1950–1953

The Korean War

Why did Stalin approve it, and why did he not send Soviet troops?

The Korean War began with the southward attack of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 and stopped with the armistice of 27 July 1953. Kim Il-sung had asked repeatedly from 1949 for approval to unify by force. Stalin gave it in the spring of 1950, judging that the United States would not intervene and reckoning that the founding of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet atomic test had shifted the balance, but he ruled out direct Soviet participation. When the United States intervened under a UN command and the Inchon landing reversed the front, China sent the People's Volunteer Army, and from the summer of 1951 the line hardened near the 38th parallel. Soviet involvement stayed limited to weapons, advisers, and the pilots who flew MiG-15s from Manchurian bases, a presence both sides long denied officially.

Division and the 38th parallel: what was already under way before the war?

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950, but the structure that made it possible was built five years earlier. In August 1945, with Japan's surrender imminent, the United States proposed dividing the peninsula into American and Soviet occupation zones, and the U.S. officers Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel chose the 38th parallel as the line. Rusk later recalled that "even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by US forces... we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops". The Soviets accepted the proposal, and the division was understood as a temporary arrangement until a trusteeship could be put in place. 1 2

In December 1945 the Moscow Conference agreed on independence after a five-year trusteeship. Waiting five years was unpopular among Koreans and unrest followed. Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee led the anti-trusteeship movement, while the Korean Communist Party supported the trusteeship decision. The US-Soviet Joint Commission met in Seoul on 20 March 1946 and 21 May 1947 but broke down, and the United States took the question to the United Nations. Under the General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, elections were held in the South on 10 May 1948; the Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 15 August and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang on 9 September. Each government claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the whole peninsula. 2 3

From 1948 to the spring of 1950 the peninsula was already in a low-intensity civil war. The uprising that began on Jeju in April 1948 and its suppression left 30,000 violent deaths; of the 14,373 civilians among them, about 12,000 were killed by South Korean security forces and about 2,000 by the rebels. The Yeosu-Suncheon rebellion of October and its suppression cost between 2,976 and 3,392 lives. The English encyclopedia notes that these first uprisings took place without direct DPRK participation. Guerrilla activity in the mountains revived in the spring of 1949, and the small armed units the Workers' Party of South Korea (WPSK) had formed after the "2.7 struggle" of 1948, the yasandae ("mountain units"), moved into the hills and became guerrilla bands. 2 4 5

The southern partisans and the WPSK were not simply units taking orders from Pyongyang. The WPSK was the communist party formed in the South in 1946, led by southern figures such as Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung-yop. In September 1949 the "People's Guerrilla Units" organized and armed by the North, backed by 2,400 KPA commandos who had crossed the border, launched an offensive that failed, and the guerrillas dug in around the Taebaek mountains of North Gyeongsang and the border areas of Gangwon. On 1 October 1949 the ROK Army began a three-pronged campaign in South Jeolla and around Daegu and claimed 5,621 guerrillas killed or captured by March 1950. The arrest of the WPSK underground leader Yi Ju-ha in Seoul on 27 March 1950, and of Kim Sam-ryong the next day, dealt the southern party a heavy blow. By the spring of 1950 guerrilla activity had mostly subsided, and the border, too, was calm. 5 2 6

Along the 38th parallel the two regular armies fought battalion-sized and sometimes division-level engagements from May 1949. The Korean Wikipedia counts 874 clashes between 18 January 1949 and 24 June 1950, naming the battle of Songak-san near Kaesong on 4 May 1949 and the fighting on the Ongjin peninsula from 21 May to 15 November. On 4 August thousands of KPA troops attacked South Korean troops holding ground north of the parallel and were repulsed at Kuksa-bong. About 8,000 South Korean soldiers and police died in the insurgency and the border clashes. In these months the Soviet embassy repeatedly reported growing incursions from the South, and Stalin, worried about a southern attack, scolded Ambassador Shtykov for failing to keep the peace on the parallel. 7 2 8

Why did Stalin give his approval in the spring of 1950?

Receiving Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on 5 March 1949, Stalin, worried about growing southern pressure near the parallel, told him emphatically: "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important." When Kim said on 7 March that "the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means", Stalin disagreed, citing the North's military weakness, the Soviet-American agreement on the parallel and the possibility of American intervention. Only if the adversary attacked first could they try reunification by counterattacking: "Then your move will be understood and supported by everyone." 8

Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong did not stop. On 12 August 1949 they told Shtykov that since the South rejected peaceful unification the North had no choice but to prepare an attack, which would be followed by a mass uprising against Rhee in the South. Shtykov answered that an outright invasion was out of the question unless the South attacked first, and that only a limited operation against the Ongjin peninsula could be considered. On 3 September Kim's interpreter Mun Il called on the Soviet chargé d'affaires Grigory Tunkin. Stalin ordered the embassy on 11 September to assess both armies, and the embassy gave a negative view on 14 September. On 24 September the Soviet Politburo rejected the request, finding the KPA unprepared, that "little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle", and that an unprovoked northern attack "would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs"; it also ruled out the limited Ongjin strike. Some Korean-language accounts say Kim asked for approval 48 times in this period, but that figure is not borne out by the published Soviet documents. 7 2 8

The Politburo decision did not reject unification by force as such; it said the preparation was insufficient. On 17 January 1950 Kim complained to Shtykov: "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people", and asked to visit Moscow again to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin. Stalin replied on 30 January: "I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him.... I am prepared to help him in this matter." Bajanov reads this cable as the moment Stalin decided to begin preparing the war. Mao Zedong was in Moscow at the time, but Stalin did not tell him of the decision. 8

What changed Stalin's mind? Bajanov, working from the Soviet documents, names four things: the communist victory in China, the Soviet atomic test of August 1949, the founding of NATO and the general worsening of relations with the West, and a perceived weakening of Washington's will to get involved militarily in Asia. The English encyclopedia adds the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea (completed on 29 June 1949), the calculation that a United States which had not intervened directly against the Chinese communists would be even less willing to fight over strategically less important Korea, and the intelligence the Soviets gained by breaking the U.S. embassy's codes. On 12 January 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson left Korea outside the defence perimeter in his Pacific speech; Stueck notes that Acheson also said in that speech that nations outside the perimeter could expect UN help if attacked. 8 2 9 10

Kim and Pak spent almost a month in the Soviet Union, from 30 March to 25 April 1950, and the invasion plan was settled there. Stalin permitted the attack on condition that Mao would send reinforcements if needed, and made clear that Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the United States. The records of the April conversations have not yet been found in the Russian archives. On 13 May Kim met Mao in Beijing, and on 14 May Stalin told Mao that "due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion." Mao said China would help if the Americans intervened. 2 8 9

What actually happened on 25 June 1950?

