Soviet cybernetics debate
소련의 사이버네틱스 논쟁
A dispute in the Soviet Union over Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics (1948). In the early 1950s the Soviet press and philosophical journals attacked it as a "reactionary pseudoscience"; after an article by military computing specialists signalled its rehabilitation in 1955, the programme of the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 named it among the sciences to be used in building communism. Features of the debate are that most critics had not read the original, that not one Soviet scientist was singled out, and that computer development went on being supported. It is also a case for the theory of knowledge, asking how explaining machines and information meets materialism.
In depth
What is wrong with saying a machine thinks?
A thermostat turns the heating on when the room gets cold and off when it gets warm. A person pulling a hand from a hot pot and a factory correcting its process after looking at the reject rate are likewise taking back results and changing the next action. Can these be explained by the same principle? And if so, are the human head and society a kind of machine? What the American mathematician Norbert Wiener proposed in Cybernetics in 1948 was to treat control and communication in animals and machines within one framework.
Philosophy could not let this question pass. Soviet philosophy held that each form of the existence and development of matter has its own qualitatively peculiar laws, and the 1954 dictionary would charge cybernetics with denying just this. If thought is explained as the processing of signals, is that not reducing it to a machine? Wiener also wrote that information is information, not matter or energy. Was there then something besides matter and consciousness? This caught at once on materialism's "basic question of philosophy".
There is one caution in reading this debate. According to Slava Gerovitch's study, the criticism did not begin as a refined philosophical discussion; the philosophical charges piled up later. So this entry first follows what appeared, when and in what context.
How did the criticism grow?
The first shot was fired by a journalist and not a philosopher. On 4 May 1950 Literaturnaia gazeta printed Boris Agapov's article "Mark III, a calculator". He portrayed the American computer craze as a giant campaign of deception. The article did not use the word cybernetics, and most of its basis was a single issue of Time, that of 23 January 1950.
The following year the book Against the Philosophizing Henchmen of American and English Imperialism, published by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, carried an article by the psychologist Mikhail Yaroshevsky. Cybernetics was placed there under the rubric of "semantic idealism", and its supporters were called "semanticists-cannibals". The name had a context. After Stalin wrote in the "1950 Soviet linguistics debate" that Marr had fallen into idealism by overvaluing semantics, "semantic idealism" had become a catchword. In April 1952 Literaturnaia gazeta printed the article "Cybernetics: a 'science' of obscurantists".
In October 1953 the attack acquired the language of philosophy with "Whom does cybernetics serve?", under the pseudonym "Materialist", in Voprosy filosofii. The author was apparently the psychologist Viktor Kolbanovsky. According to this article cybernetics clung to old idealist philosophy and was also a mechanicism that reduced the activity of the brain to mechanical connection and signalling. Idealism and mechanicism run in opposite directions, and the author resolved this by saying mechanicism had turned into idealism. From the fact that the first automatic digital computers in America were built for the Department of Defense he drew the conclusion: "This is the god whom cybernetics serves!" The entry in the 1954 Short Philosophical Dictionary summed up the charge in the words "reactionary pseudoscience".
реакционная лженаука
Had the critics read the book?
Mostly not. This is the most interesting point in Gerovitch's study. The critics were mainly philosophers and psychologists with little mathematical or engineering training, and they wrote from second- or third-hand accounts. Only "Materialist" quoted Wiener's book directly, and even he seems not to have read it but to have taken the quotation from elsewhere. After Agapov's article the original could not even be borrowed from a library. Gerovitch compares this with Frederic Bartlett's "serial reproduction" experiments. Just as a story moves further from its original as it is retold, the criticism picked up features added by the critics as it was passed along. Wiener's plain sentence that information is information, not matter or energy, was turned into a claim that information has nothing to do with matter or consciousness and was denounced as a road to religion.
Gerovitch distinguishes the campaign from others. Unlike the campaigns in genetics and linguistics, it was not aimed at any group of Soviet scientists; those attacked were Americans such as Wiener, Shannon and McCulloch, and not one Soviet scientist was mentioned negatively. His account is that the more the criticism grew, the more it seemed an officially sanctioned attitude and the more critics hurried to join, and he calls such an environment a "quicksand ideology".
Did it really block Soviet computing?
