Тегеранская конференция · 1943.11.28–12.01

Tehran Conference

테헤란 회담

The first face-to-face meeting of Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, held at the Soviet embassy in Tehran from 28 November to 1 December 1943. Its most urgent outcome was the British-American commitment to open a second front in northern France by May 1944, a goal the Soviets had pressed for since 1941 to relieve the Eastern Front. The conference also broached the postwar partition of Germany, Poland's borders, and the design of the United Nations, but its gravitational center remained military survival. Set against the Yalta Conference of 1945, where the Big Three turned to dividing the spoils of victory, Tehran was still a meeting of allies fighting to win.

In depth

Origins

The Tehran Conference was the first wartime meeting of the leaders of the three main Allies: Joseph Stalin (USSR), Franklin D. Roosevelt (USA), and Winston Churchill (UK). It was held in Tehran from 28 November to 1 December 1943. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Western Allied and Soviet delegations had shuttled between London and Moscow over supply and cooperation, but a common strategy for allocating resources between Europe and Asia and for handling postwar Germany remained unsettled. Above all, the Soviets had pressed for a second front in the west since 1941 without obtaining a firm commitment.

Stalin was reluctant to leave Moscow, and Roosevelt found travel difficult because of his disability. Roosevelt proposed Cairo, but Stalin declined that and offers of Baghdad or Basra, finally agreeing to meet in Tehran in November 1943. Stalin traveled by train to Baku and then by air; Roosevelt reached Oran in Algeria aboard the USS Iowa and came on via Cairo. In secret correspondence the meeting was codenamed "Eureka."

Proceedings and the second front

The conference convened at 16:00 on 28 November 1943 and ran until 1 December. Its central question was opening a second front in Western Europe. Churchill favored expanding operations in the Mediterranean and Italy, while the Soviets demanded a landing in northern France. When the debate deadlocked, Stalin rose and, turning to Voroshilov and Molotov, said with irritation that they had too much to do at home to waste time there; fearing the conference would collapse, Churchill compromised.

As a result, the United States and Britain committed to launching Operation Overlord, the invasion of northern France, by May 1944, while the Soviets agreed to mount a concurrent major offensive on the Eastern Front to divert German forces. This is regarded as the conference's most critical military outcome; Roosevelt secured Churchill's agreement at lunch on 30 November. The conference also addressed an invasion of southern France, support to the Yugoslav Partisans, and Soviet entry into the war against Japan after Germany's defeat.

The conference as seen by a General Staff officer

Among the Soviet party was the chief of the General Staff's Operations Directorate, Sergei Shtemenko. In his memoir The General Staff in the War Years he recalls that on the afternoon of 24 November the deputy chief of the General Staff, Aleksei Antonov, told him only to take maps of all the fronts and a cipher clerk, and that night he boarded a train at a military platform outside Moscow. The train ran via Stalingrad, Kizlyar and Makhachkala to Baku; at each stop he linked up with the General Staff by high-frequency telephone and reported on the fronts in Stalin's carriage three times a day. At Baku airfield Stalin turned down the aircraft to be flown by the commander of long-range aviation, Golovanov, and chose the one piloted by Colonel Viktor Grachev. Shtemenko reported on board, and only at the airfield did he learn that they were going to Tehran.

At the Soviet embassy in Tehran he was first put in a small room next to the telegraph, then moved to a large veranda when Stalin complained there was nowhere to spread the maps. During the conference he gathered the situation three times a day and reported, as a rule, in the morning and after the evening sessions, and obtained Stalin's signature on draft directives sent from Moscow by Antonov. At that moment the Germans were counter-attacking west of Kiev, had retaken Zhitomir and surrounded Korosten, and during the conference Stalin telephoned Nikolai Vatutin and Konstantin Rokossovsky himself to ask how the counter-offensive could be stopped. According to Shtemenko, Stalin had him check again and again the number of German and satellite divisions on the Soviet-German front and on the Western Allies' fronts, and on the first day used the figures to argue that Mediterranean operations could not take the place of a second front. On 30 November he was also ordered to check a map of the situation in Yugoslavia that Churchill had handed to Stalin; compared with the data from Moscow, he wrote, the Soviet information proved more accurate.

