The Making of Japanese Militarism: From the Manchurian Incident to Total Mobilization
How did the Japan of the 1920s, with party cabinets, trade unions and academic freedom, turn within fifteen years into a mobilization regime led by the army and the bureaucracy, and what paths did the labour and socialist movements take in the face of it?
After the Manchurian Incident of 1931, assassinations and coup attempts such as the May 15 and February 26 Incidents ended party government in Japan, and the Takigawa and Emperor Organ Theory Incidents silenced the universities and constitutional scholarship. Once the war with China began, the Popular Front arrests swept up the legal left, and in 1938 the National Mobilization Law put working conditions and disputes under control by ordinance. In 1940 the parties and unions dissolved into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association, and colonial Korea was bound to the system through the name-change policy and forced mobilization.
Out of what crisis did Japanese militarism grow?
The world depression that began in the United States in October 1929 reached Japan the following year and produced the Shōwa depression of 1930 and 1931. It coincided with the Rikken Minseitō cabinet of Hamaguchi Osachi, which made the former Bank of Japan governor Inoue Junnosuke finance minister and pushed through the lifting of the gold embargo (a return to the gold standard) and fiscal austerity, so the economy sank into deep deflation. The countryside was hit hardest: raw silk exports to the United States collapsed, and the rice price fell under a good harvest in 1930 and rice shipped in from Korea and Taiwan. 1 2
Japan was then in its era of party cabinets, in which the majority party in the House of Representatives formed the government. But the two parties, the Rikken Seiyūkai and the Rikken Minseitō, were attacked as creatures of the zaibatsu, and young army officers and civilian ultranationalists blamed rural poverty on a "privileged class" that deceived the emperor and exploited the people. On the model of the Meiji Restoration they called for a "Shōwa Restoration" that would strike down the "evil advisers around the throne" and return to rule centred on the emperor; their scripture was Kita Ikki's Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan. 3 4
Disarmament fed the fire. Overriding the opposition Seiyūkai and navy hardliners, the Hamaguchi cabinet concluded the London Naval Treaty in 1930, and its opponents charged that it had infringed the emperor's prerogative of supreme command. On 14 November 1930 Hamaguchi was shot inside Tokyo Station by a member of the ultranationalist Aikokusha, and he died the following August of the unhealed wound. In March and October 1931 the Sakurakai, a society of mid-ranking army officers, plotted coups with civilian ultranationalists such as Ōkawa Shūmei, and both were called off (the March and October Incidents); the ringleader Hashimoto Kingorō got twenty days' strict confinement and a transfer. 5 2 6 7
How did the Manchurian Incident change politics at home?
On the night of 18 September 1931 a section of the South Manchuria Railway was blown up at Liutiaohu, outside Mukden (now Shenyang) in north-east China. The charge was set off by an officer of the Kwantung Army, the Japanese army garrison in Manchuria, and it was so weak that it did not even cut the line. The Kwantung Army blamed the Chinese and occupied all of Manchuria; the plan was the work of its staff officers Itagaki Seishirō and Ishiwara Kanji. The government in Tokyo, the second Wakatsuki cabinet, at first announced that it would not let the conflict spread, and then ratified each extension of the front after the fact. 8 9 7
On 1 March 1932 the Kwantung Army set up Manchukuo with the last Qing emperor, Puyi, as its figurehead. When the League of Nations assembly adopted the report of its Lytton Commission on 24 February 1933, the Japanese delegation walked out, and on 27 March Japan gave notice of withdrawal from the League. The incident set the precedent that the army could start a war without government approval and be hailed rather than punished, and at home it brought in the language of a "time of emergency" in which the army became hard to criticise. 9 8 10
How did assassination end party government?
In February and March 1932 young followers of the Nichiren activist Inoue Nisshō, the "League of Blood," shot dead the former finance minister Inoue Junnosuke and Dan Takuma, head of the Mitsui combine (the League of Blood Incident). Three months later, on 15 May, young naval officers and army cadets allied with the League's surviving civilians attacked the prime minister's residence, the Seiyūkai headquarters, the Metropolitan Police Board and the Bank of Japan. At the residence they shot Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, president of the Seiyūkai (the May 15 Incident). 11 12 13 14
The trials came to resemble a judgment on the victims rather than on the killers. A nationwide petition movement for clemency arose; ultranationalist political groups held rallies, and youth associations and companies gathered signatures. In November 1933 the naval court-martial sentenced the ringleaders Koga Kiyoshi and Mikami Taku to fifteen years' imprisonment, far below what the prosecution had asked, in a judgment that praised the defendants' "patriotic intent." After the incident the elder statesman Saionji Kinmochi gave up on a party cabinet in order to hold the army in check and recommended the retired admiral Saitō Makoto as prime minister. With the "national unity" cabinets of Saitō and then Okada Keisuke, the era of party cabinets was in effect over. 13 12 15
How were the universities and constitutional scholarship silenced?