The common story is that the philosophers' criticism left Soviet computers behind. Gerovitch regards this as a myth. Computers were given full support during that very period. In 1950 the small electronic calculating machine МЭСМ began operating in Kyiv, in 1952 came БЭСМ, and in 1953 serial production of the Strela began. The critical articles too recognised the value of calculating machines and set them apart from cybernetics. He quotes David Comey's remark that the later myth was an attempt to shift the deficiencies of the Soviet computer programme onto unnamed reactionary philosophers.
That does not mean the criticism cost nothing. The computer was legitimised as a "giant calculator", and its uses as a tool for processing economic data or for biological research were pushed back to avoid ideological trouble. His judgement is that the price of presenting a technology without ideology was paid in the breadth of its applications.
How was it rehabilitated?
The leading actors in the rehabilitation were military men and not philosophers. The military computing specialist Anatoly Kitov read Wiener's original in 1951–1952 in the library of the secret design bureau SKB-245, and recalled judging cybernetics to be a serious science and not a pseudoscience. In autumn 1953 Deputy Minister of Defence Aksel Berg assigned him a report on computers and cybernetics. Kitov prepared a paper with the mathematician Alexey Lyapunov, and until the authorities gave approval the two had to give public lectures again and again.
At the same time an unexpected ally appeared. The philosopher Ernest Kolman, a former ideological watchdog, criticised the suppression of cybernetics in a lecture at the Academy of Social Sciences in November 1954. Then in Voprosy filosofii 1955 no. 4 (pp. 136–148) "The main features of cybernetics" by Sergei Sobolev, Kitov and Lyapunov appeared together with an article by Kolman. The three authors' article avoided philosophical dispute and presented cybernetics in three parts: information theory, the theory of automatic high-speed electronic calculating machines, and the theory of automatic control systems. It diagnosed the earlier criticism thus: "Some of our philosophers have made a serious mistake." Kolman's article was different. In the same manner as the Stalin-era criticism he fought by citing the Marxist classics and returning labels such as idealist and vitalist to the critics.
Некоторые наши философы допустили серьёзную ошибку
In the additional printing of the Short Philosophical Dictionary issued that same year the critical entry had gone. In 1956 a Soviet delegation attended the First International Congress on Cybernetics; in 1958 Wiener's Cybernetics and The Human Use of Human Beings came out in Russian, and Problems of Cybernetics, edited by Lyapunov, was launched. The hall for Wiener's 1960 lecture at the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow was so full that people sat in the aisles and on the stairs.
What changed after rehabilitation?
What changed was the direction of assessment. In 1959 the Academy of Sciences set up the Council on Cybernetics, with Berg as chairman and Lyapunov as his deputy. The council became an umbrella for research that had been suppressed. Structural linguistics got the name "cybernetic linguistics", genetics "biological cybernetics" and non-Pavlovian physiology "physiological cybernetics". Fields made taboo in the aftermath of the linguistics debate returned under the name of cybernetics. In 1964 the council set up a section on organisation theory, in which Alexander Bogdanov's "Tektology" enjoyed a limited revival.
In 1961 the council published Cybernetics in the Service of Communism, and the same year the programme of the Twenty-Second Party Congress named cybernetics among the sciences that would build the material and technical basis of communism. The pseudoscience of only seven years before had entered the programme. Gerovitch points out that career-minded scholars then began to use the word as a buzzword. When Lyapunov, disgruntled with Berg's administrative style, withdrew, as one memoirist put it the unifying centre disappeared and cybernetics split into many branches.
The extension to economic planning is another story. In 1959 Kitov wrote to Nikita Khrushchev proposing to manage the economy through a network linking the country's computing centres, and after criticising the delays of the Ministry of Defence in a second letter he was expelled from the party and removed from his post. The plan for a nationwide automated management system, in which Viktor Glushkov carried the idea forward, never won approval for realisation. The "East German cybernetics debate" is treated separately.
What remains as a problem of the theory of knowledge?
The debate asks how far a model people make explains its object. One of the objections the critics raised is still an ordinary problem: is comparing the brain to a calculating machine an analogy or an identification? The 1954 dictionary charged cybernetics with identifying the work of the brain and that of a calculating machine. The three authors of 1955 deliberately avoided philosophical dispute, so the rehabilitation stepped round this question and did not resolve it.
"Dialectical logic", which looked for the forms of thought in social activity, and the "Moscow Methodological Circle", which saw thought as a procedure to be described and redesigned, offer different sides from which to view the problem of machine and thought. Gerovitch's conclusion points elsewhere. He reads this episode as a scandal arising from the fundamental ideological uncertainty of late Stalinism. They fought over whether an idea fitted materialism, yet few had read it directly.