Shtemenko wrote that the Soviet pledge, timed to Overlord, "to organise a large offensive against the Germans in several places by May" was built into the plans for the first half of 1944. The General Staff replaced simultaneous offensives along the whole front with successive blows separated in time and place, beginning near Leningrad in January and continuing on the right-bank Ukraine, at Odessa and in the Crimea. He noted that the General Staff received no special instructions after the conference and, because the Allies had hedged the second-front date with reservations even in Tehran, worked by the motto "trust the Allies, but don't drop your own guard". His account is plainly written from the Soviet side, describing the Soviet delegation as cornering the British. English Wikipedia sums up the outcome as a pledge of a concurrent major offensive in the east, which became Operation Bagration, launched on 22 June 1944.

Postwar questions: Germany and Poland

The participants shared the view that postwar Germany would have to be divided, but differed on the method and number of divisions. Roosevelt proposed splitting Germany into five states, Churchill raised a Danubian federation, and Stalin insisted on preserving German unity. No decision was reached at Tehran; the matter was referred to the London commission, and the European Advisory Commission was to "carefully study the question of dismemberment."

On Poland, Churchill's proposal was adopted: the eastern border would follow the 1920 Curzon Line, with Poland compensated by German territory to the west. Roosevelt asked to be excused from the discussion, citing Polish voters in the 1944 U.S. election, and the USSR had already broken off relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London in April 1943, when that government asked the International Red Cross to investigate the Katyn graves announced by Germany. The decisions were not formally ratified until the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences of 1945. On the Baltic republics, Roosevelt secured Stalin's assurance of a vote, but Stalin refused any international control over it.

Iran, Turkey, and the United Nations

Iran was under Allied occupation. The three leaders issued a "Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran," thanking the Iranian government for its wartime assistance, promising continued economic assistance, and affirming their desire for the maintenance of Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Regarding Turkey, they agreed it was desirable for it to enter the war on the Allied side and discussed offering Crete and the Dodecanese islands as inducement.

The design of a postwar international organization was also discussed in earnest for the first time. Roosevelt outlined to Stalin a vision in which the future United Nations would be dominated by "four policemen" (the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union), and Stalin broadly welcomed it while warning that small states might object and raising the need for regional bodies. No formal decision on creating an international organization was taken at Tehran.

Alleged assassination plot and security

According to Soviet reports, Nazi Germany planned to assassinate the three leaders at Tehran, with the mission assigned under the codename "Long Jump" to Otto Skorzeny. Soviet intelligence notified Roosevelt's chief of security of the suspected plot several days before his arrival, and large-scale arrests were carried out in Tehran ahead of the conference.

The reality of the plot is disputed. The Soviets asserted that German agents had been infiltrated into Tehran, but after the conference Molotov told Harriman that they had known of German agents there but not of a specific assassination plan, scaling back the earlier claims. The Americans suspected Stalin might have fabricated the plot as an excuse to move Roosevelt into the Soviet embassy. Roosevelt initially stayed at the American legation but moved to the Soviet embassy after the warning, which also gave him closer access to Stalin and Churchill. Conversations at the Soviet embassy were bugged by Soviet intelligence.

Related historical events

Sources

  1. Wikipedia (RU) Russian Wikipedia: full account of the conference, including preparations, the second-front debate, Operation Overlord commitment, German and Polish questions, and the NKVD role in the assassination plot
  2. Wikipedia (EN) English Wikipedia: comprehensive overview including codename Eureka, military decisions, political decisions, and the alleged German assassination plot
  3. history.state.gov Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State: authoritative summary of the conference's military and political outcomes, including the second-front decision, Poland's borders, and UN discussions
  4. history.navy.mil Naval History and Heritage Command: U.S. Navy museum summary confirming the conference as the first Big Three meeting and its key outcomes
  5. Wikipedia (EN)
  6. Wikipedia (RU)
  7. history.state.gov
  8. militera.lib.ru
  9. Wikipedia (EN)