The Soviet-Polish War
Why did the Red Army march on Warsaw in the summer of 1920, and why did it break there?
The Soviet-Polish War was fought from 1919 to 1921 between reborn Poland and Soviet Russia in the borderlands of three collapsed empires. Begun without declaration in Belorussia in February 1919, it became full-scale war in April 1920 when Pilsudski, allied with Petliura, drove on Kiev. Budyonny's cavalry and Tukhachevsky's July offensive reversed the tide, and the Red Army marched on Warsaw under the banner of exporting revolution, only to be decisively beaten in the Battle of Warsaw in August. The Peace of Riga in March 1921 drew the border far east of the Curzon Line, partitioning Belorussia and Ukraine; it stood until 1939. The defeat before Warsaw proved in practice the last attempt to export revolution by bayonet, and turned the Soviet state onto the road of building in one country.
Borderlands Without Borders: How the War Began
The war was never declared, and even its starting date is hard to fix. Germany's surrender in November 1918 left a vast vacuum in the middle of Eastern Europe, where three empires had ruled. No treaty defined the eastern border of reborn Poland, and Soviet Russia was pushing troops westward on the heels of the withdrawing Germans. In February 1919 the two armies, advancing toward each other, first collided at Bereza Kartuska in Belorussia.
The two states' aims were incompatible from the start. Pilsudski, Poland's head of state, wanted a Polish-led federation of Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine standing between Poland and Russia, pushing Russia back to its pre-eighteenth-century bounds. For the Soviet leadership Poland was less a goal than a bridge to revolutionary Germany. In 1919 Polish forces took Wilno (April) and Minsk (August); but in the autumn Pilsudski halted and, through secret contacts, in effect froze the front. This was precisely the moment Denikin's Whites were approaching Moscow. A victory of the Whites, whose slogan was 'Russia one and indivisible,' would be worse for Polish independence than the Soviet government, he calculated, and the calculation gave the Soviet regime breathing space at the peak of the White advance.
Poland advanced into the space left by collapsing German occupation. That background continues in Brest-Litovsk; the Rada, Hetmanate, Directory and Petliura's declining bargaining position in Ukraine's revolution and wars.
1919: from Vilnius to Mikaszewicze
The first year's war was small, but its consequences were large. In the spring of 1919 the Polish army was still a sum of several armies: Polish officers of the old Austrian and German armies, Piłsudski's legionaries, Józef Haller's "Blue Army" of some 68,000 men organized in France and shipped in from April, and the Greater Poland army that had risen against Germany at Poznań, all being welded into one force while still wearing different uniforms and answering to different chains of command. On the Soviet side the western frontier was held by the Western Army that had followed the Germans in, always short of troops because of the southern and eastern fronts against Denikin and Kolchak.
From 19 to 21 April Piłsudski personally led cavalry in a surprise attack on Vilnius and drove out the Litbel Soviet government. In his proclamation of 22 April "to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania" he promised to let them decide their own future, but the city stayed in Polish hands. Minsk fell on 8 August, and in the autumn the front came to rest on the Berezina and the Daugava. Piłsudski stopped not because his strength was spent. That autumn Denikin, marching on Moscow, asked Poland for joint operations but refused to discuss Poland's eastern frontier except on the premise of restoring "Russia one and indivisible". Piłsudski judged that a White victory would return Poland to the borders of 1914. From October to December secret talks were held at Mikaszewicze station in Belorussia between the Polish envoy Boerner and the Soviet envoy Julian Marchlewski, and as a result the Polish army stood still during the decisive weeks in which Denikin broke at Orel. The Soviet leadership could shift some 40,000 men from the west to the south. Denikin later counted this silence among the causes of his defeat.
The truce of Mikaszewicze was not a peace. On 28 January 1920 the Soviet government offered Poland peace "on the present front line", and the Polish government put off its answer. Meanwhile on 3 January Polish troops took Daugavpils together with Latvia, and Piłsudski prepared for a decision in the spring. The Soviet side reckoned the same way. In March 1920, with Kolchak shot and Denikin embarking at Novorossiysk, the Red Army's best formations began to move west. Each country believed the other was preparing to attack, and both were right.
The northern flank: cooperation with Latvia, conflict with Lithuania
In January 1920 Polish and Latvian forces drove Soviet troops from Daugavpils in a joint operation. Latvia sought control of Latgale; Poland secured contact with a friendly state and reduced its northern commitments. Lithuania shows why this was not a common Polish-Baltic war.
Poland had occupied Vilnius in April 1919. Soviet Russia recognized Lithuania's claim to the city in the Moscow treaty of 12 July 1920, without settling the dispute with Poland. Red advances and retreats brought renewed Polish-Lithuanian clashes. The Suwałki Agreement of 7 October provided a limited demarcation and ceasefire; Żeligowski's troops seized Vilnius on 9 October. Central Lithuania left a legacy of enduring hostility. The independence struggles and separate peace settlements are covered in the Baltic wars of independence.
Spring 1920: Poland Goes to Kiev
In early 1920 both sides exchanged peace proposals while preparing for a decisive campaign. On 21 April Pilsudski concluded the Warsaw agreement with Petliura, the exiled head of the Ukrainian People's Republic: Poland recognized his government, and Petliura conceded Eastern Galicia and western Volhynia to Poland. The joint offensive opened on 25 April, and on 7 May Polish troops entered Kiev, which the Red Army had abandoned rather than defend.
The military success was politically hollow. Even in Petliura's name no mass rising of the Ukrainian peasantry occurred, and the surrender of Galicia undercut his standing within the Ukrainian national movement. On the Soviet side, by contrast, the 'invasion of the Polish lords' became an occasion for patriotic mobilization that rebound a society exhausted by civil war: thousands of former tsarist officers, Brusilov among them, volunteered to serve the Red Army in this war.