When judges and court staff named as communists or sympathisers were arrested in 1933, the "Reddening of the Judiciary" affair, Minoda Muneki of the ultranationalist Genri Nippon society and the peer Kikuchi Takeo demanded the expulsion of the "red professors" of the imperial universities' law faculties. Their target, the criminal-law scholar Takigawa Yukitoki of Kyoto Imperial University, had his books banned, and Education Minister Hatoyama Ichirō of the Saitō cabinet demanded his dismissal. When the university refused, the ministry suspended Takigawa on 26 May under the civil service status ordinance; every teacher of the law faculty, from its thirty-one professors down to the assistants, handed in a resignation in protest, but the other faculties and the university administration did not follow (the Takigawa Incident). 16 17
On 18 February 1935 Kikuchi Takeo told the House of Peers that the constitutional scholar Minobe Tatsukichi's emperor organ theory was "slow-motion treason" and called Minobe a "bandit of learning." The theory held that sovereignty belonged to the state as a legal person and that the emperor exercised it as the state's highest organ, with the advice of his ministers; since the Taishō era it had been the accepted reading of the constitution. Minobe explained it calmly in a "personal vindication" speech on 25 February, but the army, the ultranationalists and the opposition Seiyūkai widened the attack as a weapon against the Okada cabinet, and three of Minobe's books, including his Outline of the Constitution, were banned. On 3 August and 15 October the Okada cabinet issued two "Statements on the Clarification of the National Polity" declaring that sovereignty resided in the emperor and that the organ theory must be "eradicated" (the Emperor Organ Theory Incident). 18 19 20
In 1937 the Ministry of Education published Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Polity) and sent it to the schools. It opened by defining the national polity: "The Great Japanese Empire is reigned over eternally by an emperor of a line unbroken for ages eternal, in obedience to the oracle of the imperial ancestor; this is our national polity, unchanging for all time," and it declared not only communism and anarchism but democracy and liberalism contrary to that polity. Just after the war with China began that year, Yanaihara Tadao, scholar of colonial policy at Tokyo Imperial University, wrote in Chūō Kōron in "The Ideal of the State" that the ideal a state must serve is justice, the protection of the weak against the encroachment of the strong; after attacks from inside and outside the university he was forced out of his chair in December (the Yanaihara Incident). 21 22 23 24
How did the army's factional struggle explode in the February 26 Incident?
Two currents faced each other in the army of the 1930s. The Kōdōha, or Imperial Way Faction, which looked to Araki Sadao and Masaki Jinzaburō, was influenced by Kita Ikki, dreamed of reorganising the state under direct imperial rule (the Shōwa Restoration) and aimed at a showdown with the Soviet Union; the young captains and lieutenants beneath it did not shrink from direct action. The staff officers around Nagata Tetsuzan and Tōjō Hideki were called the Tōseiha, or Control Faction: instead of a coup they would build a "high national-defence state" fit for total war by the legal path of pressing their demands on politics through the army minister. Nagata himself claimed that the army had only the Kōdōha and no such faction as a "Tōseiha." 25 26 27 28
When the Kōdōha's inspector-general of military education, Masaki, was removed in July 1935, Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa Saburō, a Kōdōha officer, cut down the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Nagata, with his sword in Nagata's office at the War Ministry on 12 August (the Aizawa Incident). At dawn on 26 February the following year young Kōdōha officers rose with 1,483 NCOs and men, killed Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saitō Makoto, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo and Inspector-General of Military Education Watanabe Jōtarō, badly wounded Grand Chamberlain Suzuki Kantarō, and occupied the area of the prime minister's residence, the War Ministry and the Metropolitan Police Board. Prime Minister Okada Keisuke survived by hiding in his residence. The rebel officers appealed for the realisation of the "Shōwa Restoration," but Emperor Hirohito ordered them suppressed, and on the 29th most of their men, surrounded by martial-law troops, returned to their units. 29 3 4 30
Closed courts-martial executed nineteen of the rising's leaders and imprisoned forty. The civilians who had given the officers their ideas, Kita Ikki and Nishida Mitsugi, were sentenced to death as the men "behind" the rising and executed on 19 August 1937. The Kōdōha lost its place in the army, but the army, its infighting settled, tightened its grip on the civilian government. Under the next cabinet, Hirota Kōki's, the rule that only active-duty officers could serve as army and navy ministers was restored, which let the services bring down a cabinet simply by refusing to name a minister. On 7 May 1936 the Minseitō deputy Saitō Takao gave his "army purge speech" in the House of Representatives, an hour and twenty-five minutes long, condemning soldiers' meddling in politics and the politicians who leaned on them. 4 3 31 32
How did the labour, peasant and socialist movements collapse as war came?
