Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis

Лев Захарович Мехлис
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia (Jewish) 1889.1.13.–1953.2.13. ○ Natural causes

From Stalin's personal secretary to the Red Army's purge enforcer, nicknamed 'the Inquisitor of the Red Army'

According to former USSR Health Minister Ye. I. Smirnov, when he proposed to Stalin in 1949 that Mekhlis head a government commission, Stalin burst out laughing, wiping away tears, saying words to the effect that Mekhlis was suited to destroying and wrecking things, not to constructive work.

Born in Odessa into a Jewish family, he worked as a clerk and tutor before joining the Zionist workers' party Poale Zion (1907–1910). He entered the Communist Party in 1918 and did Red Army political work; in 1922–1926 he was in effect Stalin's personal secretary. As Pravda editor-in-chief from 1930 to November 1937 he incited the campaign against 'enemies of the people'. From December 1937 to September 1940, as Deputy People's Commissar of Defence and head of the Main Political Directorate, he helped organise the mass purge of the officer corps. His interference on the Crimean Front contributed to the Kerch catastrophe of 1942 and he was demoted two ranks, but his ranks were later restored and he became a colonel-general (1944). He served as USSR Minister of State Control (1946–1950) and died of heart disease in 1953.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

The Central Committee Orgburo

1952.10 served until the body was abolished

Related historical events

The Red Army Purge and Political Control (1930–1941)

From 1930 to November 1937 Mekhlis headed the Central Committee Press Department and edited Pravda. Day after day the paper carried material demanding an intensified struggle against "enemies of the people", exposed alleged conspiracies against Soviet power and inflamed spy mania. In 1935–1936 he provided the propaganda coverage of the Zinoviev–Kamenev trials and repeatedly called for the execution of all the defendants.

From 30 December 1937 to 6 September 1940 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Defence and head of the Red Army's Main Political Directorate. He is recorded as one of the organisers of the mass repressions in the Red Army. English Wikipedia states that he supervised a purge of at least 20,000 of the 30,000 political commissars attached to the army, and Yad Vashem gives the same figures.

In May 1938 he travelled to Khabarovsk with the deputy head of the NKVD, Mikhail Frinovsky, to supervise the purge of the Far Eastern Army. Its commander, Vasily Blyukher, was arrested and beaten to death. Mekhlis telegraphed Stalin boasting that he had dismissed all 215 political workers, most of them arrested.

During the 1939–1940 war with Finland he was sent to the front to report to Stalin on why the Red Army was being beaten back. He attributed the setbacks to treachery and had the commander Alexei Vinogradov, his chief of staff and the chief of the political department tried and shot in front of the troops. In September 1941, on his order, the artillery commander of the 34th Army, Vasily Goncharov, was shot in front of army headquarters; according to English Wikipedia, Goncharov was posthumously exonerated only in 2002.

Yad Vashem states that Mekhlis fabricated charges against the local commanders on each front to which he was assigned, and that on his initiative the generals D. Pavlov, V. Klimovskikh, A. Grigoryev, A. Korobkov, N. Klych, K. Kachanov and others were tortured, sentenced to death and executed. This is a documented account of repression that should be preserved without sanitising.

Contemporaries assessed him in conflicting terms. Khrushchev recalled him as "an honest man but somewhat mad", seeing enemies and wreckers everywhere; admiral Isakov described him as nervous, overwrought and fanatical rather than brave; Meretskov wrote that he was honest and brave but suspicious and very rude. Simonov, who witnessed Kerch, argued that he bore the main responsibility for the Kerch disaster and was "military illiterate", yet was of irreproachable personal courage and did not act for personal glory. His later wartime career and his post-war tenure as Minister of State Control are covered in the biography.

The Kerch Disaster (1942)

On 20 January 1942, Mekhlis arrived at Kerch as the Stavka (Supreme High Command) representative. Within two days he cabled Stalin denouncing Crimean Front commander General Kozlov as 'a bewildered and unconfident leader,' and proceeded to flood Moscow with hostile reports on nearly every senior officer. He reshuffled the command at will, replacing chief of staff Tolbukhin (a future Marshal) with his own man, Major-General Vechny.

Yet Mekhlis himself contributed nothing tangible to reorganising the front. For two months he fixated on offensive preparations while refusing to transition to a defensive posture, and squandered air power on secondary targets instead of interdicting enemy armour and troop concentrations. According to Vasilevsky's memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978), on the evening of 8 May, the first day of the German attack, Mekhlis cabled Stalin: "This is no time to complain, but I must report so that the Stavka knows the front commander." Kozlov, he wrote, had spent the eve of the attack discussing a plan to take Koi-Asan, had told the armies to expect the attack on 10 to 15 May, and had resisted sending more forces to the 44th Army's sector. Stalin's reply of 9 May accused him of holding "the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front": 'You are not a bystander on the Crimean Front. You are the responsible Stavka representative, answerable for all successes and failures. If "the whole situation indicated the enemy would attack in the morning," why did you confine yourself to passive criticism instead of organising resistance?' To the demand that Kozlov be replaced by 'someone like Hindenburg' he answered that 'we have no Hindenburgs in reserve', adding that had the ground-attack aircraft been used against the enemy's tanks and men rather than on side tasks, the enemy would not have broken through.

When Manstein's 11th Army struck on 8 May, the Crimean Front collapsed within days. On the morning of 10 May the Stavka ordered the front to fall back to the Turkish Wall and hold there, but according to Vasilevsky and the Stavka directive of 4 June, the front command and Mekhlis delayed the withdrawal by two days and then carried it out in disorder. On 14 May the Germans reached the outskirts of Kerch, and the remnants crossed the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula. The Crimean Front, some 296,000 strong, lost more than 162,000 men irrecoverably (killed, captured or missing) from 8 May and was driven from the Kerch Peninsula entirely. On 4 June 1942, Stalin demoted Mekhlis two ranks to Corps Commissar and dismissed him as Deputy Defence Commissar and head of the Political Directorate. The cipher telegrams Mekhlis wrote in his own distinctive hand recorded everyone else's failures. But never once his own.

The Stavka directive of 4 June named as the first cause of the defeat the "complete failure to understand the nature of modern war" shown by the front command (Kozlov, military council member Shamanin and chief of staff Vechny), by the Stavka representative Mekhlis, and by the army commanders Chernyak of the 44th and Kolganov of the 47th: divisions strung out in a single line with no reserves, and command posts left so long in the same place that the first air raid destroyed them and cut communications. The second cause was a "bureaucratic and paper" method of command. "Comrades Kozlov and Mekhlis believed that their main task was to issue an order," the directive said, and in the critical days the two of them sat through long, fruitless sessions of the military council instead of going to the army commanders in person. The third was indiscipline: failing to carry out the Stavka's withdrawal order in time.

Vasilevsky quoted the directive at length and wrote that the Stavka concluded the leadership of Kozlov, Shamanin, Vechny and Mekhlis had been "clearly incompetent". His account, however, follows a Stavka verdict that bound the whole command together, and how the blame divides between Mekhlis and Kozlov differs from one participant and memoir to the next. Writing about the 1944 liberation of Crimea, Vasilevsky held that the system of Stavka representatives had proved itself and that the question was only whether a given person was prepared for the task, citing Mekhlis at Kerch as the case in point.