1942.01.07–07.12

Lyuban Offensive and the Destruction of the 2nd Shock Army (1942)

Why did the 1942 Lyuban offensive, meant to break the siege of Leningrad from outside, end in the encirclement and destruction of the 2nd Shock Army, and how have its responsibility and memory been contested?

On 7 January 1942, pressed by the Stavka, the Volkhov Front attacked across the Volkhov before it was ready. When the attack was renewed on the 13th, the 2nd Shock Army broke the German line at Myasnoi Bor and drove more than 70 kilometres towards Lyuban, but its corridor was narrow and it never met the Leningrad Front's 54th Army. In March the German 18th Army cut the corridor, and while the Volkhov Front was merged into the Leningrad Front in April the withdrawal was delayed. Trapped again at the end of May, the army collapsed after a last breakout attempt on 25 June, and its commander, Andrey Vlasov, was taken prisoner on 12 July.

Why did the Stavka rush an unprepared offensive?

On 12 December 1941, with the Tikhvin counteroffensive under way, the Chief of the General Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, presented to the Stavka a plan for a large offensive south-east of Leningrad. By Meretskov's account those present included Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Mikhail Khozin and Andrei Zhdanov of the Leningrad Front, and the commanders of the arriving 26th and 59th Armies. The plan took shape on 17 December in Directive No. 005826 to the newly created Volkhov Front and No. 005822 to the Leningrad Front: the two fronts were to attack towards each other, lift the blockade, retake Novgorod, destroy all the German forces east of Leningrad and ultimately smash Army Group North. Lyuban was only one intermediate objective. The offensive was part of the general offensive on all fronts decided by the Stavka on 5 January 1942, which aimed to drive the Germans west without a pause, make them spend their reserves before spring, and so bring about their complete defeat in 1942. 1 2

Meretskov wrote that he wanted to halt the exhausted 4th and 52nd Armies, bring them up to strength and attack again once the 59th and 2nd Shock Armies had arrived, but the Stavka repeatedly demanded that the offensive continue without an operational pause. The directive of 24 December put the demand most plainly, and at the end of December the Stavka sent Lev Mekhlis as its representative, who in Meretskov's words "drove us on every hour". The new armies arrived late: of the first echelons due by 25 December only one division had come, and the 59th Army's artillery lacked sights and signals equipment. According to the Russian Wikipedia, on 1 January the Volkhov Front outnumbered the enemy 1.5 to 1 in men and 1.3 to 1 in guns, but had only a quarter of a load of ammunition, and the divisions of the 4th and 52nd Armies had 3,500 to 4,000 men instead of 10,000 to 12,000. 2 1

The German side was shaken as well. Army Group North had planned to winter behind the Volkhov and renew the Tikhvin offensive in spring, but seeing Soviet preparations north and south of Lake Ilmen, Leeb proposed withdrawing from the Volkhov to the Baltic. At a conference on 20 December Hitler ordered the lines held, and when on 15 January Leeb asked for freedom of action Hitler dismissed him. Georg von Küchler took over Army Group North and Georg Lindemann the 18th Army (on 16 January according to the English Wikipedia, on the 18th according to the German). The Army High Command sent the 215th, 126th, 250th and 20th Motorised Divisions from its reserve, the 225th Infantry Division from France and the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade from Germany. 1 3 4 5

What happened on the Volkhov on 7 and 13 January?

On the afternoon of 7 January the Volkhov Front attacked along its whole 150-kilometre front. The 59th Army had deployed only five divisions, with three more on the way; the 2nd Shock Army had barely half its formations in place and as yet no army artillery or ammunition. The attack failed everywhere in the same way: infantry crossing the broad frozen river fell to German crossfire from machine guns and artillery, and the 2nd Shock Army lost about 3,000 killed and wounded in the first half hour. The 52nd Army seized a small bridgehead with two battalions and lost it. Veterans of the German 215th Infantry Division remembered wave after wave of attackers and bodies covering the river ice. The German command took the attack for no more than a reconnaissance in force. 1 3

