The Fall of Beria
How and why was Stalin’s secret-police chief brought down by his own colleagues?
After Stalin’s death, Beria grew powerful as first deputy premier and head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), driving reforms such as amnesties, early de-Stalinization, and a softer foreign line. Fearing his ambition and grip on the security organs, a Presidium coalition of Khrushchev, Malenkov, Molotov and others arrested him in June 1953 with the help of army officers under Zhukov. Beria was executed after a December trial, together with his closest associates.
The Dictator's Last Winter: the Kremlin in March 1953
When Joseph Stalin collapsed from a cerebral hemorrhage on the night of 1 March 1953, the Soviet Union was run by barely ten people. For eight years they had lived inside a system of terror that Stalin had personally designed.
After the war, Stalin virtually abolished formal Politburo meetings. Between September 1946 and his death, the full Politburo convened only twice. Instead, Stalin summoned five to seven men, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Bulganin and a few others, to his Kuntsevo dacha for marathon dinners that ran past four in the morning. At those dinners the state's most important decisions were made; absent Politburo members were notified afterward and asked to approve "by correspondence." At the same time, Stalin built a parallel structure of regularized expert committees under the Council of Ministers to handle economic and administrative routine. Malenkov was the man who ran those committees, and there, in the need to prepare agendas, hold votes, and reach collective decisions, the habit of collective governance began to form.
But at every crucial turn, Stalin reminded his inner circle who was master, and he did it the old way. In the 1949–50 "Leningrad Affair," the chairman of the State Planning Committee, Nikolai Voznesensky, and Central Committee secretary Alexei Kuznetsov were arrested and shot, along with dozens of Zhdanov's former associates. In November 1951, Stalin launched the "Mingrelian Affair": a purge of Georgian party officials from the Mingrelian ethnic subgroup, which was Beria's own power base. The message was unmistakable: even Beria's network could be destroyed, and Beria himself was being tested. In 1949, Molotov's wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, was arrested because she was Jewish and sent to a labour camp. At the Central Committee plenum following the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, Stalin publicly attacked both Molotov and Mikoyan, and Khrushchev later wrote that "had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan probably would not have delivered any speeches at this Congress."
At that Congress, the Politburo was formally replaced by an enlarged "Presidium" of 25 members. But Stalin immediately created an unofficial "Bureau of the Presidium" of only nine. Molotov and Mikoyan were excluded from even that body. Stalin kept his succession plan to himself, and everyone understood that plan might involve their destruction.
As 1953 began, the terror had not let up. The so-called "Doctors' Plot" was underway. On 13 January 1953, Pravda's front page announced that a group of Kremlin physicians, most of them Jewish, had conspired with Western intelligence to poison the Soviet leadership. The case was driven by MGB (Ministry of State Security) chief Semyon Ignatiev, and arrests and torture were expanding. Multiple sources indicate Stalin intended to use the case as the fuse for a new mass purge.
The security apparatus itself was divided. Beria had been removed as head of the NKVD in 1945 and held only the vague title of "curator of the security organs." The MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) was run by Sergey Kruglov, and the MGB, after Viktor Abakumov's arrest in 1951, by Ignatiev. Neither was Beria's man. What Beria still controlled directly was the atomic bomb project and foreign intelligence.
Stalin was 74. He had suffered a myocardial infarction in October 1945 and lived with severe hypertension and atherosclerosis. In his final years, he kept a rhythm of all-night drinking sessions followed by sleep until noon and state business only in the afternoon. During the daylight hours when he slept, the Council of Ministers Bureau began to function almost as a collective leadership. But the moment Stalin awoke, any decision could be reversed.
When Stalin's death was certain, Beria's wife Nina reportedly told her husband: "Your position now is even more precarious than when Stalin was alive."
From the deathbed to the first cabinet: 1–6 March 1953
On the night of 28 February, Stalin watched a film at the Kremlin with Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, then took them to the Kuntsevo dacha to keep drinking; the inner circle broke up only at 5 a.m. on 1 March. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, Stalin had drunk heavily and was in good spirits. All through that Sunday, no sound came from Stalin's room. The guards dared not enter: the room had motion sensors, and in the climate of the Doctors' Plot, even Stalin's own physician was being tortured in the Lubyanka basement. Not until 11 p.m. did the housekeeper cautiously open the door. Stalin lay on the floor in his pyjamas, unconscious, breathing heavily, incontinent.
Khrushchev and Bulganin were the first to be called, but terrified of Stalin's wrath, they would not enter the room. They summoned Beria and Malenkov instead. Beria arrived at 3 a.m. on 2 March. When the guard chief Lozgachev reported that Stalin was 'sick and needed medical attention,' Beria shouted, 'Don't bother us, don't cause a panic, and don't disturb Comrade Stalin!' and left. The summoning of a doctor was deferred for a full twelve hours.
