1941.12.26–1942.05.20

The Battle of the Kerch Peninsula (1941–1942)

Having retaken the Kerch Peninsula in the landings of December 1941, why did the Red Army fail to relieve Sevastopol and stay stuck for three months at the narrow Parpach isthmus? How did Manstein's German 11th Army destroy a Crimean Front nearly twice its size in little more than ten days in May 1942, and where did the blame lie: with Mekhlis, with Kozlov or with the Stavka?

On 26 December 1941 Soviet forces from the Caucasus and the Black Sea Fleet landed at Kerch and Feodosia and retook the Kerch Peninsula. In January the Germans recaptured Feodosia, and the newly formed Crimean Front attacked the Parpach isthmus again and again from February to April, gaining nothing but heavy losses. On 8 May Manstein's German 11th Army, led by Richthofen's air corps, broke through along the southern coast in Operation Bustard Hunt; the Crimean Front collapsed within some ten days and its remnants escaped to the Taman Peninsula. The Stavka demoted Mekhlis and Kozlov, while some soldiers and civilians held out in the Adzhimushkay quarries until the end of October.

Where is the Kerch Peninsula, and why did it matter to both sides?

The Crimea juts out into the Black Sea, and the Kerch Peninsula is the long finger at its eastern end. Its port, Kerch, faces the Taman Peninsula on the Caucasian side across the Kerch Strait, only a few kilometres wide. To the west, near Feodosia, the peninsula joins the rest of the Crimea through a neck barely 18 km across between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, the Parpach Narrows (the Ak-Monai positions in Soviet usage). Whoever held that neck could hold it with few troops, and there was no room to swing round it; this shaped both sides' calculations throughout the battle. 1 4

In the autumn of 1941 Erich von Manstein's German 11th Army and Romanian troops broke through the Perekop isthmus in the north and entered the Crimea. By mid-November the whole peninsula except the fortress of Sevastopol had fallen, and what was left of the Soviet 51st Army crossed from Kerch to the Kuban. For the Soviet side, retaking the Kerch Peninsula meant three things: relieving Sevastopol, the besieged main base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the rear; gaining a foothold from which to recover the whole Crimea; and barring the way across the strait to the oilfields of the Caucasus. For the German side, ahead of the great summer offensive of 1942 into southern Russia and the Caucasus (Case Blue), the stakes were removing the threat to the Crimea's eastern flank and freeing troops to take Sevastopol. 1 2 4 3

The battle was therefore not one operation but a five-month struggle. It began with the Soviet Kerch-Feodosia landing on 26 December 1941, went on through the German counterattack and the loss of Feodosia in January 1942 and the Crimean Front's repeated failed offensives from February to April, and ended when the German Operation Bustard Hunt (Unternehmen Trappenjagd), launched on 8 May, broke the Crimean Front and its remnants withdrew to the Taman Peninsula. Underground, in the Adzhimushkay quarries outside Kerch, a holdout went on until the end of October. How the Red Army retook the Crimea two years later is told in The Crimean Offensive (1944). 3 1

How did the landing of December 1941 succeed?

On 7-8 December the Stavka (the Soviet supreme command) ordered the Transcaucasian Front, under Lieutenant General Dmitry Kozlov, to prepare within two weeks an amphibious operation to retake the Kerch Peninsula. The plan was drawn up by the front's chief of staff, Fyodor Tolbukhin. The 51st Army would land on several beaches north and south of Kerch, while the 44th Army, brought from the Iranian border, would land straight into the port of Feodosia behind the German lines, trapping the German forces on the peninsula from both ends. The Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky) and the Azov Flotilla (Rear Admiral Sergei Gorshkov) gathered more than 250 ships, and the landing force numbered 82,500 men in eight divisions and several brigades. With almost no landing craft, troops had to be ferried to the beaches in fishing boats and rowing boats. It was the first large amphibious operation in Soviet history. 1 3

Before dawn on 26 December the first troops landed on the coast north and south of Kerch. In a storm, men waded through icy water up to their chests to reach the shore, and many drowned or were felled by hypothermia. German bombers sank the transport Voroshilov with 450 soldiers aboard. The only German force on the peninsula was Lieutenant General Kurt Himer's 46th Infantry Division, but within two days it wiped out most of the northern beachheads and took 1,700 prisoners. Only the 302nd Mountain Rifle Division, landed at Kamysh-Burun in the south, held on to a foothold. 3 1