Meretskov wrote that lack of preparation decided the outcome, and quoted his teleprinter conversation with the Stavka on 10 January: "Stalin and Vasilevsky at the apparatus. By all reports your offensive is not ready for the 11th. If so, it must be put off for another day or two." He needed at least another 15 to 20 days to prepare properly, he wrote, but such a delay was out of the question, so he seized on the two days offered and bargained for one more, moving the attack to the 13th. He also wrote that the 2nd Shock Army's commander, Grigory Sokolov, a former deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, promised much but did not know where his own units were, and that at his request the Stavka replaced him with Nikolai Klykov, the commander of the 52nd Army. The English Wikipedia likewise says Meretskov asked for Sokolov's removal. 2 6

On 13 January, after a ninety-minute bombardment, the attack resumed. The 4th and 59th Armies made almost no progress round Kirishi and Gruzino, but the 2nd Shock Army's 327th Rifle Division, backed by massed artillery, crossed the river by evening and held a bridgehead near Krasny Posyolok and Bor. The 52nd Army also crossed but stopped before the second line along the Novgorod-Chudovo road. By the 20th the bridgehead was 25 kilometres wide and 5 deep, and on the 24th the 366th Rifle Division and other units took Myasnoi Bor and Teremets-Kurlyandsky, breaking the German main line. Breaking two lines ten kilometres deep had taken two weeks. 1 7 3

How did the 2nd Shock Army drive deep through a narrow corridor, and why did it never reach Lyuban?

After the breakthrough the advance quickened. To the north-west, where there were few Germans, the 2nd Shock Army drove more than 30 kilometres in five days to Vditsko, and on 25 January Nikolai Gusev's 13th Cavalry Corps entered the breach, took Novaya Kerest and Finev Lug station, and cut the Novgorod-Leningrad railway. By the end of January the army had penetrated some 75 kilometres. But the neck of the breach was narrow. German strongpoints at Lyubtsy and Zemtitsy to the south and Spasskaya Polist to the north held to the end, and even after Mostki and Lyubino Pole to the north fell on 12 February the corridor was at most 12 kilometres wide. The chain of German strongpoints running north from Spasskaya Polist was called "Wandel's tongue" after its commander, Martin Wandel, and it was never cut off. A German account judged that the Soviet command trusted in its deep thrust rather than widening the flanks. 1 3

On 17 February Kliment Voroshilov arrived as Stavka representative to demand a stronger offensive. In directives of 26 and 28 February the Stavka narrowed the aim: the 2nd Shock Army and the Leningrad Front's 54th Army were to meet at Lyuban, and the town was to be taken by 1 March. From then on the operation was called the Lyuban operation. Khozin later saw this as the Stavka abandoning its original concept, and wrote that had it been decided so from the outset the result might have been different. The 13th Cavalry Corps' 80th Cavalry Division took Krasnaya Gorka south-east of Lyuban on 20 February and on the 28th reached the south-eastern outskirts of the town, but a counterattack by the German 254th, 225th and 212th Infantry Divisions cut it off. Meretskov admitted in his memoirs that he and his staff "overestimated the capabilities of our own troops", and wrote that for lack of close contact with Khozin the two fronts' attacks diverged in time and direction, and that the supply organisations failed to keep their promised schedule. 1 3 8

In the north Ivan Fedyuninsky's 54th Army had been attacking the frozen railway embankment at Pogostye station since 4 January. The war diary for the attack of the 13th records that it began without plans or reconnaissance, and within three days one guards rifle regiment had to merge its three battalions into one with eight bayonets left. Reinforced in March by the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, the army crossed the railway and by the end of March reached the Tigoda, about 15 kilometres from Lyuban, but was still 30 kilometres from the 2nd Shock Army. The Germans brought two divisions and a brigade from western Europe to stop it. The two armies never met, and in mid-April the 54th Army went over to the defensive. 1 3

How did the Germans cut the corridor, and how did the trapped army hold out?

