Soviet General Staff
소련군 총참모부
The Soviet General Staff (Генеральный штаб) was the central staff organ of the Soviet armed forces, responsible for operational planning, the collation of intelligence and the drafting of command directives. It was created on 22 September 1935 by reorganising the Staff of the Red Army into the General Staff of the Red Army, and was renamed the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1946. During the Great Patriotic War it was the main working organ of the Stavka, planning strategic operations and reporting daily on the situation at the front, under Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky and Antonov in turn. In 1992 it was succeeded by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
In depth
What does a general staff do?
To move an army, commanders who give orders need an organisation that gathers the information behind those orders, draws up plans and prepares the documents. Such a body is a staff, and the staff of a country's entire armed forces is its general staff. In the Soviet Union the armed forces were commanded by the People's Commissar of Defence (in wartime the Supreme Commander, Stalin); the General Staff worked for him, assessing the situation of both sides, preparing operational and mobilisation plans, and drafting and transmitting directives.
In 1927 the Soviet military theorist Shaposhnikov wrote a book on the general staff entitled The Brain of the Army (Мозг армии). Vasilevsky, who worked under him, recalls in his memoir A Lifelong Cause that Shaposhnikov called the General Staff "the brain of the army" and said its chief must always stand at the centre of military events and feel the pulse of the struggle on every front.
Why did the name "General Staff" appear in 1935?
In the early Civil War the Red Army had both the All-Russian Main Staff (Всероглавштаб), created in May 1918, and the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council. In February 1921 the two were merged into the Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Штаб РККА), which became the single body administering the armed forces and the executive organ of the Revolutionary Military Council. The British historian John Erickson dates its growth into the Soviet "military brain" from Frunze's appointment as its chief in April 1924.
On 22 September 1935 a decision of the Council of People's Commissars turned the Staff of the Red Army into the General Staff of the Red Army. The English Wikipedia notes that this essentially reincarnated the General Staff of the Russian Empire, and that many former imperial General Staff officers became Soviet General Staff officers. Vasilevsky remembers the change as part of the army's reconstruction in the mid-1930s: by the end of 1935 almost three quarters of the divisions had become regular cadre divisions, and new tanks and aircraft were arriving.
What was the General Staff Academy?
In 1936, by decision of the Party Central Committee, the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army was founded to train senior commanders and staff officers (order of the People's Commissar of Defence of 11 April 1936). Vasilevsky was in its first intake. According to him the students were selected under the Central Committee's direct supervision and had to have combat experience, excellent service reports and, as a rule, higher military education. On 1 November 1936, 137 students began an 18-month course in two buildings in Bolshoi Trubetskoy Lane in Moscow. The core subject was operational art, the planning and conduct of army and front operations.
This first intake later became known as the "marshals' course". Vasilevsky and Antonov headed the General Staff during the war; Bagramyan, Vatutin, Govorov and Kurochkin commanded fronts; many classmates became front chiefs of staff. But in 1937, as commanders, teachers and students were arrested in the Great Purge, more than 30 students were sent off mid-course to fill command and staff posts. According to Vasilevsky only half continued their studies and a quarter finished. Vasilevsky himself was put in charge of the Academy's course on the rear in August 1937 and in October was called to the General Staff to head the section for the operational training of senior commanders. In 1941 the Academy was named after Voroshilov.
How was the General Staff organised?
Its core was the Operations Directorate, responsible for operational planning. When the war plan was being refined in 1940, Vatutin headed the Operations Directorate with Malandin as his deputy, and from the spring of 1940 Vasilevsky was its first deputy head. When Vatutin became First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Malandin took over the Operations Directorate. Other parts included the Intelligence Directorate (headed by Golikov at the start of the war), the organisation and mobilisation departments and military transport.
When the war began, the regional departments of the Operations Directorate (North-West, West, South-West, Near East, Far East) were abolished and replaced by "directions", one for each front. On 28 July 1941 State Defense Committee decision No. 300 removed four directorates from the General Staff: organisation, mobilisation and manning formed the new Main Directorate for the Formation and Manning of the Red Army (Главупраформ), and military transport went to the Main Directorate of the Rear. The aim was to let the General Staff concentrate on operational and strategic questions. Vasilevsky considered this a mistake: formation and transport plans had to match operational plans, and only the General Staff had the data. In practice, whenever an operation was prepared, the Chief of the Rear Khrulev and officials of the Commissariat of Railways sat in his office drawing up the transport plan with the General Staff. In 1943–1944 these departments were returned to the General Staff.
At the start of the war, on Stalin's instructions, six advisers were attached to the Chief of the General Staff; according to Vasilevsky they gave advice without bearing responsibility and were soon dropped. More useful was the corps of General Staff officers posted to the headquarters of fronts, armies, corps and sometimes divisions, who sent the General Staff and the Stavka representatives independent and objective information about the fighting and the state of the troops.
What did the General Staff do during the war?
During the Great Patriotic War the General Staff was the Stavka's main operational working organ. The Stavka had no staff of its own, so situation reports from the front, the detailed plans of operations, the draft directives to the fronts and the calculations of reserves and supplies all came from the General Staff. The chief or his deputy reported almost every evening in Stalin's Kremlin office to members of the Stavka, the Politburo and the State Defense Committee. Vasilevsky wrote that the Second World War was "in a certain sense a war of staffs", and that no earlier war had made such demands on general staffs.
