1953.07.27–1961.12.16

Postwar Reconstruction and the Chollima Movement (1953-1961)

How did North Korea's recovery from the ruins of war pass through foreign aid, mass mobilisation and inner-party purges to end in the rule of one man?

After the armistice the DPRK rebuilt with Soviet, Chinese and East European aid, putting heavy industry first. While the criticism voiced at the August 1956 plenum was crushed despite Soviet and Chinese intervention and the purges widened, the Chollima movement, collectivisation, the Chongsan-ri method and the Taean work system became the framework of the system. The Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew in 1958 and the repatriation of Koreans from Japan began in 1959; in 1961 Kim Il Sung signed alliance treaties with the USSR and China and confirmed the rule of his partisan group at the Fourth Party Congress.

Starting from ruins: aid from the socialist countries (1953-1956)

When the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, the industry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had been all but destroyed. The DPRK government stated that three years of bombing had cut industrial output by nearly 40 percent against 1949; electricity production had fallen to 26 percent of its prewar level, chemicals to 22 percent and fuel and metallurgy to about 10 percent. Seventy percent of the trains and 85 percent of the ships were destroyed and close to three-quarters of homes were gone. In the words of the historian Charles Armstrong, "North Korea had been virtually destroyed as an industrial society." On 31 July, four days after the armistice, Kim Il Sung sent the Soviet ambassador a report on the damage and asked for aid, and on 5 August, at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, he set out a three-stage programme: a preparatory period of six months to a year, a Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) to restore prewar levels, and a Five-Year Plan for general industrialisation. 1

Reconstruction became a project divided up among the whole socialist camp. In Moscow in September 1953 Kim Il Sung was promised one billion rubles (about USD 250 million) in grant aid, and in November he sent Minister of Commerce Ri Ju Yon to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and East Germany, each of which took on particular rehabilitation projects. The East European commitment for ten years came to 1.147 billion rubles, nearly half of it from East Germany. Kim went to the Soviet Union first and reached Beijing only two months later, in November, but China proved more generous: under the Sino-Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement of 23 November it cancelled 729 million yuan of wartime debt and granted 800 million yuan for 1954-1957. According to Soviet Ministry of Trade documents, 33.3 percent of the reconstruction aid of 1953-1960 came from the USSR, 29.4 percent from China, 37.8 percent from Eastern Europe and 0.5 percent from Mongolia and North Vietnam. In 1954 aid made up 31.6 percent of the DPRK state budget. 1

The division of labour was clear. The USSR and Eastern Europe supplied heavy-industrial equipment and plants, China 130,000 tons of grain, 40 million metres of cotton cloth, shoes, winter clothing and other necessities. The Chinese People's Volunteers who stayed on after the war were free labour: by their withdrawal in 1958 they had repaired 881 public buildings and 45,412 rooms in private homes, rebuilt 4,263 bridges and built 429,220 metres of dams and 1,218 kilometres of ditches and canals. China cared for 22,735 Korean child refugees in 1954-1956 and in 1954 alone took more than 3,000 Korean trainees into Shanghai and Shenyang. With this aid the Three-Year Plan was declared fulfilled in 1955, a year early, and industrial output in 1955 was 56 percent above 1949. But investment went overwhelmingly to heavy industry, consumer goods were short, and the hurried collectivisation of agriculture bred resentment among the peasants. 1

What to build first: heavy industry and the appearance of "Juche" (1953-1955)

The official slogan of the Three-Year Plan was "priority development of heavy industry with the simultaneous development of light industry and agriculture", but in practice close to three-quarters of capital investment went to heavy industry. Bad weather and underinvestment brought a poor harvest in 1954 and a rural food crisis in the spring of 1955, and senior party officials began to criticise the policy openly. Soviet Koreans such as Pak Chang-ok and Pak Yong-bin, who had moved up into posts left empty by the purged former Workers' Party of South Korea group, were inspired by Malenkov's post-Stalin turn of the Soviet economy towards consumer goods and objected that the basic needs of the workers who were to rebuild heavy industry were being ignored. Returnees from China such as Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Yun Kong-hum joined them, comparing Kim Il Sung's course unfavourably with Soviet and Chinese policy. 2