On 2 March a conference with Hitler decided on a counterstroke on the Volkhov by 7 March. Küchler's counteroffensive was called Operation Raubtier ("Wild Beast"). On 15 March, when the weather allowed aircraft to fly, the German 58th Infantry Division attacked from the south of the corridor, and the SS Police Division, the 215th Infantry Division and the Dutch and Flemish SS volunteer legions from "Wandel's tongue" in the north. According to the Russian Wikipedia, at 16.45 on the 19th the two groups met between the Polist and Glushitsa rivers four kilometres west of Myasnoi Bor, trapping the 2nd Shock Army (the article on the army dates the closing of the ring to the 17th). Attacking from inside and outside, Soviet troops reopened a corridor 800 metres wide on the 28th and secured it by about the 30th; by early April it was 2.5 to 4 kilometres wide. 1 9 3

According to the English Wikipedia, when Meretskov reported to the Stavka that communications had been restored he left out that the corridor was barely two kilometres wide, under constant air and artillery attack and of very low capacity, so the Stavka did not extract the 2nd Shock Army while it still could. Half a month cut off and then the spring thaw starved the army. The ice airstrips on the swamps melted, and supplies had to be carried by hand along log roads and a narrow-gauge line. Men received 50 to 80 grams of crumbled rusks a day or nothing; they dug up dead horses to eat and boiled leather harness, and from April men died of malnutrition. A signals platoon commander wrote in his diary on 1 April that there was rusk-crumb soup in the morning and the same in the evening; a medical orderly remembered tearing up dead men's underwear for bandages. 10 11 1

Around this time the leadership changed. According to the Russian Wikipedia Lieutenant General Andrey Vlasov, famous for the defence of Moscow in 1941, became deputy commander of the Volkhov Front on 8 March; by Meretskov's account he arrived on the same plane as Voroshilov, Malenkov and the deputy air force commander Aleksandr Novikov. On 20 March Meretskov sent him with a commission to the 2nd Shock Army. Its commander, Klykov, had been seriously ill since mid-February and on 16 April was relieved and flown to the rear. On 20 April Vlasov became commander of the 2nd Shock Army while remaining deputy front commander. In his memoirs Meretskov drew Vlasov in his deputy weeks with hostility, as silent at meetings and sluggish in carrying out orders, and wrote that the appointment was a Stavka order; the English Wikipedia says it was Meretskov himself who recommended him for the post in April. On 3 to 5 April the army made a last attack on Lyuban through Apraksin Bor, which stalled after the first line. 8 12 7 3

Why was the Volkhov Front abolished in April, and why was the withdrawal so late?

The Stavka concluded that a main reason for the failure was that the Volkhov Front and the Leningrad Front's 54th Army had not acted in step. By Directive No. 170301 of 21 April the two fronts were merged from the 23rd into a single Leningrad Front, and the nine Volkhov armies and several corps became the Volkhov Group under the front commander, Mikhail Khozin. Meretskov wrote that the decision came as a complete surprise, and that in Moscow he learned Khozin had claimed he could lift the blockade with the Volkhov Front's forces if it were attached to him, and the Stavka had agreed. He wrote that on the 23rd Khozin turned up "with the directive in his pocket and in a very cheerful mood". Vasilevsky later wrote that commanding nine armies and three separate corps divided by enemy-held ground from one headquarters was not merely difficult but impossible. 1 11 8

By Meretskov's account, on 24 April he told Stalin and Malenkov that "the 2nd Shock Army is completely exhausted", that as it stood it could neither attack nor defend, that its communications were threatened, and that unless something was done "catastrophe is inevitable". He wrote that he proposed reinforcing it with the 6th Guards Rifle Corps or, failing that, pulling it out of the forests and swamps at once to the Chudovo-Novgorod railway and road. The conversation is known only from his memoirs and should be read alongside the charge that he himself had played down the state of the corridor in March. He went on to be deputy commander of the Western Front and then, at his own request, commander of its 33rd Army. 8