To the Vistula: Revolution on Bayonets
The counterblow came on two axes. In the south, on 5 June, Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army tore open the front and drove the Poles from Kiev; in the north, on 4 July, Tukhachevsky's Western Front went over to a general offensive. In the course of July, Minsk, Wilno, Grodno and Bialystok fell in turn. On 11 July Britain proposed an armistice on the ethnographic line later known as the Curzon Line; confident of victory, the Soviet government declined mediation.
At this point the character of the war changed: a defensive war became a test of exporting revolution. The delegates of the Second Comintern Congress, then meeting in Moscow, followed the front's movement on a map hung in the hall. On 30 July, in occupied Bialystok, the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee (Polrevkom) of Marchlewski, Dzerzhinsky, Kon and others was proclaimed as a government-in-waiting for a Soviet Poland. The expectation failed. Polish workers and peasants met the Red Army not as liberators but as a Russian army. Lenin later admitted to Clara Zetkin that they had faced the Red Army 'as enemies, not the allies we had counted on,' and in a closed speech to the party conference in September 1920 he called the march on Poland 'a reconnaissance by bayonet' and conceded the defeat. That speech was published only in 1992.
A Revolutionary Government and a Divided Command: Two Cracks on the Road to Warsaw
Arriving in Białystok, the Polrevkom declared in its manifesto that it was "depriving the gentry-bourgeois government of power" and proclaimed factories, forests, and landed estates the property of the people. Headed by Julian Marchlewski, with Feliks Dzerzhinsky as its de facto leader and Feliks Kon and Iosif Unshlikht among its members, this government-in-waiting had travelled by armoured train from Smolensk via Minsk and Wilno in the wake of Tukhachevsky's advancing armies. His troops had taken Białystok on 28 July, two days before the committee's proclamation; the Polrevkom set up headquarters in the Branicki Palace.
But the expected rising of Polish workers never came. On 5 August Dzerzhinsky cabled Lenin: "The mood beyond the Narew is hostile; they drive off their cattle and horses, they strip the wheels from the carts." The Polish Red Army the committee tried to raise amounted to barely 176 men in a single Red Rifle Regiment, supplemented by detachments from the Russian Red Army, perhaps a thousand in total. Among Białystok's Jewish working class the reception was relatively warm, but the Catholic Polish majority regarded the committee as little more than an occupier's puppet. On 4 August the Polrevkom ordered the arrest and dispatch to concentration camps of "all those dangerous to the socialist revolution in Poland, all representatives of the Polish big bourgeoisie and landowners, and all known for their sympathy with White Poland," yet its real administrative reach extended over only a sliver of occupied territory.
At this very moment a second crack was opening inside the Red Army's own command, one that would undo the whole advance. Tukhachevsky's Western Front had covered over 600 kilometres in July and now stood east and north of Warsaw, but its southern flank was perilously exposed, held only by the Pripet Marshes and the 8,000-strong Mozyr Group. The seam between Tukhachevsky's forces and Yegorov's South-Western Front was the most vulnerable point on the entire line.
At Tukhachevsky's insistent urging, Commander-in-Chief Sergey Kamenev issued a directive on 2 August transferring the 12th Army and Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army from the South-Western Front to the Western Front; he reaffirmed the order on 5 August. But Stalin, the political commissar of the South-Western Front's Revolutionary Military Council, refused to countersign. For Stalin, Lwów was more than a military objective. Taking it would make his front the war's decisive victor while insulating him from the charge of abandoning the southern theatre, where Wrangel's White forces were pressing from the Crimea. On 12 August he wrote to Lenin arguing that "the commander-in-chief and his boys are sabotaging the work of organizing victory over Wrangel."
The 1st Cavalry Army remained tied down in the battle for Lwów throughout August; not a single division of it reached Warsaw. Karl Radek had warned of an explosive Polish nationalist resistance, and Trotsky too was sceptical of the march on Warsaw. But Lenin, convinced that Poland was the bridge to European revolution, ordered the advance to continue. On 13 August Tukhachevsky's forces opened the battle by attacking Radzymin east of the capital, but by then the two cracks, a divided command and a hostile Polish population, had already set the terms of the coming defeat.
Warsaw: the battles of August
On 24 July a government of national defence was formed in Warsaw with the peasant leader Wincenty Witos as prime minister and the socialist Ignacy Daszyński as his deputy. This government of left and right together appealed for volunteers, and by mid-August more than 100,000 had enlisted. The minister of military affairs, Kazimierz Sosnkowski, ran the mobilization of the rear, and the chief of staff, Tadeusz Rozwadowski, fixed the counterattack plan in operational order 8358/III of 6 August. In the north Sikorski's 5th Army would hold the Soviet 4th and 15th Armies on the Wkra; the 1st Army in front of Warsaw would hold Radzymin; and a strike group of five divisions assembled on the Wieprz in the south would drive north into the exposed left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On 12 August Piłsudski briefly laid down the office of head of state and took personal command of the strike group.
Poland's greatest weapon was out of sight. Jan Kowalewski of the general staff's cipher bureau had been breaking the Red Army's radio ciphers since September 1919, and during the August battles the Polish command read Tukhachevsky's orders almost in real time. On 13 August the Soviet 3rd and 16th Armies attacked Radzymin, 20 kilometres east of Warsaw, taking and losing the town twice. On 14 August the priest Ignacy Skorupka, leading a volunteer battalion at Ossów, was killed, and his death soon became the central symbol of the "Miracle on the Vistula". The same day Sikorski's 5th Army counterattacked on the Wkra in the north, and on 15 August Polish cavalry raided Ciechanów, where the Soviet 4th Army's radio station stood, cutting Tukhachevsky's link to that army. For the next several days the 4th Army kept marching west without orders from headquarters.
At dawn on 16 August the strike group on the Wieprz moved north. The expected resistance was not there. The 100-kilometre gap held by the 8,000 men of the Mozyr Group opened within a day; on 17 August Polish troops took Siedlce and Mińsk Mazowiecki and on the 18th cut the railway to Białystok. Tukhachevsky, at his headquarters in Minsk, grasped the situation only on 18 August and ordered a general retreat. The 4th Army and Gaya Gai's 3rd Cavalry Corps, which had advanced furthest north of Warsaw, found their way back blocked and crossed into East Prussia between 24 and 26 August, where German troops disarmed them. When the battle ended on 25 August the Red Army had lost 66,000 men taken prisoner and more than 40,000 interned, along with more than 200 guns and 1,000 machine guns; Poland lost about 4,500 killed and 22,000 wounded.