Kim Il Sung treated the debate as a matter of Soviet hegemony against national economic self-determination. At the April 1955 plenum he condemned Pak Il-u, Kim Ung and Pang Ho-san of the Yan'an group for sectarianism and blamed Pak Chang-ok of the Soviet Koreans and Kim Il of his own guerrilla group for the grain crisis of that spring, saying that "neither the Soviet Union nor China would help us forever." On 28 December 1955, speaking to propaganda workers, he named Ho Ka-i, Pak Chang-ok, Pak Yong-bin and Pak Il-u, scolded that "those who returned from the Soviet Union advocate the Soviet method, those who returned from China advocate the Chinese method", and declared the Korean revolution the "Juche" of the party's ideological work. The Japanese historian Shimotomai Nobuo sees this Juche as beginning as a tool to remove Soviet influence from North Korean ideology and education. Yet even while speaking of independence Kim kept asking for aid; the historians Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng note that he seldom named the donor countries in public while never letting the aid go. 2 1

1956: the aid tour, the August plenum and the intervention of the two great powers

When Khrushchev criticised Stalin's cult of personality at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, the shock reached Pyongyang. At the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on 23-29 April the Soviet delegate Brezhnev stressed collective leadership, but Kim Il Sung said nothing against Stalin, and the Soviet ambassador Ivanov reported that the DPRK "does not give up on establishing a closed-door economy." From June to July Kim toured the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Mongolia to seek aid for the Five-Year Plan. The USSR promised 300 million rubles of further grant aid and the cancellation of 570 million rubles of debt and East Germany 18 million rubles, far less than he had hoped. 1 3

While Kim was away, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (vice-premier), Yun Kong-hum (commerce minister), So Hwi (chairman of the General Federation of Trade Unions) and Ri Pil-gyu of the Yan'an group and Pak Chang-ok (vice-premier) and Kim Sung-hwa of the Soviet Koreans prepared, in contact with the Soviet embassy, to criticise the personality cult and economic policy openly at a plenum. On 30 August Yun Kong-hum took the rostrum but was shouted down, and that night Yun, So Hwi, Ri Pil-gyu and Kim Kang crossed the Yalu into China. The next day the plenum expelled them and removed Ch'oe and Pak from their party posts. When the news reached Beijing and Moscow through the refugees and a letter from Ri Sang-jo, the ambassador in Moscow, Mao Zedong and Mikoyan agreed during the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to send a joint delegation. Peng Dehuai and Mikoyan arrived in Pyongyang on 19 September, and at a plenum convened again on 23 September Kim admitted that the August punishments had been "somewhat hasty" and reversed the expulsions and dismissals. 3 1

The intervention drove Sino-North Korean relations to their lowest point since the armistice. Kim skipped the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and sent Choe Yong-gon, whom Mao summoned to rebuke for the purge of cadres with Chinese connections. When the DPRK proposed in a November memorandum to invite the United Nations to deal with reunification and the withdrawal of foreign troops, China objected, and on 30 November Mao told the Soviet ambassador Yudin that "Kim wants to drive the CPV army out of Korea. He might follow J. B. Tito's road, or even Imre Nagy's steps." Beijing turned down a DPRK request for further grant aid in September 1956, and at a party meeting in December Kim announced that the Five-Year Plan would be financed mainly from domestic sources. The Chollima movement came out of this shortage of aid. 1 4

The widening purge and one-man rule (late 1956-1958)

The reconciliation of September did not last two months. When crises broke out in Poland and Hungary in October and drew Soviet and Chinese attention to Europe, Kim Il Sung used an exchange of party cards to re-screen members' views and began to drive out the opposition. Pak Chang-ok was sent to a sawmill and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik to a pig farm before being detained again; the party secretary of Kim Il Sung University, where intellectuals were concentrated, was executed and its president imprisoned. Ri Sang-jo, the ambassador in Moscow, ignored his recall and stayed in the Soviet Union. On 30 May 1957 the foundations were laid for the songbun system, which sorted the population into "core", "wavering" and "hostile" classes by family origin and political background. 3 5 6

