Erich von Manstein

Germany state institutions Germany Germany 1887.11.24.–1973.6.10. ○ Convicted of war crimes 1949, released 1953

Nazi Germany's finest operational strategist and the apex of the 'clean Wehrmacht' myth

"Preussische Feldmarschälle meutern nicht": "Prussian field marshals do not mutiny." With these words he is said to have turned down Colonel Gersdorff's proposal in August 1943 that the field marshals confront Hitler together; the remark was made public only in 1977, after his death.

Erich von Manstein was a field marshal of Nazi Germany and widely regarded as the most dangerous operational mind on the Eastern Front. Born into the Lewinski family, he was adopted by his aunt's husband Georg von Manstein. He devised the Ardennes breakthrough plan (the Sichelschnitt, or sickle cut) that broke France in 1940, captured the Crimea and Sevastopol in 1941–42, and in February–March 1943 stopped the collapse of the German southern front with his counteroffensive at Kharkov. Relieved in March 1944 after operational disputes with Hitler, he was convicted of war crimes by a British military court in 1949 and sentenced to 18 years (later 12), was released in 1953 and advised West Germany on rebuilding its army. His memoir Lost Victories ignored the Holocaust and Wehrmacht crimes and became a cornerstone of the myth of the clean Wehrmacht.

Also known as: Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Lewinski

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

What was his relationship with Hitler, and why was he dismissed in March 1944?

Manstein was born in Berlin in 1887, the tenth child of the artillery general Eduard von Lewinski. As agreed beforehand, he was handed to his childless aunt Hedwig and her husband Georg von Manstein, who adopted him, and from then on he bore the name Manstein. Another aunt, Gertrud, was the wife of Paul von Hindenburg.

When the defence minister Blomberg extended the Aryan paragraph to the army in February 1934 and officers of Jewish descent were dismissed, Manstein, then chief of staff of Wehrkreis III in Berlin, sent a letter of protest to Ludwig Beck over a lieutenant under him who had been discharged as a "quarter Jew". English Wikipedia records him as the only Reichswehr officer to oppose the paragraph. Yet he objected to it as an intrusion on the army's control of its own personnel and on comradeship, and in the same text wrote that "the whole army affirms the racial idea".

As commander of Army Groups Don and South in 1942–1944 he clashed with Hitler again and again over a breakout from the Stalingrad pocket, Operation Citadel and the retreat to the Dnieper. In his memoir he wrote that he tried "no fewer than three times" to persuade Hitler to keep supreme command in name only, hand the conduct of operations to a responsible chief of staff and appoint a separate commander for the Eastern Front. Yet he turned away the officers of the resistance: Claus von Stauffenberg in January 1943, Rudolf-Christoph von Gersdorff in August and Henning von Tresckow in November sounded him out, and he did not join them. In his memoir he repeated what he had said at his trial: a senior commander could not demand for years that his soldiers give their lives for victory and then help bring about defeat with his own hand.

Like the other field marshals, he received tax-free monthly payments from Hitler's secret fund "Konto 5", 4,000 Reichsmarks a month for a field marshal, and in the last months of the war he kept changing the bank account into which the money was to be paid as the Allies advanced. In October 1944, after his dismissal, he bought an estate in East Pomerania.

In March 1944, with the 1st Panzer Army about to be encircled, he fought Hitler over a breakout to the west and on 25 March, threatening to resign his command, extracted his consent. Five days later, on 30 March at the Obersalzberg, Hitler presented him with the Swords to the Knight's Cross and then told him that the army group would pass to Walter Model. According to Manstein's diary, Hitler said that "the time for large-scale operations in the East was over" and that holding on was all that remained. Ewald von Kleist of Army Group A was dismissed the same day. Manstein left his headquarters at Lemberg (today Lviv) on 3 April, was transferred to the Führer reserve and was never employed again.

Occupied Crimea and the 11th Army: orders, support and the concealment of responsibility

Manstein commanded the 11th Army that invaded the Crimean Peninsula in September 1941 and took Simferopol on 1 November. In that region his troops operated in the same space as Einsatzgruppe D's killing operations. The unit travelled in the wake of Manstein's 11th Army and was supplied by his command with vehicles, fuel and drivers; military police cordoned off the sites where the Einsatzgruppe shot Jews. Captain Ulrich Gunzert, who witnessed a massacre of Jewish women and children, asked Manstein to stop the murders and is reported to have been told to forget what he had seen and concentrate on fighting the Red Army. Of the seventeen charges later brought against him, fourteen concerned events in the Soviet Union, six of them the killing of Jews and other civilians by Einsatzgruppe D in Crimea.