Even on the road to militarism the labour movement did not vanish at once. In August 1936, when the martial law imposed after the February 26 Incident was lifted, four unions of the legal left, among them the National Council of Japanese Labour Unions (Zenhyō), proposed an "anti-fascist united front" to the Social Masses Party (Shakai Taishūtō), the main proletarian party. In the first half of 1937 labour disputes reached their pre-war peak in both number and participants, and in the April general election the proletarian parties won just over 1.01 million votes, making the Social Masses Party the third party in the lower house (the Labour Year Book gives it 37 seats, other accounts of the party 36). Yet only 5.6 per cent of workers were unionised, and the Japanese Communist Party had already lost its central leadership by about 1935. 33 34
When the Seventh Congress of the Comintern switched to the anti-fascist united front in 1935, Nosaka Sanzō and Yamamoto Kenzō passed the new line on in February 1936 in a "Letter to the Japanese Communists." The special higher police and the thought prosecutors tied the anti-fascist mood that had risen after the February 26 Incident to this popular-front tactic and made it a new target. At dawn on 15 December 1937 police in eighteen prefectures arrested 466 leaders and scholars of the Japan Proletarian Party, whose chairman was Katō Kanjū, of Zenhyō and of the National Farmers' Union; on the 22nd the party and Zenhyō were banned and dissolved. On 1 February 1938 a further thirty-eight, the "professors' group" including Ōuchi Hyōe, Arisawa Hiromi and Uno Kōzō, were arrested (the Popular Front Incident). It extended punishment to Marxists and socialists who had nothing to do with the Communist Party by a broad reading of the Peace Preservation Law's offence of "furthering the aims" of a banned association. 35 33
The mainstream of social democracy chose a different road. The Social Masses Party and the All-Japan General Federation of Labour (Zensō) under its influence rejected Zenhyō's offer of a common struggle, and the Japan Trade Union Congress declared, of the popular-front arrests, that "tendencies contrary to the national standpoint" must be suppressed. After the war with China began in July 1937, disputes fell sharply, and at its October congress Zensō pledged "service to the nation through labour" and the extinction of strikes. At its November congress the Social Masses Party called the war with China a "holy war" and, invoking the trinity of state, nation and class, turned to national socialism. The special edition of the Labour Year Book judged that the unions' function had thereby "almost stopped." 33 34
How did the National Mobilization Law bind labour and daily life?