Khozin at first prepared a new offensive to lift the blockade and submitted a plan on 2 May. But once he learned the army's real state he sent Stalin a risky proposal on 11 May to halt the offensive, pull the 2nd Shock Army back to the base of the salient and widen the corridor. Moscow decided more drastically: on the 12th Khozin received an oral instruction to prepare to withdraw the whole army, confirmed on the 14th by Directive No. 170379. Even so the withdrawal was late. The Russian Wikipedia says Khozin dragged his feet for several days and the withdrawal began only on the 17th or 18th; the German Wikipedia says the Stavka's permission reached the Volkhov Group headquarters only at 17.20 on the 21st, after which Vlasov began the general withdrawal on the 24th. The Russian Wikipedia counts as a serious mistake Khozin's sending the units that came out of the salient elsewhere instead of reinforcing the two divisions holding the corridor: the 65th Rifle Division held 14 kilometres in the south with 3,708 men, the 372nd held 12 kilometres in the north with 2,796. 11 3 12

How did the 2nd Shock Army collapse once trapped again?

Army Group North soon spotted the withdrawal and decided to cut the corridor and destroy the army piecemeal. On 22 May I Corps (121st and 61st Infantry Divisions, 20th Motorised Division) attacked from the north and XXXVIII Corps (126th and 58th Infantry Divisions, 2nd SS Infantry Brigade and the Spanish 250th Division) from the south; the same day German aircraft bombed the 2nd Shock Army's command post, and control was never fully restored. The two Soviet divisions held until they were all but wiped out, but the corridor was cut on the evening of the 30th and on the 31st the Germans widened the barrier to 1.5 kilometres. On 1 June there were 40,157 men inside the ring, and on 25 June the army hospital held about 12,000 wounded besides. Food at reduced rations would last only until 10 to 12 June, and 279 supply flights between 2 and 29 June dropped far too little. The Russian Wikipedia records that cases of cannibalism occurred. 11 7 3

The 59th Army outside and the 2nd Shock Army inside attacked towards each other on 31 May and on 3 and 5 June, and failed each time; the attack of 3 June was betrayed in part by an officer of the 2nd Shock Army staff who defected and revealed the breakout plan. On 8 June the Stavka dismissed Khozin, writing that by "failing to carry out the Stavka's order to withdraw the troops of the 2nd Shock Army in time and quickly, by paper-bound bureaucratic methods of command and by remoteness from the troops" he had put the army in an exceptionally grave position. The same day the Volkhov Front was restored, and on the 9th Meretskov was again its commander. Meretskov recalled that Stalin told him then, "We made a big mistake in merging the Volkhov Front with the Leningrad Front," and sent him with Vasilevsky to get the army out even without its heavy weapons. 11 13

The attack of 10 June was also beaten off. On the 21st there were 23,401 men left inside, along with about 5,000 local people who had left their homes with the Soviet troops. That day the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies, attacking towards each other, opened a corridor 250 to 400 metres wide and more than 2,000 wounded got out. One veteran recalled the corridor carpeted with bodies several layers deep, the tracks of Soviet tanks sinking into them. On the 23rd the corridor closed again. At 11 p.m. on the 24th Vlasov ordered the last breakout. There were no shells for a preparatory bombardment; the Germans guessed what was coming from the glare of equipment being blown up inside the pocket, and Soviet artillery outside sometimes fired on its own men. The corridor opened and closed several times in the night and was shut for good at 9.30 on the 25th. Vlasov ordered every man to save himself and went into the forest with a handful of staff. Meretskov kept attacking from outside until the 27th, and on the 28th the last resistance ended. The Germans shot communists and commissars among the prisoners, killed the badly wounded where they lay and destroyed field hospitals with their staff. 11 7 12

How many died or were captured, and why do the figures differ?