What turned the tide was the landing at Feodosia before dawn on 29 December. Once an advance party of naval infantry under Senior Lieutenant Arkady Aydinov had seized the harbour mole, the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, hit seventeen times, put some 1,800 soldiers ashore directly onto the mole. The German garrison collapsed that day. With Feodosia lost, the 46th Division at Kerch risked being cut off, and the German XXXXII Corps commander, Lieutenant General Hans von Sponeck, disobeyed Manstein's orders and pulled the division back westward. It marched 120 km through a snowstorm in two days and escaped encirclement, abandoning most of its heavy weapons; Sponeck was relieved and court-martialled in Germany. When the frost set in, most of the 51st Army crossed the frozen Kerch Strait on foot, and by 2 January 1942 the Red Army had retaken the whole Kerch Peninsula. 1 3

The price was high. From 26 December to 2 January the Red Army lost 41,935 men, of whom 32,453 were killed, drowned, frozen to death or missing. Even so, Manstein later wrote in his memoir Lost Victories that had the Soviets pressed their advantage, "the fate of the entire 11th Army would have been decided". For several days the way to Dzhankoy and Simferopol, the key points of the Crimean railway, lay almost open, and the German forces besieging Sevastopol had their backs exposed. 1 3

Why was the chance won by the landing lost within weeks?

The Red Army failed to use those days. The 51st Army moved west from Kerch so slowly that it reached the Parpach Narrows only on 5 January, and the 44th Army at Feodosia moved east to meet it rather than west into the Crimea. The front command postponed the attack, citing a shortage of men and supplies. The landing force had not a single field hospital, so wounded men had to find their own passage to Novorossiysk, and anti-aircraft guns did not reach Feodosia in time, so transports were sunk one after another by bombing. 1 3

Manstein pulled troops out of the Sevastopol siege lines and moved first. On 15 January the German XXX Corps (Major General Maximilian Fretter-Pico), backed by the Luftwaffe, struck the junction of the 44th and 51st Armies. The first bombing raid destroyed the 44th Army's headquarters and badly wounded its commander, and on 18 January the Germans retook Feodosia. The isolated 236th Rifle Division collapsed; its commander got away but was later sentenced to death by a Soviet military tribunal and shot. From 16 January the Soviets landed a regiment-sized force at Sudak, behind German lines, but with no artillery or anti-tank weapons it was isolated and ground down. According to the research summarised in English Wikipedia, 2,000 Soviet soldiers were killed at Sudak, 876 captured men were executed, and 350-500 escaped into the mountains to join the Crimean partisans. 1 3

Losing the deep-water port of Feodosia sharply slowed the build-up. The Red Army fell back east of the Parpach Narrows and dug in; the Caucasus Front (as the Transcaucasian Front had meanwhile been renamed) lost 115,630 men in January alone. Even so, an ice road across the frozen strait brought 96,618 men, 23,903 horses and 6,519 vehicles onto the peninsula. On 28 January the Stavka separated the forces on the Kerch axis into an independent Crimean Front under Kozlov. It comprised the 44th, 47th and 51st Armies, and the Coastal Army at Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet came under its operational command. 1 7 3

Why could the Crimean Front not break through the Parpach Narrows in three months?

On 20 January Lev Mekhlis, Deputy People's Commissar of Defence and head of the Red Army's Main Political Directorate, arrived at Kerch as Stavka representative. In his first report to Stalin he wrote that Kozlov did not know where his units were or what state they were in and "gives the impression of a bewildered man". His proposals to separate the Crimean Front from the Caucasus Front and to move its headquarters from distant Tbilisi to the peninsula were accepted, but from then on he devoted himself to replacing commanders. Sergei Shtemenko, then responsible for this sector in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, wrote in his memoir The General Staff in the Years of the War that Mekhlis, "as was his habit, instead of helping, began reshuffling the leading cadres", citing his replacement of chief of staff Tolbukhin by Major General Pavel Vechny, whom he had brought from the General Staff. 7 6 3

The first offensive began on 27 February. The Coastal Army at Sevastopol attacked the same day to break the siege, without result. A thaw had just set in and turned the plain of the isthmus into a sea of mud. The heavy KV-1 tanks sank into it, and shells had to be carried forward by hand. On open ground without cover, the infantry fell to fire from the fortified German villages, above all Koi-Asan, the strongpoint linking north and south. In the far north the Romanian 18th Infantry Division gave way and the Soviets drove in some 5 km, but Manstein threw in his last reserves to seal the gap. When tank units attacked Koi-Asan on 2 March, the Soviets admitted losing 93 tanks in a single day. 3 1 2

