1941.10.30–1942.07.04

Defence of Sevastopol (1941–1942)

How did Sevastopol, the base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, hold out for 250 days against the German and Romanian siege, and why did it fall in the third assault of June 1942? What happened to the soldiers and townspeople left behind when the command left by submarine and aircraft in the last days?

When Manstein's German 11th Army overran the Crimea in the autumn of 1941, Petrov's Coastal Army, shipped from Odessa, and the Black Sea Fleet held Sevastopol. Coastal batteries, rugged ground and supply by sea beat off the November and December assaults, and the Kerch landing bought half a year's respite. But in June 1942, after the Crimean Front collapsed, Germany's Operation Störfang massed super-heavy guns and the VIII Air Corps, cut the sea lanes and reduced the forts one by one. After the crossing of Severnaya Bay and the fall of Sapun Hill on 29 June, Oktyabrsky, Petrov and the rest of the command left by aircraft and submarine, and on 4 July tens of thousands left on Cape Khersones were taken prisoner.

Why did Sevastopol matter so much to both sides?

Sevastopol, a port on a limestone promontory at the south-western tip of the Crimea, was the main base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The deep Severnaya (Northern) Bay sheltered the anchorage, and the cliffs and rugged, wooded ravines above it made an approach from the land hard as well. On this ground the Soviet Navy had built coastal batteries of 305 mm battleship guns in armoured turrets. The best known were Battery 30 in the north and Battery 35 on Cape Khersones in the south, each with four guns in two turrets, and they could fire inland as well as out to sea. In 1941 the city had 111,000 civilian inhabitants. 2 1 4

Its weakness was just as clear. The fortifications had been built against attack from the sea and the air, and the enemy came by land. When the war began the landward lines had only been surveyed. Between July and November 1941 soldiers and townspeople hurriedly dug a forward, a main and a rear line, and much of the work had to be finished under enemy fire. 1 15

For Germany the Crimea was at first a side issue. German planners assumed it would fall in mopping-up operations once the bulk of the Red Army had been destroyed west of the Dnieper. But in June 1941 Soviet bombers flying from the Crimea struck Romanian refineries and burned 12,000 tons of oil. Hitler called the peninsula an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and in Directive 33 of 23 July made Ukraine and the Crimea vital objectives. Romanian oil was indispensable to the German forces. The Army High Command ordered the Crimea taken as soon as possible to protect it, and on 12 August Hitler again demanded that the peninsula be seized at once. 2

For the Soviet Union, Sevastopol was the base that let the Black Sea Fleet operate across almost the whole Black Sea and the last airfield from which the Romanian coast and oilfields could be threatened. Once the city was lost, Soviet aircraft could no longer threaten the Ploiești oilfields, and the fleet lost the means to attack enemy shipping in the northern and north-western Black Sea. For Germany, conversely, the port promised a base for sea and air operations reaching the Caucasian ports and mountains. 1 2

How did the German 11th Army break into the Crimea, and how did the Coastal Army reach Sevastopol?

In September 1941 the commander of the German 11th Army, Eugen Ritter von Schobert, was killed when his plane landed in a Soviet minefield, and Erich von Manstein took over the army on 17 September. The Crimea is joined to the Ukrainian mainland only by the narrow Perekop isthmus. In the attack that began at the end of September, Erik Hansen's German LIV Corps (45th and 73rd Infantry Divisions) broke through at Perekop in six days at a cost of 2,641 casualties. But a Soviet counter-offensive against the 11th Army's flank near Melitopol forced Manstein to turn his forces north, and meanwhile the Stavka set up another defence line at Ishun, south of the isthmus. 2 17 12

Renewing the attack at Ishun in mid-October, LIV Corps lost 5,376 men in twelve days but pushed back the Soviet 51st Army. On 22 and 23 October German fighter wings crippled Soviet air strength in the Crimea, and the sky passed to the Germans as well. By the end of October the Soviet forces had been split in two: the 51st Army fell back east towards Kerch, while the Coastal Army, which had come from Odessa, made for Sevastopol. On 1 November the Germans took Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea, and with the fall of Kerch on 16 November only Sevastopol remained in Soviet hands. 2 5

The Coastal Army (officially the Separate Coastal Army) had defended Odessa against the Romanians for more than two months. When the Stavka decided to give up Odessa, the army under Major General Ivan Petrov was shipped to the Crimea by 16 October. According to Russian Wikipedia the reinforcement amounted to up to 36,000 men (over 80,000 by German figures), about 500 guns, 20,000 tons of ammunition and ten T-26 tanks. Some of its units were sent north to the Perekop and Ishun front without rest but could not change the outcome. When German mobile units cut the road from Simferopol through Bakhchisaray to Sevastopol, the Coastal Army had to cross the mountains to Alushta and Yalta and reach Sevastopol along the coast road, part of it carried from Yalta by ships of the Black Sea Fleet. It lost a good deal of men and equipment on the way. 1 5 7

The German spearhead reached the outskirts of Sevastopol on 30 October, and on 1 November the 305 mm guns of Battery 30 shelled the vanguard of the German 132nd Infantry Division. Soviet accounts count 30 October as the first day of the defence. At that moment there were hardly any land forces in the city: some 20,000 men of the Black Sea Fleet's 7th and 8th Naval Infantry Brigades, the coastal batteries and training, artillery and anti-aircraft units held it, and more infantry was formed from sailors taken off the ships. On 4 November the Sevastopol Defence Region was created, joining the Coastal Army, the ships and aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet and the units of the Sevastopol naval base. Petrov commanded it at first, but Vice Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, soon took over, and Petrov became deputy commander for the land forces while keeping the Coastal Army. About 15,000 townspeople volunteered for the militia. 1 2 3 7

Why did the two assaults of November and December 1941 fail?