From the summer of 1957 the purge widened for a year. The remaining Yan'an cadres and the Soviet Koreans became targets together, and officials of the Pyongyang party committee, the army and the judiciary were arrested or dismissed one after another. In March 1958 the First Party Conference confirmed the decisions of the August plenum and declared factionalism liquidated; Kim Tu-bong, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, who had taken no direct part in the August affair, was purged at this time. Accounts of the scale differ. English Wikipedia, following Chinese-language research, states that 10,000 people were purged in 1957-1958, about 6,000 of them executed, while the figure cited in Korean-language studies is 3,912 expulsions from the party by July 1958. Most Soviet-Korean officials were sent home or arrested in 1957-1959. In November 1958 the leaders of the satellite Korean Democratic Party and Chondoist Chongu Party were sentenced to death as spies. 3 1

The fate of the refugees in China changed with Sino-North Korean relations. At the Moscow Conference in November 1957 Mao met Kim twice, apologised for the interference of 1956 and urged him to pardon the refugee cadres and take them back; Kim answered that he no longer wanted them, and Mao promised that China would never use them against him. Early in 1958 fifteen senior refugees were moved from Beijing and Shenyang to Sichuan (four) and Shanxi (eleven) and kept under strict surveillance; some were imprisoned, and their cases were redressed only in 1981. So Hwi was sentenced in 1962 to five years in prison for allegedly planning to slip into the Soviet Union. At the Fourth Congress in 1961 Kim reported the period as the victory in which, "with the impetus of the August 1956 Plenary Meeting and the Party Conference in March 1958, the Party cleared itself of anti-Party factional elements." 1 7 8

The withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Sino-Korean reconciliation (1957-1958)

After the armistice large Chinese forces remained north of the demarcation line, and studies count them differently. Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng write that thirty-four divisions stayed and nineteen left in 1954-1955; Vasily Lebedev writes that of some 1.2 million men fifty-six divisions were withdrawn in three stages between September 1954 and the end of 1955, leaving about 250,000. After the political conference on the withdrawal of foreign forces recommended by paragraph 60 of the armistice (the Geneva conference of 1954) ended without result, China gave up on a joint withdrawal with the Americans and simply reduced its garrison. By 1956 there was also serious friction between the Volunteers and the local population: internal Xinhua reports recorded illegal detentions and rapes by CPV personnel and noted that the North Korean government and people had come to see the CPV as an occupation force. 1 9

The decision to withdraw settled the aftermath of 1956 and served China's wider strategy. Discussing the withdrawal with Khrushchev in January 1957, Zhou Enlai also meant to use it to press for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany. In Moscow in November 1957 Mao himself proposed to Kim Il Sung that all Chinese troops leave; Kim was taken aback at first but accepted, saying it would put pressure on the United States to leave South Korea. The two sides agreed on a sequence: the DPRK government would first issue a statement demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and China would then withdraw unilaterally. On 5 February 1958 the DPRK called for all foreign troops to leave North and South at the same time, followed by all-Korean free elections under the supervision of a neutral-nations body; China declared its support on 7 February. Zhou Enlai came to Pyongyang that month and issued with Kim a joint statement that the Volunteers would leave in three stages by the end of 1958. 1 9 10

The first units crossed the Yalu in March, and the last left Korea on 25 October 1958, the eighth anniversary of the Chinese entry into the war, passing the triumphal arch at Andong (Dandong) the next day. Chinese accounts give 25 October as the date the withdrawal was completed, while photographic records date the last group's return to 26 October. October 1958 became "Korea-China Friendship Month" in Pyongyang, and on 25 October 1959, the ninth anniversary of the intervention and the first of the withdrawal, the Friendship Tower was erected. Only the CPV delegation to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom remained, until 1994. The United States did not answer the call for withdrawal in the joint statement, and its troops stayed in South Korea. Biographers of Kim Il Sung count the withdrawal as the point at which the DPRK became effectively independent; since no rival group was left by then, it also confirmed his one-man rule. 10 11 9 5 1