The second offensive, renewed on 13 March, a small attack on 26 March and a last offensive on 9-11 April all ran into the same wall. Kozlov blamed the weather; Mekhlis blamed Tolbukhin's planning and had him dismissed. On Mekhlis's advice the tanks were parcelled out among the rifle divisions instead of being massed, and scattered in this way they were picked off one by one by German assault guns and anti-tank guns. On 20 March the newly arrived German 22nd Panzer Division counterattacked in fog and pulled back after losing 32 tanks. Russian sources count three offensives in this period, English ones four, counting the attack of 26 March separately. Either way, by mid-April the line was back near the February start line. 3 1 7

The sea was no friend to the Red Army either. From February the torpedo bombers and bombers of the German Luftflotte 4 concentrated on transports in the Kerch Strait and the ports of the Caucasian coast. In the eight weeks from early February to the end of March the Black Sea transport fleet shrank from 43,200 to 27,400 tons, and by late April even food and firewood were running short. The loss figures vary widely between sources. Russian Wikipedia gives the Crimean Front's losses from 14 January to 12 April as more than 110,000 men (over 43,000 of them irrecoverable); English Wikipedia gives 352,000 from January to April including the Sevastopol forces, against 24,120 for the German 11th Army over the same months. 3 2

How did the Germans prepare Operation Bustard Hunt, and what did the Soviet side miss?

On 5 April 1942 Directive No. 41 of the German Armed Forces High Command ordered the 11th Army first to clear the Kerch Peninsula and then to take Sevastopol. The difference in strength was plain. In his memoir The Cause of My Whole Life, Vasilevsky wrote that in April the Crimean Front had 21 rifle divisions, 3,577 guns and mortars, 347 tanks and 400 aircraft, clearly superior to the Germans with ten and a half infantry divisions, 2,472 guns and mortars, 180 tanks and about 400 aircraft. By the count summarised in Russian Wikipedia, the Crimean Front had 296,000 men, 4,653 guns and mortars, 213 serviceable tanks and 406 serviceable aircraft, against some 150,000 German and Romanian troops. Manstein was attacking an enemy nearly twice his size. 2 4 5

Manstein's target was the Soviet deployment. The earlier offensives had left the Soviet line bulging far westward in the north, and two-thirds of the Soviet forces were packed into that salient. The 44th Army's sector in the south, on the Black Sea, was thinly held because its marshy coast was thought unsuitable for attack, and the 44th Army's second echelon stood only 3-4 km behind the front line. The German plan was to break through head-on along the southern coast, then turn the 22nd Panzer Division north to the Sea of Azov to trap the 47th and 51st Armies in the salient, while a mobile group (the Groddeck brigade) raced east towards Kerch to cut the escape routes and prevent a new line from forming. The isthmus was too narrow for a wide envelopment, so the only way was to punch through at one point and wheel inside. 2 4 3

The key to the plan was air power. On Hitler's orders Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps was recalled from leave in Germany. "By order of the Führer, I must immediately leave again, to work at Kerch," Richthofen wrote in his diary. Breaking with Luftwaffe practice, he was given all close air support to run on his own rather than under Luftflotte 4, and worked hand in glove with Manstein. The attack was put back two days to wait for his units. Counts of German aircraft in the Crimea in early May range from 460 to 800 depending on the source, and Richthofen stockpiled more than 6,000 canisters of 2 kg SD-2 anti-personnel cluster bombs. 10 3

Whether the Soviet side had really switched to the defensive differs from source to source. Vasilevsky wrote that in the second half of April the Stavka ordered the Crimean Front to stop attacking and build "a solid defence echeloned in depth". But according to research cited in English Wikipedia, Stalin refused to consider evacuating Kerch and on 21 April ordered preparations for a new offensive, issuing Order No. 170357 for a defensive posture only on 6 May. Researchers cited in Russian Wikipedia likewise point out that the Stavka kept setting the front offensive tasks right up to the German attack. On the ground the deployment remained an attacking one: divisions strung out in a single line, with no reserves and no prepared rear lines behind them. Shtemenko wrote in his memoir that "front intelligence had established precisely even the day" the Germans meant to attack, and that this was passed to the troops the day before, yet neither the Stavka representative nor the front commander took proper measures to meet the blow. 5 3 2 6

How did the Crimean Front fall apart in the ten-odd days from 8 May?

