Ivan Stepanovich Konev

Иван Степанович Конев
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia 1897.12.28.–1973.5.21. ○ Died of cancer

Soviet marshal who led the Steppe, 2nd and 1st Ukrainian Fronts from Kursk to Berlin and Prague

On the night of 17 April 1945 Stalin asked whether Zhukov's mobile troops could be sent through Konev's breach. Konev replied that he could turn his own two tank armies on Berlin, and Stalin answered: "I agree. Turn the tank armies on Berlin."

The son of a peasant in Vologda Governorate, he served as an artillery NCO in the First World War, joined the Bolsheviks in 1918 and was a commissar of an armoured train and of a division in the Civil War. In October 1941 his Western Front was destroyed in the Vyazma encirclement, but he went on to command the Kalinin Front in the Battle of Moscow. In 1943 his Steppe Front retook Kharkov and crossed the Dnieper; as commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front he led the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky encirclement and was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in February 1944. From May 1944 he commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Prague operations. After the war he headed the Ground Forces and was the first commander of the Warsaw Pact forces; he presided over the 1953 trial of Beria and directed the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

Konev and Zhukov: Rescue, Rivalry, and Betrayal

Konev's career was entangled with Georgy Zhukov's again and again. When the Western Front was destroyed in the Vyazma encirclement in early October 1941, a State Defence Committee commission led by Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment Voroshilov arrived at front headquarters. Russian histories commonly say that Zhukov then saved Konev from a court-martial and execution. In a passage restored in the later uncut edition of Zhukov's memoirs, Stalin told Zhukov on 10 October that Konev would be relieved and Zhukov given the front, and asked: "What shall we do with Konev?" Zhukov proposed giving him the group of forces on the Kalinin axis. In the 1975 edition Stalin himself says first that "Konev stays as your deputy." That day's Stavka order made Konev deputy commander of the Western Front, and on 17 October he took over the newly formed Kalinin Front.

Over the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket in February 1944 their memoirs diverge. Zhukov wrote that when the encircled Germans tried to break out towards Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, Konev telephoned Stalin directly instead of informing Zhukov or Vatutin, giving the impression that the operation might fail unless he were put in charge of finishing it. On 12 February the Stavka gave Konev the destruction of the pocket and placed Vatutin's 27th Army under him. In Notes of a Front Commander Konev replied that Zhukov had described this "not quite accurately": it was Stalin who insisted that he take the 27th Army, and he himself had refused.

Berlin produced the same pattern. Sergei Shtemenko of the General Staff wrote that at the meeting of 31 March 1945 Konev "became very agitated" because the boundary with the 1st Belorussian Front left him no way to strike at Berlin; Zhukov said he could not confirm this. The next day Stalin broke off the boundary between the two fronts at Lübben, some 60 km south-east of Berlin. In Year of Victory (Forty-Five) Konev allowed that this might have been a silent invitation to a contest between the fronts, and admitted that taking Berlin "was my passionate wish too." By Konev's account, when Stalin asked on the night of 17 April whether Zhukov's mobile troops could be sent through Konev's breach, he answered that he would turn his own two tank armies on Berlin. Zhukov wrote that Stalin told him "we are thinking of ordering Konev to move Rybalko's and Lelyushenko's tank armies on Berlin from the south," and insisted that the turn was Stalin's decision, not Konev's initiative. As proof he quoted Konev himself telling a commanders' conference in February 1946 that Stalin had instructed him to "turn Rybalko and Lelyushenko on Zehlendorf."

Zhukov's troops were the first into the city. The 1st Belorussian Front broke into Berlin's eastern outskirts on 21 April, and Rybalko's tank army approached from the south that evening. Under the boundary that the Stavka drew from 23 April and twice amended, the city centre with the Reichstag fell to the 1st Belorussian Front, and Konev turned Rybalko's corps, already heading for the centre, to the west. He wrote that he accepted the adjustment as proper.

In 1946 Konev succeeded Zhukov as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. The decisive break came in 1957. When Zhukov was expelled from the Central Committee in October, Konev sided with his opponents, and in an article in Pravda on 3 November 1957 he denounced Zhukov as a man who 'failed to justify the Party's trust' and proved 'a politically incompetent figure inclined toward adventurism in understanding the most important tasks of Soviet foreign policy.' This attack on the man commonly credited with having saved him remains one of the most controversial episodes of Konev's career.