The Chollima movement and the Five-Year Plan (1956-1960)

Chollima is the legendary horse that runs a thousand li in a day. At the December 1956 plenum of the Central Committee Kim Il Sung argued that carrying out the Five-Year Plan without aid required the maximum mobilisation of internal reserves, raised the slogan of "maximum increase of production and economy" and called: "Let us produce more, practice economy, and overfulfill the five-year plan ahead of schedule!" Around this time he told the workers of the Kangson Steel Works that ten thousand more tons of rolled steel would let the country straighten its back; according to the official account they produced 120,000 tons on a blooming mill rated at 60,000 tons a year. Sources differ on when the movement began. The DPRK's official history dates it to the December 1956 plenum; the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture says it got fully under way in 1958; and some scholars think the start was backdated to 1956 so that the movement would not look like an imitation of China's Great Leap Forward. 4 12 13

In 1958 the DPRK did move in step with China's Great Leap. On 11 June Kim said that "all of the workers are, upon the call of the Party, riding a flying horse [Chollima] running forward to socialism." In August a government delegation under Ri Ju Yon toured more than a hundred Chinese enterprises and reported that the Great Leap would decide the future of the world. The DPRK adopted the slogan "steel and machines are the kings of industry", a campaign against the four pests, small-scale steelmaking, mergers of cooperatives with communal mess halls and workers' and peasants' Red Guards, and Kim spoke of reaching communism in four or five years. The same year collectivisation was completed. Cooperatives begun among poor peasants in the autumn of 1953 took in every farm household by August 1958, and at the end of the year cooperatives of 40 to 100 households were merged into one per ri, with the chairman of the ri people's committee also chairing the management board. The socialist transformation of private trade and industry was likewise completed in 1958. With the National Meeting of Production Innovators in Pyongyang that September, Chollima became a labour competition of the whole workforce. 1 8 4

In March 1959 Chin Ung-won, a team leader at the Kangson Steel Works, launched the "Chollima Workteam Movement", which gave the campaign the form of socialist competition between work teams. A team that set and met a high production target received the title of Chollima Workteam, and the movement spread from factories to farms, schools and hospitals. At the Fourth Congress in September 1961 Kim reported that by the end of August more than two million working people had joined, that 4,958 workteams and workshops (125,028 people) had received the Chollima title and 55 the title of Double Chollima. In the spring of 1961 the 46-metre Chollima Statue went up on Mansu Hill in Pyongyang. The leadership declared that the main targets of the Five-Year Plan had been met in two and a half years, by June 1959, and by official figures industrial output grew by more than 36 percent a year over the period. 4 12 8 14

The costs were high. Soviet and Hungarian diplomats reported that the rapid growth of 1957-1959 had produced imbalances between sectors, above all lagging electricity and fuel, poor product quality and overcrowded cities, and one study concluded that "the North Koreans in 1958 lived close to a marginal subsistence level." Quantity rose while quality fell, and the workforce was exhausted. The leadership designated the second half of 1959 and 1960 as a "buffer period" to consolidate the plan's gains and prepare the next one. Sources date the buffer differently: East European diplomatic documents of the time give the second half of 1959 and 1960, Shen and Xia give 1960, and the English Wikipedia article on the economy gives 1959 in one place and 1960 in another. From the mid-1960s the DPRK stopped publishing economic statistics other than percentage increases over earlier periods. 1 14 15 12

The Chongsan-ri method and the Taean work system (1960-1961)