As the war in China dragged on, the first cabinet of Konoe Fumimaro laid the National Mobilization Bill before the Imperial Diet in February 1938. Article 1 defined national mobilization as "the control and use of human and material resources so that the whole strength of the nation is exerted most effectively for the attainment of the aims of national defence in time of war (including incidents equivalent to war)." The law did not say what would be controlled and left everything to imperial ordinances, so it was attacked as a blank cheque that stripped the Diet of its legislative power. Business and the parties protested that it was a "socialistic" law restricting private property without statute, and during the committee hearing on 3 March Lieutenant Colonel Satō Kenryō of the War Ministry shouted "Shut up!" at questioning deputies. But the established parties, afraid of a Konoe new party and a dissolution election, gave way; the law was promulgated on 1 April and took effect on 5 May. 36 37 38
For workers the law meant the loss of the right to dispute. Article 4 let the government, by ordinance, "conscript imperial subjects and set them to work in mobilization services"; Article 6 allowed orders on hiring, dismissal, wages and other conditions of work; and Article 7 allowed "orders necessary for the prevention or settlement of labour disputes" and "the restriction or prohibition of the closing of workplaces, the stopping of work or labour, and other acts relating to labour disputes." The National Service Draft Ordinance followed on 8 July 1939, and with each revision of the law, in 1939, 1941 and 1944, the scope of control widened. The Minseitō deputy Saitō Takao questioned the aims of the war with China in his "anti-military speech" in the House of Representatives on 2 February 1940; on 7 March an overwhelming majority expelled him from the House, with only seven votes against. 37 36 39
In the countryside, too, the war changed the relation between landlord and tenant. The peasant movement, which had led tenancy disputes in villages ruined by the Shōwa depression, was badly broken when leaders of the National Farmers' Union were arrested in the Popular Front roundup at the end of 1937. In the account of the Ōhara Institute for Social Research, after the war with China, and especially after the Pacific War began, government tenancy policy went beyond mediating between landlords and tenants to keep "peace in the village" and took as its new aim securing the food production the war absolutely required. To keep the peasants, as soldiers and as food producers, from dwindling, the government strengthened tenancy mediation, promoted the creation of owner-farmers and reached out to control land prices and rents. Yet it was a "two-sided policy": wary of any denial of parasitic landlordism itself, it leaned toward protecting tenants while meeting the peasants' class-struggle stance with repression and co-optation. 40 35 1
What did the New Order Movement and the Industrial Patriotic Association build?
Around June 1940 a "New Order" movement arose around Konoe Fumimaro to create a one-party national organisation modelled on the Nazi Party in Germany and the Fascist Party in Italy. Politicians of the established parties hurried to join, crying "Don't miss the bus," and Kido Kōichi, soon to be Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, drew up with Konoe and Arima Yoriyasu a "memorandum on the founding of a new party" to push the movement forward. The Social Masses Party dissolved first, in July, the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō followed, and on 12 October 1940 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was launched. But criticism that a single party was unconstitutional, and its own internal rifts, left the association an auxiliary organ of government rather than a party. 41 42 43 34 44
On the labour side the "industrial patriotic service" movement had already begun to take the unions' place. The Industrial Patriotic League was founded in August 1938, and industrial patriotic associations were formed factory by factory under the guidance of the special higher police section chief of each prefectural police department. Their prototype was schemes such as the Aichi prefectural police's "plan for organising labour-capital harmony" (1938), in which employer and workers' representatives would affirm "labour and capital as one body" in councils and head off disputes inside the factory. The last surviving union of the right, the Japanese Federation of Labour (Sōdōmei), dissolved by a statement of its central committee dated 8 July 1940. A passage of that statement whose publication the police forbade read: "The government authorities would not recognise our policy; regarding our very existence as a great obstacle to the patriotic service movement, they took up a policy of destroying the labour unions." By the end of 1940 the unionisation rate had fallen from 4.9 per cent a year earlier to 0.12 per cent. 45 46 47 48
On 23 November 1940 the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association (Dai Nippon Sangyō Hōkokukai, or Sanpō) was founded at the Military Hall in Kudan, Tokyo. Its president was the welfare minister, and the first article of its programme read: "We pledge to be thoroughly true to the essence of the national polity, to realise the patriotic service of all industry as one body, and so to assist the imperial destiny." Sanpō organised 5.5 million workers; the special edition of the Labour Year Book published by the Ōhara Institute for Social Research in 1965 judged that it bore no resemblance to a trade union and was a vast bureaucratic machine of wartime mobilization and repression ruled by the Home and Welfare Ministries. In May 1942 Sanpō was placed under the supervision of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Matsuoka Komakichi, president of Sōdōmei, had opposed the industrial patriotic movement because it would mean the liquidation of the unions, but many union officials moved into posts in Sanpō. 49 45 48
Where did colonial Korea stand in the mobilization system?
