Establishment of the monolithic ideological system (1962–1974)
How did the DPRK become a garrison state in the 1960s, and how were a system allowing only Kim Il Sung's ideas and a hereditary succession established?
Having built a war footing with the four military lines of 1962, North Korea proclaimed independence amid the Sino-Soviet split and began the monolithic ideological system with the Kapsan purge of 1967. When the attempts at reunification by force, the Blue House raid and the Pueblo seizure of 1968 among them, failed, it purged the military leadership in 1969. Through the July 4 Joint Statement and the Socialist Constitution's presidency in 1972, the system was completed with Kim Jong Il's succession and the Ten Principles in 1974.
What happened
Between 1962 and 1974 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea turned into a garrison state braced for war, and in the process a "monolithic ideological system" was built that allowed only the ideas and leadership of Kim Il Sung. In December 1962 the 5th plenum of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea decided to strengthen defence first even at a cost to economic growth, the line of building the economy and defence in parallel, whose content came to be summed up as the four military lines: arming the whole people, fortifying the whole country, turning the army into a cadre army and modernising it. In August 1966 the Rodong Sinmun editorial "Let Us Defend Independence" declared a course leaning on neither the Soviet Union nor China. 1 2 3
The purge of the party leadership's Kapsan faction in 1967 brought the term "monolithic ideological system" into use for the first time. In January 1968 Unit 124 raided the Blue House, and two days later the US Navy intelligence ship Pueblo was seized off Wonsan. That autumn 120 armed men infiltrated Uljin and Samcheok. In January 1969 the military leaders who had driven the line of reunification by force, among them Minister of National Defence Kim Chang-bong, were purged. As détente approached, North and South issued the July 4 Joint Statement in 1972, and in December that year the Socialist Constitution created the office of President. The period ends with Kim Jong Il's designation as successor in February 1974 and the publication of the "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System" in April. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Parallel development and the four military lines (1962–1966)
The plenum of 10–14 December 1962 took as its agenda "On further strengthening defence in view of the prevailing situation". There were three backgrounds. In May 1961 Park Chung Hee's military coup took place in the South; when the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles in the Cuban crisis of October 1962, Pyongyang and Beijing saw capitulationism; and from 1961 new credits from the socialist countries stopped. The plenum cut the industrial growth target for 1963 from 18 to 11 per cent and set up a military committee under the Central Committee. Five days later the Rodong Sinmun ran an article headed "Let the whole people take up arms and turn the whole country into a fortress". In February 1963 Kim Il Sung told army cadres that fortifying the country was meant to deter enemy provocation and to prepare for the time when revolutionary forces in the South grew and asked for help. 1 8 2
Defence spending rose sharply only from 1966. Kim Seong-ju argues that for the first three years after the parallel line was adopted, investment in light industry actually grew in order to calm discontent over falling living standards, and that the big increase in defence spending began in 1966, when the escalation of the Vietnam War coincided with worsening relations with China. In October 1966 the second Party Conference confirmed the parallel line as the party's line, and Kim Il Sung called the liberation of South Korea a national task that could not be delayed for a moment. According to the report to the 5th Party Congress in 1970, defence rose from 19 per cent of state budget spending in 1960 to 31.3 per cent in 1967–1969. The Seven-Year Plan fell short and was stretched to ten years in 1966. Minister of National Defence Kim Chang-bong and Chief of the General Staff Choe Kwang, appointed in October 1962, drove the four military lines. 1 12 13
War preparation reached into everyday life. Food stockpiling began in 1966 and militia training was lengthened. At the end of 1967 the East German ambassador in Pyongyang reported that residents could no longer travel more than 2 km from home, and that a third of Pyongyang's population was rumoured to be evacuated in case of war. The share of soldiers on party congress presidiums rose from single figures in 1962–1965 to 30–40 per cent in 1968–1970. Pak Kum-chol, on the other hand, told the Soviet ambassador in early 1963 that he did not think the South would attempt an invasion. Even the judgement of the war threat was not shared across the leadership. 1
Independence between China and the Soviet Union
Amid the Sino-Soviet split Pyongyang leaned towards China in the early 1960s, then revived its relations with Moscow after Khrushchev's fall in 1964. Soviet aid grew from 1965 to 1968. The Rodong Sinmun editorial of 12 August 1966, "Let Us Defend Independence", refused to follow any big party blindly, and North Korean officials told the Soviet side that it was aimed mainly at the Chinese leadership. At the Party Conference that October Kim Il Sung's title changed from chairman of the Central Committee to general secretary. 14 15 3 16