Khrushchev later recounted a macabre scene. Beria, standing over the paralysed Stalin, was 'spewing hatred against him and mocking him.' Whenever Stalin showed a flicker of consciousness, Beria dropped to his knees and kissed his hand; the moment Stalin slipped back into unconsciousness, Beria stood up and spat. Montefiore likened it to 'wrenching a dead king's ring off his finger.'
At 9:50 p.m. on 5 March, Stalin died. Beria was the first to kiss the lifeless body, then strode from the room shouting for his driver. His voice rang, Stalin's daughter Svetlana recalled, with 'the ring of triumph unconcealed.' Mikoyan muttered to Khrushchev, 'He's off to take power,' and they dashed frantically to their limousines to intercept him at the Kremlin.
The very next day, 6 March, the new government was announced. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Beria was named First Deputy Chairman and head of a newly merged Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The merger was decisive: the MGB (State Security) was folded into the MVD, placing the secret police, the regular police, and the entire Gulag system under one man's control. Beria had not directly commanded the security organs since 1945. Now he held more power than he had wielded even as NKVD chief fifteen years earlier. Kruglov was made his First Deputy; Merkulov became Minister of State Control.
Beria moved at once to dismantle the purges Stalin had been preparing at the end of his life: the Doctors' Plot and the Mingrelian affair. On 3 April, the MVD issued a formal statement declaring the Doctors' Plot a fabrication. The imprisoned physicians were freed and exonerated; the MGB investigator Ryumin, who had manufactured the case, was arrested. Ignatiev was dismissed from his post as CC secretary. Beria drafted an amnesty decree on 26 March; published under the Presidium's name the next day, it began the release of over 1.2 million prisoners. The Gulag's mammoth construction projects, such as the Salekhard-Igarka railway, were halted, and preparations began to transfer the camp system to the Ministry of Justice.
At Stalin's funeral on 9 March, Beria delivered one of the eulogies, standing beside Malenkov and Molotov, right next to Stalin's coffin. No one yet knew that in barely a hundred days, those same men would have him shot.
June 26, 1953: From the Presidium Chamber to the Underground Bunker
Beria entered the Kremlin on June 26 without a trace of suspicion. The agenda was the case of Semyon Ignatiev, the former State Security minister Beria had ordered arrested. In reality, it was an ambush Khrushchev had been laying since mid-June.
Khrushchev first broached the plan to Malenkov. "While he holds the security organs in his hands, our hands are completely tied," he argued. Malenkov, though a longtime Beria ally, agreed. Khrushchev then recruited Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin one by one, all outdoors to avoid eavesdropping. Only Mikoyan argued that demoting Beria to a provincial party post would suffice; he was overruled. The decisive moment came on June 21: Timofei Strokach, an MVD official in Ukraine whom Beria had dismissed and threatened, came to Khrushchev with a warning. Beria was moving special MVD divisions toward Moscow to prepare a coup, and soon "a regional MVD chief would no longer answer to the Party secretary."
Through Bulganin, Khrushchev enlisted Marshal Zhukov and put Kirill Moskalenko, commander of Moscow's air defense forces, in charge of the arrest squad. Bulganin's role was to get the armed generals into the Kremlin. At the time, anyone entering the Kremlin had to surrender weapons at the commandant's office.
When the meeting opened, Malenkov set aside the agenda and proposed discussing Beria's errors, particularly his personnel policy in the Baltic states and Ukraine. Khrushchev immediately opened fire, calling Beria an "imperialist agent engaged in anti-Party factional activity." Molotov and others piled on. A stunned Beria asked, "What's going on, Nikita?" Malenkov pressed a button under his desk, and Zhukov, Moskalenko, and their officers burst in with drawn pistols. Zhukov shouted, "Hands up! Stand! You are under arrest!" Beria reflexively reached for his briefcase on the windowsill behind him, but Khrushchev grabbed his hand. The briefcase contained no weapon.
Since Beria's men were guarding the Kremlin, the arrested man was held in a special room there until nightfall, then smuggled out in the trunk of a car. On Defense Minister Bulganin's order, the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division moved into Moscow to block any rescue attempt by Beria's loyalists. Beria was taken first to Lefortovo Prison, then to Moskalenko's bunker at Moscow Air Defense headquarters, where he would spend the next six months until his execution that December.