By 29 June 9,462 men had got out, 5,494 of them wounded or sick, and another 146 by 10 July. A report by the Volkhov Front's Special Department to Viktor Abakumov, deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, said that of the 40,157 men on 1 June, 13,018 had come out by August and the fate of the remaining 27,139 was unknown. Small groups crossed the line until September, and some joined the partisans. The sources put the number who escaped anywhere from 6,000 to 16,000. German reports counted 32,759 prisoners; other sources give about 30,000, and the English Wikipedia about 33,000. The German Wikipedia says 14,000 to 20,000 died in the final breakout alone. 11 7 10 3

According to Grigori Krivosheyev's loss statistics, of the 327,700 men of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army committed to the offensive from 7 January to 30 April, 95,064 were killed, missing or captured and 213,303 wounded or sick: only about one in twenty of those committed was neither killed, wounded nor captured. In the withdrawal operation of 13 May to 10 July the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies lost 54,774 permanently and 39,977 wounded or sick, 94,751 in all. The official figures are disputed; some researchers put the dead, including the withdrawal, at 156,000 to 158,000. The Volkhov Front headquarters claimed the Germans lost at least 75,000 men in the withdrawal operation, an estimate the Russian Wikipedia calls clearly inflated. 9 1 11

German losses are not precisely known. The German 215th Infantry Division, at the tip of the breach, lost 961 killed, 3,119 wounded, 180 missing and 1,633 cases of second- and third-degree frostbite between 23 November 1941 and 18 July 1942. Over the same period the Soviet 376th Rifle Division started with 10,530 men and, despite four rounds of replacements, had 4,580 left on 1 June. Army Group North as a whole lost 103,773 killed, wounded and missing in January-April, but that includes the fighting at Demyansk and Kholm and the Leningrad siege lines. The Spanish Blue Division had also suffered heavy losses in the Myasnoi Bor swamps in December 1941, and was thrown into the fighting south of the corridor again in the spring of 1942. 1 3 14 15

How was Vlasov captured, and what became of the men left behind?

According to the Russian Wikipedia Vlasov refused the last plane sent for him and stayed in the forest. Testimony differs on where he spent the next three weeks. By about 10 July only his wounded chief of staff, Pavel Vinogradov, the cook Maria Voronova and a soldier and a driver were with him; Vlasov gave the sick Vinogradov his greatcoat with its general's insignia, and Vinogradov soon died. On the 11th Vlasov and Voronova went looking for food in Tukhovezhi, a village of Old Believers. The house they entered was the village elder's, and he called the auxiliary police, who locked them in a shed. Vlasov insisted he was a refugee schoolteacher, but the next day, 12 July, a party led by Captain Max von Schwerdtner, intelligence officer of the German XXXVIII Corps, recognised him from his picture in a newspaper. The elder was rewarded by the German 18th Army with a cow, tobacco, two bottles of vodka and a certificate of merit. The English Wikipedia says "a local farmer" gave him away and its article on the 2nd Shock Army dates his capture to 6 July, but the Russian and German Wikipedia's 11 and 12 July rest on more detailed evidence. 12 16 3 6

Lindemann, commander of the 18th Army that captured him, questioned him about the encirclement and the fighting, and in a prisoner-of-war camp at Vinnytsia Vlasov soon set out on the road to collaboration. Yet only a few officers of the 2nd Shock Army went over to the enemy: Vlasov, Colonel P. G. Sheludko of the 25th Brigade and a handful of others. The army's military council member Ivan Zuev was betrayed while trying to cross the line and died fighting alone; the deputy commander, Pyotr Alferyev, went missing. Ivan Antyufeyev, commander of the 327th Rifle Division, captured wounded, refused to collaborate, was sent to a camp at Kaunas and after the war regained his general's rank. The army's chief medical officer, K. K. Boborykin, stayed behind deliberately to protect the wounded in the hospital and went on treating patients in captivity. The Tatar poet Musa Jalil, badly wounded and captured in a counterattack near Myasnoi Bor on 26 June, wrote the "Moabit Notebooks" in German prisons. 16 12 11 15