It did not work that way from the start. According to Vasilevsky, when the war began the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov was sent to the South-Western Front, the former chief Shaposhnikov to the Western Front and the First Deputy Chief Vatutin to the North-Western Front, while the deputy chief Sokolovsky and the head of the Operations Directorate Malandin also left for the Western Front. For some days the General Staff was left without its leaders. Vasilevsky blamed this on Stalin's initial underestimation of the General Staff. He recalls the new head of the Operations Directorate, Zlobin, complaining that "we have in effect become mere technical transmitters" of decisions already taken above, and believed that making proper use of the directorate might have spared the high command some errors in the first months.
As the war went on the General Staff found its place. The detailed plan of Operation Uranus was worked out in the General Staff, and the secrecy of its preparation, with correspondence and telephone talk banned and troops moved only at night, was imposed by a special General Staff directive. Because in major operations the chief was at the front as a Stavka representative, the General Staff set up a signals centre at his command post linking him to Moscow and all fronts and assigned him a group of officers. From the front Vasilevsky heard the General Staff's senior officers several times a day and gave his instructions. His experience of spending 22 of his 34 months as chief at the front is described under Stavka.
Sergei Shtemenko, chief of the Operations Directorate, described in his memoir The General Staff in the War Years the daily routine that settled in from the second half of 1942. Inside the directorate, the heads of the "directions", one for each front, gathered the night's events from 7 a.m., while an intelligence officer came round to correct the enemy positions on their maps. The heads of directions often reported without a word, simply laying their maps against the chief's. Around 9 a.m. the intelligence summary, the military transport schedule and the state of the reserves arrived, and the morning combat report was edited and signed at 10. Between 10 and 11 Stalin rang the directorate on a direct line and asked "What's new?", and the chief reported front by front, walking between two tables spread with 1:200,000 maps of each front and a 1:1,000,000 overview, starting with the most critical sector. Skipping an army, even one where nothing had happened, was not allowed. Around 4 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff or his deputy gave the second report; at 9 p.m. the data were gathered again, and after 11 p.m. they drove to the Kremlin or Stalin's "Near Dacha" at Kuntsevo with the summary for the day. They were back at 3 or 4 a.m. Stalin fixed even the hours of rest of each senior officer, and, Shtemenko wrote, the routine hardly changed until Stalin's death.
Papers for Stalin went into folders of three colours: red for orders, directives and plans for distributing weapons, which had to be settled that day; blue for the fronts' requests; green for promotions, awards and appointments, opened only when the mood was right. The officers reported from the maps without notes, naming fronts, armies and corps by their commanders' surnames and divisions by number. An unverified front report such as "our troops broke into village N" was given to Stalin as "our troops are fighting for village N". Directives Stalin dictated on the spot were not retyped but sent in the original to the nearby signals room and transmitted to the fronts. Of the three combat reports the Stavka received each day, two were written at the General Staff and one by the fronts' military councils; the daily operational summary, covering every division, could run to more than twenty pages. Shtemenko dismissed as groundless the story that Stalin directed operations on a globe.
Maps and secrecy were also the General Staff's business. According to Shtemenko, before the war modern topographic maps existed only up to the line Petrozavodsk, Vitebsk, Kiev, Odessa, so in the first six months of the war maps had to be made for more than 1.5 million square kilometres. The directorate used the same colours and symbols for each time of day and type of action, so that any direction's map could be read without explanation. When Vasilevsky went to the Far East in summer 1945 to prepare the Manchurian operation, his papers named him "Deputy People's Commissar of Defence Colonel General Vasilyev", and Malinovsky travelled as "Colonel General Morozov". General Staff officers attached to the fronts were to report only what they had seen with their own eyes.
Shtemenko's memoir, published in the 1960s and 1970s, presents the General Staff as an orderly machine. The routine he describes is that of late 1942 onwards, in contrast with the confusion of the first weeks that Vasilevsky recounts, and some of his accounts are disputed by other commanders: he wrote that in November 1944 the front commanders worked at the General Staff before the Stavka discussed the 1945 campaign as a whole, whereas Zhukov denied knowing of any such meeting.
Who were the chiefs of the General Staff?
The chiefs of the Staff of the Red Army were Lebedev, Frunze, Sergey Kamenev, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov and Yegorov. From the creation of the General Staff to the end of the war its chiefs were:
- Yegorov: September 1935 to May 1937. Moved to First Deputy People's Commissar of Defence, he was arrested in March 1938 and executed in February 1939.
- Shaposhnikov: May 1937 to August 1940, when he stepped down for health reasons.
- Meretskov: August 1940 to January 1941.
- Zhukov: January to July 1941.
- Shaposhnikov: reappointed on 29 July 1941, until May 1942. From 24 April 1942, when illness kept him from work, Vasilevsky acted in his place.
- Vasilevsky: formally appointed on 26 June 1942, until February 1945, when he took over the 3rd Belorussian Front after its commander Chernyakhovsky was killed.
- Antonov: February 1945 to March 1946. He came to the General Staff as head of the Operations Directorate in December 1942, and from the spring of 1943, as first deputy chief, handled the reports to the Stavka and the General Staff's daily work while Vasilevsky was at the front.
After the war they were followed by Vasilevsky (1946–1948), Shtemenko, Sokolovsky, Zakharov, Biryuzov, Kulikov, Ogarkov, Akhromeyev, Moiseyev and others.
What became of the General Staff after the war?
In February 1946 the General Staff of the Red Army was renamed the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. When a separate Navy Ministry was set up in 1950 it became the General Staff of the Soviet Army, and in 1955 it was again the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The American scholar of the Soviet military William Odom judged that during the war it became Stalin's main organ for the operational direction of all forces, and afterwards the most powerful centre for virtually all aspects of military planning, operations and resource requirements, leaving even the defence minister heavily dependent on it. After the dissolution of the USSR, on 7 May 1992 a decree of the Russian president created the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its basis.