Preparations had been going on since 1949. That year the USSR and the DPRK signed a protocol on military-technical assistance under which Moscow would supply large numbers of aircraft, tanks, guns and landing craft, and in March 1950 Kim asked to use the Soviet credit for 1951 a year early, a request that was met. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Koreans who had fought in China's People's Liberation Army during the civil war came back with their weapons and became the core of the initial invasion. In April 1950 leaders of the southern guerrillas came to Pyongyang to work out a programme for before and after the invasion. On 12 May Kim told Shtykov that the General Staff had begun planning, and while the Soviet advisers preferred July, Kim insisted on June, arguing that the secret could leak and that the July rains would slow the advance. 8 2

The plan was first drawn up to open with a limited attack on the Ongjin peninsula, but on 21 June Kim, believing the South had learned of it and strengthened Ongjin, changed it to a general attack across the parallel, and Stalin agreed. The KPA planned to defeat the South Korean army within 22 to 27 days, and division commanders received their orders on 24 June. The Korean Wikipedia gives the plan's name as Operation Pokpung ("Storm"). In the same days Syngman Rhee repeated his wish to conquer the North, including to the State Department adviser John Foster Dulles, who visited Seoul on 18 June, and the ROK Army lifted its emergency alert on 23 June. 2 7 9

At 4:40 a.m. on 25 June (the Korean Wikipedia says 3:30), the KPA crossed the 38th parallel behind artillery fire, without a declaration of war. The Korean Wikipedia says the advance was led by 242 T-34/85 tanks. The attack came at once on the Ongjin, Kaesong-Munsan, Uijeongbu, Chuncheon and Gangneung axes, with the KPA 4th and 3rd Divisions on the Uijeongbu road and the 2nd and 12th toward Chuncheon. According to Shtykov's report, units advanced 3 to 5 kilometres in the first three hours; the enemy resisted strongly only toward Ongjin, Kaesong and Seoul, and began more organized resistance after noon. On the first day Osin on the Ongjin axis, Kaesong and Sinyuri fell. The ROK army had no tanks, no anti-tank weapons and no heavy artillery. 2 7 8

Pyongyang radio announced right after the attack that the South had invaded first and declared a counterattack. South Korean sources also initially claimed that the 17th Regiment on the Ongjin peninsula had counterattacked into Haeju, and some scholars argue that this claimed "counterattack" was in fact the instigating attack. But the report containing the Haeju claim contained errors and outright falsehoods. The Soviet documents show that the date and form of the attack had been settled in advance with Stalin's approval, and the National Archives of Korea notes that the North announced its "declaration of war" over Pyongyang radio while concealing that it had attacked. 2 8 11

The Korean Wikipedia gives the KPA ground forces at the outbreak as 135,000 men with about 200 aircraft, and the ROK as 65,000 regulars plus 45,000 police, with an air force of nothing but L-4 and L-5 liaison planes and ten T-6 trainers bought from Canada with public donations. On 25-26 June in the Korea Strait the ROK Navy's Baekdusan sank an armed transport carrying about 600 men of the KPA 766th Independent Infantry Regiment toward Busan, 18 miles off the port. On the Seoul front resistance collapsed. Rhee left Seoul with part of the government on 27 June, and early on 28 June the ROK army blew up the Han River bridge. Of about 4,000 refugees crossing it, hundreds were killed, and ROK units and equipment were still north of the river. 7 12 13 14 2

Seoul fell on 28 June. The ROK army, 95,000 strong on 25 June, was down to fewer than 22,000 within five days. Of the National Assembly members who stayed in Seoul, 48 pledged allegiance to the North. The KPA paused in Seoul for three days without crossing the Han; the Korean Wikipedia writes that Pak Hon-yong, the WPSK leader, had promised that 200,000 party members would rise together once war began and bring the Republic down quickly, and that the KPA waited for that uprising, which did not come. On 27 June, the day before Seoul fell, President Truman ordered U.S. air and sea forces into action and sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. 2 7 9

How one empty chair changed the course of the war

From January 1950 the Soviet delegate Yakov Malik stayed away from the UN Security Council, in protest at the Nationalist government on Taiwan holding China's seat instead of the People's Republic. The empty seat mattered most between 25 June and 7 July. On the day the war began, the Council adopted Resolution 82 by 9 to 0, with Yugoslavia abstaining and the USSR absent, condemning the armed attack and calling for withdrawal north of the 38th parallel. On 27 June Resolution 83, passed 7 to 1 with Yugoslavia against, recommended that members furnish the Republic of Korea "such assistance... as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area", and on 7 July Resolution 84 set up a unified command under the United States with the use of the UN flag. Douglas MacArthur was appointed its commander. 15 16 17 7

Malik was in New York. According to the State Department record, on 27 June, the day Resolution 83 passed, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie and the U.S. delegate Ernest Gross met Malik at a luncheon given by Zinchenko of the Soviet delegation. Malik first raised Moscow radio's claim that South Korean forces had attacked across the border, and argued that decisions taken without the USSR and the lawful Chinese representative were illegal. Lie and Gross rejected this, and Gross said that since the Korean question so clearly involved the Charter and world peace, the time had passed when debate on Chinese representation could be substituted for North Korean compliance with the Council's decision. Malik said only that he still meant to leave for the USSR in the first week of July. Stueck writes that the decision not to return to the Council in late June was Stalin's alone, against the advice of his top aides. 18 10

Why did Stalin not use the veto? When Klement Gottwald of Czechoslovakia asked, Stalin answered on 27 August 1950 through the Soviet ambassador in Prague. The document, held in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), was made known when the Russian diplomat and historian Andrei Ledovskii published it in Novaya i noveishaya istoriya in 2005. Stalin gave four reasons: "first, to demonstrate solidarity of the Soviet Union with the new China. Second, to underscore the foolishness and idiocy of the United States policy of recognizing the Guomindang puppet in the Security Council as the representative of China...; third, to render decisions of the Security Council illegitimate by virtue of the absence of representatives of two great powers; fourth, to give the American government a free hand and give it an opportunity to commit more foolishness using a majority in the Security Council so that public opinion can see the true face of the American government." 10

Stalin went on: "America became entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority.... it is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East." If the American government continued to be tied down in the Far East and also pulled China into "the struggle for the freedom of Korea", he wrote, America would overextend itself and "would be incapable of a third world war in the near future", giving time "to strengthen socialism in Europe". When he wrote this in late August, the KPA still had the upper hand, pressing the Pusan Perimeter. 10

How to read the letter is disputed. Donggil Kim, a researcher in Beijing, argues that Stalin not only predicted but wanted American intervention, saw Chinese entry as a precondition of his approval, and meant to set the United States and China against each other and deepen China's dependence on the USSR. The American historian William Stueck reads it instead as an effort to reassure a nervous ally of Stalin's infallible leadership: in April Stalin had told Kim that U.S. military intervention was unlikely and stressed a quick victory, and UN intervention with the U.S. buildup in Europe that followed were not the results he had hoped for. Malik returned to the Council on 1 August as its president and declared that none of the resolutions passed in the absence of the People's Republic of China could be recognized. 10 7

How did the South change under KPA occupation?

The KPA crossed the Han on 3 July and kept moving south, and by early August only the Naktong line around Busan remained. In occupied areas the DPRK revived the people's committees that had sprung up after liberation in 1945 and had been outlawed by the U.S. military government. Under a decree of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of 14 July, people's committee elections were held at city, county, township and village level in the occupied zone from 25 July to 13 September, in 103 counties, under a Central Election Guidance Committee that included Kim Won-bong. Yi Sung-yop, a WPSK leader, became chairman of the Seoul People's Committee, and some politicians, among them O Man-sop, Cho So-ang and Kim Kyu-sik, escaped prison or death by joining it. 19 20 21 2

Land reform began in early July. Land was taken from large landlords and given to tenants and landless farmers in proportion to the labour points each family had, and "newly redistributed land would be taxed at the rate of about 25 percent of the annual harvest". Southern landlords could keep up to 20 chongbo (about 50 acres), more than in the North, where nothing over 5 chongbo was allowed. The people's committees carried out the distribution under the oversight of party cadres, in every province outside the Pusan Perimeter, and the North claimed that by the end of August land reform had been accomplished in Gyeonggi, both Chungcheong provinces, North Jeolla and most of South Jeolla. By one estimate, 573,000 jeongbo, or 95% of the land targeted, had been redistributed by the time the KPA left. 21