From Failure at Rzhev to the Prut: Front Commander, 1942–1944

In August 1942 Konev again took over the Western Front and, with Zhukov as the Stavka representative, fought the First Rzhev-Sychevka operation and, in November and December, Operation Mars against the Rzhev salient. Heavy losses bought advances of only a few dozen kilometres. Zhukov wrote that when the Western Front failed to break the German defences in Mars, Stalin sent him to Konev to find out why. After the Zhizdra operation and the attack on Gzhatsk also failed in February 1943, Konev was dismissed on 27 February "as having failed to cope with the tasks of directing the front." He was given the North-Western Front in March, but its offensive at Staraya Russa also came to nothing, and on 22 June he was relieved again.

The next day he took command of the Steppe Military District, the Stavka's strategic reserve gathered behind the Kursk salient, which became the Steppe Front on 9 July. In Notes of a Front Commander Konev wrote that after Operation Citadel had been stopped he protested categorically when the Stavka began "pulling apart" his front by handing his armies to the neighbouring Voronezh Front, but was overruled. His troops retook Belgorod on 5 August; when the Germans began leaving Kharkov on 22 August he ordered a night assault and held the city by 11 a.m. on the 23rd. He recalled insisting on waking Stalin to report it in person.

The Steppe Front pursued the Germans through Poltava to the Dnieper and crossed it near Kremenchug at the end of September. Renamed the 2nd Ukrainian Front on 20 October, it retook Kirovograd on 8 January 1944. From late January, together with Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, it encircled two German corps near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. Citing official figures, Konev wrote that the Germans lost 55,000 killed and wounded and more than 18,000 prisoners; German records count 40,423 escapees, including wounded flown out, out of some 60,000 men encircled. After the battle ended on 17 February Stalin told him by telephone that he would be made a marshal, and he became a Marshal of the Soviet Union on 20 February. When the body of the German commander in the pocket, Wilhelm Stemmermann, was found, Konev wrote, he allowed German prisoners to bury him with due honours.

Konev called the Uman-Botoşani operation of March-April the most difficult of all the operations in his book. In a month his troops advanced more than 300 km through the mud of the spring rasputitsa, and on 26 March they became the first Red Army troops to reach the Soviet frontier on the Prut and enter Romania. On 14 March, at a crossing of the Southern Bug, his car was strafed by a German fighter, but he was unhurt.

In May 1944 Konev took over the 1st Ukrainian Front from Zhukov. In the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, which began on 13 July, he took the risk of pushing Rybalko's entire tank army in a single column through the Koltów corridor, about 6 km wide, opened by the 60th Army, and encircled up to eight German divisions near Brody. His troops retook Lvov on 27 July and won and held the Sandomierz bridgehead across the Vistula, and on 29 July he was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. In September and October he mounted an operation across the Dukla Pass in the Carpathians to help the Slovak National Uprising.

From the Vistula to Berlin and Prague: the 1st Ukrainian Front in 1945

On 12 January 1945 the 1st Ukrainian Front opened the Vistula-Oder offensive from the Sandomierz bridgehead. On its southern wing the 59th and 60th Armies took Kraków on 19 January. Konev wrote that "only our speed could save Kraków from destruction": although his troops could have closed a ring, they drove the Germans out of the city by direct assault instead. The mines the Germans had laid under the main buildings and historic monuments did not go off, he recalled, and the sappers cleared the routes within a day.

The next objective was the Silesian industrial region. When the plan was presented, Konev wrote, Stalin circled the area on the map with his finger and said only: "Gold." Some 100,000 German troops were inside it. Konev judged that encircling and destroying them would turn the factories and mines into a battlefield, and after long hesitation he decided "not to encircle the enemy, to leave him a free corridor out of the Silesian basin and finish him off afterwards in the open field." He turned Rybalko's tank army, which was racing to close the ring, round once more on the march. As a professional soldier taught that encirclement is the "crown" of operational art, he admitted, the decision was not easy. In the Lower and Upper Silesian operations of February and March his front took the whole industrial region, and on 30 March he received the Order of Victory together with Zhukov and Rokossovsky.

