Operation Uranus
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Operation Uranus was a Soviet strategic counteroffensive that began on 19 November 1942 by breaking through the flanks of German and allied Axis forces around Stalingrad. The Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts struck towards Kalach from north-west and south of the city, supported by the Don Front, with the Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky coordinating all three. Soviet spearheads linked near Kalach on 23 November, encircling the main Axis grouping in the Stalingrad area and shifting the initiative to the Soviet side.
In depth
Character of the operation
The Soviet high command planned more than a relief attack for the forces holding the city. It sought a deep penetration against the flanks and rear of the main Axis grouping, with the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts delivering the principal blows and the Don Front supporting them; Stavka approved the plan on 13 November 1942.
How did the idea of a counteroffensive arise?
In September 1942 the German 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army were packed into a narrow sector, trying to take the city of Stalingrad, while Romanian troops held their flanks. Vasilevsky, then Chief of the General Staff, wrote in his memoir A Lifelong Cause that with the enemy drawn deep into street fighting and without reserves, a counteroffensive suggested itself. According to him the decision was taken in mid-September after an exchange of views between Stalin, Zhukov (Deputy Supreme Commander) and himself. The Russian Wikipedia dates the decision in principle to Stalin's meeting with Zhukov and Vasilevsky on 13 September and names Colonel M. M. Potapov of the General Staff's Operations Directorate as the author of the concept. Accounts thus differ on who first proposed it.
Zhukov's memoir Reminiscences and Reflections, the original source of the scene, spreads it over two days. On 12 September Zhukov flew to Moscow from north of Stalingrad and reported that the forces at hand could not cut the German corridor and that at least one more army, a tank corps, three tank brigades, 400 howitzers and an air army were needed. While Stalin studied his map of the reserves, Zhukov and Vasilevsky stepped away from the table and said quietly that some "other solution" had to be found; Stalin looked up, asked what "other" solution they meant, and told them to work it out at the General Staff and come back the next evening. At 10 p.m. on the 13th the two proposed to keep wearing the enemy down by active defence while preparing a counteroffensive that would strike the flanks held by the Romanians, with a new front formed near Serafimovich to hit the enemy's rear. Zhukov said it could be prepared in 45 days. When Stalin asked whether it would be better to strike north and south along the Don, they answered that the German armoured divisions could then turn quickly to meet the blows, whereas west of the Don the river would hamper the enemy's manoeuvre. Stalin said the plan needed more thought, that for now the main task was to hold the city, and that no one but the three of them was to know about it.
The core of the concept was to strike at the same time from the Serafimovich area north-west of the city and from the narrow passage between Lakes Tsatsa and Barmantsak to the south, converging on Kalach west of the city. Where the two blows met, the main forces of the 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army, tied down in the city, would be trapped. Until then the defence inside the city was to be kept up to wear the enemy down and stop him from advancing north along the Volga.
Vasilevsky writes that the State Defense Committee and the Stavka made preparing this counteroffensive the country's most important task until the end of 1942. Stalin imposed strict secrecy: not even members of the GKO were to be told, and each front commander was to learn only what concerned him directly. After the preliminary decision Zhukov went to the Stalingrad Front and Vasilevsky to the South-Eastern Front to study the directions of attack, work finished by the end of September; in September, too, the main provisions of the plan, named "Uranus" (Уран), were approved by the Stavka and the GKO. The detailed planning was handed to the General Staff, which drew in the commanders of the arms, the Chief of the Rear Khrulev and the head of the Main Artillery Directorate Yakovlev. From early October the front staffs submitted their own proposals.
What did each of the three fronts do?
The operation was carried out by three fronts directly subordinate to the Stavka. The newly formed Southwestern Front (commander Vatutin) delivered the main blow from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don, south-west of Serafimovich and at Kletskaya. It received the 63rd and 21st Armies from the Don Front and the newly arrived 5th Tank Army under Prokofy Romanenko; to keep the secret, its creation was formalised only on 25 October. The Don Front (the former Stalingrad Front, commander Rokossovsky) held the line from Kletskaya to Yerzovka near the Volga and delivered two supporting attacks. The Stalingrad Front (the former South-Eastern Front, commander Yeryomenko, with Khrushchev on its military council) delivered the main blow from the passage between the lakes south of the city.
The decisive role was given to tank and mechanised troops. According to Vasilevsky, four tank corps and two mechanised corps were sent from the Stavka reserve, raising the tanks of the three fronts to 900, and artillery and aviation were greatly reinforced. According to the Russian Wikipedia, by weakening secondary sectors the attackers created a superiority of 2.8 to 3.2 times on the breakthrough sectors. On the ground, Zhukov supervised the preparation of the Southwestern and Don Fronts and Vasilevsky that of the Stalingrad Front.
How were the forces gathered and hidden?
A special directive of the General Staff banned all correspondence and telephone conversations about the counteroffensive; orders were given orally and only to those who would carry them out. Troops from the Stavka reserve were concentrated and regrouped only at night. Vasilevsky notes that as late as early November German intelligence expected the main Soviet blow in the centre, towards Smolensk, and only on 12 November predicted an attack on the Romanian 3rd Army, without determining its strength. Autumn mud and the lack of railways meant that troops and supplies had to be ferried across the Volga and the Don.