The occupation authorities organized trade unions, peasant unions, the Democratic Youth League and the Women's League. Equal rights for women were promised, one of the few policies that made a positive impression on southerners, and a U.S. Air Force survey found that about two-thirds of students actively supported the KPA. At the same time police, officials and right-wing youth group members were rounded up, and hastily organized "people's courts" sometimes ordered executions; about 3,000 people died in these round-ups. Southerners were mobilized to repair roads and bridges and carry munitions, and young men and boys were drafted under the name of "volunteer army" (uiyonggun). The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture calls this forced conscription, and one Korean commentary puts the number taken at about 600,000. Many of them later became UN prisoners who refused to go back north. 21 19 22

Judgements of the occupation differ. The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture calls the North's occupation policy "rule by terror through the bloody purges of people's courts". The historian Charles Armstrong holds that, despite the executions, the "three-month KPA occupation of Seoul and a large part of South Korea was far from a reign of terror", pointing to the land reform, the women's and youth organizations and the restored people's committees. After the Inchon landing this order fell apart. Retreating KPA forces carried out widespread killing and destruction, marched about 20,000 prisoners north on a "death march" and killed many other South Korean political and military prisoners. When Seoul was retaken, those who had joined the committees or supported the North were purged in turn by the South Korean authorities. 19 21

Who killed the civilians?

The largest civilian massacres of the early war were carried out by the southern government. The National Bodo League was a state-sponsored body the Rhee government created in June 1949 to manage former leftists who had "converted", and police stations filled their quotas by enrolling people with no leftist connection at all. When war broke out, the Home Ministry's police bureau ordered that all persons under surveillance be detained and prison guards reinforced. According to the military police officer Kim Mansik, Rhee ordered the execution of people linked to the Bodo League or the WPSK on 27 June, and the first massacre began the next day in Hoengseong, Gangwon Province. The executions were carried out without trial or sentence. Historians estimate 60,000 to 200,000 victims, and the southern government hid the massacre for four decades while falsely blaming it on the communists. 23 24 25

In November 2009 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) reported, after a three-year investigation on its own initiative, that the police and the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of Army headquarters had summoned, detained and killed Bodo League members, with military police, air force and navy intelligence and right-wing youth groups taking part in some areas, and that civilians had died "by the decision and order of the highest levels". The commission put League membership at about 300,000; the total death toll could not be known, but 4,934 victims had been confirmed. Killings ran from about 100 to 1,000 people per county. In Ulsan, 407 members were shot in ten batches between 5 and 26 August 1950 in a valley of Mount Daeun and at Banjeong pass, and in 2009 a court ordered the state to pay compensation. 26 27 28

Political prisoners were killed in the jails as well. In Daejeon, as the KPA approached, South Korean forces executed about 7,000 political prisoners and buried them in mass graves; photographs taken by American officers who were present stayed classified until 1999. Near Busan 3,400 were executed. U.S. documents record that Ambassador John Muccio recommended to Rhee and Defense Minister Shin Sung-mo that the executions be stopped. After Seoul was retaken in late September, about 30,000 people were deemed collaborators and summarily shot, and on 4 January 1951 police on Ganghwa killed 139 civilians. American troops killed civilians too. From 26 to 29 July 1950 at Nogeun-ri in North Chungcheong, the U.S. 7th Cavalry Regiment fired on refugees gathered under a railway bridge. A 2005 South Korean government inquiry certified the names of 163 dead or missing and 55 wounded; the No Gun Ri Peace Foundation estimates 250 to 300 dead. The killings became known through a 1999 Associated Press report based on veterans' testimony and orders to fire on approaching refugees, and in 2001 President Clinton expressed regret. 24 29 30

The KPA committed massacres as well. On 28 June, the day it entered Seoul, it killed 700 to 900 doctors, nurses, inpatients and wounded soldiers at Seoul National University Hospital, shooting them, throwing grenades or burying them alive; 330 deaths are confirmed. On 17 August 1950 on Hill 303 near Waegwan in North Gyeongsang, KPA guards shot 41 American prisoners. Some accounts say the killings during the retreat were carried out systematically on Workers' Party orders. In 2024 the TRC certified, as "killings by hostile forces", cases such as the Duam church in Jeongeup, North Jeolla, where partisans killed some twenty people from children to the elderly because they were relatives of rightists and members of the congregation. The Sinchon massacre in Hwanghae is disputed: the North says American and South Korean forces killed 30,000 to 35,383 people over 52 days, while South Korean sources name communists and a small group of right-wing vigilantes. 31 32 33 34

Figures for total civilian losses differ by source. The Home Ministry statistics bureau in 1955 counted 990,968 civilian casualties in the South: 244,663 dead, 128,936 massacred, 229,625 wounded, 84,532 abducted and 303,212 missing. South Jeolla had the most massacre victims, 69,787. These statistics do not distinguish perpetrators. The TRC, established on 1 December 2005, investigated both killings by South Korean forces and the U.S. military and killings by hostile forces. 35 28

How did the Inchon landing reverse the war?

From 4 August to 18 September the UN and South Korean forces were penned in a defensive line about 230 km (140 miles) long around Busan, where some 140,000 UN troops held off 98,000 KPA soldiers. The KPA tried to break through in the August offensives and a great push beginning on 3 September but failed, and, having lost control of the air and sea, with its supply lines stretched, it reached the limit of its offensive power. U.S. ground forces grew to three divisions and two regiments, and naval and air units from Britain, Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand arrived. On 4 August the Soviet Union, back in the Security Council, proposed a ceasefire centred on the withdrawal of foreign troops, but the plan came to nothing once the United States made the collapse of the northern regime its aim. 36 37 7

MacArthur had been planning a landing behind enemy lines since the first days of the war, and chose Inchon. Its two narrow approach channels could easily be mined, the current ran at 3 to 8 knots, the tides were so extreme as to prevent immediate follow-on landings, and tall seawalls surrounded the harbour; U.S. Navy Commander Arlie Capps said it had "every natural and geographic handicap". The navy preferred Kunsan. At a meeting in Tokyo on 23 August nine members of Admiral Doyle's staff spent nearly 90 minutes on the technical problems, and MacArthur then spent 45 minutes arguing that because Inchon was so heavily defended the enemy would not expect an attack there, that victory would avoid a brutal winter campaign, and that it would cut the KPA's supply lines. The Joint Chiefs approved the plan on 28 August. On 2 July China's Zhou Enlai had already passed Mao's advice to the Soviet ambassador that the North should build a strong defence at Inchon because the Americans could land there. 38 8

Operation Chromite began at dawn on 15 September, with some 75,000 troops and 261 naval vessels. After a preparatory bombardment from 5 a.m., the 3rd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Marines landed on Wolmi-do and took the island in two hours, and the U.S. 1st Marine Division and the ROK 1st Marine Regiment secured Inchon. Kimpo airfield was taken on the morning of 18 September. The Eighth Army counterattacked from the Pusan Perimeter and broke out on 18 September, and Seoul was retaken on 28 September. On 23 September Kim Il Sung ordered the KPA into general retreat. 38 7 2 9

The KPA trapped in the South disintegrated quickly; only 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers reached the KPA lines during the retreat. By the end of October the UN forces held 135,000 KPA prisoners, and with some 200,000 killed or wounded the KPA had suffered 335,000 casualties since late June and lost 313 tanks. Some of the stragglers hid in the mountains of the South and became guerrillas in the Taebaek and Sobaek ranges. On 27 September Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo, condemned the incompetence of the KPA command and held the Soviet military advisers responsible. 2 37 8

With this victory the war aim widened from restoring the 38th parallel to removing the northern regime. Rhee ordered a march north, declaring that "the 38th parallel was already destroyed when the North Korean army invaded", and on 27 September the U.S. government issued a directive to MacArthur for operations north of the parallel. The ROK 3rd Division crossed first on 1 October, and the UN forces followed after the General Assembly resolved on 7 October to establish a unified Korea. The U.S. Eighth Army took Pyongyang on 19 October, and the lead units of the ROK 6th Division reached the Yalu at Chosan. 37 19 2 39

Why did China fight under the name of the People's Volunteer Army?

