Builder of Marxist aesthetics who defended absolute truth and beauty against relativism
"Contrary to the catchphrases of our century, absolute beauty exists just as absolute truth does" — VKHUTEIN journal, 1927
Jewish philosopher from Melitopol. After breaking with the avant-garde at VKHUTEMAS, he devoted his life to reconstructing Marx's aesthetics as a coherent system. In the 1930s, with Lukács, he refuted vulgar sociology and grounded art theory in dialectical materialism, compiling the landmark anthologies Marx and Engels on Art and Lenin on Art. Targeted in the post-war anti-cosmopolitan campaign, he became a lightning rod in the 1960s for his anti-modernist polemics, and in his last years developed an original philosophy centred on 'ontognoseology.'
Also known as: Lifšic
Activities and affiliations
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Soviet Communist Party and Bolsheviks
Scholarship and theory
Career Timeline
- 1923–1925Studied painting at VKHUTEMAS; broke with avant-garde for realism and Marxism
- 1925–1929Taught dialectical materialism at VKHUTEMAS; ousted after the Vagramyan affair
- 1930–1933Senior researcher at Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute; began collaboration with Lukács
- 1933–1938Compiled Marx and Engels on Art and Lenin on Art; refuted vulgar sociology
- 1938–1941Deputy research director at Tretyakov Gallery; head of art theory at IFLI
- 1941–1946Served with Pinsk Naval Flotilla; wounded, escaped captivity; Order of the Red Star
- 1954–1968Diary of Marietta Shaginyan (1954); Why I Am Not a Modernist? (1964); Crisis of Ugliness (1968)
- 1973–1983Doctor of Philosophical Sciences (1973); Academician (1975); Ilyenkov debate on the ideal
Related historical events
Lukács and the Literaturny Kritik Circle: The Refutation of Vulgar Sociology
In 1930, at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Lifshitz met György Lukács. The two became immediate intellectual comrades, and their friendship, which lasted four decades, altered the trajectory of Soviet Marxist aesthetics. Lifshitz drew Lukács toward the aesthetics of Marxism and Lenin's theory of reflection, and Lukács's 1930s works, notably The Young Hegel (1948, dedicated to Lifshitz), bear the deep imprint of Lifshitz's ideas. Yet Lifshitz maintained that Lukács never fully assimilated his conclusions, and he criticised Lukács's later 'subjectivist' turn as a residual neo-Kantianism.
Around Lifshitz gathered a circle of like-minded critics (V. Grib, E. Usievich, I. Sats) known as 'the Current' (Techenie), with the writer Andrei Platonov as a close associate. Their organ was the journal Literaturny Kritik (1933–1940). The group's central task was the refutation of 'vulgar sociology,' which had dominated Soviet literary theory in the 1920s, treating art as a mere reflex of class psychology and dismissing the classical heritage as feudal-bourgeois. Reading Lenin's 'Lev Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution,' Lifshitz argued that the maxim 'being determines consciousness' meant not deterministic reduction but the dialectical insight that consciousness can grasp the objective truth of the world. His decisive article 'Leninism and Art Criticism' (1936) reformulated the theory of reflection not as passive copying but as reality reflecting itself in human consciousness. The article triggered a wide debate, and in August 1936 a Pravda editorial effectively adopted Lifshitz's position, restoring 'realism' and 'narodnost' to the official aesthetic vocabulary.
With this victory, Lifshitz compiled two landmark anthologies: Marx and Engels on Art (1937) and Lenin on Art (1938). These volumes introduced Soviet readers to Marx's 1844 Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts and other early writings for the first time, and became the definitive reference works of Marxist aesthetics. Lifshitz himself valued the anthologies above his own original works. In the autumn of 1939, however, a wave of political denunciations engulfed the Literaturny Kritik group. Rival literary bureaucrats branded them an 'anti-party grouping,' and in 1940 a special Central Committee resolution closed the journal. Lukács was arrested and detained; Lifshitz faced a de facto ban on publication.
Revolutionary Tragedy: Between Necessary Demand and Impossible Realization
Lifshitz's philosophical work unfolded in the late 1920s and the 1930s, as Stalinism took hold and the Great Terror raged. He thought through the experience of that era as the tragedy of revolution. His starting point was the letters Marx and Engels sent Lassalle in 1859 about his play Franz von Sickingen, the Sickingen debate. There Engels located the core of tragedy in "the tragic collision between the historically necessary postulate and the practically impossible realization." Lifshitz held to this idea all his life. From the 1957 edition on, his anthology Marx and Engels on Art places a large section, "The Problem of Revolutionary Tragedy," right after its opening "Ideological Content and Realism."
He read the same thought in the late Lenin, who wrote of "the gap (abyss) between the immensity of the tasks and the material poverty and cultural poverty. To fill this abyss." Lifshitz asked in return: "Shall we fill this abyss with our bodies?" The gap, the abyss, the "between" became threads running through his thinking. A late programmatic essay that serves as a guide to his ideas of the 1930s ends: "History, Marx said, sets itself only tasks it can solve. That is true, of course, but it does not reckon its strength when it does so. Often that strength falls short of an immediate solution."
In an essay for the 140th anniversary of Engels's birth (1960) he examined at length the tragic guilt of revolutionaries, a guilt as unavoidable as that of a hero of ancient tragedy. Here also lies the source of his interest in how the ideal enters reality, and in what inverted forms. "The ideal exists in the world, but it does not come in by the front door. The love of scorpions foreshadows Romeo and Juliet."
