Partisanship in philosophy
철학의 당파성
Lenin's claim that there is no neutrality in philosophy and social theory, that every philosophy finally stands on the side of materialism or idealism, and that this fight expresses the interests of social classes. In his 1895 critique of Struve Lenin wrote that materialism includes "partisanship", and in Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909) he concluded that "the newest philosophy is as partisan as it was two thousand years ago". In the Soviet Union and China it widened into the demand that scholarship and art follow the party line. The point at issue is how objectivity of knowledge and taking sides can be reconciled.
In depth
Why suspect "neutrality"?
Suppose a newspaper writes of a labour dispute that "both sides have a point". It looks fair. But if the power to stop the strike is concentrated on one side, whose side does that neutrality favour? The discussion of partisanship extends this suspicion to philosophy and scholarship themselves. No knowledge stands outside society's struggles, it claims, and professing neutrality is often a way of taking one side.
"Partisanship" translates the Russian партийность (partiinost). The word has broad uses, reaching from belonging to a political party to standing on one side of a struggle. This entry centres on its meaning within philosophy and follows the process by which it later widened into party direction.
How did Lenin establish the term?
It begins in 1895, when the young Lenin criticized a book by the legal Marxist Pyotr Struve in "The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of It in Mr. Struve's Book". Against Struve's objectivism, after saying that a materialist would name the classes in question, he added: "On the other hand, materialism includes partisanship, so to speak, and obliges one in any assessment of an event to take up directly and openly the standpoint of a definite social group."
материализм включает в себя, так сказать, партийность, обязывая при всякой оценке события прямо и открыто становиться на точку зрения определенной общественной группы
So this speaks not only of the fact that knowledge stands on some side but of a duty to show it. The objectivist, speaking only of the necessity of the facts, easily slides into defending them, whereas the materialist follows through to the class antagonism producing them.
Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909) extended this to the whole history of philosophy. Empirio-criticism professed to rise above materialism and idealism. Lenin attacked the idea of scholarship being non-partisan in this fight as a cherished notion not only of Mach but of all bourgeois professors, countered that Marx and Engels were partisans in philosophy from start to finish, and in his conclusion wrote: "The newest philosophy is as partisan as it was two thousand years ago."
Новейшая философия так же партийна, как и две тысячи лет тому назад.
The contending parties are materialism and idealism, which puts the frame of the "Basic question of philosophy" into the language of struggle. Lenin did not call only his own side partisan. Of the idealist Eduard von Hartmann he wrote "this partisan, uncompromising idealist", adding that the non-partisan in philosophy are as hopeless blockheads as in politics. He ranked a consistently partisan enemy above halfway eclectics.
Did it mean rejecting the professors' scholarship?
No. Lenin said economics professors could do valuable factual research, yet could not be trusted on general theory, "for this general theory is as partisan a science in modern society as is the theory of knowledge." The Marxist's task, he wrote, is to take up and rework the achievements of these "clerks" while cutting off their reactionary tendency, and he even granted that new economic phenomena cannot be studied without their works.
This distinction fits with "Objective, relative and absolute truth". For Lenin partisanship and objectivity are not opposed: to side with materialism is to side with acknowledging objective truth, so taking sides turns out to be fidelity to the truth. This bold combination is both the concept's appeal and its difficulty.
Must one break at once with a comrade who differs on philosophy?
Lenin's own conduct says otherwise. He opposed Bogdanov's philosophy from the book of 1899 on, yet when he joined forces with him in the summer and autumn of 1904 they made a tacit bloc that set philosophy aside as "neutral ground". Opening the philosophical war in 1908, he said two things together in his letters to Gorky. "There cannot and will not be neutrality on such a question." And yet to obstruct the party's revolutionary tactics for the sake of quarrels over materialism or Machism would be "unforgivable stupidity". The fight over philosophy was to be conducted so that Proletary and the Bolshevik faction were not touched by it.
In his 1967 essay "Lunacharsky", Mikhail Lifshitz set this out as a distinction between two neutralities. One is neutrality about philosophy itself. Kautsky wrote to Plekhanov that the economic and historical outlook of Marx and Engels was "in the last resort compatible with neo-Kantianism", and Victor Adler put such questions "beyond all politics". Lifshitz counts this among the most negative traits of the parties of the Second International. The other is neutrality toward philosophical disputes in the organizational sphere, which under the right conditions is possible and even necessary.
Нейтральность в философии - нет, нейтральность к философским спорам в организационной области-да
The ground, he argues, lies in materialism itself. If social contradictions are reflected in clashes of ideas, and not the other way round, then false ideology is removed by practice and not by polemic alone. To turn partisanship into a purity test, cutting away whatever fails to match the formula, is sectarianism, a departure from materialism made in the name of its purity. Hence Lifshitz's claim that Plekhanov as a theorist was in a sense more uncompromising than Lenin, and his judgement that the so-called dogmatism of the 1930s and 1940s revived not Lenin's legacy but a schematized Plekhanovite understanding of dialectics.
This neutrality had a time limit. After 1909 Lenin saw no further possibility of reconciliation, and the Bogdanov group was driven out. The distinction above should also be read as an interpretation from within Soviet philosophy in the 1960s.
How did it widen into party direction?
On a line distinct from philosophical partisanship, Lenin wrote "Party Organization and Party Literature" in the 1905 revolution, asking how legalized Social Democratic publications were to serve the party. "Literary work must become a component of organized, planned, united Social Democratic party work." He also warned against believing in the absolute freedom of the bourgeois writer: "One cannot live in society and be free from society."
Литературное дело должно стать составной частью организованной, планомерной, объединенной социал-демократической партийной работы.
Lenin's article concerned the press of a voluntary association, the party. In the Soviet period it served as grounds for regulating the literature and scholarship of the whole country. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia stated that the Communist Party consistently upholds the principle of partiinost and that the bourgeoisie must wrap itself in the toga of non-partisanship to hide its self-seeking aims. Philosophy textbooks taught that a philosophical theory's partisanship is revealed in how it resolves the basic question. After the Deborin school was condemned for "Menshevizing idealism" in the early 1930s, partisanship became the demand for loyalty to the party line in all philosophical work and for struggle against bourgeois ideology. In the Zhdanov period after the Second World War this took the form of combating "objectivism" and "cosmopolitanism".
What is China's "party spirit"?
The Chinese Communist Party took the word up as dangxing (党性), a key term of party members' self-cultivation and press guidance. Around the Seventh Party Congress in 1945 Mao stressed training in party spirit. In the late 1970s People's Daily editor Hu Jiwei argued that the press should first follow "people's spirit", and Hu Qiaomu opposed him in favour of the primacy of party spirit. Xi Jinping's speech at the Symposium on News Reporting and Public Opinion that the media must "be surnamed Party" belongs to the same lineage. Here the word stands far closer to organizational discipline than to a philosophical position.
How is it read in today's epistemology?
The thought that knowledge is entangled with position continued in other camps too: the German sociology of knowledge of the 1920s (Scheler, Mannheim), and the standpoint theory of Sandra Harding and others, which holds that the position of the oppressed can produce more objective accounts. The last section of "Ideology (Marxism)" continues this question.
What remains is this. If all knowledge takes sides, where does the ground for saying my side is right come from? Lenin's answer was practice and objective truth.