Manstein avoided the strong defences in the north and struck in the east and south, towards Balaklava. On 11 November about 60,000 men, four German infantry divisions and a Romanian motorised brigade among them, opened a full attack but advanced only one to four kilometres. The Coastal Army was now in place, and the coastal batteries, two cruisers and the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna pounded every German penetration. Having lost about 2,000 men, Manstein called off the attack on 21 November. Soviet historiography calls the fighting from 30 October to 21 November the "first assault". On 20 November the garrison, army and navy together, numbered 62,337 men. 3 2 1

Russian Wikipedia counts among the reasons the defence held the artillery group that Colonel Nikolai Ryzhi, the Coastal Army's chief of artillery, put together in the middle of the fighting, with its system of command: fixed coastal guns, mobile batteries and the guns of ships in the bay were tied into a single net of fire. The sea exacted its price, though. On 7 November the hospital transport Armeniya, which had left Sevastopol and Yalta with wounded and refugees, was sunk by German torpedo bombers. English Wikipedia says only eight of some 5,000 passengers survived; the Russian Wikipedia article on the ship puts the dead at between 4,500 and 10,000. On 12 November dive bombers sank the cruiser Chervona Ukraina in the bay. 1 2 14

Manstein planned to attack again on 27 November, but by 17 November rain and partisan raids had put half of the 11th Army's motor and horse transport and four of its five locomotives out of action. The attack did not begin until 17 December. By then the German armies on the Eastern Front had been forced onto the defensive before Moscow, and Manstein was the only commander with an offensive mission. Yet LIV Corps, which was to make the main thrust, had only 15,551 men in its four divisions, over 7,000 men of the 11th Army were on the sick list, and shells and heavy guns were short. Manstein left the whole eastern coast from Yalta to Kerch to the 46th Infantry Division and two Romanian brigades and threw everything else at Sevastopol. 1 2

In the north the German 22nd Infantry Division rolled up the flank of the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade on the Belbek river within five days, and the Germans closed in on the forts north of Severnaya Bay. Meanwhile Oktyabrsky used the long winter nights and Soviet command of the sea to bring in the 11,000 men of the 388th Rifle Division on 7 to 13 December, the 345th Rifle Division and tank battalions on 23 and 24 December, and then the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade. When Soviet troops landed on the Kerch peninsula on 26 December and at Feodosia on 30 December, Manstein had to send the 170th Infantry Division east, and by about 30 December the 11th Army's offensive strength was spent. In his memoirs Manstein wrote that pulling his troops back to their start lines was his own decision; Soviet historiography says they were driven back by a series of counter-attacks. 2 1 17

The command in Sevastopol was shaken during the December fighting too. At the end of the month the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, the superior headquarters, removed Petrov from command of the Coastal Army without consulting Sevastopol's military council and appointed S. I. Chernyak. Oktyabrsky and the fleet's military council member sent Stalin an urgent telegram saying Petrov had done nothing to deserve dismissal and asking that he be promoted and kept in his post, and the dismissal was cancelled. On 17 December, at Battery 35 in the south, a charge ignited before the breech was fully closed; the second turret exploded and about forty of the gun crew were killed. The turret was rebuilt under fire in two and a half months. 7 4

What did the Kerch landing and the spring of 1942 give Sevastopol?

From 26 December 1941 the Soviet 44th and 51st Armies, supported by the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, landed on the Kerch peninsula and at Feodosia. That landing and the fighting until the collapse of the Crimean Front in May 1942 are treated separately as the battle of the Kerch peninsula. Seen from Sevastopol, the landing was a reprieve: as long as a large Soviet force stood at Kerch, the 11th Army had to keep considerable strength in the east, and the siege lines around Sevastopol went quiet until May 1942. On 5 January 1942 the fleet landed a naval infantry battalion in the western port of Yevpatoria, where part of the population rose in support, but once German reserves arrived the landing force was destroyed or captured by 7 January. 1 2 12

The besieged city made its own weapons. In the naval dockyard, in town factories and in "Special Works No. 1", set up in unfinished galleries 60 metres underground in the Troitskaya ravine south of Severnaya Bay, skilled workers and hastily trained schoolchildren and housewives worked twelve to sixteen hours a day. They turned out 930 82 mm mortars, 1,326 50 mm mortars and some 250,000 mortar bombs, and by the spring of 1942 most of the mortars in the defence region had been made there. Guns raised from sunken destroyers and a cruiser went into new coastal batteries, and a test section of an unfinished battleship hull became a floating anti-aircraft battery nicknamed "Don't touch me". Nikolai Krylov, chief of staff of the Coastal Army, was badly wounded by shellfire on 8 January 1942 and should have been evacuated, but Petrov insisted that he stay, and he returned to staff work at the end of March. 1 8

The reprieve had a cost, however. According to a 1995 study group at the Black Sea Fleet museum, ammunition shipments to Sevastopol had fallen to a quarter by April 1942, because the fleet's resources went to the Crimean Front on the Kerch peninsula. Transports made 178 runs to Sevastopol in November 1941 and 161 in December, but only 174 in the six months from January to June 1942 together. When the German Operation Bustard Hunt, launched on 8 May, destroyed the Crimean Front, the balance turned. Aleksandr Vasilevsky, who watched it from the General Staff, wrote in his memoirs that "the defeat at Kerch was galling and brought grave consequences for Sevastopol." The whole 11th Army now turned on the city. 1 19

Meanwhile the Germans prepared the next assault. They converted the railway to the German gauge, built the so-called Manstein road linking the centre and south-east of the siege ring, and stockpiled ammunition. In early March 1942 the 80 cm railway gun (Krupp's "Schwerer Gustav", often called "Dora") arrived at Perekop, and from early May a special spur line was laid near Bakhchisaray; 4,000 men needed five weeks to make it ready to fire. Three 600 mm self-propelled Karl mortars, among them "Thor" and "Odin", had been formed into a battery in February. To cut the Soviet supply line at sea, Germany asked Italy for help, and the Italian Navy's 101st Squadron of motor torpedo boats and midget submarines was brought in by truck and barge and based at Feodosia and Yalta. 1 10 11 2

What was different about the third assault, Operation Störfang, in June 1942?