China's Cultural Revolution was a threat to Pyongyang. Red Guards called Kim Il Sung a "fat revisionist", and the Workers' Party of Korea called Mao Zedong "an old fool who has gone out of his mind"; slogans attacking the other side hung along the border until 1968. Meeting Brezhnev secretly in Vladivostok in December 1966, Kim called the Cultural Revolution "massive idiocy". Bernd Schaefer argues that while China turned inward Kim sought to lead Asian communism, taking as his model Vietnam's fight against the Americans for national unification, and that this led to the "adventurist" path of reunification by force. Relations began to thaw in October 1969, when a delegation led by Choe Yong-gon stood with Mao on Tiananmen Gate to review the National Day parade, and from 5 to 7 April 1970 Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang, the first trip abroad by a senior Chinese official since the Cultural Revolution began. 17 18
The independent line reached Koreans beyond the borders too. In Japan the General Association of Korean Residents (Chongryon) adopted the doctrine of the leader at its 8th congress in 1967. In the late 1960s Pyongyang presented itself, rather than China, to the anti-imperialist movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America. On 8 October 1968, the first anniversary of Che Guevara's death, Kim Il Sung published a theoretical article in Tricontinental, a new journal born of the Havana conference of April 1967. In March 1969 relations were so low that an incident on the Sino-Korean border was reported, but after Zhou Enlai's visit a commission to study the Yalu and Tumen border and wider trade were agreed. 3 18 19
The Kapsan purge and the monolithic ideological system (1967)
The Kapsan faction came from the underground network that had helped Kim Il Sung's guerrillas around Kapsan and Changbai in the 1930s. After October 1966 Pak Kum-chol, fourth in rank on the Political Committee, Yi Hyo-sun, fifth and in charge of South Korean affairs, and propaganda chief Kim To-man argued for investing in light industry and consumer goods rather than in heavy industry for the military, and resented a personality cult that erased everyone but Kim Il Sung from the history of the anti-Japanese struggle, as well as the rise of Kim Il Sung's brother Kim Yong-ju as heir. Kim To-man had a play, "Ilpyon Tansim", staged about the anti-Japanese work of Pak and his wife. In March 1967 Kim Il Sung warned against "individual heroism" in a speech and put forward the party's monolithic ideological system for the first time. 4 20 21
Sources differ on the date of the 15th plenum of the 4th Central Committee, which expelled them. Ko Myeong-gyun gives 4–8 May, Kim Seong-ju and James Person give May, and the English Wikipedia gives 4–8 April. Diplomatic reports note that Pak and the others disappeared from public view from April, which gives the May dating more support. More than a hundred people were expelled, and Pak was accused of spreading feudal Confucian thought. Accounts of his fate differ: a provincial factory, a political prison camp, or execution or suicide. On 25 May Kim Il Sung's "May 25 instructions" branded feudal Confucian thought a poison alongside bourgeois and revisionist ideas. Kim Jong Il took his first official assignment investigating the case. Kim Il Sung badges and compulsory quotation of his words followed, many books were burned, and Kim's birthday became a national holiday in 1968. On 16 December 1967 Kim Il Sung presented the ten-point programme of the Republic to the Supreme People's Assembly. 8 1 4 20 22 23 3
The purge changed the meaning of words. "Suryong" (leader), once used for the head of any group or for Lenin and Stalin, now meant Kim Il Sung alone. Yi Hyo-sun was blamed for failed operations in the South and his subordinate Rim Chun-chu for writing novels instead of running agents, while Pak Kum-chol's charges even included having party cadres read Jeong Yak-yong's Mongmin simseo and praising the Silhak school. A Hungarian diplomat in Pyongyang reported being told that the authorities could tolerate deviation from the line but not a lack of respect for the leader. The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture explains that the Kapsan group can hardly be said to have existed as a faction under that name before 1967, the label having been attached informally after the purge. 4 20 21
Force against the South (1968–1969)
Unit 124 was formed under the Reconnaissance Bureau in April 1967. On the night of 17 January 1968 thirty-one men crossed the DMZ, and on the night of the 21st, at the Jahamun checkpoint near the Blue House, they shot the Jongno police chief Choi Gyu-sik, who was questioning them, and scattered. The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture says that by the 31st 28 had been killed and two were presumed to have fled; later accounts give 29 dead, Kim Shin-jo captured and Pak Jae-gyong back in the North. Pyongyang presented the raid as the struggle of South Korean armed guerrillas. Drawing on East German documents, Schaefer reconstructs a plan to kill Park, provoke a coup and popular uprising, and intervene at the request of the new rulers. 5 24 18
The raid's failure began with chance. On 19 January, on Sambong Mountain near Beopwon-ri, the commandos ran into four Woo brothers gathering firewood; because the frozen ground made burial impossible, they lectured them on communism and let them go, and the brothers soon reported them. The commandos marched on the Blue House in South Korean army uniforms, posing as a unit returning from a sweep, and after the firefight they scattered, one throwing a grenade at a passing bus. Casualty figures also differ. The English Wikipedia gives 26 South Koreans killed and 66 wounded and four Americans killed; the Korean Wikipedia gives 30 dead and 52 wounded, civilians included. 25 24 26
On 23 January the intelligence ship Pueblo was seized off Wonsan; one man died and 82 were held. Washington said she had been in international waters, Pyongyang that she had intruded into its territorial waters. The Johnson administration sent an aircraft carrier but chose negotiation once the Tet Offensive began in Vietnam, and on 23 December the United States recovered the crew by the unusual device of signing an apology while repudiating it in the same breath. Seoul was angered when Washington negotiated directly with Pyongyang at Panmunjom, leaving the South out. From 30 October to 2 November 120 armed men infiltrated Uljin and Samcheok and fought a two-month guerrilla campaign; 113 were killed and seven captured. It was the largest infiltration since the armistice, and more than 40 people died on the southern side, civilians included. On 15 April 1969 North Korean fighters shot down a US Navy EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan, killing all 31 aboard. The Nixon administration did not retaliate. 6 27 7 28 29
The Pueblo's position was disputed too. The UN Command placed the seizure at 127°54′3″E, 39°25′N, Pyongyang at 127°46′E, 39°17′N. On release the crew reported that they had been starved and regularly tortured in captivity. Schaefer, working from East European documents, writes that the Soviets were neither informed nor consulted in advance of either incident and worried that North Korean "adventurism" could drag the socialist camp into a new war in Korea; yet, he argues, Washington's restraint owed much to the military and political shield Moscow provided. The EC-121 was shot down on 15 April Korean time, 14 April in the United States. The DMZ clashes of 1966 to 1969 became the everyday state of North-South relations in these years. 27 6 18 28 29
Pyongyang also sought a revolutionary organisation in the South. The Revolutionary Party for Reunification, led by Kim Jong-tae, publisher of the magazine Chongmaek, grew from a preparatory committee of 1964 and is said to have been formally founded on 25 August 1969. Its leaders, Kim Jong-tae and Choi Yong-do among them, were executed. The South introduced a Homeland Reserve Force and military drill in schools, and in April 1968 formed Unit 684 on Silmido to assassinate Kim Il Sung. When détente cancelled the mission, the unit broke out towards Seoul in August 1971 and most of its men died. 30 5 31 32
The military purge of 1969
The line of reunification by force came to nothing. No popular uprising broke out in the South, the Soviet Union, not told in advance about the Pueblo, worried about war, and China was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. At the 4th plenum of the 4th Korean People's Army party committee in January 1969 Kim Il Sung condemned Minister of National Defence Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak, head of the general bureau for the South, and Chief of the General Staff Choe Kwang as "warlord bureaucrats", and they were purged. In May 1972 Kim Il Sung told Lee Hu-rak, visiting Pyongyang, that the Blue House raid had been the work of left-wing adventurists acting without his or the party's intent, and that those responsible had been punished. 8 18 33 34 24
Ko Myeong-gyun questions whether the military could have planned and carried out provocations on this scale without Kim Il Sung's approval. After the purge political commissars were introduced down to regimental level, tightening party control over the army. Work aimed at the South shifted from armed infiltration to building an underground party and united front inside the South, and the 5th Party Congress of 1970 defined the South Korean revolution as a task for the people of the South themselves. Former guerrillas loyal to Kim Il Sung, among them O Jin-u, took the purged men's places. 8 1 29
Kim Il Sung's explanation of 1972, blaming the army for the Blue House raid, was long taken as fact in the South too, since the condemnation at the January 1969 plenum and the testimony of the defector Hwang Il-ho seemed to bear it out. Ko Myeong-gyun considers Hwang's testimony hard to credit without circumstantial support. Meanwhile the economic balance was tilting. In 1970 a commission of 1,000 South Korean economists and technicians announced that in 1969 the South's per capita GDP, at 205–208 dollars, had overtaken the North's 194–197 dollars for the first time since division. Schaefer writes that this reversal could hardly have gone unnoticed by the North Korean leadership. It happened in the very years when defence took a third of the budget. 8 35 12
Détente and the July 4 Joint Statement (1970–1973)
On 31 March 1970 nine members of the Japanese Red Army Faction hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 351, the Yodo, on its way from Tokyo Haneda to Fukuoka. Fooled once at Gimpo airport, they flew on with Vice-Minister of Transport Shinjiro Yamamura, who took the passengers' place as hostage, and landed at Pyongyang's Mirim airfield. Pyongyang took them in, and most of them, including their leader Takamaro Tamiya, stayed in North Korea. Young Japanese New Leftists who called themselves international revolutionaries, they had made Pyongyang their destination from the start under the Red Army Faction's "international base" theory, which meant to build armed bases in workers' states and turn them into bases of world revolution. They chose North Korea not because they supported its system but as the nearest country hostile to Japanese imperialism, and they meant to remake it into a military base for their faction. The hijacking began a relationship between the Japanese New Left and North Korea. 51 In his Liberation Day speech that year Park Chung Hee offered competition in good faith if the North gave up reunification by force. After the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, the People's Republic of China's entry into the United Nations in 1971 and Nixon's visit to China in 1972, preliminary Red Cross talks between North and South began on 20 September 1971. 36 37 38 19
In May 1972 KCIA director Lee Hu-rak secretly met Kim Il Sung and Kim Yong-ju in Pyongyang, and Pak Song-chol visited Seoul on Kim Yong-ju's behalf. Announced simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July, the joint statement set out three principles of independence, peace and great national unity and agreed to stop mutual slander, open a hotline and form a North-South Coordinating Committee. Schaefer writes that its wording drew heavily on Kim Il Sung's own language, and North Korean leaders told East European diplomats that it was merely tactical and that a unified Korea would have to be a socialist state on the northern model. On 17 October Park Chung Hee declared martial law and began the Yushin order, telling Pyongyang an hour in advance. When KCIA agents kidnapped Kim Dae-jung in Tokyo on Lee Hu-rak's orders on 8 August 1973, Pyongyang broke off the Coordinating Committee talks on 28 August. 9 35 39 38
The two sides wanted different things from the talks. Both delegations to the Red Cross talks that began in September 1971 were staffed largely by intelligence officers. Pyongyang hoped to use détente to bring about the withdrawal of US troops and to move defence spending, over 30 per cent of the budget, into the economy. At the first meeting of the Coordinating Committee co-chairmen at Panmunjom on 12 October 1972 Pak Song-chol attacked the South for violating the statement by keeping its anti-communist laws and the "outside force" of the UN Command. Meeting Lee Hu-rak again on 3 November, Kim Il Sung proposed cutting both armies to 100,000 men and forming a confederation that left both systems intact. When the South announced on 23 June 1973 that it would seek simultaneous UN membership for both Koreas, Pyongyang objected strongly and had China and the Soviet Union threaten to veto the South's accession. Even so, China later backed the North's peaceful reunification proposals by quoting Kim Il Sung's own three principles of 1972. 35 19
The Socialist Constitution and the President (1972)
Discussion of a new constitution went back to the mid-1960s. The 1948 constitution had been amended five times between 1954 and 1962 but remained a constitution of the people's democratic stage. On 23 October 1972 the 5th plenum of the 5th Central Committee set up a drafting committee, and Kim Il Sung said in his report that the constitution should embody the achievements of socialist revolution and construction. This came three months after the July 4 Joint Statement and six days after Yushin was proclaimed in the South. 40 41
On 27 December 1972 the 1st session of the 5th Supreme People's Assembly adopted the Socialist Constitution; the same day the Yushin Constitution was promulgated in the South. It defined the state as "an independent socialist state", and Article 4 wrote juche into the constitution for the first time, making the Workers' Party's juche idea, a creative application of Marxism-Leninism, the guide to the state's activity. Article 14 enshrined a defence system of the whole people and state and a self-reliant military line, carrying the four military lines of 1962 into the constitution, and the capital changed from Seoul to Pyongyang. 10 42 40 41
The constitution also redrew society. Article 5 made the state's aim the complete victory of socialism in the northern half and the peaceful reunification of the country by driving out foreign forces, and Article 11 pledged to strengthen the ideological revolution and revolutionise and working-classise the whole society. Article 18 vested the means of production in the state and cooperatives, and Article 22 confined personal property to the workers' personal consumption. Article 49 based citizens' rights and duties on the collectivist principle "one for all and all for one". Before East European ambassadors, Deputy Foreign Minister Ri Man-sok in Pyongyang called the South's Yushin Constitution, promulgated the same day, a "wicked deception". 10 40 35
