공급망 이중 제약 · 2022–present

Supply Chain Double Squeeze

공급망 이중 제약

A structural condition in which Korean semiconductor and battery firms are simultaneously caught between US equipment and technology export controls on one side and Chinese raw material and intermediate goods export controls on the other. Samsung and SK Hynix require annual US Commerce Department approval to bring American-made equipment into their Chinese fabs, while battery makers import 96.6% of their precursors from China yet risk US tax credits if they use Chinese inputs, under the IRA's FEOC clause and the later Prohibited Foreign Entity rule. This condition (where firms lose regardless of which constraint they prioritize) is a signature feature of the US–China supply chain weaponization competition, intensifying after the Biden administration's 2022 semiconductor export controls and China's 2023 gallium and germanium export restrictions.

In depth

Origins and Structure

The supply chain double squeeze emerged in the 2020s as US–China strategic competition weaponized supply chain chokepoints. The United States controls semiconductor equipment, design software, and export licensing; China dominates global supply of rare earths, gallium, germanium, precursors, and other critical materials and intermediates. Advanced manufacturing firms in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan caught between them lose operational autonomy at the precise points where the two regulatory regimes collide.

The Korean Semiconductor Case

Samsung's Xi'an fab makes about 40% of the company's NAND flash and SK Hynix's Wuxi fab about 40% of the company's DRAM. In October 2022 the United States in principle barred chip equipment from entering China while making exceptions for particular firms, and in October 2023 it effectively suspended the controls indefinitely for Korean firms' China fabs. This exception is Validated End-User (VEU) status. On 29 August 2025 the Trump administration announced its revocation, stating that it might allow maintenance but not capacity expansion or moves to next-generation processes, and ahead of the 31 December effective date it agreed to allow shipments through an annual licence approving equipment volumes each year. The result: Korean firms now require a third country's government approval to replace or upgrade equipment in their own factories, a structural sovereignty gap.

Batteries: The IRA–FEOC Paradox

The double squeeze on Korea's three major battery makers (LG Energy Solution, SK On, Samsung SDI) is even starker. Precursors account for roughly 70% of cathode material costs and Korea imports 96.6% of them from China. Yet the IRA's FEOC clause excluded EVs using components or minerals from entities with 25% or more Chinese ownership from the $7,500 per-vehicle tax credit. Severing the China link causes costs to surge and destroys competitiveness; maintaining it forfeits the subsidy. Either path produces losses.

Theoretical Implications

Lenin's analysis in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism of capital export and the division of the world reappears in 21st-century form as control over supply chains, technology licensing, and intermediate goods dependency. Where 19th-century imperialism secured raw materials and markets through direct colonial rule, its 21st-century successor constrains competitors' industrial capacity itself through the strategic control of chokepoints.

How have conditions for batteries changed since 2025?

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, enacted in the United States in July 2025, changed conditions again. The $7,500 tax credit for consumers buying an electric vehicle ended for purchases after 30 September 2025. The FEOC exclusion described above is therefore over as far as that credit is concerned.

The pressure moved elsewhere. The Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (AMPC) for cells and modules made in the United States stayed in place until 2032, but a new Prohibited Foreign Entity (PFE) condition was attached, stricter than the FEOC rule. Firms now face both the risk of weaker EV demand with the consumer subsidy gone and the burden of moving away from Chinese materials to keep the production subsidy.

Where are the chokepoints?

A chokepoint is a bottleneck that is hard to replace, so that blocking it stops the whole. The American chokepoints are equipment, design software, and the export controls that decide where firms may produce. The Chinese chokepoint is materials. When the export-permit regime for gallium and germanium took effect in August 2023, China accounted for 89 percent of South Korea's germanium imports in the previous year. The South Korean government judged the short-term impact limited, but the case showed that dependence itself can be a means of pressure.

The geopolitical analyst Rodger Baker wrote in July 2026 that "Korea is squeezed from both sides of the same supply chain." A similar expression appears in a report by a South Korean state research council but with a somewhat different sense: the National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences uses "dual squeeze" for China's technological catch-up together with American reshoring and trade pressure. The double squeeze of this entry is narrower, referring to controls by two states holding the two ends of the same supply chain.

How does it fit economic history and political economy?

In economic history the problem is a product of the era of global value chains. Because processes were split across countries to cut costs, a state holding one process can press on the whole. The fragility of supply chains exposed during COVID-19 was among the occasions that led states to look at this structure again as a security matter.

In international relations Farrell and Newman's theory of weaponized interdependence explains it: a state holding the centre of a network can impose costs by denying others access. The Marxist reading in the "Theoretical Implications" section above adds a framework of competition among capitals and states. For firms the same thing appears in other words: costs and markets make it hard to leave China, and the US market and its equipment make it hard to stay. How this contradiction is resolved will be the practical content of economic security policy.

Related historical events

Sources

  1. periplo.us Rodger Baker (July 2026): 'Korea is squeezed from both sides of the same supply chain. U.S. equipment and export controls, coupled with China's upstream dominance, sandwich Korean ambitions'
  2. uscc.gov U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2025 Annual Report documenting China's weaponization of supply chain chokepoints across critical minerals, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals
  3. link.springer.com Bu (2024), 'Can de-risking avert supply chain precarity in the face of China-U.S. geopolitical tensions?', International Cybersecurity Law Review, analyzing the structural squeeze on allied semiconductor firms
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