The National Mobilization Law took effect on 5 May 1938 in Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) as well as in Japan proper. Its subjects of mobilization were "imperial subjects," and the ordinances based on its Articles 4 to 6, the National Service Draft Ordinance among them, were enacted in Japan and then applied to Korea. The Government-General of Korea pursued a policy of "imperialisation" that forced Japanese language, shrine worship and the identity of "imperial subjects" on Koreans, and from 11 February 1940 it carried out the name-change policy (sōshi-kaimei) that made Koreans create and register a Japanese-style family name. About 80 per cent of all households in Korea registered a name within the deadline, against 14.2 per cent of Koreans living in Japan proper. 37 50 51 52
Koreans were mobilized as labourers, soldiers, civilian employees of the military and "comfort women" for the Japanese army. On the basis of the Japanese government's official statistics, the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture puts the mobilization, excluding the "comfort women," at 7,804,376 person-times, and those taken outside the peninsula who died or went missing at about 270,000. Labour mobilization statistics compiled in the Japanese Wikipedia give about 3,447,000 person-times inside the peninsula and about 538,000 to "Japan proper" (including Karafuto) and the South Seas, and the debate over the figures continues. As early as 1930 some 300,000 Koreans lived in Japan, doing the lowest work on construction sites, in mines and in factories. 50 53
Did resistance and repression continue under the war?
In March 1941 the Peace Preservation Law was rewritten from seven articles into sixty-five. The new law let the authorities hold even a political prisoner who had served his sentence in a preventive detention centre if the risk of reoffending was judged "marked" (for two years, renewable), and allowed defence counsel to be chosen only from lawyers designated in advance by the justice minister. In October 1941 Richard Sorge, who had run a Soviet intelligence network in Tokyo under cover as a German newspaper correspondent, and Ozaki Hotsumi, a former Asahi Shimbun journalist who had advised the Konoe cabinet, were arrested (the Sorge Incident); both were executed in 1944. 54 55 56
Workers' resistance did not stop either. Government statistics record 1,303 labour disputes with 53,443 participants from 1941 to 1944, and 382 workers took part in disputes even between January and July 1945. A Labour Ministry analysis of 1950 noted that while the number of disputes fell during the war, the share that went on to strikes and other dispute actions rose, from 37.0 per cent in 1940 to 73.0 per cent in 1944. In the press, Ishibashi Tanzan's Tōyō Keizai Shinpō kept up a line warning against a long war from the start of the war with China to the defeat, and for that it was watched by the government and the Home Ministry and had its rations of paper and ink sharply cut. 57 58
After the defeat of August 1945 the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association dissolved in September, and in October the Peace Preservation Law was abolished on the orders of the Allied headquarters. The special edition of the Labour Year Book concluded that in the decade from about 1935 to the summer of 1945, while the peoples of Europe and Asia were building united fronts, the Japanese labour movement fell far back without overcoming its sectarianism to unite, and that this gap had a negative effect on the movement's fresh start after the war. 45 54 47
Can this system be called fascism?
What to call the Japanese system of these years is still disputed. The political scientist Maruyama Masao called it "emperor-system fascism," a state that combined political, moral and spiritual authority and recognised no external limit on its own power. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association is commonly classed as a para-fascist organisation, and the English Wikipedia notes that it was modelled on the mass parties of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy but differed in being built from the top by the government and the elites rather than from below. Other scholars, such as Kevin Doak and Reto Hofmann, stress how Japanese statism differed from European fascism and root it in the distinctive features of the Japanese state, the imperial tradition and the idea of kokutai. 10 43
Whichever view one takes, the change of 1931 to 1945 was not a single coup but a layered process. Coups from below such as the February 26 Incident failed, but the army centre, the bureaucracy and the established parties that put them down went on to disable the Diet, the universities and the labour unions one after another by statute, ordinance and the name of the kokutai. The statements on the clarification of the national polity that drove out Minobe's constitutional scholarship are judged to have openly repudiated the constitutionalist principle of government under the Meiji constitution, and the Home Ministry itself described the replacement of the unions by the Industrial Patriotic Association as "epoch-making in the history of our country's labour movement." 19 47 4
Consequences
By the defeat of August 1945 Japan had no independent unions or parties left. After the defeat the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association dissolved in September, and in October the Peace Preservation Law was abolished on the orders of the Allied headquarters. The special edition of the Labour Year Book judged that the gap of the decade from about 1935 left a negative mark on the labour movement's fresh start after the war.
Timeline & Map
- 11930.11.14Prime Minister Hamaguchi shot
Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, who had concluded the London Naval Treaty, was shot and badly wounded inside Tokyo Station by a member of the ultranationalist Aikokusha. He died the following August.
- 21931.09.18Liutiaohu bombing opens the Manchurian Incident
A Kwantung Army officer blew up a section of the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu outside Mukden, and the Kwantung Army, blaming the Chinese, set out to occupy Manchuria.