The German operation was called Störfang ("Sturgeon Catch"). Russian Wikipedia sums up its design in four parts: blockade Sevastopol from the sea with submarines, mines, torpedo boats and aircraft; destroy the fortifications regardless of the ammunition it cost; take the city step by step; and destroy the Black Sea Fleet when it came to evacuate the garrison. The underlying aim was to free the 11th Army from Sevastopol for the main thrusts of the summer campaign of 1942. 1

This time, with the Kerch peninsula cleared, Manstein could for the first time concentrate nearly all his strength on Sevastopol. German Wikipedia estimates seven and a half German and one and a half Romanian divisions, about 200,000 men. According to English Wikipedia there were 785 German and 112 Romanian medium and heavy guns, to which were added First World War 420 mm howitzers, the Karl mortars and the 800 mm gun, used in battle only this once. Overhead was Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps with about 600 aircraft. Facing them, by German Wikipedia's count, were 106,000 Soviet troops with 600 guns and mortars, 38 tanks and 53 aircraft. The defenders had hardly any anti-aircraft guns or tanks and were short of 82 mm mortar bombs. In his memoirs Manstein claimed the two sides were numerically equal. 3 2 1 16

The assault opened from the air and with the guns. From 2 to 6 June the Luftwaffe flew over 3,000 sorties and dropped over 2,000 tons of bombs, with one- to two-and-a-half-ton bombs aimed at concrete bunkers. Ivan Laskin, commanding the Soviet 172nd Rifle Division in the north, recalled bombers that "came in, wave after wave, and literally ploughed up the earth throughout our defence area." The 800 mm gun fired 53 seven-ton shells (47 according to English Wikipedia's article on the gun) at Batteries 30 and 35 and at ammunition stores in the rock. Russian Wikipedia says one shell went through 30 metres of rock, but English Wikipedia judges that the super-heavy guns did not repay their cost, and that the one fort turret actually knocked out by them was hit by a single Karl mortar shell. 2 1 10

The ground assault began on 7 June. The main blow was struck by LIV Corps (22nd, 24th, 50th and 132nd Infantry Divisions), crossing the Belbek in the north towards Severnaya Bay, while XXX Corps attacked towards Sapun Hill in the south and the Romanian Mountain Corps advanced in the centre along the Chernaya river towards Inkerman. On the first day LIV Corps lost 2,357 men and gained two kilometres. The fighting turned into more than ten days of attrition, and a Russian source says attacking German companies were down to an average of 25 men. The German 132nd Infantry Division suffered so heavily that it had to be taken out of the line. In June the German 16th Infantry Regiment had only 347 of its 3,000 men fit to fight; its commander was Dietrich von Choltitz, later commandant of Paris. 2 1 3

On 13 June the German 22nd Infantry Division took, with 813 men, one of the forts barring the way to Severnaya Bay, and on 17 June the area of Battery 30 and the foot of the Mekenzievy Hills fell in the north. The garrison of Battery 30 held out in its tunnels and surrendered on 20 June. Between 18 and 23 June the Soviet forces north of Severnaya Bay collapsed: the remaining units surrendered when their ammunition ran out or fought on in isolated strongpoints, and the last defenders of Fort Konstantinovsky swam across the bay on the morning of 24 June. In the south a position known as the "Eagle's Nest" fell on 17 June and the Germans reached the foot of Sapun Hill. 2 1 3

The sea decided it. On 12 and 13 June cruisers and destroyers brought in the 2,600 men of the 138th Naval Infantry Brigade, but once German guns overlooked Severnaya Bay large transports could no longer get in. The hospital transport Belostok, the last to enter the bay, on the night of 18 to 19 June, left under shellfire with about 400 wounded and was sunk by Axis torpedo boats. From then on fast destroyer leaders, minesweepers, patrol boats, submarines and night transport aircraft brought in small loads. The destroyer leader Tashkent made the last run on the night of 26 to 27 June and carried out more than 2,100 people, along with fragments of the famous panorama of the 1854 to 1855 siege, and was attacked by 90 aircraft over four hours that morning. In June the VIII Air Corps flew 23,751 sorties and dropped 20,528 tons of bombs; English Wikipedia says this far surpassed the German bombing of Warsaw, Rotterdam or London. 1 2

The Soviet problem was ammunition. On 7 June the defence region held less than two and a half standard loads of heavy shells and about one load of mortar bombs. In the first ten to twelve days it fired some 580 tons a day and inflicted heavy losses, but consumption then fell to a third and then a quarter of that. A report from Semyon Budyonny, commander of the North Caucasus Front, to Vasilevsky said the garrison needed 300 tons of ammunition, 90 tons of fuel and 1,000 replacements a day and was receiving 250 tons, 65 tons and 545 men. By 27 June every anti-aircraft gun except those at the airfield was out of shells. The Germans too were scraping the bottom: on 11 June Richthofen reckoned he had less than two days of bombs left and gave up carpet bombing, and in mid-June he himself moved near Kursk to prepare the coming Case Blue. 1 2

What gave way with the crossing of Severnaya Bay and the loss of Sapun Hill?