In the south, Budyonny's First Cavalry Army, having given up Lwów and turned north-west on 20 August, fought another decisive battle at Zamość and Komarów.
French arms, ammunition, military training and attached advisers provided sustained support. The French Military Mission active from 1919 should be distinguished from the Anglo-French Interallied Mission of summer 1920. Maxime Weygand, part of the latter, advised the Polish staff and discussed the counterattack. Attributing victory to him alone would erase the planning and execution by Piłsudski, Rozwadowski and the Polish command. Conversely, the Polish "miracle" narrative erases the worldly conditions of the division in the Soviet command, the coolness of Polish workers and the broken ciphers.
Zamość and Komarów: the First Cavalry Army's last cavalry battle
Even after the outcome at Warsaw was settled, the First Cavalry Army in the south was still intact. On 17 August Budyonny destroyed a Polish volunteer battalion at Zadwórze station east of Lwów after a day-long fight, but that day cost him his entry into Lwów. On 20 August, on the high command's instructions, he gave up the attack on Lwów and turned north-west. Tukhachevsky reckoned that if the cavalry struck the right flank of the Polish strike group, the Poles would have to turn forces south, letting him reverse the collapse in the north and try for Warsaw again. But fighting on the upper Bug delayed the march, and by the time the Cavalry Army reached the Zamość area at the end of August the Poles had already shifted troops and built a line of defence.
Zamość was held by a mixed Polish and Ukrainian garrison. Its core was Colonel Marko Bezruchko's 6th Sich Rifle Division of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army, worn out by two months of retreat after the Kyiv expedition, which the Polish command reinforced with Captain Mikołaj Bołtuć's 31st Kaniów Rifle Regiment. From 25 to 28 August some 3,500 townspeople were mobilised to dig trenches, while Ukrainian sappers laid hundreds of mines before the town and strung layered wire entanglements up to 18 kilometres long in places. Three armoured trains supported them. Accounts of the garrison's size differ: Polish accounts give 700 bayonets and 150 sabres, Russian accounts about 3,200 bayonets and 200 sabres. From 29 to 31 August the Red Army attacked day and night but could not break through the old fortress walls, loopholes and minefields. On the 31st the troops of General Stanisław Haller arrived from Lwów and lifted the siege.
Meanwhile Colonel Juliusz Rómmel's Polish 1st Cavalry Division closed in behind the Cavalry Army. On 29 August Major Stanisław Maczek's special battalion delayed the Soviet cavalry near the village of Waręż, and the 1st Krechowce Uhlan Regiment fell on unprepared Soviet units at Łykoszyn and Tyszowce, taking 150 prisoners, three guns and seven machine guns. On the 30th Sikorski, commanding the 3rd Army, ordered the Cavalry Army to be encircled and destroyed around Zamość: Stanisław Haller's troops would close in from the south and the 2nd Legions Infantry Division from the north, while Żeligowski's 10th Infantry Division pushed from Zamość towards Hrubieszów to split the cavalry in two. Budyonny had three choices: storm the well-defended town, break through the 13th Infantry Division dug in in the forests to the west, or attack Polish cavalry of unknown strength 20 kilometres to the west. Knowing little of the enemy and expecting no serious resistance, he ordered his troops to bypass the town to the west.
At six in the morning of 31 August, 200 men of the Polish 2nd Grochów Uhlan Regiment took Hill 255, north of the main Polish cavalry line, without opposition. Soon a Soviet supply column mixed up with a much larger cavalry force appeared below. The uhlans charged and inflicted heavy losses on the rear units, but a counterattack drove them off the hill into the village of Wolica Śniatycka. At ten Major Stefan Dembiński's 9th Lesser Poland Uhlan Regiment retook the hill, and the 8th Uhlan Regiment recaptured the village. The Soviet 4th Cavalry Division broke and fled, leaving its heavy equipment behind; Budyonny abandoned his staff car and barely escaped capture. At noon the 9th Regiment charged down the hill again into the 11th Cavalry Division, which had relieved the 4th, and the two sides fought with sabres for half an hour. The Soviet cavalry withdrew, but the Polish VII Cavalry Brigade was badly depleted and the 9th Regiment also took losses from friendly artillery fire. The VI Cavalry Brigade, held in reserve until then, took up the pursuit, led by Captain Tadeusz Komorowski's 12th Podolian Uhlan Regiment: the same Bór-Komorowski who would command the Warsaw Uprising twenty-four years later.
Around five in the afternoon the last phase began. The Soviet 6th Cavalry Division, the strongest in the area, broke through the Polish infantry ring and reached the battlefield, deploying six regiments into attack formation at the edge of the forest near Wolica Śniatycka. By the Polish account, Rómmel ordered every available unit to charge before the enemy moved. The 8th and 9th Regiments struck the front, the 1st Krechowce Regiment the left flank and the 12th, coming up from Niewirków, the rear; after half an hour Budyonny ordered the division to retreat. Budyonny's memoirs tell the same evening differently: under heavy shellfire the 6th Division dismounted and attacked Niewirków on foot, was stopped twice by machine guns on the roofs, and drove the Polish infantry out only once it had half-encircled the village. Either way, by the night of 1 September the Cavalry Army was trapped in a corridor 12 to 15 kilometres wide. The only way out to the east ran through the trenches of the 2nd Legions Infantry Division, and the Cavalry Army broke through there at heavy cost and escaped towards Hrubieszów.
