A leading architect of armoured warfare and a general of Nazi Germany
In May 1940, he argued that the armoured forces across the Meuse should keep moving toward the Channel rather than wait for the infantry.
Heinz Guderian was a German professional soldier, one of the officers who built the panzer divisions in the 1930s under Oswald Lutz, and he publicised the idea of armoured warfare in Achtung – Panzer! (1937). In the 1940 invasion of France his corps drove through the Ardennes and Sedan to the English Channel, helping trap Allied forces around Dunkirk. He led the 2nd Panzer Group into the Soviet Union in 1941 and was dismissed that December; he returned as Inspector General of Armoured Troops in 1943 and became acting Chief of the Army General Staff in July 1944, pledging the army to the regime. He commanded in an eastern war of aggression marked by occupation crimes, yet his 1951 memoirs cast him as the "father" of the panzer arm and played down those crimes and his ties to the regime.
Also known as: Heinz Wilhelm Guderian
Activities and affiliations
-
1919
Freikorps (Germany, 1918–1923)
Military command -
1941
Germany state institutionsCommander of the 2nd Panzer GroupMain
Military command -
1943–1945
Germany state institutionsInspector General of Armoured Troops
Military command -
1944–1945
Germany state institutionsActing Chief of the Army General Staff
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1908Lieutenant, 10th Hanoverian Jäger Battalion
- 19123rd Telegraph Battalion, Koblenz
- 1914–1918World War I, signals and staff officer
- 1919Staff officer of the Iron Division Freikorps in the Baltic
- 1922.04Inspectorate of Motor Troops, Reichswehr ministry
- 1924–1927Instructor in tactics and military history, Stettin
- 1927.10–1928.10Transport section of the Truppenamt
- 1928.10Instructor, Motor Transport Instruction Staff
- 1931–1935.10Chief of staff to Oswald Lutz, Inspector of Motor Troops
- 1935.10.15–1938.02.04Commander of the 2nd Panzer Division
- 1938.02.04–11.20Commanding general of XVI Army Corps (Austria, Sudetenland)
- 1938.11.20–1939.08Chief of Mobile Troops, Army High Command
- 1939.08–1940.06Commanding general of XIX Army Corps (Poland, France)
- 1940.06–1941.10Commander of Panzer Group Guderian and the 2nd Panzer Group
- 1941.10–12.26Commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, dismissed in December
- 1943.03.01–1945.03.28Inspector General of Armoured Troops
- 1944.07.21–1945.03.28Acting Chief of the Army General Staff
- 1945.05.10–1948.06.17US prisoner of war, worked with the US Army Historical Division
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarGerman signals and staff officerHe served in the First World War as a German signals and staff officer.
- 1939.09.01–10.06The Invasion of Poland (1939)Commander, XIX CorpsCrossed the Corridor to the Vistula, then drove south via Wizna to Brest; held the handover ceremony with Krivoshein on 22 September.
- 1940–1944The Fall of France and the Vichy RegimeCommander of XIX Corps, later of Panzer Group GuderianDrove his panzers across the Meuse at Sedan to the English Channel, and in June led his panzer group south to the Swiss border.
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarPanzer group commander in Operation BarbarossaIn 1941, he commanded the 2nd Panzer Group in Operation Barbarossa.
- 1941.07.07–09.26Battle of Kiev (1941)Commander of the 2nd Panzer GroupAs the northern pincer crossed the Desna and Seim and came down to Lokhvitsa to close the ring.
- 1941.07.10–09.10Battle of Smolensk (1941)Commander of the 2nd Panzer GroupTook Smolensk and Yelnya as the southern pincer, and after meeting Hitler on 23 August led his panzer group south towards Kiev.
- 1941.09.30–1942.04.20Battle of MoscowCommander of the 2nd Panzer Group (2nd Panzer Army)Diverted to the Kiev encirclement, then advanced from the south on Oryol, Tula and Kashira but never took Tula; dismissed at the end of December after withdrawing without orders.
- 1943.07.05–08.23The Battle of KurskOpponent of the offensiveCalled the attack pointless at the Munich conference and warned it would squander the rebuilt panzer forces; afterwards called the outcome a decisive defeat.
- 1944–1953The Soviet reoccupation of the Baltic states: the Forest Brothers and the deportations of 1949Chief of the German General StaffUrged that the troops in Courland be evacuated to stabilise the front in Central Europe.
- 1944.03–1945.03Hungary under German occupation: from Operation Margarethe to the siege of BudapestChief of the German Army General StaffWanted the 6th SS Panzer Army used to defend Berlin rather than in Hungary.
