Aleksei Innokentievich Antonov

Алексей Иннокентьевич Антонов
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Russia 1896.9.27.–1962.6.18. ○ Natural causes

The architect of every major Soviet operation from 1943 onward: the only Order of Victory holder who was not a marshal

'Though he knew the situation thoroughly, he still spent two or three hours preparing for every Stavka report.' — General Shtemenko, his deputy

Chief of the General Staff (1945–1946) and first Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces (1955–1962). From December 1942, as head of the Operations Directorate and then deputy chief, Antonov was the operational architect behind every major Soviet strategic campaign: Kursk, Bagration, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin. A staff officer rather than a field commander, he earned Stalin's trust to a degree unmatched by any other general, visiting the Kremlin office more often than all front commanders combined.

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Stalin's Most Trusted Staff Officer

When Antonov arrived in Moscow on 11 December 1942 as head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff, the post had burned through seven occupants in six months. The Chief of the General Staff, Aleksandr Vasilevsky, was almost always away at the front as a representative of the Stavka (the Soviet supreme command), and it was he who had asked Stalin to bring in Antonov, then chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front. According to the historian Richard Overy, instead of rushing off to report to Stalin, Antonov spent his first week familiarizing himself thoroughly with the General Staff and the state of the front.

For his first months, however, Antonov was kept away from the Stavka's work. Vasilevsky's memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (Delo vsei zhizni, 1978) says that the General Staff's business was reported to the Stavka by the deputy chief for organisation, Fyodor Bokov, and that Antonov, unsure of his place, asked Vasilevsky to get him sent back to the front. When Vasilevsky asked Stalin again to employ him on the Stavka's operational work, Stalin, distrustful of people he did not know, replied, "Judging by your descriptions, Antonov will be far more useful at the front just now than here in our office business," and sent him to join Vasilevsky on the Voronezh Front. Antonov stayed at the front until the end of March 1943, helping the 18th Separate Rifle Corps in the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh operation in January, and only after returning to Moscow with Vasilevsky was he properly presented to Stalin. From then on Antonov and Vasilevsky went to the Stavka together almost every day.

The relationship with Stalin that took shape from the spring of 1943 transformed how the Soviet high command functioned for the remainder of the war. Antonov worked 17 to 18 hours a day, sleeping only from 5 or 6 AM until noon. He never sugar-coated his reports and, in the words of his deputy General Shtemenko, showed a 'brave outspokenness' when challenging Stalin. Yet Stalin trusted him completely: between 1943 and 1945, Antonov was summoned to Stalin's Kremlin office at least 238 times: more than any other figure in the Soviet armed forces leadership, and more than all front commanders combined across the entire war.

This trust was earned through sheer competence. Antonov prepared for every Stavka report for two to three hours, even though he already knew the situation inside out. His calm precision was such that even Zhukov, no easy man to impress, would let Antonov deliver briefings in his place. According to multiple commanders, Stalin almost invariably sought Antonov's opinion on strategic operations and never disregarded it. No staff officer in the history of the Soviet military had ever occupied such a central role in the conduct of war, and none would again.

Vasilevsky also wrote that when the offensive into Right-Bank Ukraine was being prepared in the spring of 1944, Antonov was "in fact leading the planning of the coming operations," and that he talked over the choice of commanders and the deployment of forces for Operation Bagration with him again and again. In February 1945, when Vasilevsky proposed giving up the post of Chief of the General Staff to stay in East Prussia and handing it to Antonov, who was already doing the job, Antonov, who was present, said he did not share the view. Chernyakhovsky was killed later that day, Vasilevsky took over the 3rd Belorussian Front, and on 19 February Antonov became Chief of the General Staff. Vasilevsky judged him a fully prepared successor who, over a year and a half as First Deputy Chief, had won great authority not only in the armed forces but in the Party Central Committee, the State Defence Committee and the Stavka.

Sergei Shtemenko, who worked under Antonov for six years as head of the Operations Directorate, drew the closest portrait of him in his memoir The General Staff in the War Years. By his account the long night vigils of senior officers in Stalin's waiting room ended after Antonov arrived, and the strict timetable Stalin set for the General Staff took shape with his help. The second report of the day, around 4 p.m., was Antonov's; at night he and Shtemenko drove to the Kremlin or the Kuntsevo dacha with the summary report. Stavka representatives always sent a copy of their reports to Stalin "to comrade Antonov". Shtemenko wrote that in all those years he never once saw him lose his temper or scold anyone, that he called meetings only when necessary and kept them short, and that some people called him a pedant. In Shtemenko's recollection it was Antonov who argued most firmly in November 1944 that the fronts on the Berlin axis should halt and go over to the defensive for a time, and Antonov again who, at the Stavka meeting of 1 April 1945, raised once more the boundary line between the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts.