behind them when German armour came on. On the 18th Stalin gave the 4th Mechanised Corps that held the village the Guards title (it became the 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps). Russian Wikipedia judges the five-day delay at Verkhne-Kumsky a clear Soviet success that bought time for the 2nd Guards Army to arrive.

The 17th Panzer Division reached the battlefield on the 17th, and on the 19th the Germans broke the resistance around Verkhne-Kumsky and reached the Myshkova. That night Lieutenant General Erhard Raus's 6th Panzer Division seized the only bridge over the river in a surprise attack and set up a bridgehead on the north bank. German Wikipedia writes that the spearheads were now 55 kilometres from the pocket and could see the flares fired from its southern front. This distance, too, differs by source: English Wikipedia gives 48 kilometres, Vasilevsky's memoirs and Russian Wikipedia 35 to 40.

How did the Soviets respond?

The Soviet response is covered in detail in the event "Battle of Stalingrad" and the entries on Operation Little Saturn and Operation Ring, so it is told briefly here. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that on the night of 12 December he asked Stalin to turn Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Guards Army, then arriving as the main force for Operation Ring, south to the Myshkova and to postpone the destruction of the pocket. By his account Stalin first objected sharply and gave his approval at about five in the morning on the 13th. The Don Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs that he was present during that call and said no when Stalin asked him; as he remembered it, Stalin replied that his idea of finishing the pocket first was bold but too risky in the circumstances. Vasilevsky explained his own reasoning this way:

Otherwise Paulus's encircled troops might have broken out of the "cauldron".
Иначе окруженные войска Паулюса могли бы вырваться из «котла».

According to Vasilevsky, of the 165 trains carrying the 2nd Guards Army only 60 had arrived by 12 December. Even so, the army marched 40 to 50 kilometres a day in hard frost and took up position on the north bank of the Myshkova between the 18th and the 20th. According to English Wikipedia it numbered some 90,000 men. At the same time the Stavka turned Operation Saturn: after breaking the Italian 8th Army it was to strike south-east towards Morozovsk and Tormosin, into the rear of the relief force, instead of south to Rostov. This Operation Little Saturn began on 16 December, tore a wide gap in the Italian front by the 18th, and on the 24th Vasily Badanov's Soviet 24th Tank Corps raided Tatsinskaya airfield, the main base of the 6th Army's air supply.

Why was Thunderclap never ordered?

Manstein's idea was that while Hoth closed in from outside, the 6th Army would break out southwards from inside and meet him. The signal for the 6th Army to move was "Thunderclap" (Donnerschlag). According to German Wikipedia, preparations for a breakout were made inside the pocket for the second time: tanks and units were massed in the south, equipment to be left behind was destroyed, and the positions and bunkers on the northern edge were abandoned. But the 6th Army staff judged that, with its men weakened and fuel and ammunition short, the army could break out only 15 kilometres deep, and wanted to wait until Army Group Hoth was within 18 kilometres.

On 21 December Hitler allowed the 6th Army to attack on condition that Stalingrad was still held. According to German Wikipedia, his headquarters asked the same day for the army's fuel returns, found that its tanks could go no more than 30 kilometres, and Hitler withdrew the permission rather than see the heavy equipment abandoned on the steppe. English Wikipedia likewise cites Colonel Wilhelm Adam of the 6th Army staff: its tanks had fuel for only 30 kilometres, after which fuel and ammunition would have had to be flown in, and it had fewer than 70 serviceable tanks. Russian Wikipedia puts the hesitation on Manstein: under Hitler's orders Paulus had to hold "Fortress Stalingrad" and a breakout meant abandoning the city, so Manstein could not be sure Paulus would obey the signal. The 6th Army staff said it needed six days to prepare a breakout.

How was the attack halted and pulled back?

From 20 to 22 December the 23rd Panzer Division fought to widen the bridgehead, but the link to it was cut several times and the Soviets threw every unit they could spare against the flanks of the relief force. To the north, Little Saturn broke the Italian 8th Army and threatened Army Detachment Hollidt and the Don bridges. Army Group Hoth risked being outflanked west of the Don and caught in a second pocket, which the Luftwaffe could not have supplied. According to German Wikipedia, Hoth believed that after regrouping he could push out of the bridgehead again and that getting within 25 kilometres would be enough for the 6th Army to break out, and the 4th Panzer Army was preparing to go for a decision on the 24th regardless of its flanks and rear. But on 23 December Manstein ordered the attack stopped and a switch to the defensive, and pulled the strongest unit, the 6th Panzer Division, west towards Morozovsk.

On the 24th the Soviet 2nd Guards and 51st Armies counter-attacked and retook Verkhne-Kumsky that afternoon. According to German Wikipedia, Army Group Hoth was allowed to fall back to its start line only on the 26th, and had to give up that line too on the night of the 29th. According to English Wikipedia, by the end of 1942 the gap between the 6th Army and the German forces outside was more than 65 kilometres. Soviet accounts put German losses high: Russian Wikipedia writes that by 20 December the Germans had lost 60 percent of their motorised infantry and 230 tanks, and that in falling back to the start line they lost nearly all their equipment and more than 40,000 men.