On 20 November 1941 Manstein issued an order modelled on the Reichenau Severity Order, praised by Hitler. In it he affirmed that the "Jewish Bolshevik system" had to be eradicated once and for all and demanded that his troops stifle at the outset any uprising, which was mostly instigated by Jews. According to the historian A. M. Ermakov, after Hitler had praised the Reichenau order as exemplary and the army commander-in-chief Brauchitsch had asked army commanders to issue similar ones, Manstein, Hermann Hoth, Ernst Busch and Karl Kitzinger signed orders on the treatment of Jews in November. Manstein's order portrayed Jewry as the "middleman" between the enemy in the rear and the remnants of the Red Army and its leadership still fighting, and as the seedbed of all unrest, and told the troops to distinguish Jews and Bolsheviks from Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars, who were hostile to the Bolsheviks and would in time side with the "new order". He also endorsed the plundering food strategy in the occupied territory, writing that a large part of the population of enemy cities would have to go hungry but that, out of misplaced humanity, nothing intended for the home front should be given to prisoners or civilians not working for the Wehrmacht. The mass killings in Crimea grew out of precisely this calculus. In Simferopol, Krymchaks and Jews were rounded up between 9 and 13 December 1941 with personnel supplied by the army's field police and field gendarmerie, loaded onto trucks and shot in an anti-tank ditch about ten kilometres outside the city. Einsatzgruppe D had planned the murder of the Jews for March 1942, but the 11th Army headquarters pressed for an earlier date, chiefly because of the catastrophic food situation: with Sevastopol still unconquered and eastern Crimea open to a Soviet counterattack, famine riots in the rear could have put the 11th Army in grave danger. Roughly 13,000 people, among them about 10,600 Jews, some 1,500 Krymchaks and 600 to 1,000 Roma, fell victim to the massacre. The Soviet Extraordinary State Commission counted 10,600 Jewish and 1,500 Krymchak victims, and Werner Otto von Hentig, the Foreign Office representative with the 11th Army, reported that the shootings of Jews in Simferopol alone came to 12,000.

Concealment of this responsibility was not confined to his memoir. At Nuremberg Manstein denied any knowledge of the Einsatzgruppen's activities and testified that soldiers under his command were not involved in the murder of Jewish civilians. Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, contradicted him, testifying that Manstein was aware of what was happening and that his Eleventh Army was actively involved. At the Hamburg trial in 1949 the prosecution confronted him with the order of 20 November 1941 that he had signed; he replied that he remembered asking for a draft of such an order but had no recollection of signing it. He stated in court that he had received no reports of Jews being shot, and his defence counsel Paget characterised the atrocity charges as Soviet propaganda. Though acquitted on the three charges relating to the extermination of the Jews, he was convicted on nine of the seventeen charges and sentenced to eighteen years. The judge advocate, Charles Collingwood, held that it was immaterial whether Manstein was aware of the mass killings in his area: he should have known, and he should have tried to stop them.

How did the postwar trial and Lost Victories shape his image?

Taken into British custody on 26 August 1945, Manstein was moved to Nuremberg, where he wrote the generals' memorandum with Brauchitsch, Halder and others, and in August 1946 testified as a witness that he had received the Commissar Order but not carried it out. In 1941, however, he had been receiving regular reports of commissars being executed. The memorandum and his testimony became a starting point of the myth of the clean Wehrmacht. At the Island Farm camp in Wales he began drafting two books and corresponded with the British military writer Basil Liddell Hart.

In March 1948 the Soviet Union asked for him to be handed over, which Britain refused, and in July the British cabinet decided to try him itself. The trial was held before a British military court in Hamburg from 23 August to 19 December 1949. The Labour MP Reginald Paget led the defence, and Winston Churchill was among the donors to a public subscription for its costs. Of the seventeen charges he was acquitted on the three concerning Poland and on those concerning the extermination of the Jews, but convicted on nine, including scorched earth orders and the deportation of civilians during the retreat, using prisoners of war to build fortifications, the execution of commissars, the maltreatment and deaths of prisoners of war and the execution of civilians, and sentenced to eighteen years. The sentence was cut to twelve in February 1950; from 1952 he was effectively released on account of an eye condition, and his imprisonment officially ended on 7 May 1953. Pressure from Churchill, Adenauer, Liddell Hart and Paget combined with Britain's wish to bring West Germany into the defence of Western Europe.

In 1955 he was one of eleven former senior officers called in by the Blank office, which was preparing West German rearmament, and until 1960 he was the only former field marshal to advise the federal government, unofficially. His proposals are credited with brigades instead of regiments as the basic operational unit, a conscript service of at least 18 months and a reserve force.

His memoir Lost Victories, published the same year, became a bestseller. In its preface he called the book "a soldier's record" from which he had deliberately left out political problems, and placed Liddell Hart's praise of the German generals at its head. In the same preface he wrote that he had not been personally acquainted with Liddell Hart, yet Liddell Hart had corresponded with him since his camp days, campaigned for his release, and arranged and wrote the foreword to the English edition of 1958. The book blamed defeat on Hitler's interference and said nothing of the massacres in Crimea. The German military historians Michael Epkenhans and John Zimmermann judge that he "wrote up" victories that never happened, and historians including Gerhard Weinberg regard his account of Stalingrad as distorted. In 1958 he published From a Soldier's Life, covering his life up to 1939, and he also influenced Paul Carell's popular serial on the Eastern Front. He died at Irschenhausen in Bavaria on 10 June 1973 and was buried with Bundeswehr military honours.