On 7 May German bombers struck Soviet headquarters and airfields located in advance. Command posts that had not moved for a long time were destroyed and communications cut. At 04:15 on 8 May, after a short bombardment, the German XXX Corps attacked the 44th Army's sector on the Black Sea coast, while a battalion in assault boats went round by sea and landed behind the Soviet second line. Within 210 minutes the anti-tank ditch forming the 44th Army's second line had been breached. On the first day the Germans took 4,514 prisoners for 104 killed and 284 wounded. The 51st Army's commander, Lieutenant General Vladimir Lvov, was killed when his headquarters was bombed early in the offensive; sources variously give the date as 8, 9 or 11 May. 3 4 2 12

On the evening of the first day Mekhlis cabled Stalin: "This is no time to complain, but I must report so that the Stavka knows the front commander." He wrote that on the eve of the attack Kozlov had convened the military council to discuss a plan for taking Koi-Asan, had told the armies to expect the enemy attack on 10-15 May, and had resisted moving more troops to the 44th Army's sector. Stalin replied the next day: "You are holding the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front." He told Mekhlis that he shared with the command the responsibility for the weak left flank, and to the demand that Kozlov be replaced by someone like Hindenburg he answered that "we have no Hindenburgs in reserve". Both telegrams appear in the memoirs of Vasilevsky and of Shtemenko; Shtemenko judged Stalin's reply to be the first document defining the duties and responsibility of a Stavka representative. 5 6

On 9 May, once German engineers had filled the anti-tank ditch, the 22nd Panzer Division passed through the breach and wheeled north. That evening a heavy thunderstorm bogged down the German mobile units, but when the weather cleared on 10 May they moved on and reached the Sea of Azov on 11 May. On the afternoon of the 9th the Groddeck brigade overran three Soviet airfields in a row, destroying dozens of aircraft on the ground. On the morning of 10 May the Stavka ordered the front to fall back to the Turkish Wall west of Kerch and hold there. According to Vasilevsky, the front command delayed the withdrawal by two days and then failed to organise it properly; the Stavka directive of June recorded that the order for the 51st Army to cover the withdrawal of the whole front never even reached the army commander. Most of the 51st Army, left in the salient, was surrounded and destroyed on 11 May. 4 3 2 5

Richthofen's air corps flew 1,500 to 2,000 sorties a day, striking retreating columns, tanks, airfields and ships carrying wounded alike. The cluster bombs did particularly terrible damage to infantry fleeing across open ground. On 12 May his aircraft dropped 1,780 bombs on Kerch and set the town ablaze, and three transports went down with 900 wounded aboard. Richthofen called the operation "concentrated air support, the likes of which has never existed". That same day most of his units were moved to the Kharkov sector, but the sky already belonged to the Germans. On 13 May the defence of the Turkish Wall was broken too. That day the Soviet Information Bureau announced that "the German command's statement that the fighting on the Kerch Peninsula has ended in the Germans' favour is a lie". 3 10 2

On the night of 14 May Marshal Semyon Budyonny, commander-in-chief of the North Caucasus Direction, authorised the evacuation of the Kerch Peninsula, and Stalin's permission followed a few hours later. The Germans entered the port of Kerch on 14 May, and the town fell completely on the 15th or 16th depending on the source. Scattered Soviet troops fought on in three pockets, at the Voikov steelworks in Kerch, at Yenikale and at Opasnoye, and crossed the strait under ceaseless shelling and bombing. The evacuation went on until about 20 May. The Crimean Front was disbanded on 19 May, and the next day its headquarters became the basis of Budyonny's North Caucasus Front, charged with defending the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait and the Black Sea coast. 2 4 6 7

What were the losses, and why do the figures differ?