The south shore of Severnaya Bay was so strongly fortified that a landing there seemed almost impossible, and Manstein counted on precisely that for surprise. At 2 a.m. on the night of 28 to 29 June, without a preparatory bombardment, German spearhead units crossed the bay in inflatable boats under a smoke screen and landed at four points. Seventeen boats and a launch were sunk, but the Germans gained a foothold in the Volovya ravine and climbed onto Suzdalskaya Hill. By noon the village of Inkerman was lost, and the railway and road along the bay were blocked by ammunition stores blown up by the retreating Soviet troops. 1 2

What happened in the rock galleries of Inkerman is still disputed. The official Soviet version is that a quartermaster technician, Prokofy Sayenko, blew up the galleries in the Sovetskaya ravine holding some 500 wagonloads of ammunition, burying hundreds of German soldiers and more than twenty tanks. Manstein wrote in his memoirs that the explosion killed thousands of wounded and refugees sheltering in the galleries. A document submitted by the Soviet prosecution at Nuremberg in 1946 says drunken German soldiers burned down a field hospital in the Inkerman wine cellars together with wounded who could not be evacuated, and a Soviet pamphlet of 1985 says the Germans set fire to the galleries and 3,000 civilians and wounded soldiers died. Russian Wikipedia also records that in the Troitsky tunnel, where an armoured train had been hidden, about 360 wounded and 400 refugees died, most of them suffocated by grenades and smoke canisters. 1

Early on the same day, 29 June, the Germans also tried to land on Cape Khersones with twelve motor schooners from Yalta, but Coastal Battery 18 sank nine of them. That afternoon, however, the Soviet guns on Suzdalskaya Hill, around Dergachi and on Sapun Hill fell silent for want of shells, and much of the 386th Rifle Division holding Sapun Hill had left its positions under the morning bombardment. By evening the Germans had dragged guns up onto Sapun Hill, from which the whole city and Cape Khersones could be seen. On 30 June the Malakhov Kurgan, also fought over in the Crimean War, fell. That day only five coastal batteries were left with a few shells, and the Coastal Army had 1,529 medium-calibre rounds. The rear services of the army and fleet began destroying their stores. 1 3

In the last days, how did the commanders get out, and who was left behind?

On 30 June Oktyabrsky sent a cipher telegram to the People's Commissar of the Navy, Nikolai Kuznetsov, asking permission to evacuate the command, and the Stavka granted it. That day the last joint meeting of the military councils of the Black Sea Fleet and the Coastal Army, held underground at Battery 35, decided that the command would leave for the North Caucasus by aircraft and submarine. According to the Russian Wikipedia article on Oktyabrsky, the plan provided for evacuating only the senior army and navy commanders and the city's party activists; no evacuation of the rest of the troops was planned. 4 6

Oktyabrsky flew out on the night of 30 June to 1 July in a PS-84 transport that had been kept waiting in a separate revetment at the Khersones airfield. Thirteen transports that landed that night carried away 183 commanders and 49 wounded, but boarding broke down into disorder, many who were on the lists could not get aboard, and the airfield commandant left on the first plane. The Coastal Army staff, Petrov and Krylov among them, left on the evening of 1 July in the submarine Shch-209. Russian Wikipedia writes that before leaving Petrov, tormented at being unable to save his garrison, tried to shoot himself and was stopped by his comrades. In all, 222 commanders and 49 wounded got out by air and about 700 commanders by submarine, and several thousand more left in the fleet's small craft. 1 7 8

Thousands of soldiers and civilians, no longer under anyone's control, crowded the pier below Battery 35 and the airfield. A special parachute unit of the fleet's air arm, renamed "Group 017", was given the task of escorting commanders with boarding passes to the submarine pier and keeping order at the airfield. According to figures cited by Novaya Gazeta, there were 34,248 wounded in the defence region on 1 July, most of whom were never evacuated. Command of the remaining garrison was handed to Major General Pyotr Novikov, commander of the 109th Rifle Division. Novikov tried to get away with his staff in patrol boats, was intercepted by German torpedo boats and captured; the Russian Wikipedia article on him dates this to 2 July, the article on the defence as a whole to 9 July. 4 21 9 1

When its live shells ran out Battery 35 fired practice rounds, and on the night of 1 to 2 July its crew blew up the turrets and the power station. Its underground passages went on sheltering the last defenders. The remnants of the Coastal Army penned on Cape Khersones tried night after night to break out to the partisans in the mountains. Organised resistance ended on the afternoon of 4 July when the defence between Kazachya Bay and Battery 35 was split apart, but scattered fighting went on until 9 July (Vasilevsky's memoirs and English sources) or 12 July (Russian sources), and an anti-aircraft battery at Cape Fiolent fought on until 16 July. On 3 July the Soviet Information Bureau announced: "Sevastopol has been abandoned by Soviet troops, but the defence of Sevastopol will go down in the history of the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union as one of its most brilliant pages." 4 1 19 12

How is Oktyabrsky's decision judged?

The controversy turns on two questions: whether more of the garrison could have been evacuated, and whether it was right for the command to leave while the troops stayed. Critics argue that many commanders left in haste or abandoned their duties to secure their own evacuation, so that control of the troops almost entirely collapsed, leading to retreats from prepared positions and panic at the airfield and the pier. The men left behind said "we were handed over as prisoners", and according to testimony cited by Novaya Gazeta survivors who said there had been no evacuation were themselves suspected of treason. The dispute has extended to proposals to rename Oktyabrsky Street in Sevastopol. In December 1942 the People's Commissar of the Navy, Kuznetsov, proposed removing Oktyabrsky from command of the fleet, but the State Defence Committee rejected it. At a military-historical conference on the Crimea and Sevastopol in 1961, Oktyabrsky is recorded as having dwelt on dividing the glory between himself and the late General Petrov, leaving a bad impression on the participants. 6 1 21

Defenders of the decision point to other facts. The evacuation of the command was not Oktyabrsky's decision alone but was authorised and ordered by the Stavka. By late June the sea and the air belonged entirely to the Germans: the last transport had been sunk on 19 June, and the Tashkent, towed with difficulty into Novorossiysk on 27 June, was sunk in that harbour by air attack on 2 July. Since the last aim of Störfang was precisely to destroy the Black Sea Fleet when it came to evacuate the garrison, sending large ships, they argue, would have lost the fleet along with the garrison. Russian Wikipedia notes that the Germans achieved every aim of the operation but that one, because the fleet simply did not come. The commanders who got out were soon used on other fronts: Krylov spent a month writing a report on the defence and then became chief of staff of the 62nd Army at Stalingrad, and Petrov led an army again in the defence of the Caucasus. 1 6 8 7

The two judgments part over the same facts. Most of the command survived, and most of the soldiers they had commanded were killed or captured. For a long time the Information Bureau and the newspapers reported the end as though there had been an orderly evacuation, and the fate of those left behind remained hidden long after the war. 21 6

What happened to the prisoners and the civilians?

The sources disagree on the number of prisoners to begin with. The German general Kurt von Tippelskirch claimed 100,000 prisoners at Khersones, while Manstein wrote more cautiously of 30,000 at the tip of the peninsula and about 10,000 around Balaklava. German Wikipedia gives about 97,000 prisoners between 7 June and 4 July, and reports of the German XXX Corps cited by Novaya Gazeta speak of 80,914 men captured around Sevastopol. Russian Wikipedia says that according to Soviet archival records the number did not exceed 78,230. 1 3 21

Abuse began at the moment of capture. According to testimony cited by Novaya Gazeta, soldiers left on the shore without water, ammunition or food were made to sit with their hands behind their heads, wounded men who could not walk were shot where they lay, and the columns of prisoners stretched for tens of kilometres. Of the nearly six million Soviet soldiers captured by Germany over the whole war, around three million died of hunger, cold, disease and execution. Jews and political officers were singled out for killing, and prisoners too wounded or ill to keep up on the march were shot. Novikov, the garrison's last commander, was sent through the officers' camp at Hammelburg to the Flossenbürg concentration camp, where in 1944 he died after a guard's beating. Families usually received only a notice that their relative was "missing". 21 18 9

Civilians. From the autumn of 1941 townspeople worked on the defence lines and in the underground factories, and many stayed in the city to the end. Most of the city burned in the June air raids; when the fighting ended only eleven buildings, according to English Wikipedia, or nine, according to German Wikipedia, were undamaged. Right after the occupation, on 12 and 13 July 1942, the remaining Jews were assembled on the pretext of "registration" and shot, among other places at an anti-tank ditch at the fourth kilometre of the Balaklava road, or killed with exhaust gas in vans on the way. The killing was carried out by Sonderkommando 11a of Einsatzgruppe D, with local auxiliary police hunting down those in hiding. Yahad-In Unum, which investigates Holocaust killing sites, counts about 4,000 Jews of Sevastopol killed under the occupation. In 1939 the city had 5,988 Jewish inhabitants. 2 3 20

It is also alleged that the Germans used toxic smoke to drive Soviet troops out of caves and galleries. The British historian Chris Bellamy documents the use of toxic smoke to suffocate defenders holding out underground, and something similar happened in the quarries of the Kerch peninsula. On 20 November 1941, early in the occupation of the Crimea, Manstein signed an order calling for the "Jewish-Bolshevik system" to be rooted out. At his trial before a British military court in Hamburg in 1949 he was convicted on nine counts, including the mistreatment of prisoners of war and failing to protect civilians in his area. 2 17

What did occupation policy bring to the Crimea under the 11th Army?

From November 1941 to the summer of 1942 the Crimea was not under German civil administration but was an operational area ruled by the German 11th Army. The army headquarters sat at Sarabus (today Hvardiiske), about 10 kilometres north of Simferopol, and town commandant offices in each city registered and watched the population. The commander of the army rear area, Lieutenant General Heinrich Doehla, reported directly to the army commander, Erich von Manstein, and day-to-day business went through the department of the 11th Army's chief quartermaster, Colonel Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck. Feeding the population and drafting its labour fell to the Crimea economic command, part of the eastern economic organisation under Hermann Göring. Einsatzgruppe D of the SS Security Police and SD was assigned to the 11th Army and followed it in. 24 25

The food situation in the Crimea was bad from the start. The retreating Red Army had carried off or destroyed food stocks and plant, and destroyed railways and partisan raids cut supplies so far that even the assault on Sevastopol planned for the end of November had to be postponed. On 1 December the agriculture department of the Crimea economic command demanded that all prisoners be removed from the Crimea, that the "Jewish question" be "solved" at once, and that the unemployed industrial population of Kerch, Simferopol and Sevastopol be moved to northern Ukraine. The order Manstein signed on 20 November rested on the same reckoning. The army was to live off the land as far as possible; a large part of the population of hostile cities would have to go hungry, but out of "misunderstood humanity" nothing was to be handed out to prisoners or to inhabitants not working for the Wehrmacht. 24