On 29 September Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong wrote to Stalin begging for direct Soviet military help or "volunteer units of China and other countries of people's democracy". The letter reached Stalin at 2:50 a.m. on 1 October, and ten minutes later he cabled Mao Zedong asking him to move "at least 5-6 divisions" to the 38th parallel. Mansourov, working from the Soviet documents, writes that this cable apparently first proposed the "volunteer" formula. Stalin did not tell Pyongyang of the request. 8

Beijing's first answer was no. On 2 October the CCP Politburo judged that the risks outweighed the benefits, and the views of Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao prevailed. Mao's reply, relayed on 3 October by the Soviet ambassador Roshchin, said the Chinese troops were still weak and a clash with America would wreck the plan for peaceful reconstruction and could drag in the USSR, so it was "better to show patience now" and let Korea accept temporary defeat and "change the form of the struggle to partisan war". At 1 a.m. that same day Zhou summoned the Indian ambassador K. M. Panikkar and warned that China would intervene if American troops crossed the 38th parallel. The Russian documents cast doubt on whether the 2 October telegram from Mao printed in Chinese sources was ever sent. 8 40

Stalin pressed again. The Americans would not dare start a big war, he argued, and even if they did, "let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee's Korea". Mao wanted Lin Biao to command, but Lin declined on grounds of illness, and Peng Dehuai, summoned from the northwest, arrived on 4 October and with Gao Gang backed intervention, arguing that an American occupation of all Korea would be a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. The enlarged Politburo meeting of 4-5 October decided to send troops with Peng as commander. On 8 October Mao ordered the Northeast Frontier Force renamed the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the draft name zhiyuanjun written 支援军 ("support army") was changed to the homophone 志愿军 ("volunteer army"). The name let China claim it had not formally gone to war with the United States. 8 40 41 42

Air cover was the remaining problem. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao met Stalin on the Black Sea coast in October, and the Soviets said they would supply equipment but could not yet send their air force over Korea. On 12 October Stalin told Kim that the Chinese had refused again and that Korea would have to be evacuated, and plans were drawn up to move Kim's government and army to China and the Soviet Far East. But within 24 hours, on the 13th, word came that the Chinese had agreed to help. The People's Volunteers crossed the Yalu on 19 October and opened their first offensive on 25 October with 270,000 men. The National Archives of Korea explains the Chinese forces' sudden disappearance after the first offensive as a deliberate feint to lure the UN forces on. 8 42 39

MacArthur's "Christmas offensive" of 24 November collapsed against the second Chinese offensive. The U.S. Eighth Army left Pyongyang on 4 December, and in the east the U.S. X Corps and ROK I Corps, their retreat cut off, were evacuated by sea from Hungnam. The Chinese crossed the 38th parallel in their third offensive on 31 December, and on 4 January 1951 the UN forces gave up Seoul again (the "1.4 retreat"). In this crisis the South Korean government called up men aged 17 to 40 into a National Defense Corps under the National Defense Corps Act promulgated on 21 December 1950. The call-up grew from 480,000 to 680,000 men. The aim was to avoid a repeat of the KPA drafting young men as "volunteers" during the occupation. 39 43 22

The result was a catastrophe. Defense Minister Shin Sung-mo had the Korean Youth Corps leader Kim Yun-geun commissioned a brigadier general and put in command, and the officers siphoned off the budget and the food. Ordered to march to training camps in the South in midwinter, the conscripts collapsed from hunger and frostbite without food or winter clothing, while the Defense Ministry and Chough Pyung-ok's Home Ministry even quarrelled over who had authority to issue grain. Death estimates range from 50,000-90,000 to 120,000 and to over 200,000. When a National Assembly investigation exposed the embezzlement, Shin resigned, Vice President Yi Si-yeong resigned in protest, and on 12 August 1951 five officers including Kim Yun-geun and Yun Ik-heon were publicly executed. In the same winter, from 9 to 11 February, the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, ROK 11th Division, sweeping an area guerrillas had briefly controlled, killed 719 unarmed villagers in Sinwon township, Geochang, South Gyeongsang, 385 of them children. Shin Chung-mok, a lawmaker from Geochang, exposed it in the National Assembly in March. 43 22 44 45 46

The secret war in the air: how did the Soviet pilots fight?

On 11 October 1950 Stalin agreed to send Soviet Air Force MiG-15 fighters to give air cover to the Chinese troops moving into Korea. On 1 November Soviet MiG-15s began defensive patrols over the Yalu, and that day, of the Soviet aircraft that intercepted about 15 USAF P-51 Mustangs, First Lieutenant Fiodor Chizh shot one down. The same day three MiG-15s attacked about ten F-80s, counted as the first air combat between jets. The Soviet authorities credited First Lieutenant Semyon Khominich with an F-80, though a U.S. record says that aircraft was lost to anti-aircraft fire. The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (64th IAK) was established on 14 November. 47 48

The participation was kept strictly secret. The MiGs carried Chinese Air Force markings, the pilots were given Chinese documents and uniforms, and they were forbidden to approach the front line or fly over the sea. Early on they were required not to speak Russian on missions and to learn Korean phrases, a rule dropped after the first battles because it was practically impossible. The corps' main task was to cover the Yalu bridges and hydroelectric plants, North Korean facilities and the Chinese rear, and it also trained Chinese and North Korean pilots. The corps headquarters was at Mukden and Andong, with airfields at Mukden, Anshan and Andong (Miaogou). Despite the secrecy, UN pilots were aware of the Soviet presence. The details of Soviet participation were published in the USSR only in the 1970s and 1980s. 47 49

On 12 April 1951 thirty MiGs intercepted 48 B-29 bombers escorted by about 100 F-80s and F-84s, shooting down three and damaging seven with no communist losses. The Americans called it "Black Thursday", and bomber sorties stopped for about three months before switching to night raids. UN pilots called the northwestern corner of North Korea, where the Yalu empties into the Yellow Sea, "MiG Alley", where MiG-15s fought F-86 Sabres. 48

Kill ratios are sharply disputed. USAF F-86 pilots claimed 792 MiGs destroyed for 78 Sabres lost, a ratio of 10 to 1. A RAND report drawing on recent scholarship put the actual ratio at 1.8 to 1 overall and likely closer to 1.3 to 1 against MiGs flown by Soviet pilots. The top Soviet scorers are usually named as Nikolai Sutyagin (21 victories, 22 in some sources) and Yevgeny Pepelyayev (20, or 23 in some sources). The corps rotated its units: twelve fighter aviation divisions, two night fighter regiments, two naval aviation fighter wings and four anti-aircraft artillery divisions passed through it, and in 1952 it numbered 26,000 personnel. 48 50 49 47

Over the war the corps flew about 64,000 sorties and fought 1,872 air battles. Its official totals claim 1,250 UN aircraft shot down, 1,100 by fighters and 150 by anti-aircraft guns, figures the English encyclopedia calls inflated. The corps lost 335 aircraft, with 120 pilots and 68 anti-aircraft gunners killed. By the Soviet count its kill ratio fell from 7.9 to 1 between November 1950 and January 1952 to 2.2 to 1 in 1952 and 1.9 to 1 in 1953. Major General Georgy Lobov commanded the corps from the autumn of 1951 to August 1952. After the armistice the corps left Korea for Petrozavodsk. 47 49

Prisoners and Stalin's death: why did the armistice take two years?

