People of the Revolution and the USSR

Czechoslovakia 1884–1948 ○ Natural causes

The last democratic president, who tried to topple a government with resignations and instead handed it to Gottwald

On 25 February 1948, with Communist militias controlling Prague and civil war imminent, Beneš accepted the resignations of twelve non-Communist ministers.

Beneš was a central figure in the Czechoslovak independence movement, co-founding the Czechoslovak National Council with Masaryk and Štefánik during the First World War. As foreign minister for 17 years from 1918, he shone at the League of Nations, built the Little Entente with Romania and Yugoslavia, and forged alliance treaties with France and the Soviet Union. Elected president in 1935, he resigned after Munich and led the government-in-exile in London, securing Britain's repudiation of the Munich Agreement. In February 1948, he accepted the resignations of non-Communist ministers and sanctioned Gottwald's Communist-dominated government, a decision that sealed Czechoslovakia's entry into the Soviet bloc.

Czechoslovakia 1886–1948 ✕ Died in a fall

The non-Communist foreign minister who lent Gottwald's government legitimacy, found dead under Černín Palace window two weeks after the coup

Returning from Moscow in July 1947 after being forced to reject the Marshall Plan, Masaryk said: 'I left as a minister of a sovereign state and I have come back as Stalin's servant.'

Son of Czechoslovakia's founder-president Tomáš Masaryk, he served as minister-plenipotentiary to Britain from 1925, resigning in protest at the Munich Agreement. As foreign minister of the London government-in-exile, his weekly BBC broadcasts to occupied Czechoslovakia made him a national symbol. In July 1947 Stalin forced him to withdraw from the Marshall Plan; Masaryk returned saying he had left 'as a minister of a sovereign state' and come back 'as Stalin's servant.' When non-Communist ministers resigned in February 1948, Masaryk stayed on as Gottwald's only non-Communist minister, lending the coup a veneer of legality: two weeks later he was found dead beneath his bathroom window at the Černín Palace, and the shock of his still-unresolved death helped drive the Marshall Plan through Congress.

United States state institutions 1900–1949 ○ Natural causes

A corporate executive turned architect of the postwar international order

The Yalta Protocol preserves the signature of the American representative, “E. R. Stettinius Jr.”

Edward Stettinius was a statesman who moved from corporate management and national mobilization into the center of American diplomacy at the end of the Second World War. As administrator of Lend-Lease, he helped sustain the Allied war effort, and at Yalta he accompanied Franklin Roosevelt in negotiating the framework of postwar Europe and international organization. He signed the Yalta Protocol as the American representative and then led the United States delegation at the conference that founded the United Nations, but his effort to address growing tensions with the Soviet Union through the UN brought him into conflict with the Truman administration. His career shows how wartime coordination between corporations and the state fed into postwar multilateralism while being constrained on the threshold of the Cold War.

United States state institutions 1904–1972 ○ Cancer

The US Ambassador to Moscow who knew Khrushchev personally and, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, told Kennedy to ignore the second letter

"The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say 'I saved Cuba; I stopped an invasion,'" Thompson told the ExComm during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

An American diplomat who served as Ambassador to Moscow from 1957 to 1962, building a personal rapport with Nikita Khrushchev that gave Washington rare insight into Soviet decision-making. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, on Kennedy's ExComm, he was the one who argued that the second, more aggressive Khrushchev letter of October 27 should be ignored and the first, conciliatory letter of October 26 answered instead: the strategy that became the resolution. He returned to Moscow as ambassador under Johnson and helped shape nuclear non-proliferation policy and the SALT process.

United States state institutions 1904–1974 ○ Pancreatic cancer

The State Department Soviet expert who turned Kennan's and Clayton's policy memos into Marshall's Harvard speech

"After Potsdam, there was little that could be done to induce the Soviet Union to become a reasonable and cooperative member of the world community," from his memoir, Witness to History.

An American diplomat and Soviet specialist who was present at nearly every pivotal moment in U.S.-Soviet relations from the opening of the Moscow embassy in 1934 through the Cold War. As Roosevelt's and Truman's interpreter, he sat beside them at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam; in 1947, at Secretary of State George C. Marshall's request, he drafted the Harvard commencement address that launched the Marshall Plan, synthesizing policy memoranda from George F. Kennan and William Clayton. He survived a brutal McCarthy-era confirmation battle to become ambassador to Moscow in 1953, later serving as ambassador to France and as one of the nonpartisan 'Wise Men' advising presidents from FDR to LBJ.

United States state institutions 1906–1999 ○ Natural causes

An international lawyer who worked the UN’s procedures

On June 25, 1950, he reported on Korea and steered the Security Council’s procedure toward a vote on the resolution.

Ernest A. Gross was an international lawyer and U.S. diplomat whose work joined legal counsel, postwar administration, and representation of American policy at the United Nations. When the Korean War began in June 1950, he led the U.S. delegation and managed the Council’s procedures and voting so that Resolution 82 could be adopted. The result was a diplomatic success made possible by the Soviet delegate’s absence, but it also exposed the tension between collective security and great-power rivalry. He later practiced international law, assisting the Tibetan government in exile and challenging South Africa’s apartheid policy.

France state institutions 1907–1978 ○ Natural causes

French resistance veteran and official who concluded the 6 March 1946 preliminary agreement with Ho Chi Minh

On 6 March 1946, he reached an agreement with Ho Chi Minh that allowed French troops to enter Hanoi without fighting.

Born Jean Roger, he led the Normandy section of the Alliance resistance intelligence network during the Second World War. After the war, appointed French Republic commissioner for Tonkin and northern Annam, he negotiated with Ho Chi Minh; their 6 March 1946 agreement enabled French troops to enter Hanoi without fighting.

United Nations 1909–1974 ○ Natural causes

The quiet diplomat who mediated a superpower nuclear standoff

“Neither would wish to be remembered by history, if any history survived, as having jointly precipitated the end of human civilization.”

U Thant was a Burmese teacher, civil servant and diplomat who became the third UN Secretary-General during the Cold War, when decolonization and international negotiation were reshaping the organization. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, he appealed to John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, proposed a face-saving link between turning back Soviet ships and removing missiles from Cuba, then travelled to Cuba to discuss verification with Fidel Castro. His mediation lowered the danger of nuclear war, yet the UN's quiet diplomacy was long overshadowed by superpower-centered accounts of the crisis. He also directed peacekeeping in the Congo and pursued negotiations to end the Vietnam War, exposing the tension between an international institution's moral obligations and great-power politics.

United States state institutions 1909–1994 ○ Natural causes

A Cold War diplomat who built containment through international coalitions

“Our United Nations action should be aimed at removing the missile threat; our objective in the OAS would be to persuade other Latin American countries to act with us under the Rio Treaty.”

Dean Rusk was an internationalist who reached the center of American foreign policy through World War II service and the postwar State Department. As secretary of state under Kennedy and Johnson, he helped manage the Cuban Missile Crisis, backing a quarantine rather than immediate attack while using the Organization of American States and the United Nations to defend it internationally. In Vietnam he became an increasingly forceful advocate of intervention, leaving a defining tension between his commitment to international legitimacy and his role in explaining an expanding war. After leaving office, he taught international law and foreign relations at the University of Georgia.

United States state institutions 1909–1994 ○ Cancer

The Under Secretary who stopped an airstrike on Cuba with the Pearl Harbor analogy, then alone opposed escalation in Vietnam

This coming in there, a Pearl Harbor, just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond... You go in there with a surprise attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn't the end. This is the beginning, I think.

Under Secretary of State (1961–1966) serving Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, he was the exceptional figure who opposed escalation at two defining Cold War junctures: the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam. In October 1962 at EXCOMM, he called a surprise airstrike on Cuba 'a Pearl Harbor' and played the decisive role in swinging Robert Kennedy and the majority toward the naval blockade. Alone among Johnson's senior advisers, he warned in 1965 that sending combat troops would lead to hundreds of thousands more and an unwinnable war, and was proven right. After leaving government, he criticized America's pro-Israel tilt in the Middle East and, as Jean Monnet's collaborator in the 1950s, helped draft the Schuman Plan and the treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community.

United States state institutions 1914–1994 ○ Natural causes

A negotiator of the nuclear age

When he headed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Smith proposed a direct Moscow–Washington link that met resistance from State and the military, yet once it became the 'hot line,' President Kennedy credited Smith with the original idea.

Gerard C. Smith was an American lawyer and nuclear-policy specialist who treated arms control and nonproliferation as problems of statecraft. As the U.S. lead negotiator at SALT I, he organized the practical work of limitation talks amid competing nuclear strategies, later recording their tensions and judgments in Doubletalk. He continued to oppose measures he believed would undermine the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, making his career a study in both managing and questioning the arms race.

United Kingdom state institutions 1915–1995 ○ Natural causes

A practical architect of nuclear diplomacy

With Kissinger, he turned the Soviet draft into a counterproposal that preserved alliance obligations.

Thomas Brimelow was a British diplomat and Soviet specialist who worked where Cold War alliance politics met arms diplomacy. During the negotiation of the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, he helped Henry Kissinger reshape the Soviet proposal for an unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons into a narrower text preserving alliance obligations and covering third countries. His role showed British Foreign Office expertise entering the heart of American strategy toward the USSR, while also revealing how the language of détente could preserve nuclear deterrence and great-power realpolitik.