The Simferopol massacre took place inside this frame. From early November the Simferopol town command registered the Jews and made them wear the Star of David. Einsatzgruppe D had planned to murder the Crimean Jews in March 1942, but the 11th Army headquarters pressed for an earlier date. When Werner Braune, head of Sonderkommando 11b, said he lacked the men to finish before Christmas, Hauck's quartermaster department lent him lorries with drivers, fuel, ammunition and field gendarmes. On 9 December the Krymchaks (a Turkic-speaking Jewish community of the Crimea) were shot in an anti-tank ditch beside the Feodosiya road outside the city, and the Roma on the same day; from 11 to 13 December Jews brought out by lorry were killed at the same place. Field gendarmes cordoned off the site, and the army's Secret Field Police unit 647 did the shooting together with the Sonderkommando. German Wikipedia puts the victims at about 13,000 (about 10,600 Jews, 1,500 Krymchaks and 600 to 1,000 Roma); the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission counted 10,600 Jews and 1,500 Krymchaks. The historian Manfred Oldenburg saw the army's motive for bringing the killings forward less in racial ideology than in an inhuman military calculation to save food and reduce the danger in the rear; Kiril Feferman noted that the calculation rested on an overly pessimistic reading of the situation. 24

The killing went on. In a sweep for "unreliable elements" in Simferopol on 11 January 1942, Sonderkommando 11b was supported by 20 Secret Field Police, 55 field gendarmes and 2,320 soldiers, and 1,250 inhabitants were seized. Einsatzgruppe D reported that in the month from mid-December 1941 it had shot 17,645 Jews, 2,504 Krymchaks, 824 Roma and 212 communists and partisans in the Crimea, and that by mid-February the number of Jews executed in Simferopol had risen to nearly 10,000. A report of 8 April stated that Jews, Krymchaks and Roma were "no longer present" in the Crimea. Almost all of the roughly 35,000 Ashkenazi Jews and 3,000 Krymchaks who had stayed in the Crimea were killed. Many Crimean Roma were Muslims close to the Crimean Tatars in language and custom, and there are accounts that the Crimean Tatar Muslim committee intervened with German commanders to stop further shootings. 24

Some Germans beside the 11th Army watched this. Werner Otto von Hentig, the Foreign Office representative attached to the 11th Army, openly criticised the treatment of prisoners, the shooting of hostages and the murder of the Jews, and reported that "the shooting of Jews, which here in Simferopol alone came to 12,000" harmed not only the victims but the whole population of the occupied area, the morale of the troops and Germany's economic position. According to research cited by English Wikipedia, Manstein wrote to Otto Ohlendorf, commander of Einsatzgruppe D, in 1941 demanding that the wristwatches of murdered Jews be handed over to the army instead of being kept by the SS, since his men were doing so much to help. The researchers note that this was the only time he ever complained about the Einsatzgruppen's activities. 24 17

The picture in his memoirs, Lost Victories, is different. Manstein wrote that the army fed its prisoners even at the cost of cutting its own soldiers' rations, that the prisoners' average annual death rate stayed under two per cent, and that the army did everything in its power to help the civilian population. He praised that same quartermaster Hauck, and the army paymaster Rabus, for solving the food problem of the population despite the supply shortage, and wrote that most Crimean Tatars were so friendly to the Germans that they formed self-defence companies to guard their villages. Of the partisans he wrote that they fought "with extreme treachery and cruelty" in disregard of international law, so that every captured partisan had to be dealt with under the laws of war. The deaths of the Jews, Krymchaks and Roma appear nowhere in the chapter. 23

How heavy were the losses on each side, and why do the figures differ?

The Soviet side. Russian figures put Soviet losses from 30 October 1941 to early July 1942 at 200,481, of them 156,880 irrecoverable (killed, missing and captured) and 43,601 wounded and sick. For the final assault alone, English Wikipedia gives 118,000 men of the Coastal Army killed, wounded or captured, and German Wikipedia more than 10,000 killed and about 97,000 captured. Over June some 20,000 to 25,000 people, mostly wounded, were evacuated by sea and air (about 20,000 according to the Russian Wikipedia article on Oktyabrsky, 25,157 according to English Wikipedia), and between 1 and 10 July 1,726 people got out of Sevastopol, mainly army and navy commanders and political workers. 1 2 3 6

On the German and Romanian side the spread is wider. On 4 July 1942 the Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Germans had lost 300,000 men in the Crimea and 150,000 in the assaults on Sevastopol alone, and the Russian researcher Igor Starcheus estimates about 60,000 killed and up to 240,000 wounded. The American writer Robert Forczyk, by contrast, calculated 35,866 losses during Störfang (27,412 German, 8,454 Romanian), the figure most Western works use. German Wikipedia says the 33-day assault cost the 11th Army 18 per cent of its establishment, about 35,800 men (5,786 dead or missing), and that the conquest of the Crimea from Perekop to Sevastopol cost the 11th Army over 96,000 men (21,600 dead or missing, about 74,000 wounded), or about 115,000 with some 19,000 Romanian casualties added. English Wikipedia gives Axis losses over the whole 250-day siege as about 70,000, including 2,000 officers, of whom 25,000 were killed in action. 1 2 3

The figures diverge because they count different things (killed only, or wounded and sick too), different periods (all 250 days, the June assault alone, or the whole Crimean campaign) and come from different counters (wartime announcements, unit reports, post-war research). On 18 June Oktyabrsky and the fleet's military council member reported to Stalin that the garrison had lost 22,000 to 23,000 men and the enemy three to four times as many; wartime reports usually set enemy losses high. Ammunition expenditure is clearer: in one month German artillery fired 46,750 tons and the Luftwaffe dropped 20,528 tons, 67,278 tons in all. 1 2

Did the defence of Sevastopol delay Germany's 1942 summer offensive?