- 1932.03.01Manchukuo proclaimed
The Kwantung Army had Manchukuo proclaimed with the last Qing emperor, Puyi, as its figurehead.
- 31932.05.15May 15 Incident
Young naval officers and army cadets attacked the prime minister's residence and other targets and shot Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, president of the Seiyūkai.
- 1933.03.27Notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations
After the League assembly adopted the Lytton Report, the Japanese government gave notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- 41933.05.26Takigawa suspended
The Ministry of Education suspended Professor Takigawa Yukitoki of the Kyoto Imperial University law faculty under the civil service status ordinance, and every teacher of the faculty handed in a resignation.
- 51935.02.18Kikuchi Takeo attacks the emperor organ theory
In the House of Peers, Kikuchi Takeo called Minobe Tatsukichi's emperor organ theory "slow-motion treason" and denounced Minobe.
- 1935.08.03First statement on clarifying the national polity
The Okada Keisuke cabinet issued a government statement that sovereignty resided in the emperor and that the organ theory was contrary to the national polity. A second statement followed on 15 October.
- 61935.08.12Aizawa Incident
Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa Saburō, a Kōdōha officer, cut down Nagata Tetsuzan, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, with his sword at the War Ministry.
- 71936.02.26–
29 February 26 IncidentYoung Kōdōha officers rose with 1,483 NCOs and men, killed Saitō Makoto, Takahashi Korekiyo and Watanabe Jōtarō, and occupied the Nagatachō area of Tokyo.
- 81936.05.07Saitō Takao's army purge speech
The Minseitō deputy Saitō Takao spoke for an hour and twenty-five minutes in the House of Representatives against soldiers' meddling in politics.
- 1937.12.04Yanaihara Tadao leaves his chair
Yanaihara Tadao of Tokyo Imperial University, attacked over essays such as "The Ideal of the State," resigned on the 1st and left the university on this day.
- 1937.12.15First Popular Front arrests
Police in eighteen prefectures arrested 466 leaders and scholars of the Japan Proletarian Party, Zenhyō and the National Farmers' Union.
- 1938.04.01National Mobilization Law promulgated
The National Mobilization Law put forward by the first Konoe cabinet was promulgated as Law No. 55. It took effect on 5 May in Japan proper, Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto.
- 1939.07.08National Service Draft Ordinance
The National Service Draft Ordinance was issued as an imperial ordinance under Article 4 of the National Mobilization Law.
- 91940.02.11Name-change policy begins in Korea
The Government-General of Korea began accepting registrations of Japanese-style family names from Koreans.
- 101940.03.07Saitō Takao expelled
The House of Representatives expelled Saitō Takao by an overwhelming majority for his "anti-military speech" of 2 February questioning the aims of the war with China; seven members voted against.
- 1940.07.08Sōdōmei dissolution statement
The central committee of Sōdōmei, the last surviving union of the right, issued its statement dissolving the organisation.
- 1940.10.12Imperial Rule Assistance Association launched
The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was launched with Konoe Fumimaro as president.
- 111940.11.23Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association founded
The Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association held its founding meeting and commemorative rally at the Military Hall in Kudan, Tokyo.
- 1941.03.10Peace Preservation Law rewritten
The Peace Preservation Law was rewritten from seven articles into sixty-five, introducing preventive detention.
- 121941.10.18Sorge arrested
Richard Sorge, head of a Soviet intelligence network, was arrested in Tokyo; Ozaki Hotsumi had been arrested four days earlier.
- 1945.09Industrial Patriotic Association dissolved
After the defeat the Greater Japan Industrial Patriotic Association dissolved.
Related people 33
Leadership4
Prime minister whose cabinet issued the statements on the national polity; survived the February 26 Incident by hiding in his residence.
EmperorHirohito1901–1989Ordered the suppression of the rebels in the February 26 Incident.
Prime minister, centre of the New OrderFumimaro Konoe1891–1945Prime minister whose cabinet put forward the National Mobilization Law; centre of the New Order Movement and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.
Tōseiha officer and prime ministerHideki Tojo1884–1948A central figure of the Tōseiha with Nagata; became prime minister in 1941.
Implementers & commanders4
Planned the Liutiaohu bombing and the occupation of Manchuria with Ishiwara Kanji.
Kwantung Army staff officerKanji Ishiwara1889–1949Planned the Manchurian Incident with Itagaki Seishirō.
Nagata's killerSaburō Aizawa1889–1936Kōdōha officer who killed Nagata Tetsuzan in 1935 and was executed in 1936.
Education Minister (Saitō cabinet)Ichiro Hatoyama1883–1959Demanded Takigawa Yukitoki's dismissal in 1933, setting off the Takigawa Incident.
Participants9
Took part with Sakurakai officers in the coup plans of the March and October Incidents.
Leader of the KōdōhaSadao Araki1877–1966As army minister he was looked up to as head of the Kōdōha.
Ideological mentor of the young officersIkki Kita1883–1937Author of the Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan; executed as a man behind the February 26 Incident.
Link to the young officersMitsugi Nishida1901–1937Guided the young officers with Kita Ikki; executed in 1937 as a man behind the February 26 Incident.
Japanese Communist leader abroadSanzo Nosaka1892–1993With Yamamoto Kenzō, sent the popular-front line home in the 1936 "Letter to the Japanese Communists."
Planner of the New Order, Lord Keeper of the Privy SealKōichi Kido1889–1977Drew up the new-party memorandum with Konoe; as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal he recommended Tōjō Hideki as prime minister in 1941.
Prime minister (1936-1937)Kōki Hirota1878–1948After the February 26 Incident his cabinet restored the rule that only serving officers could be army and navy ministers, giving the military a way to bring down cabinets.
Last of the genrōKinmochi Saionji1849–1940After the May 15 Incident he gave up on party cabinets and recommended Saitō Makoto as prime minister.
Prime minister (1931)Reijiro Wakatsuki1866–1949His second cabinet promised not to widen the Manchurian Incident but went on to approve the army's escalation.
Opposition & resistance2
Criticised the army's meddling in politics in his 1936 purge speech; expelled from the House for his 1940 anti-military speech.
Economic journalist who warned against a long warTanzan Ishibashi1884–1973As head of the Tōyō Keizai Shinpō he kept up a line warning against a long war from the start of the war with China to the defeat.
Targets & victims14
Minseitō prime minister who pushed through the London Naval Treaty and the lifting of the gold embargo; shot at Tokyo Station in 1930, he died the following year.
Assassinated prime ministerTsuyoshi Inukai1855–1932President of the Seiyūkai and prime minister, shot in his residence in the May 15 Incident.
National-unity prime minister, killed on 26 February 1936Makoto Saitō1858–1936Became prime minister on Saionji's recommendation after the May 15 Incident; killed as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in the February 26 Incident.
Suspended criminal-law scholarYukitoki Takigawa1891–1962Law professor at Kyoto Imperial University; his books were banned and he was suspended in 1933.
Constitutional scholar of the organ theoryTatsukichi Minobe1873–1948Attacked in the House of Peers in 1935 as a "bandit of learning"; his books were banned and he resigned his seat.
Leading Tōseiha officer, killed by AizawaTetsuzan Nagata1884–1935Chief of the War Ministry's Military Affairs Bureau; killed in his office by Aizawa Saburō in 1935.
Finance minister, killed on 26 February 1936Korekiyo Takahashi1854–1936Finance minister, killed by the rebels.
Grand Chamberlain, badly wounded on 26 February 1936Kantaro Suzuki1868–1948Badly wounded by the rebels.
Colonial-policy scholar forced outTadao Yanaihara1893–1961Attacked over "The Ideal of the State" and other writings, he left Tokyo Imperial University in 1937.
President of the dissolved SōdōmeiKomakichi Matsuoka1888–1958Opposed the industrial patriotic movement but dissolved Sōdōmei in 1940 under police pressure.
Japanese member of the Sorge ringHotsumi Ozaki1901–1944An adviser to the Konoe cabinet, arrested in 1941 and executed in 1944.
Head of the Soviet spy ringRichard Sorge1895–1944Arrested in Tokyo in 1941 and executed in 1944.
Arrested in the Popular Front IncidentKōzō Uno1897–1977Arrested in February 1938 with Ōuchi Hyōe, Arisawa Hiromi and the rest of the "professors' group."
Chairman of the Japan Proletarian PartyKanju Kato1892–1978He was jailed in the Popular Front arrests of December 1937, and the party was dissolved by a ban.
Related terms
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