A Closed Court in December: The Trial That Wasn't One
On December 10, 1953, the Presidium settled the format of Beria's trial by special resolution. The Law of 1 December 1934, the accelerated procedure introduced after Kirov's assassination that stripped every defendant of the right to defense counsel, appeal, and clemency petitions and mandated immediate execution upon sentencing, would govern the proceedings. The instruction to try the case "in closed session, without the participation of the parties" meant Beria now stood inside the very legal framework he had applied to tens of thousands.
The Special Judicial Presence, convened from December 18 to 23, was chaired by Marshal Ivan Konev and composed of eight members: former head of state Nikolai Shvernik, General Kirill Moskalenko (who had commanded the arrest squad), Moscow party boss Nikolai Mikhailov, MVD First Deputy Konstantin Lunev, and others. Lunev's presence was especially pointed: Beria's own former agency now sat in judgment of its chief. The composition was a political tableau, with army, party, trade unions, and judiciary converging to pass sentence on the secret police. Isaac Deutscher called it "a duel between army and political police."
The indictment rested on RSFSR Criminal Code Article 58-1b (treason against the Motherland), Article 58-8 (terrorism), Article 58-11 (anti-Soviet conspiracy), and, for Beria alone, Article 58-13 (counter-revolutionary activity dating to his service in the Musavat regime's counterintelligence in 1919). The charges alleged that Beria had organized a conspiratorial group aiming to "restore capitalism and the rule of the bourgeoisie," that his treason began in Baku in 1919 when he served as a secret agent in Musavatist counterintelligence operating under British intelligence control, that he had attempted to let the Germans occupy the Caucasus, committed "terrorist acts against honest party workers" during the Great Purge, sabotaged the collective farm system, and sought to revive "bourgeois nationalism" in the non-Russian republics.
What the indictment did not charge was just as significant. Beria had been a central architect of mass repression in the 1930s and 1940s, but the prosecution did not pursue this in earnest. The reason sat outside the dock: every member of the Presidium, from Khrushchev and Malenkov to Molotov and Kaganovich, had been co-responsible for those same policies. As the historian Nikita Petrov notes, whenever Beria shot back under interrogation that "this was done on Stalin's orders," his answer was aimed not just at the courtroom but at the entire Kremlin. The defendants took the only line of defense available to them: admitting the crimes of the purge years while denying political conspiracy. In his final statement, Beria said: "While acknowledging that I am responsible for the excesses and distortions of socialist legality in 1937-38, I ask the court to consider that I had no selfish or hostile purposes in this. The cause of my crimes was the circumstances of that time."
On December 23, the Special Judicial Presence sentenced all seven defendants to death. Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik, and Vlodzimirsky were shot immediately after the verdict. Beria was executed separately. The execution act signed by General Pavel Batitsky records that at 19:50, in the presence of Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko and General Moskalenko, the sentence was carried out by gunshot. Beria allegedly fell to his knees and wailed, a final scene resembling that of Nikolai Yezhov, whom Beria himself had sent before a firing squad in 1940. His body was cremated at the Donskoy Crematorium. Beria's personal archive, said to contain compromising material on his former colleagues, was destroyed on Khrushchev's orders. Khrushchev's faction had no interest in letting Beria's kompromat outlive him. In January 1954, subscribers to the Great Soviet Encyclopedia received instructions to "cut out with a razor blade" the entry for Beria and paste in an expanded article on the Bering Strait.
Primary text
Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР «Об амнистии» (27 марта 1953 г.)
В результате упрочения советского общественного и государственного строя, повышения благосостояния и культурного уровня населения, роста сознательности граждан, их честного отношения к выполнению своего общественного долга укрепились законность и социалистический правопорядок, а также значительно сократилась преступность в стране.
Президиум Верховного Совета СССР считает, что в этих условиях не вызывается необходимостью дальнейшее содержание в местах заключения лиц, совершивших преступления, не представляющие большой опасности для государства, и своим добросовестным отношением к труду доказавших, что они могут вернуться к честной трудовой жизни и стать полезными членами общества.
Президиум Верховного Совета СССР постановляет:
1. Освободить из мест заключения и от других мер наказания, не связанных с лишением свободы, лиц, осужденных на срок до 5 лет включительно.
2. Освободить из мест заключения осужденных, независимо от срока наказания, за должностные и хозяйственные преступления, а также за воинские преступления, предусмотренные ст. ст. 193.4 п. а, 193.7, 193.8, 193.10, 193.10 п. а, 193.14, 193.15, 193.16 и 193.17 п. а Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР и соответствующими статьями уголовных кодексов других союзных республик.