The Polish 1st Cavalry Division gave it no rest. On 2 September the VI Cavalry Brigade outflanked the Soviet 44th Rifle Division at Łaszczów and all but wiped out its 392nd Tarashcha Regiment. The Cavalry Army escaped encirclement and destruction but no longer had the strength to attack. It lost Hrubieszów on 5 September and Volodymyr-Volynskyi on the 6th, and when Sikorski's troops, back from the Niemen, opened an offensive in Volhynia on the 12th, it gave up Rivne on the 18th and was pushed east. By the end of September the Poles had reached the Sluch River, where the Red Army's march on Warsaw had begun, and the Cavalry Army was taken out of the line and sent to Taurida to fight Wrangel.
The Poles lost about 500 killed and 700 horses. Soviet losses were never published, but historians estimate that the Cavalry Army suffered up to 4,000 casualties in the campaign, about two-thirds of its strength. Greatly superior in numbers, it failed to concentrate and fed its divisions in one after another, and each wave was beaten back in turn. Communication between units broke down and reconnaissance reports were ignored. Weapons mattered too: the Polish sabre had a guard covering the hand, the Cossack shashka of the Cavalry Army did not, and Polish troopers aimed at their opponents' sword hands. Polish historiography calls the battle "the greatest cavalry battle since 1813" and "the miracle of Zamość", and 31 August is kept as Polish Cavalry Day. By the number of horsemen engaged it is counted the largest cavalry battle of the twentieth century, but "the largest since 1813" is inaccurate: battles such as Brandy Station in the American Civil War in 1863 involved more cavalry.
The defeat also exacted a price away from the battlefield. As the retreating Cavalry Army's discipline collapsed, looting and violence by the "Red Cossacks" spread, and the Cavalry Army carried out pogroms in Jewish shtetls. The 1920 diary of the war correspondent Isaac Babel recorded the Cavalry Army's violence in these weeks. In Zamość too, after the defence ended, Ukrainian soldiers and Polish townspeople wrecked Jewish shops and lynched Jewish residents, accusing some of them of collaborating with the Bolsheviks. Komarów was also the last chapter in the dispute over the South-Western Front. The refusal of its political commissar, Stalin, to countersign the order transferring the Cavalry Army became the core of the later controversy over blame, and the feud between Tukhachevsky and the Stalin-Budyonny camp ran on to 1937.
Workers' strikes and the choices of the powers: the war's international context
This war was also the first occasion on which Europe's labour movement directly blocked its own governments' foreign policy. In May 1920 dockers in the port of London refused to load the freighter Jolly George, which carried arms for Poland. On 9 August, as the Red Army approached Warsaw and the British government considered intervention, the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress set up a "Council of Action" and declared that a war on Soviet Russia would be met with a general strike; some 350 local councils of action sprang up across the country. Lloyd George's government gave up the idea of sending troops. Germany declared neutrality on 20 July and closed its territory to transit, and in August the dockers of Danzig refused to unload munitions for Poland, so that British soldiers had to do the unloading themselves. Czechoslovakia also banned the transit of arms, and the troops offered by Horthy's Hungary were stopped by that ban. Poland fought all but isolated from the west.
The exception was France. France had kept a military mission training the Polish army since 1919, and in 1920 it sent hundreds of thousands of rifles, thousands of machine guns, hundreds of guns, aircraft and tanks. The Kościuszko Squadron, flown by American pilots, attacked Budyonny's cavalry from the air. Nor was Allied policy of one piece. At the Spa conference on 10 July Britain promised the Polish prime minister Grabski mediation on condition that Poland withdraw to the Curzon line and hand Vilnius to Lithuania, and on 11 July the Curzon note went to Moscow; the Soviet government, sure of victory, refused it. France saw Poland as a barrier between Germany and the Soviets; Britain wanted trade with Russia reopened. The victory of August freed Poland from the conditions of either.
On the Soviet side the war was the Comintern's first field test. The delegates to the Second Congress of the Comintern, meeting in Moscow from 19 July to 7 August, followed the movement of the front on a map hung in the hall. The "Twenty-One Conditions" the congress adopted and its theses on the national and colonial question rested on the premise that Europe's revolution was imminent. The fact that Polish workers did not greet the Red Army as liberators shook that premise. Karl Radek and the Polish communists had warned of the force of Polish nationalism before the advance, and Lenin later admitted that the war had been "a reconnaissance by bayonet". The idea of hastening Europe's revolution by military means ended before Warsaw, and trade agreements, the Rapallo treaty and the New Economic Policy took its place.
From the Niemen to Riga: How the Defeated Side Got the Better Peace
After Warsaw, Tukhachevsky's Western Front fell back and by mid-September had established a new defensive line along the Niemen, Shchara, and Svislach rivers. Commander-in-Chief Sergey Kamenev ordered a counter-offensive, but the reality on the ground told a different story. The Western Front's units stood at 20 to 40 percent of their nominal strength; 68,000 reinforcements arrived in August and another 20,500 in September, yet experienced officers and artillery had been largely spent before Warsaw. Still, Tukhachevsky regrouped his 3rd, 15th, and 16th Armies and planned a southward drive to retake Brest Fortress and Białystok.
Pilsudski moved first, determined to break the Niemen line before Soviet defences hardened. The key to his plan was an outflanking manoeuvre. While the Polish 2nd and 4th Armies pinned the Soviets frontally at Grodno and Wołkowysk, General Osiński's Suwałki Group would slip through a narrow corridor between Sejny and Druskienniki, a strip of territory then held by Lithuania, and strike the rear of the Soviet 3rd Army from the north. The battle opened on 20 September when the Polish 21st Alpine Division attacked Grodno. After three days of stalemate, the Poles took Druskienniki on 23 September and cut the railway linking Grodno and Wilno. The Soviet 3rd Army's supply line was severed; Polish cavalry reached as far as Lida. On 26 September, General Krajowski's horsemen took Pinsk, threatening the Soviet 4th Army's supply line as well. Tukhachevsky had no choice but to order a general retreat. After the Battle of the Szczara River in mid-October, the front had been pushed back to the line of Tarnopol, Dubno, Minsk, and Drissa.