The end of the relief decided the 6th Army's fate. According to German Wikipedia, on 27 December an envoy sent by Manstein explained to the 6th Army staff that it had to break out at once, but Paulus, pointing to Hitler's promise of sufficient supply and timely relief, refused to act on his own. Hitler's headquarters told the 6th Army that this time the 17th Army of Army Group A would relieve it, though Army Groups Don and A were by then busy keeping their own lines of retreat open. The pocket was destroyed in Operation Ring, which began on 10 January 1943, and the 6th Army surrendered on 31 January and 2 February.

Could the 6th Army have escaped?

The question was argued over for a long time after the war, in German generals' memoirs and in historical writing. The disputed points fall into three.

The first is late November. When the ring had just closed the 6th Army still had tanks and fuel, and according to Russian Wikipedia the nearest German forces outside were about 40 kilometres away. Since Paulus and his corps commanders, the commander of Army Group B and the Chief of the Army General Staff all wanted a breakout, the sources above agree that what blocked it then was Hitler's order and Göring's promise of air supply.

The second is late December. The 6th Army staff's own judgement, as German Wikipedia gives it, was that the men could break out only 15 kilometres and that the tanks had fuel for only 30. Even at its closest, Hoth's spearhead was farther away than that. Had Thunderclap been given, the 6th Army would have had to leave most of its heavy equipment behind and cross the snow-covered steppe with starving infantry. How many would have got through is still a matter of conjecture; on the other hand, the 2nd Guards Army was by then already in position beyond the Myshkova.

The third is responsibility. In his post-war memoirs, Lost Victories, Manstein laid the failure at Hitler's door. The passage quoted by Russian Wikipedia reads:

The cause of the 6th Army's destruction must of course be sought in Hitler's refusal, above all for reasons of prestige, to order Stalingrad to be abandoned.
Причину гибели 6-й армии надо, понятно, искать в том, что Гитлер — прежде всего из соображений престижа — отказался отдать приказ оставить Сталинград.

Russian Wikipedia judges that the memoir in effect shifted all responsibility for the 6th Army's fate onto Hitler's incompetence. Read together, German and Russian Wikipedia show that Hitler never dropped his condition that the city be held, that Manstein did not give the Thunderclap signal on his own authority, and that Paulus would not move without an order.

Manstein himself explains in his memoirs why Thunderclap was never given. Army Group Don's order of 19 December told the 6th Army to break out, and he and Paulus agreed that the attack to open a way toward Hoth and the Thunderclap evacuation of Stalingrad had to follow one another at once. But Hitler would not drop his condition that the city be held, and when Paulus reported that his roughly 100 serviceable tanks had fuel for only 30 kilometres, Hitler used that report as his reason to refuse. Manstein wrote that the army group tried to lift the responsibility from Paulus with its order, but that Paulus "could not lay it down either before his conscience or before Hitler." In the same chapter he admits that his advice to the Chief of the Army General Staff on 24 November, to wait for relief rather than break out at once, was in hindsight wrong, and that he should have insisted on an immediate breakout.

The other side sees the very nature of the order differently. English Wikipedia writes that when Paulus put his questions to Army Group Don he was told to implement Thunderclap only on explicit orders. Colonel Wilhelm Adam, adjutant at 6th Army headquarters, wrote in memoirs published in East Germany in 1965 that Paulus told him Manstein "has to sanction the start of Thunderclap, and he is still silent", and that he "is afraid to give the order in his own name." Adam turned to the anti-fascist camp after his capture, and his book too is written from that position. English Wikipedia reports that the American historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millett judged that Manstein's message of 24 November advising against a breakout, together with Göring's assurance, sealed the fate of the 6th Army, and that Gerhard Weinberg pointed out that Manstein distorted the Stalingrad record in his memoirs and probably invented some events.

The Soviet side has its own "what if". Rokossovsky believed that had the 2nd Guards Army not been sent south, he could have finished the 6th Army before Manstein arrived; Vasilevsky held that even a short delay might have let the 6th Army escape. Their dispute is covered in the entry on Operation Ring.

How was it remembered in the Soviet Union?

In the Soviet Union the defensive battle on the Myshkova was remembered above all through Yury Bondarev's novel Hot Snow and the film of the same name that Gavriil Yegiazarov made from it in 1972. Russian Wikipedia also calls the operation by its Soviet name, the "Kotelnikovo operation".

Related people

Related historical events

Sources

  1. de.wikipedia.org
  2. Wikipedia (EN)
  3. militera.lib.ru
  4. Wikipedia (RU)
  5. militera.lib.ru
  6. Wikipedia (EN)
  7. de.wikipedia.org
  8. militera.lib.ru
  9. Wikipedia (EN)
  10. militera.lib.ru
  11. militera.lib.ru
  12. Wikipedia (EN)