3. Освободить из мест заключения, независимо от срока наказания, осужденных: женщин, имеющих детей в возрасте до 10 лет, и беременных женщин; несовершеннолетних в возрасте до 18 лет; мужчин старше 55 лет и женщин старше 50 лет, а также осужденных, страдающих тяжелым неизлечимым недугом.
4. Сократить наполовину срок наказания осужденным к лишению свободы на срок свыше 5 лет.
5. Прекратить производством все следственные дела и дела, не рассмотренные судами, о совершенных до издания настоящего Указа преступлениях:
- а) за которые в законе предусмотрено наказание в виде лишения свободы на срок до 5 лет или другие меры наказания, не связанные с содержанием в местах заключения;
- б) должностных, хозяйственных и воинских преступлениях, перечисленных в «статье 2» настоящего Указа;
- в) совершенных лицами, указанными в статье 3 настоящего Указа.
По другим делам о преступлениях, совершенных до издания настоящего Указа, за которые в законе предусмотрено лишение свободы на срок свыше 5 лет, суд, если признает необходимым избрать меру наказания в виде лишения свободы не свыше 5 лет, освобождает подсудимого от наказания, если же суд признает необходимым избрать меру наказания в виде лишения свободы на срок свыше 5 лет, — сокращает срок наказания наполовину.
6. Снять судимость и поражение в избирательных правах с граждан, ранее судимых и отбывших наказание или досрочно освобожденных от наказания на основании настоящего Указа.
7. Не применять амнистии к лицам, осужденным на срок более 5 лет за контрреволюционные преступления, крупные хищения социалистической собственности, бандитизм и умышленное убийство.
8. Признать необходимым пересмотреть уголовное законодательство СССР и союзных республик, имея в виду заменить уголовную ответственность за некоторые должностные, хозяйственные, бытовые и другие менее опасные преступления мерами административного и дисциплинарного порядка, а также смягчить уголовную ответственность за отдельные преступления.
Поручить Министерству юстиции СССР в месячный срок разработать соответствующие предложения и внести их на рассмотрение Совета Министров Союза ССР для представления в Президиум Верховного Совета СССР.
Председатель Президиума Верховного Совета СССР К. ВОРОШИЛОВ
Секретарь Президиума Верховного Совета СССР Н. ПЕГОВ
Сообщение «В Верховном Суде СССР» (24 декабря 1953 г.)
18—23 декабря 1953 года Специальное Судебное Присутствие Верховного Суда СССР в составе:
председательствующего — председателя Специального Судебного Присутствия Маршала Советского Союза Конева И.С. и членов Присутствия: председателя Всесоюзного Центрального Совета Профессиональных Союзов Шверника Н.М., первого заместителя Председателя Верховного Суда СССР Зейдина ЕЛ., генерала армии Москаленко К.С., Секретаря Московского областного комитета КПСС Михайлова H.A., председателя Совета Профессиональных Союзов Грузии Кучава М.И., председателя Московского городского суда Громова Л.А., первого заместителя министра внутренних дел СССР Лунева К.Ф. рассмотрело в закрытом судебном заседании, в порядке, установленном законом от 1 декабря 1934 года, уголовное дело по обвинению Берия Л.П. и других.
В соответствии с обвинительным заключением суду были преданы: Берия Л.П. по обвинению в преступлениях, предусмотренных статьями 58-1 «б», 58-8, 58-13, 58-11 Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР; Меркулов В.H., Деканозов В.Г., Кобулов Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешик П.Я., Влодзимирский Л.Е. по обвинению в преступлениях, предусмотренных статьями 58-1 «б», 58-8, 58-11 Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР.
Судебное следствие полностью подтвердило материалы предварительного следствия и предъявленные всем подсудимым обвинения, изложенные в обвинительном заключении.
Судом установлено, что, изменив Родине и действуя в интересах иностранного капитала, подсудимый Берия сколотил враждебную Советскому государству изменническую группу заговорщиков, в которую вошли связанные с Берия в течение многих лет совместной преступной деятельностью подсудимые Меркулов В.H., Деканозов В.Г., Кобулов Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешик П.Я. и Влодзимирский Л.Е. Заговорщики ставили своей преступной целью использовать органы Министерства внутренних дел против Коммунистической Партии и Правительства СССР, поставить Министерство внутренних дел над Партией и Правительством для захвата власти, ликвидации советского рабоче-крестьянского строя, реставрации капитализма и восстановления господства буржуазии.
Суд установил, что начало преступной изменнической деятельности Берия Л.П. и установление им тайных связей с иностранными разведками относится еще ко времени гражданской войны, когда в 1919 году Берия Л.П., находясь в Баку, совершил предательство, поступив на секретно-агентурную должность в разведку контрреволюционного муссаватистского правительства в Азербайджане, действовавшую под контролем английских разведывательных органов.