For Soviet losses the official count compiled by Russian researchers is the most widely cited. By it, the Crimean Front lost 162,282 men irrecoverably (killed, captured or missing) from 8 May, or 176,566 including the wounded, along with 4,646 guns and mortars, 196 tanks, 417 aircraft and 10,400 vehicles. Manstein announced 170,000 prisoners and 258 tanks and 1,133 guns captured or destroyed. The Swedish historian Christer Bergström holds that a large number of civilians were counted among these prisoners. 2 3

The number who got away across the strait varies even more. Russian sources say about 140,000 men, 157 aircraft, 22 guns and 29 Katyusha rocket launchers were brought out to the Taman Peninsula; German Wikipedia says only about 37,000 escaped; English sources give a range of 37,000 to 116,045. German losses are no different. an English-language study of 2008 cited in German Wikipedia gives 3,397 (600 killed), and a 2014 book by the same author 7,588 for XXX and XLII Corps from 8 to 19 May (1,703 killed or missing); the Russian researcher Alexei Isaev, going through German records division by division, gives 9,592 (2,026 killed). The figures depend on the period counted and on whether the wounded and the Romanians are included. By any of them, the side that attacked an enemy nearly twice its size lost around a twentieth as many men as the defenders, or fewer. 2 4 3 7

What happened to civilians and prisoners?

The people of the Kerch Peninsula lived through two occupations in the course of this fighting. During the first, in November-December 1941, the German occupiers took Kerch's Jews and other residents to an anti-tank ditch near Bagerovo, west of the town, and shot them. Russian Wikipedia records that 15,000 civilians were killed in Kerch during the occupation as a whole, 7,000 of them shot at the "Bagerovo ditch". Retaking the town in the January 1942 landing, Soviet troops were the first to see the site, and the war photographer Dmitri Baltermants photographed women searching for their families among the bodies lying in the muddy snow. That photograph, Grief, became one of the defining images of the German-Soviet war. 13 14 3

After the May defeat a great many captured soldiers and civilians came under occupation once more. There are records of prisoners being killed on the spot, as with the 876 men captured from the Sudak landing in January. More than 14,000 Kerch residents were taken to Germany for forced labour. Russian Wikipedia puts at 43,429 the total of Kerch residents killed or deported to Germany during the occupation together with the Soviet prisoners of war held in the town. 3 2 13

How did the holdout in the Adzhimushkay quarries go on?

Beneath the village of Adzhimushkay, north-east of Kerch, a vast maze of limestone quarry galleries had been dug since antiquity. In mid-May the units covering the withdrawal (reserve officers and military-school cadets gathered by Colonel Pavel Yagunov of the front staff, NKVD and border troops, naval infantry and others) went down into these galleries when their way out was cut. Fleeing residents hid there with them. Some 10,000 people were in the Great quarries and about 3,000 in the Small, around 13,000 in all. The Great quarries were led by Yagunov, Senior Battalion Commissar Ivan Parakhin and Lieutenant Colonel Grigory Burmin. 9 8

Water was the worst problem. All the wells were outside, and every trip to fetch water meant a fight; survivors recalled that "a bucket of water was paid for with a bucket of blood". When the Germans filled in the wells, the defenders sucked moisture from the limestone walls through lengths of German telephone cable and dug a well more than 16 metres deep inside the galleries. The engineer battalion of the German 46th Infantry Division blew in the entrances, brought down the roofs and pumped smoke into the galleries. Whether poison gas was used is disputed. English Wikipedia and one Russian Wikipedia article say gas was used from 24 May; the Russian Wikipedia article on the quarries themselves says that the use of chemical weapons has not been confirmed, that the Soviet government never officially made such a charge, and that smoke candles could have been lethal underground. 9 8 3

The holdout lasted nearly 170 days and ended on 30 October 1942, when the Germans finally took the quarries. Of the roughly 13,000 who went down, only 48 are said to have survived. Burmin and Parakhin died in prison camps. At the Sevastopol trial of 1947 four German engineers involved in the siege were sentenced to twenty years. In Soviet times not one of the defenders was made a Hero of the Soviet Union, and only 323 of them have been identified by name in the official count. Yagunov and others were decorated posthumously only in 1990. 9 8

Who was held responsible for the defeat?