In spring 1951, after the fourth and fifth Chinese offensives were stopped and the front hardened near the 38th parallel, both sides concluded that a military solution was out of reach. On 3 June George Kennan proposed U.S.-Soviet talks, and on 23 June the Soviet delegate Malik responded in an address on the UN radio network. Syngman Rhee objected in a statement that he could accept "no peace proposal that might, by deceiving us with empty promises of peace, let the war spread". Talks opened at Kaesong on 10 July, broke off there, and resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October 1951. Talks expected to finish in six weeks dragged on for two years over the demarcation line, supervision and prisoners, while hill battles such as Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge and White Horse Hill went on. 51 8 52

The biggest obstacle was the repatriation of prisoners. The UN Command insisted on voluntary repatriation, refusing to send back prisoners who did not wish to go, while the communist side demanded the return of all prisoners under Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Geoje prison camp held up to 173,000 prisoners by June 1951, including 150,000 KPA and 20,000 Chinese. Many of them were southerners who had been forcibly drafted as "volunteers" during the occupation and then captured. Bloody clashes between anti-communist prisoners who refused repatriation and pro-communist prisoners who wanted it were frequent; after a riot on 18 February 1952, the camp commandant, Brigadier General Dodd, was kidnapped by prisoners on 7 May and later released. 53 54 19 9

The Soviet documents show that Stalin consistently took a hard line. Since the Americans had an even greater need for an armistice, he advised Mao, the Chinese and Koreans should, "using flexible tactics in the negotiations, continue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations". On 16 July 1952 Kim Il Sung wrote to Stalin that in a single day of bombing of Pyongyang, on 11 July and the night of 12 July, more than 6,000 civilians had been killed or wounded and that the enemy had put every power station out of action, and urged moving quickly to an armistice on the basis of returning all prisoners under the Geneva convention. Mao answered that accepting the enemy's proposal would be disadvantageous, and Stalin called Mao's position "completely correct". On 20 August Zhou Enlai told Stalin that China could not yield on the prisoner question as a matter of principle, and that Mao believed the war was delaying the next world war by 15 to 20 years. 8

On 3 December 1952 the UN General Assembly adopted India's prisoner proposal as Resolution 610, under which a neutral nations repatriation commission would take custody of prisoners who refused repatriation for a period of persuasion; the USSR and China at first opposed it. Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 changed the game. At Stalin's funeral Zhou Enlai "urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of an armistice", and on 19 March the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution with draft letters to Mao and Kim. Noting that the resolution was drafted in only two weeks, Weathersby argues that it was Stalin's death, rather than the nuclear threats the Eisenhower administration later cited, that brought the breakthrough. On 28 March the communist side accepted the proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners, and Zhou proposed handing those who did not want to go home to a neutral state. The exchange of wounded prisoners (Operation Little Switch) began on 20 April, the plenary talks resumed on 26 April, and the prisoner agreement was signed on 8 June. 19 55 8 56 9

Rhee refused an armistice without unification. On 24 April he warned that if an armistice left Chinese troops in the North he would take the ROK army out of the UN commander's control, and before dawn on 18 June, without telling the Americans, he released about 27,000 anti-communist prisoners (26,000 according to the National Archives of Korea). The United States had by then settled on a plan to remove Rhee, known as Plan Everready (30 May), and in retaliation for the release Peng Dehuai launched on 13 July the strongest offensive since the talks began. Washington sent Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson as a special envoy, who spent sixteen days persuading Rhee, and on 11 July Rhee agreed to the armistice in return for negotiations on a mutual defense treaty, long-term economic aid, a U.S. promise to walk out of the political conference if it produced nothing within 90 days, and aid to expand the ROK army. 19 51 9

At 10 a.m. on 27 July 1953 at Panmunjom, Nam Il for the KPA and the Chinese People's Volunteers and William Harrison for the UN Command signed the armistice. The agreement was concluded in the names of UN Commander Clark, KPA Supreme Commander Kim Il Sung and CPV Commander Peng Dehuai; Clark signed separately at Munsan and Kim at Pyongyang. The South Korean government sent no representative. The agreement took effect at 10 p.m. that day. Its preamble states its purpose: to stop the Korean conflict, which had brought great suffering and bloodshed to both sides, by establishing an armistice to "ensure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved". 57 52 9 51

The main prisoner exchange (Operation Big Switch) followed the armistice. In the end more than 22,000 KPA and Chinese prisoners refused repatriation, while on the other side 327 South Korean soldiers, 21 Americans and one Briton refused to return and stayed in the North. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, chaired by India's General Thimayya, took charge of them, and on 23 January 1954, after the persuasion period ended, the UN side released some 23,000 prisoners who had refused repatriation. 52 53 55 19

An unfinished war: what was settled, and what remained?

The document signed at Panmunjom was a military armistice, not a peace treaty. Paragraph 60 recommended that a political conference be held within three months to settle the withdrawal of foreign forces and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The conference opened at Geneva on 26 April 1954, and Zhou Enlai proposed a peace treaty, but U.S. Secretary of State Dulles did not accommodate it. On 15 June the sixteen countries that had sent troops under the UN declared the discussion closed, the Korean question ended without result, and the armistice remained the only formal document. The armistice set up a demilitarized zone about 4 km wide and 250 km long, along a line not far from the prewar 38th parallel. South Korea and the United States signed a mutual defense treaty on 1 October 1953. 57 52 19 58 59

Casualty figures differ widely by source. The Institute for Military History of the ROK Ministry of National Defense lists North Korean military losses as 607,396 (508,797 dead) in the Four-Year History of the Korean War, 640,000 in the Military Armistice Commission handbook, and 801,000 including wounded in U.S. data. In 2010 the Chinese government revised its count to 183,108 dead and 25,621 missing, while the South Korean estimate puts Chinese losses at 972,600, including 148,600 dead. The United States suffered 33,739 battle deaths and 2,835 non-battle deaths. South Korean military losses (dead, wounded and missing) were given as about 257,000 by the UN side and about 586,000 by the communist side. The Strategic Air Command chief Curtis LeMay recalled in 1988 that "we... eventually burned down every town in North Korea anyway, some way or another". Hydroelectric plants were attacked from June 1952 and, late in the war, irrigation dams as well. 35 2 19 60

The southern partisans were abandoned by the armistice. After Inchon, KPA soldiers and party workers cut off from retreat and southern communists went into Jirisan and other mountains as guerrillas, and in November and December 1950 Yi Hyon-sang's Southern Corps of the Korean People's Guerrillas was formed. The South Korean government mounted joint army and police sweeps from October 1950 and set up the Paek Field Combat Command under Paik Sun-yup. The ROK claimed to have killed 11,090 partisans and sympathizers and captured 9,916 between December 1951 and March 1952. Around Mount Baega in Hwasun, South Jeolla, the ROK 11th Division burned 50 villages in a "strong walls and cleared fields" (gyeonbyeok cheongya) operation, and U.S. bombers dropped napalm there between November 1951 and February 1952. The TRC confirmed 111 local residents killed by partisans in the area and, separately, 291 residents shot or taken away and disappeared by the ROK 11th Division. 61 62 2

