Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov

Dmitry Ustinov was the living embodiment of the Soviet military-industrial complex. At 33 he was named Armaments Commissar, directing weapons production mobilization throughout the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), then helped build the postwar foundations of the missile, nuclear and space industries. In 1965 he became CC Secretary for defense industry, and in 1976 Defence Minister, the first civilian to hold the post. As a core elder of Brezhnev's 'small Politburo,' he forcefully advocated the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan. His death in 1984 destabilized the gerontocratic balance, opening the path for Gorbachev's ascent.

When Ustinov became Defence Minister in 1976, Soviet military doctrine underwent a decisive shift. Dubbed the 'Ustinov Doctrine,' its core was the large-scale deployment of tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons across the European theatre to break through NATO's deep-echeloned defences. Under his direction, the Soviet Union began replacing the aging single-warhead R-12 (SS-4) and R-14 (SS-5) intermediate-range missiles with the new RSD-10 'Pioneer' (SS-20), and in 1983–84 deployed OTR-22 and OTR-23 'Oka' operational-tactical missile systems on Czechoslovak and East German soil, placing the entire territory of West Germany within strike range. NATO analysts interpreted this as evidence that the USSR was preparing for a limited nuclear conflict in Europe. The doctrine rested on the theory of 'strengthening the Euro-strategic direction': upon detecting the first signs of a NATO nuclear attack, the Soviet Union would launch a preemptive missile-nuclear strike. Under General Staff operational plans, five front-level army groups would advance into West Germany, while the 14th Army, stationed in Moldavia, would thrust into Turkey, seize the Black Sea Straits, and then take Italy. Soviet forces were to occupy West Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium within 13–15 days and reach the French border; the entire operation to defeat NATO on the European continent was expected to take 30–35 days. The Ustinov Doctrine symbolised the peak of late Soviet military power, but its excessive military burden inflicted lasting damage on the Soviet economy.

From the mid-1970s, as Brezhnev's health failed, the substance of policymaking shifted to what was known as the small Politburo. Russian-language sources describe it as the body where the most important decisions were taken and then formally confirmed by a vote of the full Politburo membership, sometimes by absentee ballot, and list Brezhnev, Kosygin (later Tikhonov), Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Chernenko and Ustinov among its members. The historian Jonathan Haslam describes real power tacitly passing to a troika of Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov, which met in the walnut-panelled orekhovaya room where the Politburo foregathered on Thursdays, while decisions still formally required Brezhnev's assent.

Ustinov's weight in this phase was decisive. As the influence of the military grew, he was described as the Kremlin's kingmaker: his support was decisive in allowing Andropov to succeed Brezhnev in 1982. After Chernenko's accession in February 1984 he again formed an unofficial triumvirate with Gromyko that led the country until his own death, compensating for Chernenko's poor health and inexperience in military affairs. Russian Wikipedia records that he backed the election of Andropov and then Chernenko as General Secretary in 1982 and 1984 respectively. Leonid Mlechin calls him the most influential Politburo member after Andropov's death, and reports that Gorbachev expressed readiness to support Ustinov as General Secretary. A contemporary account also records that at one point in 1984, when Chernenko's health faltered, Ustinov was viewed as a possible interim leader who could oversee the transfer of power to a younger generation.

Contemporaries read his politics clearly. Colonel General Igor Illarionov, Ustinov's assistant for thirty years, called him the most Stalinist of all the Commissars, adding that Stalin had groomed Ustinov to maintain the established system. Academician Yevgeniy Chazov, former head of the 4th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Health, judged that Ustinov's one mistake, perhaps unacknowledged, was the Afghan war: a poor politician and diplomat, and a representative of the old Stalinist guard, he believed all issues could be solved from a position of strength. His refusal to support any reforms, even ones popular within the Politburo, set him against Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and many General Staff officers, who resented his influence over Brezhnev and saw him as a lobby for defence-industry interests against those of the military.

On Afghanistan he was one of the central figures pressing for intervention inside the small Politburo, alongside Andropov and Gromyko. Some accounts hold that he opposed sending troops, together with Brezhnev, but Russian Wikipedia judges this unlikely, noting that Brezhnev later blamed Ustinov for the protracted war Ustinov had promised to end within a couple of months. On the late-1983 destruction of a Korean passenger airliner, five top-secret memos disclosed by Boris Yeltsin in 1992 remain on record: published in Izvestia on 16 October 1992, they state that the USSR had recovered and deciphered the flight's black box, and that because the tapes could not support the Soviet contention that the flight was on a US espionage mission, Ustinov and KGB head Viktor Chebrikov recommended to Andropov that possession of the recorders be kept secret. Gorbachev's memoirs describe Ustinov as normally energetic and bright, and record that when Gorbachev faced opposition in the Politburo shortly after Andropov's death, Ustinov urged him to stand firm and take heart.