В 1920 году Берия Л.П., находясь в Грузии, вновь совершил предательство, установив тайную связь с охранкой грузинского меньшевистского правительства, также являвшейся филиалом английской разведки.
В последующие годы, вплоть до своего ареста, Берия Л.П. поддерживал и расширял тайные связи с иностранными разведками.
На протяжении многих лет Берия Л.П. и его соучастники тщательно скрывали и маскировали свою вражескую деятельность.
После кончины И.В. Сталина, делая ставку на общую активизацию реакционных империалистических сил против Советского государства, Берия Л.П. перешел к форсированным действиям для осуществления своих антисоветских изменнических замыслов, что и позволило в короткий срок разоблачить Берия Л.П. и его соучастников и пресечь их преступную деятельность.
Став в марте 1953 года министром внутренних дел СССР, подсудимый Берия Л.П., подготовляя захват власти, начал усиленно продвигать участников заговорщической группы на руководящие должности как в центральном аппарате МВД, так и в его местных органах. Берия Л.П. и его сообщники расправлялись с честными работниками МВД, отказывавшимися выполнять преступные распоряжения заговорщиков.
В своих антисоветских изменнических целях Берия Л.П. и его соучастники предприняли ряд преступных мер для того, чтобы активизировать остатки буржуазно-националистических элементов в союзных республиках, посеять вражду и рознь между народами СССР и в первую очередь подорвать дружбу народов СССР с великим русским народом.
Действуя как злобный враг советского народа, подсудимый Берия Л.П., с целью создания продовольственных затруднений в нашей стране, саботировал, мешал проведению важнейших мероприятий Партии и Правительства, направленных на подъем хозяйства колхозов и совхозов и неуклонное повышение благосостояния советского народа.
Установлено, что, скрывая и маскируя свою преступную деятельность, подсудимый Берия Л.П. и его соучастники совершали террористические расправы над людьми, со стороны которых они опасались разоблачений. В качестве одного из основных методов своей преступной деятельности заговорщики избрали клевету, интриги и различные провокации против честных партийных и советских работников, стоявших на пути враждебных Советскому государству изменнических замыслов Берия Л.П. и его сообщников и мешавших им пробираться к власти.
Судом установлено, что подсудимые Берия Л.П., Меркулов В.Н., Деканозов В.Г., Кобулов Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешик П.Я. и Влодзимирский Л.Е., используя свое служебное положение в органах НКВД—МГБ—МВД, совершили ряд тягчайших преступлений с целью истребления честных, преданных делу Коммунистической партии и Советской власти кадров.
Судом также установлены преступления Берия Л.П., свидетельствующие о его глубоком моральном разложении, и факты совершенных Берия преступных корыстных действий и злоупотреблений властью.
Виновность всех подсудимых в предъявленных им обвинениях была полностью доказана на суде подлинными документами, вещественными доказательствами, собственноручными записями подсудимых, показаниями многочисленных свидетелей.
Изобличенные доказательствами подсудимые Берия Л.П., Меркулов В.Н., Деканозов В.Г, Кобулов Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешик П.Я. и Влодзимирский Л.Е. на судебном следствии подтвердили показания, данные ими на предварительном следствии, и признали себя виновными в совершении ряда тягчайших государственных преступлений.
Специальное Судебное Присутствие Верховного Суда СССР установило виновность подсудимого Берия Л.П. — в измене Родине, организации антисоветской заговорщической группы в целях захвата власти и восстановления господства буржуазии; в совершении террористических актов против преданных Коммунистической Партии и народам Советского Союза политических деятелей; в активной борьбе против революционного рабочего движения в Баку в 1919 году, когда Берия состоял на секретной агентурной должности в разведке контрреволюционного муссаватистского правительства в Азербайджане, завязал там связи с иностранной разведкой, а в последующем поддерживал и расширял свои тайные преступные связи с иностранными разведками до момента разоблачения и ареста, то есть в преступлениях, предусмотренных статьями 58-1 «б», 58-8, 58-13, 58-11 Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР.
Суд установил виновность подсудимых Меркулова В.Н., Деканозова В.Г., Кобулова Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешика П.Я. и Влодзимирского Л.Е. в измене Родине, совершении террористических актов и участии в антисоветской изменнической группе, то есть в преступлениях, предусмотренных статьями 58-1 «б», 58-8, 58-11 Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР.