A week after the armistice, on 3 August 1953, Pak Hon-yong was arrested in Pyongyang, and Yi Sung-yop and other WPSK cadres were tried and sentenced to death on charges of spying for the United States and plotting to overthrow the government. Pak was sentenced to death on 15 December 1955 and executed on 19 July 1956. The guerrillas' 5th District Party in Jirisan adopted a resolution backing the purge at a meeting in Bitjeom valley on 26 August and dissolved itself on 5 September. Yi Hyon-sang was found dead in Bitjeom valley in September 1953. The remaining bands around Mount Baega were wiped out in March 1955, and when the last two were killed and captured on 12 November 1963 the guerrillas officially ceased to exist. 63 64 65 61

The war changed things beyond the peninsula too. Japan became the UN forces' supply base, earning $1 billion in direct special procurement in 1950-52 and $3.6 billion in indirect procurement up to 1955, and firms such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries learned American mass production and quality control while repairing U.S. equipment. In August 1950 a 75,000-strong National Police Reserve was created, which became the Ground Self-Defense Force in 1954. Cumings writes that the Korean War was the crisis that, in Acheson's words, "came along and saved us", enabling the final approval of NSC 68 and a quadrupling of American defense spending. The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture sums up that the war fed anti-communist hysteria and McCarthyism in the United States, strengthened Mao Zedong's rule in China, and spread the view that China's voice on Asian questions had to be acknowledged. 66 67 2 19

The argument over what kind of war it was has not ended either. In The Hidden History of the Korean War (1952), I. F. Stone argued that the South had provoked the North with repeated guerrilla attacks across the parallel. In The Origins of the Korean War (vol. 1, 1980; vol. 2, 1991), Bruce Cumings traced the war's roots to the social conflicts after liberation and the American division of the country, writing that "civil wars do not start: they come". Stueck found Cumings' account unconvincing but granted that he explored aspects of the war that traditionalist accounts had neglected. The Soviet documents opened in the 1990s showed that Kim Il Sung repeatedly asked to start the war, that Stalin approved it and that Mao agreed; at the same time the clashes on the parallel in 1949, the guerrilla war in the South and the massacres of civilians by both sides show that it was a civil war as well as an international one. 68 69 8 2

Consequences

The war ended without unification and fixed the division in place, at an enormous cost in lives on both sides of the peninsula and in China. For the Soviet Union it tied down American resources without a direct clash, but the price was high: it accelerated Western rearmament and hardened NATO into a military organization. China's standing in the socialist camp rose sharply on the strength of having fought the United States, which became one of the conditions for the later Sino-Soviet split. That armistice talks moved quickly after Stalin's death in March 1953 shows how far the war's continuation had rested on Moscow's judgment.

Timeline & Map

Seoul Yalu River (Andong, Sinuiju) Pyongyang Kaesong Panmunjom Wolmido, Incheon Daejeon No Gun Ri Sinwon, Geochang Jirisan Busan Geoje POW camp Jeju 4 Moscow 6 Moscow 7 Moscow 9 Moscow 25 Moscow 15 Prague 29 Geneva 18 Yalu River (Andong, Sinuiju) 19 Yalu River (Andong, Sinuiju) 22 Yalu River (Andong, Sinuiju) 10 Beijing 3 Pyongyang 27 Pyongyang 5 Kaesong 23 Kaesong 26 Panmunjom 2 Seoul 8 Seoul 11 Seoul 17 Seoul 20 Seoul 12 Hoengseong 16 Wolmido, Incheon 13 No Gun Ri 21 Sinwon, Geochang 28 Bitjeomgol, Jirisan 14 Busan 24 Geoje Island 1 Jeju

1950.06 War begins at the 38th parallel

  • Korean People’s Army and Chinese volunteers
  • South Korean and UN forces

Front lines are approximate, drawn from US Army Center of Military History campaign maps (Appleman, South to the Naktong; Mossman, Ebb and Flow) and the armistice line; guerrilla areas behind the lines are not shown. Map sources: US Army Center of Military History, Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1961), Map III; US Army Center of Military History, Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow (1990), Maps 3 and 13

  1. 1945.08United StatesSoviet Union
    The 38th parallel is proposed

    With Japan about to surrender, the United States proposed dividing Korea into US and Soviet occupation zones, and the officers Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel chose the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union accepted.

  2. 11948.04.03South Korea
    The Jeju uprising begins

    An uprising broke out on Jeju. About 30,000 people died in the uprising and its suppression, and most of the identified civilian victims were killed by South Korean soldiers and police.

  3. 21948.08.15South Korea
    The Republic of Korea is founded

    Following the 10 May election held in the South under a UN General Assembly resolution, the government of the Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Seoul.

  4. 31948.09.09Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    The DPRK is founded

    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang. Both governments claimed to be the only lawful government of the whole peninsula.

  5. 41949.03.05Soviet UnionDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    Kim Il Sung meets Stalin in the Kremlin

    Stalin insisted that "the 38th parallel must be peaceful", and when Kim raised military unification two days later he refused, citing the North's military weakness and the danger of US intervention.

  6. 51949.05.04South KoreaDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    Fighting on Songak Mountain at Kaesong

    Regular troops of North and South clashed on Songak Mountain at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. Korean Wikipedia counts 874 clashes on the parallel from January 1949 to the eve of the war.

  7. 1949.06.29United States
    US troops complete their withdrawal

    The withdrawal of US troops from South Korea was completed. The English encyclopedia lists this among the factors that changed Stalin's calculation.

  8. 61949.09.24Soviet Union
    The Soviet Politburo rejects an attack

    The Soviet Politburo turned down Kim Il Sung's request, saying the KPA was not ready and a first strike would give the Americans a pretext to interfere, and it also forbade a limited attack on the Ongjin peninsula.

  9. 1950.01.12United States
    Acheson's defence perimeter speech

    Secretary of State Dean Acheson left South Korea outside the US defence perimeter in a speech, while saying that nations outside it could expect help from the United Nations if attacked.

  10. 71950.01.30Soviet Union
    Stalin: "ready to help"

    Through Shtykov, Stalin told Kim Il Sung that so large a matter needed thorough preparation, but that he was ready to meet him and ready to help.

  11. 81950.03.27South Korea
    WPSK underground leaders arrested

    The WPSK underground leader Yi Ju-ha was arrested in Seoul, and Kim Sam-ryong the next day, dealing the party's southern organisation a heavy blow.

  12. 91950.03.30–04.25Soviet UnionDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong in Moscow

    The two stayed in the Soviet Union until 25 April, and the invasion plan was settled during the visit. Stalin agreed on condition that Mao would send reinforcements if needed.

  13. 101950.05.14Soviet UnionChina
    Stalin informs Mao of his consent

    The day after Kim met Mao in Beijing, Stalin cabled that he agreed to the Korean comrades' proposal to move toward unification, and that China and Korea must take the final decision together.

  14. 1950.06.25Democratic People's Republic of KoreaSouth Korea
    The KPA crosses the 38th parallel

    At dawn the KPA attacked without a declaration of war on the Ongjin, Kaesong and Munsan, Uijeongbu, Chuncheon and Gangneung axes. The same day the UN Security Council condemned the armed attack in Resolution 82.

  15. 1950.06.27United StatesSoviet Union
    Resolution 83 and the US order to intervene

    Truman ordered US naval and air forces into action and sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. The Security Council passed Resolution 83 by 7 to 1, recommending aid to the Republic of Korea, while Malik stayed away.