On the morning of 16 April Konev's troops crossed the Neisse under a smoke screen, and the next day both tank armies crossed the Spree. That night, with Stalin's approval, Rybalko's and Lelyushenko's tank armies swung north through Zossen, seat of the German high command, against the southern side of Berlin. Rybalko's troops crossed the Teltow Canal into the city on the 24th, and at noon on the 25th Lelyushenko's troops met Zhukov's 47th Army west of Berlin, closing the ring around the city. An hour and a half later the 5th Guards Army met American troops on the Elbe. At the same time Konev's front had to stop the German 9th Army, trapped south-east of Berlin, from breaking out westwards, and to hold off Walther Wenck's 12th Army coming to its relief from the west. When the Berlin garrison surrendered on 2 May, Konev wrote, 34,000 of the prisoners had been taken by his front.

In Czechoslovakia Ferdinand Schörner's Army Group Centre still held some fifty divisions. Prague rose on 5 May, and in the first days the 1st Division of the Russian Liberation Army, which had turned against the Germans, fought on the insurgents' side. On 6 May the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked on the Dresden axis across the Ore Mountains, took Dresden on the 8th, and its tank armies entered the streets of Prague early on 9 May. Konev wrote that his tank crews "cut the tangled knot" between the insurgents and the SS.

In Dresden the gallery building lay in unrecognisable ruins after the bombing. Konev had its collection searched for, and about 700 paintings, the Sistine Madonna among them, were found in the galleries of a quarry across the Elbe. He wrote that he went to see them, had the tunnels checked again for mines and put a battalion on guard. The paintings were taken to Moscow and Kiev and returned to Dresden in 1955.

After the War: the Beria Trial, the Warsaw Pact and Hungary, the Berlin Crisis

From June 1945 Konev was Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces in Austria and the Soviet member of the Allied commission there as High Commissioner, and in July 1946 he succeeded Zhukov as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. In March 1950 he became Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army, and in November 1951 commander of the Carpathian Military District. After Stalin's death he presided in 1953 over the Special Judicial Presence that tried Lavrentiy Beria and his closest associates and sentenced them to death.

In May 1955 Konev became first deputy minister of defence of the USSR and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and on 14 May 1955, when the Warsaw Pact was formally established, he also became the first Commander-in-Chief of its Joint Armed Forces. The appointment rested on his proximity to Khrushchev, reinforced after he chaired the 1953 Beria trial. He held the post until April 1960, when Andrei Grechko succeeded him; through 1960 he also remained first deputy minister of defence.

As Commander-in-Chief, Konev directed the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. From 1 November he ran the operation from a temporary headquarters in the Hungarian city of Szolnok. Before the final assault on Budapest, planned as Operation 'Vikhr' ('Whirlwind'), order No. 1 in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces was communicated to all Soviet personnel in Hungary, setting the assault for 4 November at 05:50; on 4 November the same order was read on the radio as a decoy announcement in the name of Pal Maleter. The operation began in the night of 3-4 November: 16 Soviet divisions crossed the Hungarian border, including two airborne divisions and a railway brigade, with more than 60,000 personnel and over 3,000 tanks, mainly modern T-54s. The plan tasked Lt-Gen P. N. Lashchenko's Special Corps with seizing the Danube bridges, Gellert Hill and the Buda fortress, the parliament building, the ministry of defence and police headquarters, the Nyugati and Keleti stations, Moscow Square, the Corvin cinema resistance headquarters and Kossuth radio. The Soviet command cancelled the planned air bombardment of Budapest, fearing mass civilian casualties, and Konev expected fighting to end by 6 November, but Hungarian resistance was so fierce that active combat continued until 12 November. Operation 'Vikhr' itself was drawn up under the direction of Defence Minister Zhukov, who also exercised overall command of the November re-entry.

After handing the Warsaw Pact command to Grechko in April 1960, Konev withdrew to the Group of General Inspectors of the Ministry of Defence. He was recalled in August 1961, as the Berlin Wall went up, and commanded the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany through the Berlin crisis until April 1962. He did not command the Pact forces when they entered Czechoslovakia in 1968; in May of that year he led a delegation to Czechoslovakia for the anniversary of the victory. He died of cancer in Moscow in 1973 and was buried in the Kremlin Wall.