The Soviet and Russian assessment starts from the claim that more than eight months of defence pinned the German 11th Army and the Romanian 3rd Army to the Crimea, armies Germany badly needed in late autumn and early winter 1941, above all to break through to the Caucasus. To break the third assault, it argues, Germany used up almost all the heavy and super-heavy artillery ammunition accumulated over several years, so that afterwards even at besieged Leningrad these guns could only fire occasional single rounds; some 2,200 field guns with worn-out barrels were sent straight from Sevastopol to the scrapyard, and the Luftwaffe used up much of its bomb stock, which told in the summer campaign of 1942. 1

Judged by the calendar alone, however, the direct delay was small. Case Blue, Germany's summer offensive of 1942, opened towards Voronezh on 28 June, before Sevastopol had fallen. The German command launched its main offensive without waiting for Sevastopol, and the headquarters of Richthofen's VIII Air Corps had already moved near Kursk in mid-June. English Wikipedia's article on Case Blue even says that the clearing of the Kerch peninsula and the battle of Sevastopol weakened the Soviets further and allowed the Germans to supply Army Group A across the Kerch peninsula through the Kuban. 13 2

So the real question is less the date than where the 11th Army went next. After the fall of Sevastopol the German command gave the 11th Army and the Romanian corps six weeks of rest and replenishment, and Manstein was on leave in Romania until 12 August. Then the 11th Army was dispersed: the Romanian VII Corps went towards Stalingrad, part to the Taman peninsula, the 22nd Infantry Division to Crete, and the army headquarters, the headquarters of LIV and XXX Corps and four divisions north to prepare an attack on Leningrad. Manstein argued in his memoirs that had the 11th Army been sent across the Kerch strait into the Kuban, or at least kept in reserve behind the southern flank, the defeat at Stalingrad might have been prevented. English Wikipedia likewise says Paulus's 6th Army fought without the 11th Army's support, which contributed to its defeat, and that the enormous cost of Sevastopol reduced German resources for Case Blue "at a critical time". Seen this way, Sevastopol's effect lies less in delaying the start of the offensive than in the men, ammunition and air power it consumed and in keeping the 11th Army away from the main southern thrust. 1 2 17

How did each side remember the battle after the city fell?

The German side celebrated the victory loudly. A special radio communiqué announced that after twenty-five days of fierce fighting German and Romanian troops had taken "the most powerful land and sea fortress of all that have ever existed in the world". Manstein was promoted to field marshal on 1 July, and German soldiers who had fought in the Crimea received the Crimea Shield. The gold Crimea Shield was first awarded on 3 July to Ion Antonescu in honour of Romania's contribution, and the second and last went to Manstein himself. When front-line reports of the Soviet defenders' heroism found their way into the press, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels forbade any favourable portrayal of the enemy, claiming that Bolshevik resistance was not heroism or bravery at all but the "primitive animality" of the Slavs, organised into resistance by savage terror; he thought it "extraordinarily dangerous" that the impression should spread that the Soviets too had an idea that inspired them to fanaticism and heroic resistance. 2 3

On the Soviet side the defence of Sevastopol became a symbol of the Great Patriotic War. A Medal "For the Defence of Sevastopol" was instituted, and Vasilevsky called the battle "250 fiery days and nights" in his memoirs. The city was retaken on 9 May 1944 in the Crimean Offensive and named a Hero City in 1945. Petrov left no memoirs but wrote the first military-historical study of the defence, and Krylov published his memoir "The Fiery Bastion" (1973). The chaos of the last days and the story of the men left behind came fully to light only through research and testimony from the 1990s on, and in 2008 a memorial complex was founded on the site of Battery 35. 1 19 7 8 4 22

How did Manstein tell the Crimean campaign in his memoirs?

In Lost Victories, the memoirs he published in West Germany in 1955, Erich von Manstein gave the Crimean campaign one of his longest chapters. He presented it as a rare case of an army fighting for ten months free of interference from the high command: attack and defence, mobile warfare and pursuit, repelling enemy landings, fighting partisans and storming a fortress. The chapter sets out dates, units and the reasons for his decisions in detail and so shows the German 11th Army's reckoning, but it is a commander looking back on his own choices. 23

Of autumn 1941 Manstein wrote the attack on the Ishun isthmus up as a victory won against the odds. By his count six divisions of the 11th Army faced eight Soviet rifle and four cavalry divisions; the Soviets had many tanks for counterattacks while the 11th Army had none; and the air belonged to the Soviet air force until Werner Mölders's fighter wing was put under the army. On 25 October the attack seemed spent, but he pressed it, and on 28 October, he wrote, the Soviet defence collapsed. In the pursuit he regretted having no mobile force. With one motorised formation, he argued, Sevastopol could have been taken by surprise and the winter's fighting avoided, but his request for the 60th Motorised Infantry Division, standing idle for lack of fuel in the 1st Panzer Group, was refused because of the obstinacy of Hitler, who had eyes only for Rostov. The book's overall story, that Hitler's decisions threw away victories, recurs in the Crimean chapter. 23

For the failure of the December assault he put the weather and higher command first. The attack set for 27 or 28 November was delayed three weeks by rain that wrecked the roads, a delay that, he wrote, "decided the outcome of this operation", and Army Group South took the 73rd Infantry Division away for the Rostov crisis, leaving no reserve for the northern attack. He stated that the decision to make one more attempt to break through to Severnaya Bay in the north even after the Kerch and Feodosiya landings was his own, agreed with his corps and division commanders. In mid-April 1942 he presented his plans for Kerch and Sevastopol at Hitler's headquarters and had them approved. In the memoirs he wrote that Hitler understood his operational ideas very well, and argued that the task of storming the fortress was right, since even a mere blockade of Sevastopol would have tied down three or four German divisions in the Crimea besides the Romanians. 23

