Standpoint theory
입장론
The epistemological position that knowledge is shaped by where the knower stands in society, and that enquiry starting from oppressed positions can show the whole of society less partially than enquiry starting from dominant ones. Starting from Hegel's dialectic of master and slave and from the proletarian standpoint of Marx and György Lukács, it was extended in the 1970s and 1980s to women's labour and experience by Marxist-feminist and Black feminist scholars such as Nancy Hartsock, Dorothy Smith, Sandra Harding and Patricia Hill Collins. For them a "standpoint" is not a perspective one has automatically by being a woman but an achievement won through collective political struggle. Against the charge of relativism Harding put forward "strong objectivity".
In depth
What question does it answer?
Two people walk towards the same building. For one, the steps are simply "the entrance". For the other, in a wheelchair, those steps are not an entrance but a wall, and the first thing she notices is the lack of a ramp. As in this example from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP), the same world looks different depending on where one stands. So a question arises: of the things seen from different places, which shows the world better? Or are they all equally partial?
Standpoint theory answers as follows. All knowing is socially situated. And enquiry that starts from oppressed positions brings to light what is invisible from dominant ones, so it can show society as a whole less distortedly. Someone who climbs the steps without any trouble has no reason to think about whom the building shuts out; the person shut out meets it every day.
The idea is often called feminist standpoint theory. It first emerged in the 1970s from Marxist-feminist and critical-theoretical approaches across the social sciences, and, as the IEP puts it, it places the relation between political and social power and knowledge at the centre.
How did it grow out of Marxism?
The lineage of standpoint theory begins with Hegel's dialectic of master and slave. Hegel held that the slave, through struggle with the master and through the labour of making things, finally reaches self-consciousness. From this came the insight that oppression and injustice are better understood through the slave's eyes than through the master's.
Marx and Engels moved this idea to the question of class. In The German Ideology they wrote: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas." Because the class that holds the means of material production also holds the means of mental production, the ideas a society takes for granted are steeped in the position of the ruling class.
Die Gedanken der herrschenden Klasse sind in jeder Epoche die herrschenden Gedanken
György Lukács developed this into an epistemology in the "Reification" essay of History and Class Consciousness (1923). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy counts Lukács among the first to defend what later came to be called standpoint theory, and so as an important forerunner of feminist epistemology in particular. For Lukács both bourgeoisie and proletariat face a reified society governed by the commodity form, but the bourgeoisie stays imprisoned in what is immediately given, while the proletariat is forced to go beyond it and grasp society as a totality. Lukács did not, however, say that the proletariat reaches this understanding automatically by virtue of its social position, only that it is capable of reaching it. German Wikipedia notes that Marxist standpoint theories centred on the workers' standpoint arose from the 1920s, and that feminist standpoint theories were added in the 1980s.
How did feminists extend it?
The American political scientist Nancy Hartsock, in her 1983 essay "The Feminist Standpoint" and her book of the same year, Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism, applied Hegel's master–slave dialectic and Marx's theory of class to sex and gender. She set the industrial labour of the proletariat beside the domestic labour of women and argued that women too can have a distinctive standpoint. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarises, Hartsock drew on the idea that workers are closer to use value than to exchange value because they grapple directly with things rather than merely buying and selling them. Raising children, nursing the sick and cleaning the house are just such labour in touch with material need. The heroine of The Women's Room, a novel Hartsock quotes, thinks while scrubbing a toilet used by three males that she is "coming face to face with necessity".
The Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith formed her identity as a Marxist feminist in the 1970s. She held that a woman sociologist is split in two between the concepts of a discipline drawn from men's experience and the concrete world of housework, and called this the "bifurcation of consciousness". She founded a research method, institutional ethnography, which starts from women's everyday lives and works back up to the institutions that organise them.
The philosopher of science Sandra Harding, in The Science Question in Feminism (1986), distinguished a "standpoint" from a mere perspective by stressing that it requires political engagement. Her central claim is: "Starting off research from women's lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only of women's lives but also of men's lives and of the whole social order." She summed up what standpoint theory does thus: "Standpoint theories map how a social and political disadvantage can be turned into an epistemic, scientific and political advantage."
Starting off research from women’s lives will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only of women’s lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order.
Standpoint theories map how a social and political disadvantage can be turned into an epistemic, scientific and political advantage.
How does a "standpoint" differ from a mere perspective?
Standpoint theorists distinguish a standpoint from a perspective. As the IEP puts it, a perspective is a view everyone has because of the social place they occupy. A standpoint is not something one has automatically by being a woman; it is earned through the experience of collective political struggle. It resembles the Marxist distinction between a class "in itself" and a class "for itself" that has become conscious of its situation. Oppressed people, defining themselves together, produce knowledge about their own lives against the stereotypes others have pinned on them.
The reason an oppressed position is an advantage for knowledge lies in "double vision". The colonised have to learn the colonisers' language to survive, but the colonisers get by without learning the language of the colonised. So the oppressed come to know both their own world and the world of their rulers, while the rulers see only one side.
The sociologist Patricia Hill Collins explained this double vision through the situation of Black women academics in her 1986 article "Learning from the Outsider Within". Someone who has entered the academy but, being Black and a woman, is still kept off its centre can see both inside and outside. In Black Feminist Thought (1990) she analysed stereotypes such as the "Mammy", which casts Black women as faithful domestic servants, as "controlling images", and, taking up the term intersectionality coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, called the system of oppression in which race, class, gender and sexuality interlock the "matrix of domination".
What criticisms has it faced?
The first is the charge of false universalism. Standpoint theory sounds as if every woman shared the same standpoint, and so seems to put forward the experience of relatively comfortable white middle-class women academics as that of all women. Standpoint theorists replied that there can be many standpoints, and the Black feminist standpoint theories of Collins and bell hooks drew this criticism into the theory itself.
The second is the charge of relativism. If all knowing is socially situated, what grounds are there for saying one kind of knowledge is better? Harding answered not by abandoning objectivity but by redefining it. The objectivity of existing research that claims value neutrality does not examine the researcher's own position, so it is "weak objectivity". When researchers make their own position an object of reflection too, they gain a "stronger" objectivity.
The third is the "bias paradox". Helen Longino and others pointed out that saying there is no neutral place outside all standpoints while also saying oppressed standpoints are better seems contradictory. Standpoint theory also clashed with scientists. In The Science Question in Feminism Harding noted that rape and torture metaphors pervade the writings of modern scientists such as Bacon, and asked why Newton's mechanics might not just as well be called "Newton's rape manual"; she later said she regretted the remark. An essay of hers was the lead article in the issue of Social Text that also carried the hoax article of the Sokal affair, which fed into the "science wars".
Standpoint theory is a close relative of the Marxist theory of ideology, yet it differs in widening the place of knowing beyond class to sex, race, disability and colonial experience. Later discussions such as Donna Haraway's situated knowledges and Miranda Fricker's epistemic injustice also grew out of conversation with standpoint theory.