In February 1960 Kim Il Sung led instructors of the Central Committee to the Chongsan-ri cooperative farm in Kangso County, South Phyongan Province, and stayed fifteen days. In a speech to the ri party membership on 8 February he rebuked a management board that had put only half its labour into grain and scattered its effort over oil-pressing and fish-breeding teams, and told it to subordinate all cooperative work to farming. On 23 February, at an enlarged meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he generalised the lessons of the guidance at Chongsan-ri and in Kangso County for the whole country. The "Chongsan-ri method" thus formulated is a style of guidance in which higher bodies help lower ones and superiors help subordinates, and leading officials go down to the spot, learn the actual situation, put political work first and draw out the enthusiasm of the masses. Scholars note that alongside the attack on bureaucratism and formalism came greater use of material incentives such as paid holidays, bonuses and honorific titles. 16 17 15

In December 1961, after on-the-spot guidance at the Taean Electrical Machinery Plant near Nampho, Kim Il Sung set out a new system of industrial management at an enlarged meeting of the party's Political Committee on 15 December and at an enlarged meeting of the plant's party committee on 16 December. The defects of industry, he said, came down to the fact that "the Chongsanri spirit and Chongsanri method have not yet been adopted in the industrial sector." Factories had until then been run under the Soviet-style one-man management of the director. The "Taean work system" replaced it with the collective leadership of the factory party committee, a production guidance system in which a chief engineer directed planning, production and technology as one, a materials supply system in which higher echelons brought materials down to lower units, and a welfare supply system responsible for workers' living needs. Russian Wikipedia sums up the system as arising in 1961-1962 from the experience of Chollima and the principles of the Chongsan-ri method and soon covering the whole national economy. 8 18 13 15

The start of the repatriation of Koreans from Japan (1955-1961)

In the mid-1950s about 600,000 Koreans lived in Japan, most of them people who had come from the southern half of the peninsula during the colonial period and their children. Having lost Japanese nationality when the San Francisco Peace Treaty took effect in 1952, they had no right of permanent residence and lived with discrimination and poverty. In May 1955 the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) was founded under Han Duk-su, and Korean communists in Japan left the Japanese Communist Party to come under the direction of the Workers' Party of Korea. From late 1955 the Japanese government studied ways of sending Koreans away in large numbers, citing the cost of welfare and public order, and in 1956-1957 it made secret contact with the DPRK through the Japanese Red Cross. According to Tessa Morris-Suzuki, who studied the declassified records, a leading Japanese Red Cross official wrote that his government's real aim was "to rid itself of several tens of thousands Koreans who are indigent and vaguely communist." 19 20 21

The DPRK was cool at first; it was struggling to feed its own people. In 1958, however, Kim Il Sung changed course. In July he told the Soviet chargé d'affaires that he was willing to accept Koreans from Japan and asked for Soviet support, and after a Chongryon branch in Kawasaki petitioned to return in August, he publicly welcomed their return on 8 September. Scholars see an aim of unsettling Japan's relations with South Korea and a propaganda demonstration of socialist superiority. Some read it as a way of filling the labour shortage of the Five-Year Plan, others doubt this because so many returnees were dependants. In November the same year Kim asked in Beijing that 40,000 ethnic Koreans from China's northeast be sent to the DPRK before spring ploughing, and China agreed. In Japan a Repatriation Cooperation Society was founded that November with former prime minister Hatoyama Ichiro as chairman and politicians of the Liberal Democratic, Socialist and Communist parties as members. 19 20 1

On 13 February 1959 the Japanese cabinet made repatriation official policy and, citing the humanitarian principle of free choice of residence, sought the involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Syngman Rhee's government, calling it "deportation to the North", opposed it fiercely, declared a suspension of trade with Japan on 15 June and sent agents to Japan to stop the ships. The United States at first kept its hands off and, with the revision of the US-Japan security treaty approaching, would not unsettle the Kishi Nobusuke government. After Red Cross talks between Japan and the DPRK opened in Geneva on 13 April, a repatriation agreement was signed in Calcutta on 13 August. On 14 December 1959 a Soviet ship left Niigata with the first 975 returnees and reached Chongjin on the 16th. About 70,000 people went in 1960-1961 alone, and by 1984 a total of 93,340 had gone from Japan to the DPRK, among them more than 6,000 Japanese nationals, about 1,831 of them Japanese wives. 20 22 23 19 21