The Stavka directive No. 155452 of 4 June 1942, "On the causes of the Crimean Front's defeat in the Kerch operation", named as the first cause the "complete failure to understand the nature of modern war" shown by the front commander Kozlov, military council member Fyodor Shamanin, chief of staff Vechny, the Stavka representative Mekhlis, and the army commanders Stepan Chernyak of the 44th and Konstantin Kolganov of the 47th: divisions strung out in a single line without reserves, and command posts well known to the enemy left so long in place that the first air raid cut communications. The second cause was a "bureaucratic and paper" method of command that treated an order once issued as a task done. In the critical days, the directive said, the command and Mekhlis, instead of going to the army commanders, "spent their time in hours-long fruitless sessions of the military council". The third was indiscipline: failing to carry out the withdrawal order in time. 5 2 7

The penalties were severe. Mekhlis lost his posts as Deputy People's Commissar of Defence and head of the Political Directorate and was reduced two ranks, from army commissar 1st rank to corps commissar; Shtemenko wrote that he was never again sent to the troops as a Stavka representative. Kozlov was removed from command and reduced from lieutenant general to major general, Shamanin was reduced to brigade commissar, and Vechny was removed as chief of staff. Chernyak, Kolganov and the front's air commander Yevgeny Nikolaenko were reduced to colonel. 2 6 7

Whose share was greatest is still disputed. Many put the heavier weight on Mekhlis. The writer Konstantin Simonov, who visited the front in February 1942, noted of the troops packed up against the front line that "no one was fortifying, no one was digging trenches", and recalled that Mekhlis, behaving like Stalin's personal deputy, overrode an "educated but weak-willed" commander and in effect ran everything himself. The British historian John Erickson likewise wrote that Mekhlis threw away twenty-one divisions of three armies "in a nightmare of confusion and mismanagement". Yet Stalin, in his reply, told Mekhlis that he shared the responsibility with the command, and the directive bound the two men together. Other accounts point to Kozlov's shortcomings. The research summarised in English Wikipedia says he had little command experience beyond regimental level, and General Ivan Laskin, who met him again in 1943, recalled that Kozlov himself admitted he had been unprepared, never having handled an operation on the scale of a front. 2 3 7 16

Others ask about the Stavka's own share. The directive did not examine the responsibility of the Stavka or the General Staff. Researchers cited in Russian Wikipedia point to the insertion of an intermediate command, the North Caucasus Direction, above the Crimean Front; to the Stavka's tolerating Mekhlis's direct and incompetent interference; to the transfer, in the middle of the battle, of all the front's aviation to the deputy commander of Long-Range Aviation; and above all to its setting the front offensive tasks right up to the German attack without giving it the resources they needed. Kozlov himself wrote in a letter of 1966 that the blame lay not only with those who fought, but with the leadership above them: "I mean not Mekhlis, a layman in operational art, but the commander of the North Caucasus Direction and the Stavka." Looking back on the whole plan for the summer of 1942, Vasilevsky conceded that "the most vulnerable part of it proved to be the decision to defend and attack at the same time". 2 5

How did Manstein's memoirs tell the five months at Kerch?

In the Crimean chapter of Lost Victories (1955), Erich von Manstein told the five months on the Kerch Peninsula as seen from the headquarters of the German 11th Army. His account meshes in many places with the causes of defeat that Soviet directives and memoirs drew up, and diverges in a few. 17

Of late December 1941 he wrote that Hans von Sponeck, commander of the German XLII Corps holding the peninsula, twice asked to abandon it and fall back to the Parpach Narrows right after the landings, and that he refused, because giving up the peninsula would open a new front the army could not cope with. When, after the Feodosiya landing on 29 December, Sponeck radioed that he had already ordered the withdrawal and then shut down his radio, Manstein relieved him. In the memoirs he explained that he did so not for the disobedience as such but because he was not sure Sponeck could master the crisis. Sponeck was sent before a court martial ordered by Hitler and on 23 January 1942, in a trial presided over by Hermann Göring, was sentenced to death for "negligent disobedience in the field". Hitler commuted the sentence on 22 February to fortress detention, for six years according to German Wikipedia and seven according to English Wikipedia. Manstein wrote that on hearing of the verdict he asked, with the support of Army Group South commander Fedor von Bock, to be heard again, but Wilhelm Keitel rejected this harshly. Earlier, Walter von Reichenau, then commanding Army Group South, had forbidden any decorations for the men of the retreating 46th Infantry Division. After the attempt on Hitler's life of 20 July 1944, Sponeck, though he had no contact with the plotters, was shot without trial on Heinrich Himmler's orders. 17 18 19

Manstein wrote that he would remember Sponeck as an honest soldier. An article by the historian Erik Grimmer-Solem in a German military history journal in 2013, however, examined Sponeck's role in numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity in southern Ukraine and the Crimea in 1941, and after civic protests the German Air Force in 2015 renamed the "General-Hans-Graf-Sponeck-Kaserne" in Germersheim. 19 18