Специальное Судебное Присутствие Верховного Суда СССР постановило: приговорить Берия Л.П., Меркулова В.Н., Деканозова В.Г., Кобулова Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешика П.Я., Влодзимирского Л.Е. к высшей мере уголовного наказания — расстрелу, с конфискацией лично им принадлежащего имущества, с лишением воинских званий и наград.
Приговор является окончательным и обжалованию не подлежит.
Приговор приведен в исполнение.
Вчера, 23 декабря, приведен в исполнение приговор Специального Судебного Присутствия Верховного Суда СССР в отношении осужденных к высшей мере уголовного наказания — расстрелу — Берия Л.П., Меркулова В.H., Деканозова В.Г., Кобулова Б.З., Гоглидзе С.А., Мешика П.Я., Влодзимирского Л.Е.
Акт о приведении в исполнение приговора Специального Судебного Присутствия Верховного Суда СССР в отношении Л. П. Берия (23 декабря 1953 г.)
Сего числа, в 19 часов 50 минут, на основании предписания Председателя Специального Судебного Присутствия Верховного Суда СССР от 23 декабря 1953 года за № 003, мною, комендантом Специального Судебного Присутствия генерал-полковником Батицким П.Ф., в присутствии Генерального Прокурора СССР действительного государственного советника юстиции Руденко Р.А. и генерала армии Москаленко К.С. приведен в исполнение приговор Специального Судебного Присутствия по отношению к осужденному к высшей мере уголовного наказания — расстрелу — Берия Лаврентию Павловичу.
Генерал-полковник БАТИЦКИЙ
Генеральный Прокурор СССР РУДЕНКО
Генерал армии МОСКАЛЕНКО
What Changed and What Did Not
Beria's execution meant the security apparatus would never again stand above the Party. In March 1954 the state-security functions were separated from the MVD to form the Committee for State Security (KGB). The KGB was placed under the Council of Ministers, supervised by the Central Committee, and its regional chiefs had to report to the local party first secretary. Its first chairman, Ivan Serov, was a security officer close to Khrushchev. When Abakumov was tried and shot that December for fabricating the Leningrad Affair, it showed that the Party could punish the crimes of the security organs after the fact.
A precedent was also set that losers in a power struggle would not be killed. When Khrushchev defeated the "Anti-Party Group" of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich in 1957, they lost a Central Committee vote and were demoted, not shot. Molotov became ambassador to Mongolia; Malenkov was sent to run a power station in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Zhukov was dismissed as defence minister the same year but kept his life, and Serov's removal from the KGB in 1958 brought no bloodletting. Khrushchev himself, ousted by a plenum in 1964, lived out his days on a pension. Under Stalin, defeat had meant death.
Much, however, stayed the same. Party control rested on the political oversight of party officials, not on law, and the KGB remained an enormous apparatus watching the whole of Soviet society. Collective leadership did not last either: in 1958 Khrushchev combined the posts of First Secretary and premier, concentrating power in one man again. What the Beria affair ended was the era in which the security apparatus was one man's private instrument, not one-man rule itself. In 1982 the former KGB chairman Yuri Andropov became General Secretary, the first security chief since Beria to reach supreme power.
In 2002 the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court ruled Beria an organizer of political repression and refused his rehabilitation. He has never been officially rehabilitated in Russia or in Georgia.
What Historians Are Still Arguing About
First: was Beria actually planning a coup? Khrushchev's memoirs make Strokach's warning the decisive trigger, and contemporary Western analyses noted reports of MVD divisions moving toward Moscow, but there is no conclusive evidence. Most historians think that Beria was not so much preparing a coup as that the information and leverage he had amassed through the security organs were reason enough for his colleagues to strike first.
Second: when did Beria die? The official record says Batitsky shot him immediately after the verdict on 23 December 1953, and the execution reports and memoirs of Rudenko, Batitsky and Moskalenko support it. But his son Sergo maintained all his life that his father was killed on the day of his arrest, 26 June; on that view the December trial was a posthumous legalization. The trial was closed, and not one photograph or film of Beria survives from the six months between arrest and execution. Amy Knight judged the claim unlikely and most scholars accept the December execution, but with Beria's personal archive destroyed, the question has never fully closed.
Third: were Beria's reforms genuine? In the three months after Stalin's death he pushed through an amnesty of about 1.2 million prisoners, the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, preparations to transfer the Gulag to the Ministry of Justice, and the promotion of local cadres in the non-Russian republics; he called East Germany "a fake state kept alive only by Soviet troops" and floated a united, neutral Germany. In Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (1993), Amy Knight argued that this was too specific and coherent a programme to be mere manoeuvre, and Robert Service wrote that "no Soviet leader before Gorbachev had so broad a reform programme." Critics reply that the amnesty excluded political prisoners, that the new republican interior ministers he installed were all his own men, and that decentralizing nationalities policy strengthened the MVD's nationwide network. The paradox is that the men who removed him went on to carry out much of that programme, more slowly and more safely, in their own names.