Chongryon and the Japanese press portrayed the DPRK as a "paradise on earth", but the returnees met a different reality. Most of them came from the south, so even the word "return" was a misnomer. Arrivals were shocked by the poverty and shortages, and people from Japan were classed as "wavering" or "hostile" under songbun, assigned to farms and mines and kept under surveillance. Japanese research puts the number of returnees sent to prison camps at around 10,000. Families left in Japan kept them alive with remittances and goods, and the returnees became in effect hostages binding the Chongryon community in Japan. The programme was suspended in December 1967, resumed in 1971 and ended in 1984. 19 20 21

Balancing between Moscow and Beijing: the two alliance treaties (1959-1961)

As the Sino-Soviet conflict deepened after 1959, Kim Il Sung extracted aid from both sides. At the Twenty-first Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in January 1959 he praised Khrushchev's report, and on 17 March the USSR signed an agreement to supply 500 million rubles of equipment and technical aid for a power plant, a chemical works, the expansion of the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex and other projects. But when Moscow refused further aid and postponed Khrushchev's visit in May 1960, Kim went secretly to Beijing that month and backed China's line, praising the Chinese article "Long Live Leninism". Moscow then invited him in June and handed him the minutes of Mao's 1956 conversation with Yudin in which Mao had said Kim might go the way of Tito or Nagy. Enraged, Kim accused China at the July plenum of trying to turn Korea into a colony, and in August the USSR cancelled 760 million rubles of military loans. 1

China answered once more with aid. In 1960, at the height of its own famine, China sent the DPRK a further 230,000 tons of grain, and in October it agreed to long-term loans of 420 million rubles for 1961-1964; Zhou Enlai told the Koreans they could put off repayment for ten or twenty years, or even to posterity. The USSR in turn signed, on 24 December, a technical aid agreement for 1961-1967 and a long-term loan for 1961-1965 that promised the expansion of the Kim Chaek works, thermal power stations at Tokchon and Pyongyang and an oil refinery. Change in the South added pressure: the April Revolution of 1960 brought down Syngman Rhee, and when Park Chung Hee took power in the coup of 16 May 1961 the North Korean leadership feared an attack from South Korea. 1 24

In May 1961 Kosygin came to Pyongyang and invited Kim to Moscow to conclude a treaty; Kim went on 29 June and on 6 July signed the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which took effect only if one party was actually attacked and ran for ten years. Kim then flew via Kiev straight to Beijing, where on 11 July he and Zhou Enlai signed the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Drafted hastily by China on the model of the Soviet treaty, it provided in Article 2 that if either party came under armed attack the other "shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal," and it had no expiry date. Shen and Xia agree with the South Korean scholar Lee Dong-jun that China, on learning of the Soviet treaty, co-opted the DPRK by offering stronger commitments. After the Soviet collapse the Chinese treaty remained the only military alliance treaty of either China or the DPRK. 1 24

The "Congress of Victors": the Fourth Congress and after (1961)

The Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea met in Pyongyang on 11-18 September 1961. 1,657 voting and 73 non-voting delegates represented 1,311,563 members, and the Soviet, Chinese and Japanese Communist Parties sent delegations under Frol Kozlov, Deng Xiaoping and Miyamoto Kenji. In a six-hour report Kim Il Sung declared that the cooperativisation of agriculture and the socialist transformation of trade and industry were complete and exploitation abolished, defined the Chollima movement as "our Party's general line in the construction of socialism", and presented the First Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967), continuing the priority of heavy industry with the simultaneous development of light industry and agriculture. He told the two great-power delegations that the DPRK would remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. 25 8

Kim Il Sung called it the "Congress of Victors". Of the 85 members of the new Central Committee only 28 had served on the Third; every partisan from the Third was re-elected except General Yu Kyong-su, who had died in 1958. The Soviet Koreans and the Yan'an group disappeared apart from men such as Nam Il and Kim Chang-man who had pledged loyalty to Kim. Former partisans, army and youth-league cadres trained by them and their relatives made up 80 percent of the Central Committee, and its first plenum on 18 September elected Kim chairman and Choe Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Kum-chol, Kim Chang-man and Yi Hyo-sun vice-chairmen. The reconstruction that began in the ruins of 1953, and the struggle inside the party that accompanied it, thus ended in the rule of one man and one lineage. 25

The euphoria did not last. When Khrushchev attacked Stalin's cult again at the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1961, the Sino-Soviet conflict headed for an open split, and Soviet aid stoppages stretched the Seven-Year Plan by three years. But the framework built in these years endured. The Chollima movement gave way in the mid-1970s to the "Three Revolutions Red Flag Movement" but was invoked again during the famine of the 1990s and in the 2000s; the Taean work system was still held up as the best system of economic management in the 1990s, though after the 2014 amendment of the Enterprise Act it became unclear how far it still operated; and the on-the-spot guidance of the Chongsan-ri method passed to Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. The fate of the returnees from Japan and their families remains an unresolved issue between Japan and the DPRK. 1 26 13 15 19

Consequences

By 1961 the DPRK had achieved rapid industrial growth by official figures and completed the socialist transformation of agriculture, trade and industry, at the cost of imbalances, stagnant living standards and opaque statistics. Politically, the Yan'an and Soviet-Korean groups disappeared and the one-man rule of Kim Il Sung and his partisans was established; the withdrawal of the Volunteers and the two alliance treaties gave the DPRK a base for an independent course between Moscow and Beijing. The fate of the more than 90,000 Koreans from Japan and their Japanese family members who went in the repatriation remains unresolved to this day.

Timeline & Map

Pyongyang Chongjin Sinuiju-Dandong (Yalu bridge) Chongsan-ri cooperative farm Kangson Steel Works Taean Electrical Machinery Plant Niigata 3 Moscow 9 Moscow 4 Sinuiju-Dandong 2 Beijing 10 Beijing 1 Pyongyang 8 Chongsan-ri (Kangso) 5 Kangson Steel Works 11 Taean Electrical Machinery Plant 7 Niigata 6 Calcutta
  1. 11953.07.27Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    Armistice signed

    The fighting in the Korean War stopped; the DPRK government stated that industrial output was nearly 40 percent below 1949.

  2. 1953.08.05Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Sixth Plenum sets out reconstruction

    Kim Il Sung presented a three-stage programme: a preparatory period, a Three-Year Plan and a Five-Year Plan.

  3. 21953.11.23Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    Sino-Korean economic and cultural agreement

    China cancelled 729 million yuan of wartime debt and promised 800 million yuan in grant aid.

  4. 1955.12.28Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Juche speech

    Kim Il Sung criticised cadres who followed Soviet or Chinese methods and declared the Korean revolution the "Juche" of ideological work.

  5. 1956.08.30Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    August plenum

    Yun Kong-hum's criticism was shouted down and the critics were expelled or dismissed; some fled to China that night.

  6. 1956.09.23Democratic People's Republic of KoreaSoviet UnionChina
    September plenum

    With Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai present, the August punishments were reversed.

  7. 1956.12Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    December plenum and the Chollima slogan

    Kim Il Sung raised the slogan of maximum production and economy and said the Five-Year Plan would rely on domestic resources.

  8. 31957.11Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChinaSoviet Union
    Sino-Korean reconciliation at Moscow

    Mao Zedong apologised for the 1956 interference and proposed the withdrawal of all Chinese troops.

  9. 1958.02.05Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    Statement demanding withdrawal of foreign troops

    The DPRK proposed simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from North and South and free elections under neutral supervision; China endorsed it on 7 February.

  10. 1958.03Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    First Party Conference

    The party declared factionalism liquidated and Kim Tu-bong was purged.

  11. 1958.08Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Collectivisation completed

    All peasant households had joined cooperatives, which were merged into one per ri by the end of the year.

  12. 41958.10.25Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    Chinese People's Volunteers withdrawal completed

    The last units of the Chinese People's Volunteers left Korea.