To explain why the Soviets missed their chance in early January 1942, Manstein pointed to captured operational maps. The Soviet 44th Army landed at Feodosiya had been told only to reach the area west of Stary Krym by 4 January and go over to the defence there, and even then it turned its main force not west but east, towards the 51st Army. In his view the Soviet command saw only the tactical aim of destroying the Germans on the peninsula and missed the operational aim of cutting the Dzhankoy-Simferopol railway, the 11th Army's lifeline. This judgement broadly agrees with the Soviet criticism that the 51st Army was slow and the 44th moved east. 17 1

Of Operation Bustard Hunt he stressed the unfavourable odds. By his count the Soviet 44th and 51st Armies had 26 large formations at the end of April, against five German infantry divisions and one panzer division plus Romanian troops, a ratio of two to one in the Soviets' favour. So the main blow went along the southern coast, while false radio traffic, a sham artillery preparation and troop movements in the north and centre hid its direction; the deception worked, he wrote, and the main Soviet reserves stayed behind the northern flank until it was too late. He presented the landing of a battalion by assault boats behind the Soviet line as perhaps the army's first seaborne landing, and named the rain of 9 and 10 May, which held up the 22nd Panzer Division by a day, as the moment that could have ruined the whole operation. Soviet records show another side. Sergei Shtemenko wrote that the front's reconnaissance had learned even the date of the attack but the command took no precautions, and the Soviet deployment stayed an offensive one. Manstein's account of a deception that worked and the Soviet account of a warning not acted upon describe the same outcome from opposite sides. 17 6

The book also shrinks or leaves things out. Manstein wrote that "the battle on the Kerch Peninsula" was over on 18 May and that only small enemy detachments, driven on by a few "fanatical commissars", held out for some weeks more in rock caves near Kerch. In fact some 13,000 soldiers and civilians went into the Adzhimushkay quarries and held out for nearly 170 days, until 30 October, and only 48 are said to have survived. The shooting of inhabitants at the Bagerovo anti-tank ditch, when Kerch was first occupied under the 11th Army in November and December 1941, does not appear in the chapter either. 17 9

What did the defeat mean for Sevastopol and the summer campaign of 1942?

Sevastopol was the first to pay. Having cleared Kerch, Manstein turned the freed troops and guns, and even captured Soviet guns and vehicles, against Sevastopol. Vasilevsky wrote that the loss of the Kerch Peninsula put the city's defenders in "an exceptionally difficult position", with the whole German 11th Army now turned against them. The third German assault (Operation Sturgeon Catch) began on 2 June, and the city, which had held out for 250 days, fell on 4 July. The same air corps that had covered Kerch now covered the skies over Sevastopol. Manstein was promoted to field marshal on 1 July. 2 5 15 6 11

Coming in the same May as the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet Southwestern Front's offensive south of Kharkov, the Kerch defeat tipped the whole southern front in the Germans' favour. Vasilevsky wrote that after the loss of the Crimea "the military situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front changed in the enemy's favour". Ahead of Case Blue the Germans had removed the threat to their flank and gained another door to the Caucasus. On 2 September 1942 they crossed the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula in Operation Blücher II. The Red Army set foot in Kerch again only when it crossed the strait the other way in the Kerch-Eltigen landing of November 1943, and Kerch was finally liberated on 11 April 1944. 5 2 3 4 13

It also left its mark on the Soviet command system. Shtemenko regarded Stalin's reply to Mekhlis as the first document to define what a Stavka representative was answerable for at the front, and the directive of 4 June demanded that every front and army learn deep echelonment and the keeping of reserves, cooperation between the arms and above all between ground forces and aviation, and abandon "bureaucratic and paper" command. In the midst of the defeat, from the evening of 11 May, Stavka directives bore the signature of Vasilevsky as acting chief of the General Staff in place of the ailing Boris Shaposhnikov. Kerch was the first link in the chain that led from the optimism of the 1941-42 winter counteroffensive to the disasters of the summer of 1942. 6 5 2

Consequences

Three armies of the Crimean Front were destroyed, with more than 162,000 men lost irrecoverably from 8 May alone, against German losses of roughly 3,000 to 10,000 depending on the source. With the Kerch Peninsula back in German hands, Sevastopol was left alone and fell on 4 July; ahead of Case Blue the Germans had cleared their flank, and in September they crossed the strait into the Caucasus. The Stavka directive of 4 June blamed the command's "failure to understand the nature of modern war" and dismissed and demoted Mekhlis, Kozlov and others.