Fourth: how far did the affair break with Stalinism? Writing in February 1954, Isaac Deutscher saw change in what Beria's trial lacked compared with the show trials of the 1930s: no public confessions, no chain of denunciations pointing to the next victims, no mass frenzy. Yet the charges still followed the old template of "foreign spy" and "conspiracy to restore capitalism." Beria was gone, but the way he was removed still followed the grammar of Stalinist politics.
Consequences
Beria’s fall brought the secret police under party control and sharply reduced the chance of another Stalinist mass purge. It was a turning point toward a collective leadership in which losers would no longer be killed, and the moment Khrushchev rose toward the center of power.
Timeline & Map
- 1953.03Stalin’s death and Beria’s riseLubyanka
Beria seized control of the MVD and led amnesties and reforms.
- 1953.06.26Arrest at the PresidiumKremlin
At a Presidium session Khrushchev and others denounced Beria, and officers under Zhukov arrested him.
- 1953.12Trial and executionMoscow Military District HQ
After a secret trial Beria and close aides such as Merkulov and Kobulov were executed.
Related people 46
Implementers & commanders9
As head of government, he chaired the session that arrested Beria.
He made the arrestGeorgy Zhukov1896–1974With army officers under his command, he arrested Beria in the meeting room.
Led the arrest squad and held Beria in custodyKirill Moskalenko1902–1985On Khrushchev's orders, he smuggled a pistol into the Kremlin and personally arrested Beria; he then held Beria in the bunker of his Moscow Air Defence headquarters and sat on the Special Judicial Presence that sentenced him to death in December.
Headed the Beria investigation and prosecutionRoman Rudenko1907–1981Appointed Procurator General immediately after Beria's arrest in June 1953, he effectively directed the investigative group that built the case against Beria and his accomplices, then served as state prosecutor at the closed December trial.
Security officer against BeriaIvan Serov1905–1990A security officer who took part in Beria’s arrest and the next year became the first KGB chairman.
Installed as Georgian First Secretary after Beria's arrest, purged Beria's patronage networkVasil Mzhavanadze1902–1988Appointed by Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Georgian CP immediately after Beria's arrest in June 1953, he replaced Beria's protégé Aleksandre Mirtskhulava and carried out a sweeping purge of Beria's patronage network in the Georgian party and state apparatus.
The executionerPavel Batitsky1910–1984On 23 December 1953, moments after the Special Judicial Presence sentenced Beria to death, Batitsky volunteered and personally carried out the execution with his service pistol. He signed the execution act alongside Rudenko and Moskalenko.
Chairman of the Special Judicial PresenceIvan Konev1897–1973Presided over the Special Judicial Presence that sentenced Beria and his six co-defendants to death in December 1953.
MGB chief who drove the Doctors' PlotSemyon Ignatiev1904–1983On Stalin's orders, he drove the Doctors' Plot and ran the terror apparatus in the final months.
Participants7
He backed the Presidium’s resolve against Beria.
Presidium memberNikolai Bulganin1895–1975He sided with Khrushchev in removing Beria.
Presidium memberLazar Kaganovich1893–1991He joined the Presidium’s move against Beria.
Presidium memberAnastas Mikoyan1895–1978Cautious at first, he ultimately joined the removal.
CC Secretary overseeing MVD · led the search of Beria's office and safeNikolai Shatalin1904–1984Elected CC Secretary immediately after Stalin's death in March 1953, he supervised administrative organs, especially the MVD. After Beria's arrest in June, he led the search of Beria's office and the seizure of documents from his personal safe. On 15 July 1953 he addressed a closed meeting of MVD party activists to explain the reasons for Beria's removal. He was appointed 1st Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on 1 July but never substantively took up the post.
Official warning Khrushchev of Beria's coupTimofei Strokach1903–1963Beria threatened to turn him into 'camp dust', and his warning to Khrushchev about Beria's coup plans served as a key trigger for the arrest.
MVD representative on the special tribunalKonstantin Lunev1907–1980Sat on the Special Judicial Presence, showing the MVD's subordination to the party.
Opposition & resistance2
Targets & victims23
Stalin’s secret-police chief, executed after a December 1953 trial.
TargetVsevolod Merkulov1895–1953A close security aide of Beria, executed with him.
TargetBogdan Kobulov1904–1953Beria’s closest deputy, executed with him.