This view of history drew suspicion in its own day. In the debate over Literaturny Kritik that began in September 1939, opponents accused the group of justifying Thermidor. In a note preserved in his archive, Lifshitz looked back on his position in the 1930s: he survived not only through oversight but because, as an outsider, he stood outside the exceptional rise above the average that "the terrible sword of injustice" cut down. He was, he wrote, "ultrasound" to the ear of the thirties.
The Ilyenkov Debate and Ontognoseology: Where Does 'the Ideal' Exist?
The most profound philosophical intervention of Lifshitz's later years was his debate with Evald Ilyenkov on the nature of 'the ideal' (идеальное). Ilyenkov, the most original post-war mind in Soviet philosophy, had taken much from Lifshitz and Lukács, and Lifshitz called him "the person closest to me among them".
«самый близкий мне из них человек»
Yet they diverged on fundamentals. For Ilyenkov, the ideal existed only in human social activity and its products (tools, language, works of art) as collective consciousness embodied in objects. His formula that "in nature itself, including the nature of man as a biological being, there is nothing ideal" provoked Lifshitz's fierce rebuttal.
«В природе самой по себе, в том числе в природе человека как биологического существа, идеального нет»
Lifshitz argued that the ideal is rooted in the objective world itself, on the far side of human consciousness. "The ideal is in everything: it is in material being and in consciousness, it is in society and in nature, or else it is nowhere."
«Идеальное есть во всем, оно есть и в материальном бытии и в сознании, оно есть и в обществе и в природе, или же его нет нигде»
His 'ontognoseology' (онтогносеология) sought to break down the artificial division between ontology and epistemology, recasting the world's capacity to reflect itself in human consciousness (a radicalisation of Lenin's theory of reflection) as an objective property of the world itself. On this view, idealism's real mistake was not in asserting the reality of the ideal, but in denying that matter possesses ideal potentialities. Lifshitz wrote: "Today only materialism can still defend the ideal life of the spirit, the existence of universal truth."
«Сегодня только материализм может ещё отстоять идеальную жизнь духа, существование всеобщей истины»
The debate remains one of the deepest fault-lines in Soviet philosophy. Ilyenkov's partisans see Lifshitz's ontognoseology as a relapse into the schematism of traditional Diamat; Lifshitz's defenders argue he was pursuing a genuinely dialectical materialism that overcomes the subject-object dichotomy. "Dialogue with Ilyenkov", begun in 1980 and left unfinished, appeared in part posthumously in 1984, and an expanded version assembled from the surviving fragments came out as a book in 2003. The text stands as one of the finest testimonies to the internal tensions of Soviet Marxism, and continues to generate active debate in post-Soviet philosophical circles decades later. The debate as a whole is treated in "Ilyenkov-Lifshitz debate on the ideal", and his concept in "Ontognoseology (Lifshitz)".
"Lunacharsky" (1967): False Form and Living Content
In 1967 Lifshitz published "In Place of an Introduction to the Aesthetics of A. V. Lunacharsky" in volume 7 of Lunacharsky's collected works. It asks how an idealist whom Lenin attacked so severely could also be Lenin's commissar and a great Marxist. He rejects the "school examination" that grades people right or wrong, and takes his ground from Lenin's conduct: refusing neutrality about philosophy itself while separating philosophical disputes from organization.
Its method extends to the history of ideas the "victory of realism" that Engels saw in Balzac. Living content can sit inside a false form, and content can be dead under the sign of orthodoxy. In Lifshitz's reading Lenin hoped for such a victory in Lunacharsky, citing Lenin's words that he fights "while there is still ground for a comradely war".
This is no defence of idealism. "Idealism is a lie," he writes, "but the real content of reality resists it to the end." What is rescued is the person and the content, not idealism, the same structure as "Why Am I Not a Modernist?" of the year before. The essay also criticizes the fashionable Western "aesthetics of breaking real forms" as a form of activism.
From the Dismissal of 1949 to the Last Manuscripts
In the late 1940s Lifshitz taught philosophy at the Institute of International Relations, but he was dismissed in 1949 on the wave of the antisemitic "struggle against cosmopolitanism". In 1954 Novy Mir, which had carried his article, was criticised in a Central Committee resolution, and its editor Tvardovsky was removed.
In 1972 his writings on Marx's aesthetics from 1927 to 1967 came out as one volume, and for it he received his doctorate from the academic council of the Institute of Philosophy on 17 April 1973. In 1975 he became a full member of the USSR Academy of Arts. On 24 December 1975 he delivered "Partisanship and Realism" at that academy, and in 1978, in "What Need Not Be Feared" in Kommunist, he criticised pluralism and wrote: "The complete like-mindedness of the human race is an ideal just as absolute truth is."
«Полное единомыслие человеческого рода — такой же идеал, как абсолютная истина»
This text appeared at the height of the official campaign against dissent. The Crisis of Ugliness of 1968 fixed his reputation as an obscurantist, yet the same year he wrote that he was not asking for modern art to be banned, that the question of the artist's rights must be separated from the aesthetic question, and that the Malevich and Kandinsky works in storage should be put on show. Later Dmitri Gutov called The Crisis of Ugliness "a true bible of anti-modernism".
He died in Moscow on 20 September 1983. Most of his main works appeared after his death, and his archive holds some 700 folders of drafts.