Timeline & Map

Kerch Peninsula Adzhimushkay quarries Kerch Ak-Monai (Parpach Narrows) Taman Peninsula Feodosia Sudak Novorossiysk Sevastopol 11 Moscow 13 Moscow 14 Moscow 18 Moscow 15 Southern shore of the Sea of Azov 19 Adzhimushkay quarries 1 Kerch 3 Kerch 6 Kerch 7 Kerch 16 Kerch 8 Ak-Monai (Parpach Narrows) 9 Ak-Monai (Parpach Narrows) 10 Ak-Monai (Parpach Narrows) 12 Ak-Monai (Parpach Narrows) 17 Taman Peninsula 2 Feodosia 5 Feodosia 4 Sudak
  1. 11941.12.26Soviet UnionGermany
    Landings at Kerch

    Units of the Soviet 51st Army, carried by ships of the Azov Flotilla and the Black Sea Fleet, landed in a storm on the coast north and south of Kerch.

  2. 21941.12.29Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    Landing at Feodosia

    An advance party of naval infantry seized the harbour mole at Feodosia, and the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz and other ships landed 44th Army troops in the port. The German XXXXII Corps commander, Sponeck, disobeyed orders and pulled the 46th Infantry Division west from Kerch.

  3. 31942.01.02Soviet Union
    Kerch Peninsula retaken

    The Red Army completed the recapture of the Kerch Peninsula, ending the landing operation.

  4. 41942.01.16Soviet UnionRomaniaGermany
    Landing at Sudak

    Soviet forces landed a regiment-sized force at Sudak, behind German lines.

  5. 51942.01.18GermanySoviet Union
    Germans retake Feodosia

    The German XXX Corps, which had counterattacked on 15 January, retook Feodosia.

  6. 61942.01.20Soviet Union
    Mekhlis arrives

    Lev Mekhlis arrived at Kerch as Stavka representative.

  7. 71942.01.28Soviet Union
    Crimean Front formed

    The Stavka formed the Crimean Front from the forces on the Kerch axis and appointed Dmitry Kozlov its commander.

  8. 81942.02.27Soviet UnionGermanyRomania
    First offensive

    The Crimean Front attacked the German and Romanian positions across the Parpach Narrows.

  9. 91942.03.13Soviet UnionGermany
    Second offensive

    The Crimean Front attacked again, aiming at Koi-Asan.

  10. 101942.04.09Soviet UnionGermany
    Last offensive

    The Crimean Front began its last offensive and called it off on 11 April.

  11. 111942.04.21Soviet Union
    North Caucasus Direction

    The Stavka created the North Caucasus Direction under Semyon Budyonny and placed the Crimean Front under it.

  12. 121942.05.08GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Operation Bustard Hunt

    The German XXX Corps attacked the 44th Army's sector on the Black Sea coast and broke its second line the same day.

  13. 131942.05.09Soviet Union
    Stalin's reply

    Stalin answered Mekhlis's telegram blaming Kozlov, rebuking him for behaving like an outside observer with no responsibility.

  14. 141942.05.10Soviet Union
    Withdrawal ordered to the Turkish Wall

    The Stavka ordered the Crimean Front to fall back to the line of the Turkish Wall and defend it.

  15. 151942.05.11GermanySoviet Union
    51st Army encircled

    The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the Sea of Azov, trapping the 51st Army in the salient.

  16. 161942.05.14GermanySoviet Union
    Evacuation authorised; Germans enter Kerch

    Budyonny and Stalin authorised the evacuation of the Kerch Peninsula, and troops of the German 170th Infantry Division entered the port of Kerch.

  17. 171942.05.19Soviet Union
    Crimean Front disbanded

    The Crimean Front was disbanded, and the troops who had crossed the strait passed to the North Caucasus Front formed the next day.

  18. 181942.06.04Soviet Union
    Stavka directive No. 155452

    The Stavka issued a directive on the causes of the Crimean Front's defeat and dismissed and demoted Mekhlis, Kozlov and others.

  19. 191942.10.30GermanySoviet Union
    End of the Adzhimushkay holdout

    The Germans finally took the Adzhimushkay quarries and captured the few surviving defenders.

Related people 13

Soviet Union (Crimean Front and Black Sea Fleet)11

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19