The biggest change was the office of President. As head of state, supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the National Defence Commission, the President led the new supreme organ, the Central People's Committee, while the cabinet was downgraded to an administrative council. Power that the 1948 constitution had divided between the premier and the chairman of the Assembly's standing committee was gathered in one man. The official North Korean explanation gives the purpose of the presidency as realising the leader's monolithic leadership and establishing the party's monolithic ideological system. Kim Il Sung was the only President, from 1972 until his death in 1994. 10 41 43
Kim Jong Il's succession and the Ten Principles (1973–1974)
Around 1970 Kim Yong-ju was regarded as his brother's successor. But Kim Jong Il, who had investigated the Kapsan faction and led the Kim Il Sung cult in the Propaganda and Agitation Department, was rising. Kim Yong-ju withdrew on grounds of health in 1973, and that September Kim Jong Il became Central Committee secretary for organisation and propaganda. At the 8th plenum of the 5th Central Committee in February 1974 he became a member of the Political Committee and was in effect designated successor, and on 19 February he proclaimed the "Kimilsungisation of the whole society". East European diplomats noticed the signs of hereditary succession for the first time and regarded it as Marxist-Leninist heresy. 44 45 46 47 35
In April the "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System" were published: ten articles and 65 clauses requiring that the whole society be made one in Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideas, that his authority be made absolute, that his instructions be carried out unconditionally, and that the revolutionary cause he pioneered be carried on from generation to generation. The English Wikipedia and its Kim Yong-ju article say that Kim Yong-ju proposed them in 1967; Person and Daily NK say that Kim Jong Il wrote them in 1974 with Hwang Jang-yop's help. The two accounts meet if the Republic's ten-point programme of 1967 laid down the frame and Kim Jong Il rewrote and promulgated it in 1974. The Ten Principles became a norm above the constitution and party rules, and citizens measured their conduct against them in regular self-criticism sessions. 11 44 4 48 49
There are other explanations for Kim Yong-ju's fall. The English Wikipedia writes that, having studied in the Soviet Union, he held to a more classical Marxism and disliked his brother's personality cult, and that his allies, propaganda chief Kim To-man and international department head Pak Yong-guk, were removed first. Demoted to vice-premier in 1974, he returned as vice-president of the state in 1993. In 1976 Kim Jong Il called juche an ideology of its own that Marxism-Leninism could not fully explain, and the 6th Party Congress of 1980 recognised it as the party's sole guiding idea. Hwang Jang-yop, the party ideologue said to have helped write the Ten Principles, later defected to the South. 44 3 4
Outcome
Over twelve years North Korea became a garrison state spending a third of its budget on defence, and economic growth slowed as the price. The armed offensive against the South produced not a popular uprising but anti-communist mobilisation under Park Chung Hee and a stronger US-South Korean alliance, and the blame was laid on the military leadership in 1969. The North-South dialogue of détente became the occasion for both regimes to entrench power, in the Yushin Constitution and the Socialist Constitution. 12 1 8 42
Within the party, after the Yan'an and Soviet factions in the 1950s, the Kapsan faction in 1967 and the military in 1969 were purged, leaving only Kim Il Sung's former guerrillas and his family. Juche entered the party rules in 1970 and the constitution in 1972, and in 1974 it was renamed "Kimilsungism" and stood as an ideology in its own right. The hereditary succession written into the last of the Ten Principles was made public at the 6th Party Congress in 1980, and the principles, revised in 2013, remain in force. Kim Jong Un's parallel line of economic and nuclear construction of 2013 revived the parallel line of 1962. 21 3 50 11 2
The system that set in these years was read beyond the borders as well. In the 1980s a current within the national liberation wing of the South Korean student movement took up juche and came to be called the juche faction. East European diplomats, conversely, regarded hereditary succession as Marxist-Leninist heresy from the early 1970s, and among the socialist states North Korea went its own way. The parallel line of 1962, the monolithic ideological system of 1967 and the Ten Principles of 1974 remained the framework of the North Korean system for the next half-century. 3 35 11
Consequences
A garrison state spending a third of its budget on defence, a monolithic ideological system allowing only the leader's ideas, and hereditary succession took hold. The armed offensive against the South failed, and North-South dialogue became the occasion for both regimes to entrench power by constitution.