But the Polish army was itself utterly spent. Though Poland had mobilised nearly a million men, only some 350,000 were on the eastern front, and most units stood at 50 to 60 percent of their nominal complement. And Pilsudski faced a deeper problem: the political goal of the war, an independent Ukraine allied with Poland, was already lost. Victory at Warsaw had saved Poland, not restored Petliura.
This is why the negotiating table produced an unexpected picture. Peace talks had opened at Minsk on 17 August, even as the Battle of Warsaw was raging, and were moved to Riga, resuming on 21 September. The Soviet delegation was now led by Adolph Joffe, who brought an offer drafted in Moscow: the border would run 'considerably to the east' of the Curzon Line, Eastern Galicia would remain on the Polish side, and the question of national self-determination would be set aside. The offer was valid until 5 October. Soviet Russia had compelling reasons for such concessions. Wrangel's White army still held out in the Crimea, and peasant uprisings, above all the Tambov Rebellion, were spreading across the Russian interior. Lenin could not afford to prolong the Polish front. On 15 October, speaking to a conference of Moscow gubernia committee chairmen, he put it plainly: 'We signed the preliminary peace on terms more favourable than those we proposed in April. Then the border was 50 versts further east; now it is 50 versts further west.'
The more dramatic reversal, however, came from the Polish side. Poland had won the war but did not press for maximal territorial gains. Jan Dąbski, who headed the Polish delegation at Riga, was not a Pilsudski man. The delegation was dominated by the National Democrats (Endecja), and their ideological leader, Stanisław Grabski, argued that incorporating broad eastern territories with Minsk would swell the non-Polish minority beyond a third of the population: a threat to the stability of a Polish nation-state and, not incidentally, an electoral gift to Pilsudski's camp. In confidential one-on-one talks with Joffe, Dąbski traded away Minsk in return for the strategic railway linking Baranowicze, Łuniniec, Sarny, and Równe and a corridor connecting Poland with friendly Latvia. Agreement was reached on 5 October; the Preliminary Peace Treaty and Armistice was signed on 12 October and came into force at midnight on 18 October. Petliura's Ukrainian People's Republic, the very ally for whom the war had been taken to Kiev, was now stripped of Polish recognition and left alone to face the Soviet armies. Pilsudski called the treaty 'an act of cowardice' and, the following May, visited the Ukrainian internment camp at Kalisz to apologise to Petliura's soldiers. Poland had won the war, yet the victors themselves narrowed the peace.
Riga's border and the allies excluded from peace
The Treaty of Riga of 18 March 1921 was signed by Poland, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, with Soviet Russia also representing Soviet Belarus. Poland obtained extensive eastern territories, but Minsk remained Soviet. This was distinct from the Latvian-Russian treaty signed at Riga in August 1920.
Polish leaders did not share a single objective. Piłsudski's federation project and alliance with Petliura sought an independent Ukraine between Poland and Soviet Russia. National Democrats prioritized the territory and population a Polish nation-state could govern. Soviet leaders needed to reduce western commitments while confronting Wrangel and peasant rebellion. Exhaustion and conflicting state projects converted military victory into a limited settlement.
The Ukrainian People's Republic paid the most direct price among Poland's allies. Petliura was excluded from negotiations as Poland recognized Soviet Ukraine as its treaty partner. Republican troops fought on until November 1920, then retreated into Polish internment. Bułak-Bałachowicz's separate expedition into Belarus also failed after the armistice. Continued fighting by anti-Soviet forces beyond the settlement did not commit Warsaw to renewed general war.
The treaty provided for nationality options, minority language, religious and cultural rights, restitution of property and cultural objects, and financial settlement. Implementation differed from the promises. Ukrainians and Belarusians were divided by the border; Jews and other communities also inhabited Poland's east. State consolidation meant both an achievement of stability and continued conflict over minority rule.
Prisoner deaths were not resolved by drawing a border. Epidemics, hunger, camp conditions and responsibility must be examined through prisoner records. Using them to justify the later Katyn massacre by exchanging casualty totals distorts distinct events. Warsaw checked hopes of extending European revolution through the Red Army, but neither the New Economic Policy nor the turn towards relations with the West can be explained by this war alone. Postwar state-building continues in the Russian Civil War and the formation of the USSR.
Consequences
The Riga border stood for eighteen years, until Soviet troops crossed it again on 17 September 1939. Of some 110,000 Red Army prisoners in Polish camps, between 16,000 and 20,000 died of disease and hunger (the estimate of the joint Russian-Polish documentary study of 2004); thousands of Polish prisoners also died in Soviet captivity. The defeat at Warsaw effectively ended the idea of hastening European revolution by military means, and formed the background to the New Economic Policy, the resumption of trade with the West, and the coexistence line that led to Rapallo in 1922. The memory of the war ran long: the feud between Tukhachevsky and the Stalin-Budyonny camp over blame for the defeat resurfaced in the military purge of 1937, and the shadow of this war lies over the spy-mania of the 1937 Polish Operation and the logic of the 1939 partition of Poland.
Timeline & Map
1919.02.14 The first clash, as the Germans leave Belorussia
- Soviet Russia and the Soviet republics
- Poland (with allied Ukrainian forces in 1920)
- Germany and Danzig
- Other states and forces
Boundaries are approximate, sketched from the campaign record; the Soviet fronts are those of the Russian Civil War map. Grey marks the Baltic states, the West Ukrainian and Ukrainian People's Republics of 1919, the White armies of Denikin and Wrangel, Romanian Bessarabia and Bukovina, and Czechoslovak Ruthenia. Germany in early 1919 includes the eastern zone it was evacuating; Danzig became a free city in November 1920. Uprisings and partisan areas behind the lines and Makhno's region are not shown.
- 11918.11.11Poland regains independence after 123 years
With Germany's surrender Piłsudski took over military authority in Warsaw. The eastern frontier of the reborn Poland was fixed by no treaty, and Soviet Russia was pushing troops west behind the withdrawing Germans.
- 21919.02.14Bereza Kartuska: the first clash
Polish troops and the Red Army, moving into the vacuum the Germans had left in Belorussia, clashed for the first time. War was never declared, and no single date marks its start.