  13. 51959.03Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Chollima Workteam Movement launched

    Chin Ung-won, a team leader at the Kangson Steel Works, launched competition between work teams.

  14. 61959.08.13JapanDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    Calcutta Agreement

    The Japanese and DPRK Red Cross societies signed the agreement on the return of Koreans in Japan.

  15. 71959.12.14JapanDemocratic People's Republic of KoreaSouth Korea
    First repatriation ship sails

    The first 975 returnees left Niigata and reached Chongjin on the 16th.

  16. 81960.02.08Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Speech at Chongsan-ri

    During his guidance at Chongsan-ri Kim Il Sung criticised the cooperative's management; the Chongsan-ri method grew from this.

  17. 91961.07.06Democratic People's Republic of KoreaSoviet Union
    Soviet-DPRK alliance treaty

    Kim Il Sung signed the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Moscow.

  18. 101961.07.11Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    Sino-DPRK alliance treaty

    Kim Il Sung and Zhou Enlai signed the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Beijing.

  19. 1961.09.11Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Fourth Congress opens

    At the "Congress of Victors" Chollima became the party's general line and the partisans took over the Central Committee.

  20. 111961.12.16Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Taean work system

    Kim Il Sung set out the new system of industrial management at the Taean Electrical Machinery Plant.

Related people 24

Participants17

Partisan leader, party vice-chairmanChoe Yong-gon1900–1976

Went to the Eighth CCP Congress in Kim's place in 1956 and was rebuked by Mao; became vice-chairman at the Fourth Congress.

Vice-premier and agriculture ministerKim Il1910–1984

Was blamed for the 1955 grain crisis and led the 1957 economic delegation that negotiated the Five-Year Plan with China.

Close ally of Kim Il SungPak Chong-ae1907–?

Chairwoman of the Democratic Women's League. Pak Chang-ok tried to win her over in July 1956, but she stayed with Kim, advised him before the plenum and later chaired a cadre meeting for him.

Foreign ministerNam Il1913–1976

A Soviet Korean who sided with Kim and stayed in the leadership after the Fourth Congress.

Party propaganda chiefKim Chang-man1907–1966

Attacked the critics at the August plenum and became vice-chairman at the Fourth Congress.

Ambassador to the Soviet UnionRi Sang-jo1915–1996

Wrote to Khrushchev asking for intervention and stayed in the Soviet Union rather than answer his recall.

Soviet first deputy premierAnastas Mikoyan1895–1978

Came to Pyongyang with Peng Dehuai in September 1956 and had the August punishments reversed.

Chinese defence ministerPeng Dehuai1898–1974

Led the Chinese side of the joint delegation in September 1956; after his fall in 1959 Mao blamed him for the interference.

Chairman of the CCPMao Zedong1893–1976

Decided on the 1956 intervention and in 1957 apologised and proposed the withdrawal of the Volunteers.

Chinese premierZhou Enlai1898–1976

Signed the aid agreements, the 1958 joint statement on withdrawal and the 1961 alliance treaty.

First Secretary of the CPSUNikita Khrushchev1894–1971

His attack on Stalin set the background of the 1956 crisis; he adjusted aid and debts to the DPRK.

First deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of MinistersAlexei Kosygin1904–1980

Visited Pyongyang in May 1961 and invited Kim to Moscow to sign the alliance treaty.

CPSU secretaryFrol Kozlov1908–1965

Briefed Kim in 1960 on the inside story of the 1956 intervention and led the Soviet delegation to the Fourth Congress.

CCP General SecretaryDeng Xiaoping1904–1997

Led the Chinese delegation to the Fourth Congress.

Chongryon chairmanHan Duk-su (Chongryon chairman)1907–2001

Founded Chongryon in 1955 and led the repatriation campaign.

Former Japanese prime ministerIchiro Hatoyama1883–1959

Became chairman of the Repatriation Cooperation Society in 1958.

Japanese prime ministerNobusuke Kishi1896–1987

His cabinet made repatriation official policy in February 1959.

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26