  16. 111950.06.28South KoreaDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    Seoul falls and the Han bridge is blown

    At dawn the ROK army blew up the Han River bridge while refugees were crossing it, and Seoul fell. Entering the city, the KPA killed medical staff, patients and wounded soldiers at Seoul National University Hospital.

  17. 121950.06.28South Korea
    The Bodo League killings begin

    According to the military police officer Kim Man-sik, the killing of Bodo League members began in Hoengseong, Gangwon, following Rhee's order of the previous day. Executions without trial spread across the country.

  18. 1950.07.07United States
    Resolution 84 sets up the Unified Command

    Security Council Resolution 84 created a Unified Command under the United States with the right to fly the UN flag, and MacArthur was named its commander.

  19. 1950.07.25–09.13Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    People's committee elections in the occupied South

    Under a decree of 14 July, elections to people's committees began at city, county, township and village level in the occupied South and were held in 103 counties by 13 September. Land reform went on at the same time.

  20. 131950.07.26–29United States
    The No Gun Ri killings

    At No Gun Ri in North Chungcheong, the US 7th Cavalry Regiment fired on refugees gathered under a railway bridge until 29 July. A South Korean government inquiry confirmed 163 dead or missing.

  21. 141950.08.04–09.18United StatesSouth KoreaDemocratic People's Republic of Korea
    The Pusan Perimeter battles

    UN and ROK forces held off KPA offensives along a line of about 230 km around Busan. The battles ended when the Eighth Army broke out on 18 September.

  22. 151950.08.27Soviet Union
    Stalin's reply to Gottwald

    Through the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Stalin gave four reasons for the Security Council boycott and wrote that the United States, tied down in the Far East, was turning its eyes away from Europe.

  23. 161950.09.15United StatesSouth Korea
    The Inchon landing

    In Operation Chromite, with about 75,000 troops and 261 ships, US Marines took Wolmido and Incheon.

  24. 171950.09.28United StatesSouth Korea
    Seoul is retaken

    UN and ROK forces recaptured Seoul. People who had served on the people's committees were then purged as collaborators.

  25. 1950.10.01South KoreaSoviet UnionChina
    ROK troops cross the parallel; Stalin asks for Chinese troops

    The ROK 3rd Division was the first to cross the 38th parallel. The same day Stalin cabled Mao asking for at least five or six divisions to be sent to the parallel.

  26. 181950.10.19ChinaUnited States
    Pyongyang taken; the PVA crosses the Yalu

    The US Eighth Army took Pyongyang, and the same day the Chinese People's Volunteer Army crossed the Yalu. Its first offensive opened on 25 October.

  27. 191950.11.01Soviet UnionUnited States
    The first MiG-15 combat

    Soviet MiG-15s began patrols over the Yalu and shot down a US Mustang, and the first jet-to-jet combat took place between MiG-15s and F-80s. The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps was formed on 14 November.

  28. 1950.12.21South Korea
    The National Defense Corps Act

    The South Korean government promulgated a law calling up men aged 17 to 40 into the National Defense Corps. Embezzlement by its officers left tens of thousands of conscripts to die of hunger and frostbite.

  29. 201951.01.04ChinaUnited StatesSouth Korea
    The January 4 retreat

    Under the third Chinese offensive, UN forces gave up Seoul once more.

  30. 211951.02.09–11South Korea
    The Geochang killings

    The 3rd Battalion, 9th Regiment, ROK 11th Division killed 719 unarmed villagers in Sinwon, Geochang, South Gyeongsang, 385 of them children.

  31. 221951.04.12Soviet UnionUnited States
    "Black Thursday"

    Thirty MiGs intercepted 48 B-29 bombers, shooting down three and damaging seven. US daylight bombing was halted for about three months.

  32. 231951.07.10Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChinaUnited States
    Armistice talks open at Kaesong

    After Kennan's overture and Malik's response, armistice talks opened at Kaesong. They moved to Panmunjom on 25 October.

  33. 1951.08.12South Korea
    National Defense Corps officers executed

    After a National Assembly inquiry exposed the fraud, five officers of the National Defense Corps, including its commander Kim Yun-geun, were publicly executed.

  34. 241952.05.07United StatesDemocratic People's Republic of KoreaChina
    The Geoje camp commandant is seized

    Prisoners at the Geoje POW camp seized the commandant, Brigadier General Dodd, and later released him, amid continuing clashes between anti- and pro-communist prisoners over repatriation.

  35. 1952.12.03United StatesSoviet UnionChina
    The UN adopts India's POW plan

    The UN General Assembly adopted India's plan, under which a neutral nations commission would take charge of prisoners refusing repatriation, as Resolution 610. The Soviet Union and China at first opposed it.

  36. 251953.03.05Soviet Union
    Stalin dies

    After Stalin's death the Soviet Council of Ministers adopted on 19 March draft letters pressing for an armistice, and on the 28th the communist side accepted an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

  37. 1953.06.18South Korea
    Rhee releases anti-communist prisoners

    Without telling the Americans, Rhee set free about 27,000 anti-communist prisoners. The National Archives commentary gives 26,000.

  38. 261953.07.27Democratic People's Republic of KoreaChinaUnited States
    The Armistice Agreement is signed

    At 10 a.m. at Panmunjom, Nam Il and William Harrison signed the Armistice Agreement, which took effect at 10 that night. The South Korean government sent no delegate.

  39. 271953.08.03Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    Pak Hon-yong arrested

    A week after the armistice Pak Hon-yong was arrested in Pyongyang, and Yi Sung-yop and other WPSK cadres were sentenced to death as American spies.

  40. 281953.09South Korea
    Death of Yi Hyeon-sang

    Yi Hyeon-sang, who had led the Southern Army partisans, was found dead at Bitjeomgol on Jirisan. The party's 5th District organisation on Jirisan had dissolved itself on 5 September.

  41. 1953.10.01South KoreaUnited States
    The US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

    South Korea and the United States signed a mutual defence treaty, one of the conditions Rhee had set for accepting the armistice.

  42. 1954.01.23United StatesSouth Korea
    Non-repatriate prisoners released

    When the neutral nations commission's persuasion period ended, the UN side released about 23,000 prisoners who had refused repatriation.

  43. 291954.04.26–06.15ChinaUnited StatesDemocratic People's Republic of KoreaSouth Korea
    The Geneva Conference

    The political conference called for in Article 60 of the armistice met in Geneva, but on 15 June the sixteen UN contributing states declared the discussion closed and the Korean question ended without result.

Related people 68

North: DPRK, China and USSR37

Leadership7

The leader who gave approvalJoseph Stalin1878–1953

He approved on the judgment that the United States would not intervene, but ruled out direct Soviet participation throughout.

Who pressed for unification by forceKim Il Sung1912–1994

He asked for approval repeatedly from 1949 and commanded the Korean People's Army once the war began.

Commander and Commissar of the People's Volunteer ArmyPeng Dehuai1898–1974

At the 5 October 1950 Politburo meeting he backed Mao's intervention and turned the debate; from 19 October he commanded the PVA and expelled UN forces from the Yalu.

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers who, after Stalin's death, decided to end the warGeorgy Malenkov1901–1988

On 19 March 1953, just two weeks after Stalin died, he chaired the Council of Ministers resolution that approved draft letters to Mao and Kim Il Sung directing a shift to active negotiation.

Internal Affairs Minister in the post-Stalin collective leadership who concurred on ending the warLavrentiy Beria1899–1953

With Malenkov and Molotov he formed the post-Stalin troika and joined the 19 March Council of Ministers resolution to pursue an end to the war.

Foreign Minister in the post-Stalin collective leadership who concurred on ending the warVyacheslav Molotov1890–1986

Joined Malenkov and Beria in the 19 March resolution and subsequently coordinated the diplomatic direction of the armistice talks.