- 31919.04.19Polish troops take Vilnius
Piłsudski personally led cavalry in a surprise attack on Vilnius, capital of the Litbel Soviet government. Minsk fell to the Poles on 8 August. Vilnius became the object of a long dispute with Lithuania.
- 41919.10–
12 The secret talks at MikaszewiczeAs Denikin marched on Moscow that autumn, Piłsudski judged a White victory worse for Polish independence, halted his advance and opened secret talks with Marchlewski. The Soviet leadership could shift some 40,000 men from the west to the south.
- 51920.04.21The Warsaw agreement: Piłsudski and Petliura
Poland recognized Petliura's Ukrainian People's Republic, and Petliura recognized Polish possession of eastern Galicia and western Volhynia. Four days later the joint Polish-Ukrainian offensive toward Kyiv began.
- 61920.05.07Polish troops enter Kyiv
The Red Army avoided battle and Kyiv changed hands almost without fighting. But the expected Ukrainian rising and expansion of Petliura's army did not follow, and on the Soviet side the 'invasion of the Polish lords' became an occasion for patriotic mobilization.
- 71920.06.05Budyonny's First Cavalry Army breaks through
The First Cavalry Army of the South-Western Front tore open the Polish front toward Zhytomyr. On 10 June the Poles abandoned Kyiv and began a general retreat.
- 81920.07.04Tukhachevsky's July offensive
Tukhachevsky, the 27-year-old commander of the Western Front, issued Order No. 1423 on 2 July: 'Over the corpse of White Poland lies the road to world conflagration. On to Vilna, Minsk, Warsaw!' Minsk fell on 11 July, Vilnius on the 14th, Grodno on the 19th and Białystok on the 28th.
- 91920.07.11The Curzon note
After the Polish prime minister Grabski accepted Britain's conditions for mediation at the Spa conference, the British foreign secretary Curzon proposed a ceasefire on a provisional ethnic line, the later Curzon line. The Soviet government, sure of victory, rejected mediation, demanded direct talks with Poland and pressed on.
- 101920.07.24The government of national defence in Warsaw
A government of national defence spanning left and right, with the peasant leader Witos as prime minister and the socialist Daszyński as his deputy, appealed for volunteers; more than 100,000 enlisted by mid-August. The minister of military affairs Sosnkowski ran the mobilization of the rear.
- 111920.07.30The Polrevkom at Białystok
In occupied Białystok a Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee headed by Marchlewski, with Dzerzhinsky and Kon among its members, proclaimed itself the provisional government of a Soviet Poland. Polish workers and peasants did not respond, and the Polish Red Army it tried to raise never exceeded a thousand men.
- 121920.08.09The British labour movement's Council of Action
As the British government considered intervention, the Labour Party and the TUC declared that a war on Soviet Russia would be met by a general strike and set up councils of action across the country. Dockers in London and Danzig refused to handle arms for Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia closed their territory to transit.
- 131920.08.13–
25 The battle of WarsawThe battle that began at Radzymin turned when Sikorski's 5th Army counterattacked on the Wkra on 14 August and Piłsudski's strike group hit the exposed Soviet left from the Wieprz on the 16th. The Poles were reading the Red Army's radio ciphers. The Western Front collapsed; 66,000 men were taken prisoner and the 4th Army and Gai's cavalry corps were interned in East Prussia. In Poland it is called the 'Miracle on the Vistula'.
- 141920.08.29–
31 The defence of ZamośćBezruchko's Ukrainian 6th Sich Rifle Division and Bołtuć's Polish 31st Kaniów Rifle Regiment held off the First Cavalry Army's attacks day and night for three days behind minefields, wire and the old fortress walls. Stanisław Haller's troops arrived on the 31st and lifted the siege.
- 151920.08.31–
09.02 Komarów: the First Cavalry Army defeatedRómmel's Polish 1st Cavalry Division beat back the First Cavalry Army's divisions one after another around Hill 255 and Wolica Śniatycka. Narrowly escaping encirclement, the Cavalry Army broke out east on 1 September and was hunted again at Łaszczów on the 2nd. Poland remembers it as the largest cavalry battle of the twentieth century.
- 161920.09.20–
26 The battle of the NiemenPolish troops broke Tukhachevsky's reorganized line on the Niemen by outflanking it to the north through Lithuanian territory. With the Grodno-Vilnius railway cut the Soviet 3rd Army fell back, and peace was the only option left to the Soviet side.
- 171920.10.18The armistice takes effect
The preliminary peace and armistice signed at Riga on 12 October came into force. Petliura's Ukrainian army and Wrangel's Whites in Crimea were left to face the Soviet army alone, and Żeligowski's seizure of Vilnius on 9 October opened a new dispute with Lithuania.
- 181921.03.18The Treaty of Riga
The frontier was drawn some 200 kilometres east of the Curzon line, partitioning Belorussia and Ukraine, and held until 17 September 1939. Soviet Russia promised reparations and Poland ended its support for Petliura. Between 16,000 and 20,000 Red Army prisoners died in Polish camps.
Related people 56
Soviet Russia35
Leadership4
Overrode the doubts of Radek and Trotsky, rejected the Curzon note in July and decided on the march to Warsaw. In a closed speech to the party conference in September he called the war 'a reconnaissance by bayonet' and admitted defeat.
War Commissar, sceptical of the march on WarsawLeon Trotsky1879–1940As commissar for war he led the turn from defence to counteroffensive but was sceptical of advancing past the Curzon line to Warsaw, and after the defeat defended Kamenev and the high command.
Chairman of the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee (Polrevkom)Julian Marchlewski1866–1925Headed the would-be Soviet Polish government declared at Białystok; forced to retreat after three weeks when Polish workers and peasants failed to rally to the committee.
Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army; issued the disputed redeployment ordersSergey Kamenev1881–1936Ordered the transfer of Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army and the 12th Army to Tukhachevsky's Western Front in early August 1920; Stalin and Budyonny's refusal to comply created the fatal gap in Soviet dispositions at Warsaw.