On 3, 4 and 10 November Zhukov and Vasilevsky held final review meetings with the commanders of the fronts and armies down to division level. On 13 November they reported the plan to a session of the Politburo and the Stavka: the German grouping was unchanged, Romanians still held the flanks, and while overall forces were roughly equal, a clear superiority had been created on the axes of attack. The attack was set for 19 November on the Southwestern and Don Fronts and 20 November on the Stalingrad Front, with the mobile corps of the two fronts expected to meet near Kalach on the third or fourth day. After the session Zhukov left to prepare a diversionary operation on the Kalinin and Western Fronts, and the Stavka charged Vasilevsky with coordinating all three fronts.
One episode came just before the attack. On 17 November Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanised Corps that was central to the southern blow, wrote to Stalin that the operation would fail and should be postponed or cancelled. According to Vasilevsky's memoir he was summoned to Moscow on the 18th and said there were no grounds for delay; Stalin spoke to Volsky by telephone and left him in command.
What happened between 19 and 23 November?
On the morning of 19 November the Southwestern Front and the right wing of the Don Front attacked after an artillery preparation. Thick fog and snow ruled out aviation and reduced the effect of the guns. When some divisions of the 5th Tank Army advanced slowly, Vatutin at once committed the 1st and 26th Tank Corps, which broke through the Romanian defences and advanced 20 km that day. The 4th Tank Corps (Kravchenko) with the 21st Army advanced 30 to 35 km. On 23 and 24 November two encircled Romanian groups surrendered, under Generals Lascăr (about 8,000 men) and Stănescu (about 21,000).
On 20 November the 51st and 57th Armies of the Stalingrad Front attacked the Romanian 4th Army from the south. Volsky's 4th Mechanised Corps advanced 20 km on the first day, and Vasilevsky reported its performance to Stalin specially. The Romanian VI Corps was broken by the evening of 22 November.
On the morning of 23 November the 26th Tank Corps took Kalach, and the same day the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanised Corps of the Stalingrad Front met near the village of Sovetsky, closing the ring between the Volga and the Don. The main forces of the German 6th Army and 4th Panzer Army, 22 divisions and 160 separate units, were trapped. Vasilevsky called it the first large encirclement German forces had suffered since the war began. By the evening of the 23rd, however, Soviet troops actually covered no more than 265 km of an outer front over 450 km long.
How large was the encircled force?
From 24 November Soviet troops tried to destroy the encircled enemy straight away and failed. Vasilevsky traced this to an error of calculation and admitted that "a serious mistake had been made". The fronts and the General Staff's intelligence put Paulus's encircled force at 85,000 to 90,000 men; in fact it numbered over 300,000. The reinforcements received during the advance and the anti-aircraft division, engineer, construction and police units caught in the pocket had not been counted. The Russian Wikipedia gives about 330,000 encircled, and 284,000 inside the pocket by 25 November.
On the morning of 24 November Hitler ordered Paulus, commander of the 6th Army, to stay in Stalingrad, relying on Göring's assurance that the Luftwaffe could supply the pocket by air. Soviet troops had to take units from the inner ring to hold the outer one, and by 1 December, on Vasilevsky's figures, 480,000 Soviet troops faced 330,000 Germans.
How did Operations Saturn and Little Saturn follow from Uranus?
On the evening of 23 November, as the ring closed, Stalin told Vasilevsky to prepare a new offensive by the Southwestern Front and the left wing of the Voronezh Front from the middle Don towards Millerovo and Rostov, to cut off the whole German southern wing. This was Operation Saturn (Сатурн). The Stavka approved the Saturn plan on 2 December and entrusted it to the Stavka representative Voronov, the Southwestern Front commander Vatutin and the 1st Guards Army commander V. I. Kuznetsov, while Vasilevsky was told to concentrate on destroying the pocket.
On 12 December, however, Manstein's Army Group Don attacked north from the Kotelnikovo area to relieve the 6th Army. The Stavka turned south the 2nd Guards Army (Malinovsky), which had been held back to crush the pocket, and on the night of 14 December postponed Operation Ring (Кольцо), the destruction of the pocket. The same night it recast Saturn: after breaking the Italian 8th Army, the blow was to turn not south to Rostov but south-east towards Morozovsk and Tormosin, into the rear of the relief force. This became Operation Little Saturn (Малый Сатурн), begun on 16 December. In his memoir Vasilevsky defends the change at length against writers who called it a mistake, arguing that it was forced by a situation changed by the failure to destroy the pocket quickly. He records that the Don Front commander Rokossovsky would tell him even after the war that sending the 2nd Guards Army south had been wrong.
Course and result
The offensive opened by rupturing Romanian defensive positions. Armoured and mechanized formations from the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts linked near Kalach on 23 November, closing the encirclement around an Axis grouping estimated at roughly 300,000 personnel. The surrounded forces held out until their surrender in February 1943, while Uranus transformed the course of the Battle of Stalingrad and the strategic balance on the Eastern Front.
The final destruction of the pocket began on 10 January 1943 with the Don Front's Operation Ring; a surrender ultimatum on 9 January had been rejected on Hitler's orders. On 26 January the pocket was split in two; on 31 January Paulus surrendered with the southern group, and on 2 February the northern group was finished, ending the Battle of Stalingrad. The Russian Wikipedia treats everything from 19 November to this date as one Stalingrad strategic offensive operation.