For the June assault he left the artillery figures. The northern 54th Corps alone had 121 batteries, including 56 heavy and super-heavy batteries, 41 light batteries and 18 mortar batteries; there were howitzers and mortars up to 420 millimetres, two special 600-millimetre pieces, and the 800-millimetre "Dora", designed to smash the Maginot Line. He noted that about 60 trains were needed to bring Dora to its firing position and wrote that the Germans never massed artillery like this anywhere else in the Second World War. Yet, he added, it came to 208 batteries on a 35-kilometre front, barely six batteries a kilometre, little compared with the 250 guns per kilometre of breakthrough front the Soviets planned in 1945. On the morning of 7 June, he recalled, he watched the whole battlefield from an observation post on the rocks of Cherkes-Kermen. 23

What the chapter leaves out is just as plain. The order he signed on 20 November 1941, the massacres committed by Einsatzgruppe D in the 11th Army's area and the army's support for them, and the deaths of great numbers of prisoners and civilians do not appear in the book. At his trial before a British military court in Hamburg in 1949 the prosecution presented evidence that 7,393 people died from maltreatment or were shot in the Soviet areas he commanded, and he was convicted, among other things, of using Soviet prisoners of war to build fortifications, of the poor treatment and deaths of prisoners of war, and of the execution of civilians. 26

Consequences

Sevastopol fell to the German and Romanian forces on 4 July 1942, and the Coastal Army effectively ceased to exist. Soviet losses over the 250 days exceeded 200,000, and the number of prisoners is put at between 78,000 and 100,000 depending on the source. The final evacuation of the command alone remains disputed. Germany gained the whole Crimea and freed the 11th Army, but at great cost in ammunition and air power, and the 11th Army did not join the southern summer offensive but was dispersed, much of it to Leningrad. Thousands of Sevastopol's Jews were murdered right after the occupation. The Red Army retook the city on 9 May 1944 in the Crimean Offensive.

Timeline & Map

Sevastopol Odessa Perekop Ishun Kerch Yevpatoria Simferopol Bakhchisaray Novorossiysk Battery 30 Mekenzievy Hills Inkerman Battery 35 Cape Khersones Sapun Hill Balaklava Yalta 2 Odessa 1 Perekop 8 Kerch 9 Kerch 7 Belbek river 11 Belbek river 12 Battery 30 3 Sevastopol 4 Sevastopol 10 Sevastopol 13 Sevastopol 14 Inkerman 15 Malakhov Kurgan 16 Khersones airfield 17 Battery 35 18 Cape Khersones 19 Fourth kilometre of the Balaklava road 6 Balaklava 5 Off Yalta
  1. 11941.09.26GermanySoviet Union
    Attack on Perekop

    Manstein's German 11th Army began its attack on the Perekop isthmus, the gateway to the Crimea.

  2. 21941.10.16Soviet Union
    Evacuation of Odessa completed

    The Black Sea Fleet finished shipping Petrov's Coastal Army from Odessa to the Crimea.

  3. 31941.10.30GermanySoviet Union
    Defence of Sevastopol begins

    The German vanguard reached the outskirts of Sevastopol; Soviet accounts count this as the first of the 250 days.

  4. 41941.11.04Soviet Union
    Sevastopol Defence Region formed

    The Sevastopol Defence Region was formed from the Coastal Army, the Black Sea Fleet and the naval base units.

  5. 51941.11.07GermanySoviet Union
    Armeniya sunk

    The hospital transport Armeniya, carrying wounded and refugees from Sevastopol and Yalta, was sunk by German torpedo bombers; thousands died.

  6. 61941.11.11GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    First assault

    The German 11th Army attacked the eastern and southern sectors in force but stopped by 21 November after gaining only a few kilometres.

  7. 71941.12.17GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Second assault

    German and Romanian troops opened a new attack in the north along the Belbek and in the centre.

  8. 81941.12.26Soviet UnionGermany
    Kerch landing

    The Soviet 44th and 51st Armies began landing on the Kerch peninsula, and Manstein sent troops east from Sevastopol.

  9. 91942.05.08GermanySoviet Union
    Operation Bustard Hunt

    The Germans attacked the Crimean Front on the Kerch peninsula and destroyed it by mid-May.

  10. 101942.06.02GermanySoviet Union
    Operation Störfang begins

    The VIII Air Corps and the 11th Army's artillery began a five-day preparatory bombardment of Sevastopol.

  11. 111942.06.07GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Ground assault of the third attack

    LIV Corps attacked in the north, XXX Corps and the Romanian Mountain Corps in the south and centre.

  12. 121942.06.17GermanySoviet Union
    Battery 30 area falls

    The area of Battery 30 and the foot of the Mekenzievy Hills fell in the north; the battery garrison held out in its tunnels until 20 June.

  13. 131942.06.27Soviet Union
    Tashkent's last run

    The destroyer leader Tashkent made its last run into Sevastopol and carried out over 2,100 people.

  14. 141942.06.29GermanySoviet Union
    Crossing of Severnaya Bay

    German troops crossed Severnaya Bay in inflatable boats before dawn and took Inkerman; Sapun Hill fell in the afternoon.

  15. 151942.06.30Soviet UnionGermany
    Evacuation authorised

    The Malakhov Kurgan fell, and Oktyabrsky obtained permission to evacuate the command.

  16. 161942.07.01Soviet Union
    The command leaves

    Oktyabrsky flew out from the Khersones airfield, and Petrov and the Coastal Army staff left by submarine in the evening.

  17. 171942.07.02Soviet Union
    Battery 35 blown up

    Having fired its last rounds, the crew of Battery 35 blew up its turrets and power station in the night.

  18. 181942.07.04GermanyRomaniaSoviet Union
    Organised resistance ends

    The defence on Cape Khersones was split and organised resistance ended; tens of thousands of remaining soldiers were captured.

  19. 191942.07.12GermanySoviet Union
    Murder of the Jews of Sevastopol

    Sonderkommando 11a assembled the remaining Jews of Sevastopol and by 13 July had shot them outside the city or killed them in gas vans.

Related people 12

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26