Timeline & Map
- 1962.12.10Parallel line adopted
The 5th plenum of the 4th Central Committee resolves to put defence first: the four military lines.
- 1966.08.12"Let Us Defend Independence"
A Rodong Sinmun editorial declares independence from both Moscow and Beijing.
- 1966.10.05Second Party Conference
Confirms the parallel line and makes Kim Il Sung general secretary.
- 1967.05.04Kapsan purge
The 15th plenum of the 4th Central Committee expels Pak Kum-chol, Yi Hyo-sun and others (some sources say April).
- 1967.12.16Ten-point programme of the Republic
Kim Il Sung presents a ten-point programme applying juche to every field.
- 1968.01.21Blue House raid
Thirty-one men of Unit 124 attempt to raid the Blue House.
- 1968.01.23Pueblo seized
The US Navy intelligence ship is seized off Wonsan; 82 crew held.
- 1968.10.30Uljin–Samcheok landings
120 armed men land on the east coast and fight for two months.
- 1968.12.23Pueblo crew released
The United States signs and simultaneously repudiates an apology to free the crew.
- 1969.01Military purge
The KPA party committee plenum purges Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak and others as "warlord bureaucrats".
- 1969.04.15EC-121 shot down
North Korean fighters shoot down a US Navy reconnaissance plane; 31 killed.
- 1970.03.31Yodo hijacking
Nine members of the Japanese Red Army Faction hijack JAL Flight 351 to Pyongyang.
- 1970.04.05Zhou Enlai visits
Zhou Enlai visits Pyongyang and Sino-North Korean relations recover.
- 1972.07.04July 4 Joint Statement
A joint statement with three principles of reunification is announced in Seoul and Pyongyang.
- 1972.12.27Socialist Constitution
The Supreme People's Assembly adopts the Socialist Constitution and elects Kim Il Sung President; the Yushin Constitution is promulgated in the South the same day.
- 1973.08.28Talks broken off
After the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung, Pyongyang breaks off the Coordinating Committee talks.
- 1974.02.19Kimilsungisation proclaimed
Kim Jong Il, newly designated successor, proclaims the "Kimilsungisation of the whole society".
- 1974.04Ten Principles published
The Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System are published.
Related people 20
Implementers & commanders1
Participants10
Once seen as successor; signed the July 4 Joint Statement.
Chairman of the SPA Standing CommitteeChoe Yong-gon1900–1976Led the delegation to China's National Day in 1969.
Former guerrilla veteranChoe Hyon1907–1982Of the guerrilla group that took over the army after 1969.
Unit 124 commandoKim Shin-jo1942–2025Captured in the Blue House raid.
Revolutionary Party for Reunification leaderKim Jong-tae?–1969Led the underground party in the South and was executed.
CPSU General SecretaryLeonid Brezhnev1906–1982Met Kim Il Sung secretly in Vladivostok in 1966.
CCP ChairmanMao Zedong1893–1976Sino-North Korean relations soured during his Cultural Revolution.
Chinese PremierZhou Enlai1898–1976Visited Pyongyang in April 1970.
Leader of the Yodo hijackersTakamaro Tamiya1943–1995Went to Pyongyang in 1970 and stayed.
PhilosopherHwang Jang-yop1923–2010Said to have helped draft the Ten Principles.
Opposition & resistance4
Target of the Blue House raid; declared Yushin after the July 4 statement.
KCIA directorLee Hu-rak1924–2009Visited Pyongyang secretly and signed the July 4 statement.
President of the United StatesLyndon B. Johnson1908–1973Chose negotiation over the Pueblo.
President of the United StatesRichard Nixon1913–1994Did not retaliate for the EC-121; visited China.
Targets & victims3
Related terms
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35reference 36reference 37reference 38reference 39reference 40reference 41reference 42reference 43reference 44reference 45reference 46reference 47reference 48reference 49reference 50reference 51