Beria's closest ally · arrested and executedMir Jafar Bagirov1895–1956Beria's ally of two decades, he was removed immediately after Beria's 1953 arrest, arrested in 1954, tried and shot in Baku in 1956.
A security chief swept awayViktor Abakumov1908–1954The former MGB minister, executed in 1954 amid the dismantling of the Stalin-era security apparatus that followed Beria’s fall.
Shot with Beria, December 1953Sergo Goglidze1901–1953Detained in East Germany on 3 July 1953, he was tried in camera with Beria by the Special Judicial Presence and shot on 23 December, the day of the verdict.
Shot with Beria, December 1953Vladimir Dekanozov1898–1953Arrested on 30 June 1953, three months after Beria had made him MVD minister of Georgia, he was shot on 23 December.
Shot with Beria, December 1953Pavel Meshik1910–1953MVD minister of Ukraine, where he was executing Beria's nationalities line, he was arrested in the Ukrainian party Central Committee building in Kyiv on 30 June 1953 and shot on 23 December.
Shot with Beria, December 1953Lev Vlodzimirsky1905–1953Restored by Beria in March 1953 to head the MVD's special investigations, he was arrested four months later on 17 July and shot on 23 December.
Tried separately and executedAmayak Kobulov1906–1955Arrested in East Germany on 27 June 1953, he was tried separately from the Beria group, condemned in October 1954 and shot in February 1955.
Tried separately and executedSolomon Milshtein1899–1955Arrested on 3 July 1953, four months after Beria sent him to Ukraine as first deputy minister, he was shot in January 1955 after a separate trial.
Fifteen yearsStepan Mamulov1902–1976His power was procedural and derivative, so he was tried not with the December 1953 group but in September 1954, alongside Ludvigov who had run Beria's Council of Ministers secretariat. He received fifteen years and served the full term.
Died in custody, never triedLavrentiy Tsanava1900–1955He was arrested in April 1953 by Beria's own MVD as it reopened the Mikhoels case, and the case against him continued after Beria fell, but he died in Butyrka prison in October 1955 without ever coming to trial.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Avksenty Rapava1899–1955After running the Georgian police apparatus for a decade he was re-arrested in July 1953, sentenced to death at the public Tbilisi trial in September 1955, and shot on 15 November.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Nikolai Rukhadze1905–1955He had driven the "Mingrelian affair" against Beria's own clients and was already under arrest from November 1952, yet was ultimately shot in 1955 not for that case but as an alleged member of Beria's group.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Shalva Tsereteli1894–1955Identified as one of the operatives used for Beria's covert work, he was arrested in August 1953 and shot on 15 November 1955.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Konstantin Savitsky1905–1955Bogdan Kobulov's personal secretary and assistant, he was arrested on 1 July 1953, days after Beria's fall, and became a capital defendant despite holding only the rank of colonel.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Alexander Khazan1906–1955He had already left the security service in 1945, but was arrested after Beria's fall, tried as one of the Georgian NKVD investigators, and shot in 1955.
The Tbilisi trial, 1955Nikita Krimyan1913–1955He had left the organs in 1951 and was working in Armenia's food industry ministry when he was arrested in September 1953. He was shot on 15 November 1955.
Ten yearsSardion Nadaraya1903–1982Beria's bodyguard chief and the eighth defendant at the 1955 Tbilisi trial, he escaped the fate of the six senior defendants, received ten years, and was released in 1965.
Appointed by Beria then arrested after his fallNaum Eitingon1899–1981Co-planner of the Trotsky assassination; re-arrested after Beria’s fall, he was not released until 1964.
Arrested on charges related to the Beria casePavel Sudoplatov1907–1996Arrested in 1953 as Beria’s “accomplice”, he spent fifteen years in prison.
Security official demoted and dismissedSergei Savchenko1904–1966After Beria's arrest, he was demoted to deputy head of the MVD Second Chief Directorate and soon dismissed.
Historians & interpreters4
Her 1993 biography 'Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant' is the foundational English-language scholarly work that established the paradox of Beria as an unlikely liberal reformer.
historian who raised the poisoning theoryEdvard Radzinsky1936–In his 1997 biography of Stalin, he argued that Beria may have poisoned Stalin.
British historian who argued against the poisoning theorySimon Sebag Montefiore1965–In his Stalin biography, he argued against the poisoning theory and his vivid descriptions of Beria at Stalin's deathbed were cited as a counterpoint.
witness to the historiographical debateRobert Service1947–He argued that Khrushchev and his allies eliminated Beria as much for his reformist program as for his crimes.
Related terms
Sources: Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First LieutenantEncyclopaedia Britannica: Lavrenty Beria