Implementers & commanders19
Commander of the Western Front at 27, he advanced 600 kilometres in the July offensive but was beaten before Warsaw in August with an exposed left flank and broken communications. In his 1923 lectures The March beyond the Vistula he blamed the defeat on the South-Western Front's failure to cooperate.
Political commissar of the South-Western Front; refused to countersign the transfer of the Cavalry ArmyJoseph Stalin1878–1953As political commissar of the South-Western Front he put the capture of Lwów first and in August refused to countersign the high command's order transferring the First Cavalry Army to the Western Front, the root of his long feud with Tukhachevsky.
Commander of the South-Western FrontAlexander Yegorov1883–1939Commanded the South-Western Front through the recapture of Kyiv and the Lwów offensive, but failed to coordinate with the Western Front in August.
Commander of the 1st Cavalry Army; the June breakthroughSemyon Budyonny1883–1973Broke the Polish front with the First Cavalry Army on 5 June and drove the Poles from Kyiv, but was tied down before Lwów in August and suffered his first decisive defeat at Komarów.
commander of the 14th Cavalry DivisionAlexander Parkhomenko1886–1921He fought in the Soviet-Polish War as commander of the 14th Cavalry Division.
Chief of the Western Front Political AdministrationStanislav Pestkovsky1882–1937He served as chief of the Political Administration on the Western Front during the Soviet-Polish War.
Commander of the 25th DivisionIvan Kutyakov1897–1938He commanded the 25th Division in the Soviet-Polish War in 1920.
Commander of the 15th ArmyAugust Kork1887–1937He commanded the 15th Army from August 1919 to October 1920.
Commander defending against Polish forcesNikolai Shchors1895–1919From March to August 1919, he commanded the 1st Ukrainian Soviet Division in defense against Polish forces.
Red Army company and battalion commanderMikhail Shalin1897–1970During the Civil War, he took part in the Soviet-Polish War as a Red Army company and battalion commander.
Political commissar of the 17th Cavalry DivisionIvan Petrov1896–1958During the Civil War, he served in the Soviet-Polish War as political commissar of the 17th Cavalry Division.
Red Army unit commanderSemyon Bogdanov1894–1960He served in the Polish–Soviet War as a Red Army platoon, company, and battalion commander.
Cavalry brigade commander on the Soviet-Polish frontGrigory Kotovsky1881–1925In 1920, Kotovsky commanded a cavalry brigade on the Soviet-Polish front.
Head of the Western Front Political DirectorateAlexander Myasnikov1886–1925During the Polish war, he headed the Western Front Political Directorate.
Rifle division chief of staffFyodor Tolbukhin1894–1949As chief of staff of the 56th Rifle Division, he served in the Soviet-Polish War.
Battalion commander on the Soviet-Polish frontKuzma Galitsky1897–1973In 1920, he was posted to the Soviet-Polish front as a battalion commander in the 397th Rifle Regiment, 45th Rifle Division.
Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps; reached the Vistula, then interned in East PrussiaHayk Bzhishkyan1887–1937Leading the 3rd Cavalry Corps on the far right of the Western Front, he took Vilnius and Grodno in July, reached the Vistula in the second week of August and cut the Warsaw-Gdańsk railway. Cut off with the 4th Army by the Polish counteroffensive, he crossed into East Prussia on 26 August and was interned by the Germans.
Commander of the 27th Rifle Division; the assault on RadzyminVitovt Putna1893–1937Leading the 27th Omsk Rifle Division across the Bug, he took Radzymin east of Warsaw on 13 August, and on 16 August personally led the last assault on the town with armoured cars, beaten back by Polish infantry and tanks. In the retreat he gathered broken units to bring the remnants out of the pocket near Białystok.
Commander of the 1st Cavalry Army's 4th Cavalry Division; KomarówSemyon Timoshenko1895–1970Led the First Cavalry Army's 4th Cavalry Division at Zamość and Komarów. His division was routed around Hill 255 on 31 August and then fought to open the escape route towards Hrubieszów.
Participants10
Member of the First Cavalry Army's revolutionary military council, taking part with Budyonny in the June breakthrough and the August offensive on Lwów.
Member of the PolrevkomFelix Dzerzhinsky1877–1926Effective leader of the Polrevkom at Białystok, the provisional government of a Soviet Poland, he reported to Lenin on 5 August that the population beyond the Narew was hostile.
The Comintern's Poland expert, sceptical of a Polish risingKarl Radek1885–1939The Comintern's Poland expert, he warned of the force of Polish nationalism before the advance and doubted that Polish workers would rise.
Polrevkom member in charge of educationFeliks Kon1864–1941Oversaw education and propaganda in the short-lived Polrevkom at Białystok. The would-be Soviet Polish government collapsed within three weeks.
Western Front Revvoensovet member and Polrevkom memberIosif Unshlikht1879–1938The man Lenin telegraphed on 15 July 1920 for his assessment of tactics in Poland. Handled party-building in the Polrevkom while serving on the Revvoensovets of Tukhachevsky's Western Front and the 16th Army.
Chairman of the Special Council that appealed to former officers to serve the Red ArmyAleksei Brusilov1853–1926As chairman of the Special Council under the commander-in-chief in May 1920 he appealed to former imperial officers to serve the Red Army against the 'invasion of the Polish lords', and thousands responded.
Military council member of the 3rd and 11th ArmiesKonstantin Mekhonoshin1889–1938He served on the military councils of the 3rd and 11th Armies during the Soviet-Polish War.
Blocked arms shipments to PolandHarry Pollitt1890–1960In May 1920, he stopped munitions bound for Poland from being loaded at the Port of London.
Member of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of PolandIvan Skvortsov-Stepanov1870–1928He took part in the Soviet-Polish War in 1920 and served on Poland’s Provisional Revolutionary Committee.
Soviet Russian cavalry officerPavel Kurochkin1900–1989He fought in the Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War.