Once Vlasov went over to the Germans his name cast a shadow over the whole 2nd Shock Army. In Soviet times the operation was hardly mentioned because of its tragic end and Vlasov's betrayal, and the dead were never properly searched for or buried. Survivors found themselves linked with the words "Vlasov's army" and "Vlasovites". In 1990, late in the Soviet era, Ye. Klimchuk's article in the magazine Sovetsky Voin, "The 2nd Shock Army and General Vlasov, or Why the Whole Army Was Blamed Because of One Traitor", confronted the stigma directly. In October 1988 the Soviet Defence Ministry and the Komsomol Central Committee launched the "Memory Watch", and in May 1989 the first All-Union Memory Watch was held at Myasnoi Bor, where the 2nd Shock Army had died. Since then search teams have recovered and reburied the remains of hundreds every year from the swamps round it. 3 11 17 15

Who was responsible for the defeat?

Responsibility was disputed from the start. Meretskov blamed Vlasov right after the battle, and in his 1968 memoirs drew him as an unprincipled careerist whose very feats at Kiev and Moscow in 1941 were attempts to get noticed; Vasilevsky's 1978 memoirs took the same line. The American military historian David Glantz argues, however, that whatever Vlasov later did, his command in May and June 1942 was no worse than that of most army commanders, and that Meretskov, as the front commander who planned and ran the operation, must share the blame. A. P. Silantyev, later Marshal of Aviation, who flew over the army for half a year, recalled that its destruction was also the result of a miscalculation by the Supreme High Command, that all the blame was later dumped on the traitor Vlasov, but that the army he received was already in a catastrophic state. 13 10 1

The historian Boris Gavrilov traces the causes to Stalin's and the Stavka's planning of the 1942 winter campaign: unrealistic deadlines, strategic reserves scattered across several fronts, an army pushed through a narrow gap barely punched in the enemy line, a withdrawal order that came too late after the earlier haste, a failure ever to coordinate the Volkhov Front with the Leningrad Front's 54th Army, and the grave error of abolishing the Volkhov Front. He holds that Mekhlis, Voroshilov and Malenkov, sent as Stavka representatives to drive Meretskov and the army commanders, did nothing to improve the command. The historian N. B. Oleinik lists a misjudgement of the situation on the whole front, the reorganisation of the Volkhov Front, the unpreparedness of commanders, troops and economy, deadlines that were too short, the lack of coordination between fronts and the lack of roads. 1 11

Khozin himself, in an article in the Military History Journal in 1966, found the causes of defeat at every level of command except the front: the Stavka and the army commanders. The Stavka, in dismissing him, blamed him for failing to carry out the withdrawal order in time, and he never commanded a front again. Against Meretskov stand the charge that he played down the state of the corridor in March and the Russian Wikipedia's observation that after opening an escape route in June he, like Khozin, failed to reinforce its flanks. David Glantz places the offensive beside the Demyansk, Rzhev-Vyazma, Barvenkovo-Lozovaya and Crimean offensives of the same winter and spring, all of which ended in heavy losses, and finds a common cause in the Stavka's underestimation of the Wehrmacht, its overestimation of the Red Army and its dispersal of forces over many directions. The Russian Wikipedia names as the offensive's only operational achievement that it wrecked the German plan to strike at Tikhvin again in spring or summer and link up with the Finns. 1 11 10

Consequences

None of its aims, lifting the siege or encircling the Germans, was achieved. By Krivosheyev's count about 95,000 men were killed, missing or captured in the January-April offensive and about 55,000 in the May-July withdrawal. The 2nd Shock Army all but vanished and had to be rebuilt. Because Vlasov went over to the Germans, the battle was hushed up in Soviet times and its survivors carried the stigma of "Vlasov's army"; since the late 1980s search teams have been finding and burying the dead round Myasnoi Bor.

Timeline & Map

Myasnoi Bor Pogostye Lyuban Tukhovezhi Malaya Vishera Spasskaya Polist 7 Lyuban 18 Tukhovezhi 12 Malaya Vishera 15 Malaya Vishera 11 Lyuban salient 6 Novaya Kerest 3 Krasny Posyolok 2 Volkhov River 9 Polist River 10 Myasnoi Bor 16 Polist River 14 Myasnoi Bor 17 Myasnoi Bor 5 Myasnoi Bor 8 South of Myasnoi Bor 4 Pskov 1 Moscow 13 Moscow
  1. 11941.12.17Soviet Union
    Stavka directives

    In Directives No. 005826 and No. 005822 the Stavka ordered the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts to lift the blockade and destroy the German forces east of Leningrad.

  2. 21942.01.07Soviet UnionGermany
    First attack fails

    The Volkhov Front attacked on a 150-kilometre front but failed everywhere to cross the river; the 2nd Shock Army lost about 3,000 men in the first half hour.

  3. 31942.01.13Soviet UnionGermany
    Offensive renewed

    After a ninety-minute bombardment the attack was renewed, and the 2nd Shock Army's 327th Rifle Division crossed the Volkhov and held a bridgehead.

  4. 41942.01.17Germany
    Küchler takes over Army Group North

    Georg von Küchler replaced the dismissed Leeb at the head of Army Group North, and Georg Lindemann took over the 18th Army.

  5. 51942.01.24Soviet UnionGermany
    Breakthrough at Myasnoi Bor

    The 2nd Shock Army took Myasnoi Bor and Teremets-Kurlyandsky, breaking the German main line of defence.

  6. 61942.01.25Soviet Union
    Cavalry corps committed

    The 13th Cavalry Corps entered the breach, took Novaya Kerest the next day and pushed north-west.

  7. 71942.02.26Soviet Union
    Target narrowed to Lyuban

    The Stavka ordered the 2nd Shock and 54th Armies to converge on Lyuban and demanded that the town be taken by 1 March.

  8. 81942.03.15GermanySoviet Union
    Operation Raubtier

    The German 18th Army began counterattacking from south and north of the corridor to cut off the 2nd Shock Army.

  9. 91942.03.19GermanySoviet Union
    First encirclement

    The two German attack groups met four kilometres west of Myasnoi Bor, trapping the 2nd Shock Army.

  10. 101942.03.28Soviet UnionGermany
    Corridor reopened

    Attacks from inside and outside reopened a corridor 800 metres wide, which was secured by about the 30th.

  11. 111942.04.20Soviet Union
    Vlasov takes over the 2nd Shock Army

    Andrey Vlasov, deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, replaced the sick Nikolai Klykov as commander of the 2nd Shock Army.

  12. 121942.04.23Soviet Union
    Volkhov Front abolished

    By Stavka directive the Volkhov Front became the Volkhov Group of Mikhail Khozin's Leningrad Front.

  13. 131942.05.14Soviet Union
    Withdrawal directive

    In Directive No. 170379 the Stavka ordered the 2nd Shock Army withdrawn entirely from the salient.

  14. 141942.05.31GermanySoviet Union
    Second encirclement

    The Germans, attacking since the 22nd, cut the corridor again and widened the barrier to 1.5 kilometres.

  15. 151942.06.08Soviet Union
    Khozin dismissed, Volkhov Front restored

    The Stavka dismissed Khozin for failing to carry out the withdrawal order in time and restored the Volkhov Front; the next day Meretskov was again its commander.

  16. 161942.06.21Soviet UnionGermany
    A narrow corridor

    The 2nd Shock and 59th Armies, attacking towards each other, opened a corridor 250 to 400 metres wide through which wounded men got out.

  17. 171942.06.25Soviet UnionGermany
    The last breakout

    After a last breakout begun the night before, the Germans closed the corridor for good at 9.30 in the morning.

  18. 181942.07.12GermanySoviet Union
    Vlasov captured

    An intelligence officer of the German XXXVIII Corps identified Vlasov, who had been seized by auxiliary police in the village of Tukhovezhi the day before.

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Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17