- 1944.07.20–1945.04.0920 July plot and the purge of 1944Acting Chief of the Army General Staff, member of the Court of HonourBecame acting chief of the General Staff the day after and, as a member of the Court of Honour, took part in expelling officers from the army.
- 1944.08–10Warsaw UprisingChief of staff who did not object to the uprising’s suppressionAs chief of staff, he did not object to the orders during the 1944 suppression of the Warsaw Uprising.
- 1944.08.20–09.12The Jassy–Kishinev Offensive and Romania's 23 AugustChief of the German Army General StaffIn his 1952 memoir blamed the defeat on Romanian betrayal.
- 1945.01.12–02.03The Vistula–Oder OffensiveActing Chief of the German Army General StaffBefore the offensive demanded reinforcements for the east and the evacuation of Courland, without success.
- 1945.02.10–04.04The East Pomeranian Offensive of 1945Chief of the Army General StaffPlanned Operation Solstice against Zhukov's flank from Pomerania and had its command given to Wenck instead of Himmler.
What part did Guderian play in building the German panzer arm?
In April 1922 Guderian was posted to the Inspectorate of Motor Troops in the Reichswehr ministry in Berlin. In his memoirs he wrote that his work on motor transport and its protection turned him towards armoured vehicles: Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim, who was collating the scant record of tank use in the First World War, gave him material, and he read the British writers Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel. Because the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany tanks, exercises were held with tractors, cars and dummy tanks; he first drove a real tank in Sweden in 1929. Promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1931, he became chief of staff to Oswald Lutz, the Inspector of Motor Troops.
After the Nazis took power he showed Hitler motorcycle, anti-tank, light tank and armoured car platoons on the move at the Kummersdorf proving ground. According to his memoirs Hitler, impressed by their speed and precision, exclaimed: "That is just what I need!" When the first three panzer divisions were formed in October 1935 he took command of the 2nd Panzer Division. The memoirs portray Ludwig Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff, as an opponent who saw tanks as an auxiliary of the infantry and held back the panzer divisions. The military historian Markus Pöhlmann points out, however, that this story ultimately rests on Guderian's own account: Beck himself called for a further build-up of armour in a memorandum of December 1935, and the first three panzer divisions were created while he was chief of staff.
Nor did Guderian build the panzer arm alone. He was its public face, while his superior Lutz worked behind the scenes and smoothed over Guderian's frequent clashes with his peers. It was Lutz who first set out the basic principles of independence, mass and surprise in doctrinal statements, and officers such as Volckheim, Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg and Ludwig von Radlmaier also had a large share. What is widely credited to Guderian is the radio communications system of the panzer units. When Lutz died in 1944, the panzer troops' journal called him the "father of the German panzer arm".
Achtung – Panzer! (1937) was likewise written in the winter of 1936–37 at Lutz's request. Guderian wrote in his memoirs that he wanted to explain the panzer men's ideas to a wider public than dry official channels could reach. The book argued for the concentrated use of tanks in close cooperation with infantry and aircraft, and drew in part on the Austrian general Ludwig von Eimannsberger's 1934 book Der Kampfwagenkrieg.
When Lutz was removed in the Blomberg–Fritsch crisis of February 1938, Guderian was promoted to lieutenant-general and succeeded him in command of XVI Army Corps. In the annexation of Austria in March he led the 2nd Panzer Division and the SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler" into Vienna, and stood beside Hitler in Linz. The memoirs answer critics of the panzer troops by saying that the 2nd Panzer Division covered 700 kilometres in 48 hours and that no more than 30 per cent of vehicles broke down. English-language research, however, holds that tanks ran out of fuel or broke down and that the formation had no real combat value. After the occupation of the Sudetenland in October he was promoted General der Panzertruppe in November and made Chief of Mobile Troops in the Army High Command.
He went on to command XIX Army Corps in the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the western campaign of 1940, and the 2nd Panzer Group (from October the 2nd Panzer Army) in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In December 1941 he clashed over retreat with Günther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre, and was dismissed on the 26th; he spent more than a year without a command. In March 1943 he returned as Inspector General of Armoured Troops and worked with the armaments minister Albert Speer to raise tank production.
Acting Chief of the Army General Staff, 1944-1945
On 21 July 1944, the day after the attempt on Hitler's life, Guderian was appointed acting Chief of the General Staff of the Army High Command, with responsibility for advising Hitler on the Eastern Front. The conspirators had approached him, but he had kept his distance, and he condemned the attempt even after the war. He took up the post when Germany's defeat was already inevitable and could shape neither the military situation nor Hitler's strategic decisions. Hitler made him a member of the "Court of Honour" that screened those accused of involvement in the plot (Gerd von Rundstedt presided). Without hearing the accused or any defence, the court discharged them from the army so that they could be tried by the People's Court; between 4 August and 14 September 1944 it expelled 55 officers and had 29 more dismissed. Those handed over were tortured by the Gestapo and executed by hanging. Guderian wrote in his memoirs that he tried to avoid the duty and attended only two or three sessions when Wilhelm Keitel insisted in Hitler's name, but English-language research holds that he applied himself to it with the vigour of a Nazi adherent.
He demanded of the General Staff not only high professional qualification but also ideological commitment to National Socialist ideals, and pressed its officers to unconditional loyalty to Hitler. Joseph Goebbels remarked that in loyalty to Hitler he would "let no one surpass him". At about the same time Hitler, on Goebbels's suggestion, made the Nazi salute compulsory throughout the Wehrmacht from 24 July. As chief of staff he did not object to the orders Hitler and Himmler issued during the brutal suppression of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, nor to the atrocities committed against the city's civilian population. At the swearing-in of the Volkssturm of the Warthegau in Posen (Poznań) on 6 November 1944 he said the enemy would be shown that there were "85 million National Socialists who stand behind Adolf Hitler". On 28 March 1945, following the failed operation to retake Küstrin and a further dispute with Hitler over the control of armoured units, he was dismissed and sent on leave, replaced by Hans Krebs.
What did his memoirs tell, and what did they leave out?
On 10 May 1945 Guderian and his staff surrendered to US forces. He joined the US Army Historical Division to work on the history of the war, and the United States refused Soviet requests to extradite him. Not charged at Nuremberg, he was released on 17 June 1948. English-language research holds that his testimony on former colleagues and his cooperation with the Allies helped him escape prosecution. In conversations secretly recorded during his internment he said that "the fundamental principles [of Nazism] were fine".
In a 1950 pamphlet, Kann Westeuropa verteidigt werden? (Can Western Europe Be Defended?), he lamented that the Western powers had allied themselves with the wrong side in the war and wrote that Hitler's struggle, whatever his errors, had been about Europe. His memoirs, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, published in 1951 (in English as Panzer Leader, 1952), became a bestseller. In the preface he wrote that because Germany's archives had largely been destroyed or had fallen into enemy hands, the recollections of participants mattered all the more. For years the book was in fact almost the only source on the development of the panzer force, and historians long followed its account.
The first story the memoirs built was that of the "father of the panzer arm": Guderian presented himself as the innovator who raised the panzer force in the teeth of opponents such as Beck. The British military commentator Basil Liddell Hart asked him to acknowledge that his theories had influenced Guderian, and Guderian added such a passage to the English edition. Liddell Hart in turn counted Guderian among the "Great Captains of History" and did much for his reputation.
The second was the "clean Wehrmacht". The memoirs say that the Barbarossa jurisdiction decree, which exempted crimes against Soviet civilians from military prosecution, was not applied in his panzer group, and that the Commissar Order to kill captured political commissars "never reached my panzer group". Yet every division of his panzer group whose files survive shows evidence of illegal reprisals against civilians. Joachim Lemelsen, one of his corps commanders, is documented as saying that prisoners shown to be commissars were to be shot at once and that the order came directly from Guderian, and Guderian himself reported to the OKW that his panzer group had "shunted off" 170 commissars by the beginning of August.
The memoirs also played down what he received from Hitler. The book only mentions hearing in 1942 that Hitler meant to give estates to holders of the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross and wanted him to choose one in his home region. In fact, in October 1943 he took over the Deipenhof estate (today Głębokie) in the Warthegau of occupied Poland. German Wikipedia gives its size and value as 974 hectares and 1.23 million Reichsmarks, English Wikipedia as about 810 hectares and 1.24 million Reichsmarks. According to English Wikipedia its occupants had been evicted; he had first asked for an estate three times larger and been refused, and he also received a monthly payment of 2,000 Reichsmarks.
In 1950 British intelligence counted him a member of the "Bruderschaft", a circle of former Nazis. He advised the Amt Blank, the office preparing West German rearmament, and in 1953 wrote a foreword to a book by the Waffen-SS general Paul Hausser saying that "this brave force" had met with "lies and slander" after the war. He died at Schwangau in Bavaria on 14 May 1954. The historian Pier Battistelli concludes that he was not the father of the panzer arm but one of a number of innovators, and that his most remarkable skill was not as a theoretician or commander but as an author. Heinrich Schwendemann notes that the memoirs made him the epitome of military professionalism, whereas in reality loyalty to the Führer remained his first principle to the end.