Poland and Petliura's Ukraine19
Leadership3
Allied with Poland by the Warsaw agreement of April 1920 and took part in the Kyiv offensive, but was left alone by Poland's armistice in October and withdrew into Poland with his army in November.
Head of State and commander-in-chief of the Polish armyJózef Piłsudski1867–1935As head of state and commander-in-chief he took Vilnius in 1919 and refused to cooperate with Denikin, allied with Petliura and marched on Kyiv in 1920, and on 16 August personally led the strike group from the Wieprz that turned the war.
Prime Minister of the Government of National Defence, formed 24 July 1920Wincenty Witos1874–1945Leader of the Polish People's Party 'Piast', he became prime minister on 24 July 1920, as the Red Army approached Warsaw, heading the left-right Government of National Defence with the socialist Daszyński as deputy, and led it through the volunteer drive and the Riga peace.
Implementers & commanders8
On 14 August he counterattacked the Soviet 4th and 15th Armies on the Wkra north of Warsaw, buying time for Piłsudski's strike group to come up from the south. The battle made his reputation and he became prime minister in 1922.
Minister of military affairs in 1920, responsible for mobilizing the volunteer armyKazimierz Sosnkowski1885–1969As minister of military affairs in August 1920 he ran mobilization and supply in the rear and sent more than 100,000 volunteers to the front.
Organizer of Russian units on Poland’s sideBoris Savinkov1879–1925In 1920–1921, he organized Russian units to fight alongside Poland.
Commander of the 12th Podolian Uhlans; the pursuit at KomarówTadeusz Bór-Komorowski1895–1966As a captain he led the 12th Podolian Uhlan Regiment in pursuit of the retreating Soviet cavalry towards Zamość at Komarów on 31 August. Twenty-four years later he commanded the Warsaw Uprising as head of the Home Army.
Commander of the Polish 1st Cavalry Division; victor at KomarówJuliusz Rómmel1881–1967Leading the Polish 1st Cavalry Division, he pursued Budyonny's First Cavalry Army from 29 August and on 31 August beat back its divisions one after another around Hill 255 and Wolica Śniatycka at Komarów. In the evening he ordered an all-out charge on the 6th Cavalry Division as it emerged from the forest, and drove it off.
Commander of the special battalion; the delaying action at WarężStanisław Maczek1892–1994As a major he formed a flying rifle battalion attached to Rómmel's 1st Cavalry Division, and on 29 August near the village of Waręż outside Zamość he delayed the First Cavalry Army's advance, opening the way to the battle of Komarów.
Commander of the 31st Kaniów Rifles; the Zamość garrisonMikołaj Bołtuć1893–1939As a captain he led the 31st Kaniów Rifle Regiment and, with Bezruchko's Ukrainian 6th Sich Rifle Division, held Zamość against Budyonny's First Cavalry Army on 29–31 August.
Commander of the UNR Army's 6th Sich Rifle Division; the defence of ZamośćMarko Bezruchko1883–1944After Petliura's alliance with Poland he formed the 6th Sich Rifle Division and took part in the Kyiv offensive; at the end of August, behind minefields, wire and the old fortress, he held Zamość for three days against the First Cavalry Army.
Participants8
In September-October 1920 he negotiated with Ioffe at Riga, leading to the October 12 armistice.
Advocate of the 'Little Poland' lineStanisław Grabski1871–1949Pushed for the 'Little Poland' line at the Riga talks, abandoning Minsk and limiting minority ratios, thus scuttling Piłsudski's federalist vision.
Polish general who seized VilniusLucjan Żeligowski1865–1947When the Suwałki Agreement of 7 October 1920 left Vilnius on the Lithuanian side, he seized the city on 9 October in a 'mutiny' agreed with Piłsudski and set up Central Lithuania.
Anti-Soviet commander from Estonia to BelarusStanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz1883–1940After fighting under Polish command in 1920 he marched on Mozyr under the banner of a Belarusian People's Republic even after the October armistice, and was beaten in November; his troops' anti-Jewish violence is on record.
French military adviserMaxime Weygand1867–1965Advised the Polish staff as part of the Interallied Mission in 1920.
Polish Army staff officerStefan Rowecki1895–1944He served as a Polish Army staff officer in the Polish-Soviet War in 1919–1920.
Polish Army volunteerStanisław Mikołajczyk1901–1966He served as a volunteer in the Polish Army during the Polish–Soviet War in 1920.
Prime minister June–July 1920; accepted the Curzon line terms at SpaWładysław Grabski1874–1938Became prime minister on 23 June 1920 amid the Red Army's counteroffensive. At the Spa conference in July he asked Lloyd George for mediation and on 10 July accepted withdrawal to the Curzon line and the cession of Vilnius to Lithuania as conditions. He resigned with his cabinet on 24 July.
Related terms
Sources: Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920, London, 1972.Красноармейцы в польском плену в 1919-1922 гг. Сборник документов и материалов. М.-СПб., 2004 — российско-польское совместное издание; оценка смертности военнопленных.Приказ войскам Западного фронта № 1423 от 2 июля 1920 г. (М. Н. Тухачевский).В. И. Ленин, выступление на IX Всероссийской конференции РКП(б) 22 сентября 1920 г. (опубл. 1992) — оценка похода на Варшаву; Clara Zetkin, Reminiscences of Lenin, 1929.Wikipedia (en), "Polish-Soviet War," "Battle of Warsaw (1920)," "Peace of Riga," for chronology, orders of battle and figures.reference 6reference 7reference 8Adam Zamoyski, Warsaw 1920: Lenin's Failed Conquest of Europe (HarperPress, 2008)Jerzy Borzęcki, The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europe (Yale University Press, 2008)Stephen White, 'Labour's Council of Action 1920', Journal of Contemporary History 9:4 (1974)Battle of Komarów (1920), English Wikipedia — phases of 31 August, losses and the '1813' claim.Битва при Комарове (1920), Russian Wikipedia — Sikorski's encirclement order, Budyonny's memoir account, the Łaszczów action.Obrona Zamościa, Polish Wikipedia — the Zamość garrison, fortifications and the pogrom after the defence.