Commander of the Southern Army partisansYi Hyeon-sang1905–1953

After the Inchon landing he went into Jirisan and formed the Southern Army of the Korean People's Guerrillas in November and December 1950. He was found dead at Bitjeomgol in September 1953.

Participants20

Who sent the People's VolunteersMao Zedong1893–1976

When UN forces pushed north he decided to intervene, driving the line south again.

Negotiating the interventionZhou Enlai1898–1976

He travelled to Moscow to negotiate the terms of air cover and equipment.

The empty seat, and the ceasefire proposalYakov Malik1906–1980

He boycotted the Security Council over Chinese representation, and in 1951 publicly proposed ceasefire talks.

Participated as commander of a fighter aviation divisionIvan Kozhedub1920–1991

Sent to North Korea as a radio jamming officerPyotr Pleshakov1922–1987

Head of advisory group to Chinese People's VolunteersMikhail Shalin1897–1970

PLA Commander-in-ChiefZhu De1886–1976

As PLA Commander-in-Chief, he participated in the 1950 decision-making conferences on intervention and oversaw the military's support for the Korean War effort.

WPK First SecretaryHo Ka-i1908–1953

As WPK First Secretary, he led a wartime party purge expelling 450,000 of 600,000 members, then fell after clashing with Kim Il Sung over party organization.

KPA Artillery Commander and II Corps CommanderKim Mu-chong1904–1952

As artillery commander and II Corps commander he led the advance on the Naktong front, but was purged in December 1950 after battlefield failure and an accidental killing.

Soviet deputy foreign minister who urged crossing the 38th parallelAndrei Gromyko1909–1989

On 4 December 1950 he advised the Chinese ambassador Wang Jiaxiang that Beijing should press its offensive across the 38th parallel. Stueck writes that the decision not to return to the Security Council in late June was Stalin's alone, against the advice of his top aides.

Mao's first choice to command, who refusedLin Biao1907–1971

Mao first named Lin to command the PVA, but Lin declined citing ill health and left for medical treatment in the Soviet Union. Whether he opposed the intervention itself remains debated.

Rear base chief for Chinese forcesGao Gang1905–1954

He convened pre-intervention cadre meetings in Shenyang, organized logistics, and served as Mao's key contact for all practical preparations.

commander of the 196th Fighter RegimentYevgeny Pepelyayev1918–2013

One of the top Soviet aces of the war, credited with 20 or 23 kills depending on the source.

top-scoring ace over MiG AlleyNikolai Sutyagin1923–1986

Counted as the top Soviet ace of the war, with 21 or 22 kills depending on the source.

Korean War soldierWang Hongwen1935–1992

He fought in the Korean War.

Korean War veteranYang Dezhi1911–1994

He fought in Korea.

Broker of the invasion's approvalTerentii Shtykov1907–1964

As first ambassador to the DPRK, he conveyed Kim Il Sung's invasion plan to Stalin and secured approval for the war.

Foreign minister who promised an uprisingPak Hon-yong1900–1956

With Kim Il Sung he pressed for an attack in August 1949 and went with him to Moscow in March and April 1950. Korean Wikipedia says he promised a rising of 200,000 WPSK members. He was arrested on 3 August 1953 and executed on 19 July 1956.

Chairman of the Seoul People's Committee under occupationYi Sung-yop1905–1954

A WPSK leader, he headed the Seoul People's Committee during the KPA occupation and was sentenced to death after the armistice as an American spy.

Member of the central election board for the occupied SouthKim Won-bong1898–1958

He sat on the central election guidance committee that ran the people's committee elections in the occupied South in the summer of 1950.

South: ROK and UN Command26

Implementers & commanders10

UN Command CommanderMark W. Clark1896–1984

Succeeded Ridgway in May 1952, ordered the bombing of Pyongyang, and signed the armistice for the UNC.

Army Chief of Staff at the war's outbreakChae Byeong-deok1916–1950

He was dismissed for preparedness failures, including the premature demolition of the Han River bridges.

Inchon landing force commanderEdward Almond1892–1979

As MacArthur's chief of staff, he commanded the X Corps in the Inchon landing operation.

1st Marine Division commanderOliver P. Smith1893–1977

He commanded the Inchon landing and the advance to Seoul.

Senior U.S. military officerOmar Bradley1893–1981

As the senior military officer when war began in June 1950, he reorganized and deployed U.S. forces.

Strategic Air Command commanderCurtis E. LeMay1906–1990

In 1988 he recalled of the bombing of Korea that "we burned down every town in North Korea" one way or another.

Approved MacArthur's reliefGeorge C. Marshall1880–1959

As Secretary of Defense, he approved MacArthur's relief during the Korean War.

Defence minister during the National Defense Corps scandalShin Sung-mo1891–1960

As defence minister he put Kim Yun-geun, head of the Korean Youth Corps, in command of the National Defense Corps, and resigned when a National Assembly inquiry exposed the fraud. US records say Ambassador Muccio urged him to stop the execution of political prisoners.

Commander of the National Defense CorpsKim Yun-geun?–1951

Head of the Korean Youth Corps, he was commissioned a brigadier general to command the National Defense Corps. He was publicly executed on 12 August 1951 for the embezzlement of funds and food that left tens of thousands of conscripts dead.

Commander of Task Force Paik against the partisansPaik Sun-yup1920–2020

As commander of I Corps he headed the corps-level Task Force Paik, which led the campaign against the Southern Army partisans around Jirisan.

Participants11

Security Council President triggering Soviet boycottTsiang Tingfu1895–1965

On 13 January 1950, as the Nationalist Chinese representative chairing the Security Council, his presence prompted Soviet delegate Malik to walk out, starting the boycott.

Lieutenant General who signed the Armistice as UNC delegateWilliam K. Harrison Jr.1895–1987

He signed the Korean Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom as the senior delegate of the UN Command after 158 meetings.

US deputy ambassador who proposed Resolution 82Ernest Gross1906–1999

On June 25, 1950, he introduced Resolution 82 in the UN Security Council and managed the procedural maneuvering that produced the 9-0 vote.

Undersecretary shaping the U.S. responseJames Webb1906–1992

After the Korean War began, he and Acheson formulated three recommendations, including a response through the UN.

U.S. Air Force combat pilotRichard Heyser1927–2008

He flew combat missions in the Korean War.

Korean War servicemanWilliam Westmoreland1914–2005

He served in the Korean War.

US Secretary of State of the defence perimeter speechDean Acheson1893–1971

In his speech of 12 January 1950 he left South Korea outside the US Pacific defence perimeter, while saying that nations outside it could expect UN help if attacked.

US officer who chose the 38th parallelDean Rusk1909–1994

In August 1945 he and Charles Bonesteel chose the 38th parallel as the line between US and Soviet zones, and he later recalled that it mattered to put Seoul in the American zone.

State Department adviser who visited Seoul before the warJohn Foster Dulles1888–1959

On 18 June 1950 in Seoul he heard Rhee repeat his wish to conquer the North, and as Secretary of State at Geneva in 1954 he rejected Zhou Enlai's proposal for a peace treaty.

Home minister during the National Defense Corps scandalChough Pyung-ok1894–1960

His Home Ministry quarrelled with the Defence Ministry over the right to issue grain to the National Defense Corps.

US diplomat who opened the way to talksGeorge F. Kennan1904–2005

On 3 June 1951 he proposed US-Soviet talks; Malik answered in a UN radio address on 23 June, leading to the Kaesong talks of 10 July.

Related terms

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