The Battle of the Dnieper
After Kursk, how did the Red Army cross the Dnieper and retake Left-Bank Ukraine and Kiev, and at what cost?
The struggle fought from late August to December 1943 between five Soviet fronts and Germany's Army Group South over Ukraine's Dnieper river. The Germans fell back behind the river proclaiming an "Eastern Wall" and burning the land as they went; crossing "on the march", the Red Army had some twenty bridgeheads on the western bank by the end of September. After the Bukrin airborne drop and attacks failed, the main effort moved north to Lyutezh and Kiev was liberated on 6 November, while in the south Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Melitopol were retaken and the Crimea cut off by land.

Why was the Dnieper so hard to cross, and what did each side want?
The Battle of the Dnieper is the name for a series of operations fought between the Soviet Red Army and the German Wehrmacht over Ukraine's Dnieper river from late August to late December 1943. After the Battle of Kursk broke Germany's last great offensive and Kharkov was liberated on 23 August, Soviet forces pushed west along the whole southern front. In four months they retook almost all of Ukraine east of the river, the Left-Bank Ukraine, forced the river to set up several bridgeheads on the western bank, and on 6 November liberated Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At one point nearly four million men of both sides were engaged, making it one of the largest battles of the whole war. 2 1
The Dnieper is Europe's third largest river after the Volga and the Danube. In its lower course it is up to three kilometres wide, and dams in several places spread it further. Above all, the western bank the Soviets had to take was far higher and steeper than the eastern one. The defenders looked down on the river from the heights, while the attackers had to launch their boats from the flat eastern shore. The Germans meant to turn that western bank into a fortified line. 1 2
When the offensive opened on 26 August the Soviet Union had massed about 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns and mortars, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 aircraft in five fronts (army groups). From north to south they were Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front, Nikolai Vatutin's Voronezh Front, Ivan Konev's Steppe Front, Rodion Malinovsky's Southwestern Front and Fyodor Tolbukhin's Southern Front. On 20 October, in the middle of the battle, they were renamed: the Central Front became the Belorussian Front, the Voronezh Front the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Steppe Front the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the Southwestern Front the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the Southern Front the 4th Ukrainian Front. This article uses the old names before that date and the new ones after it. On the German side the core was Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, which German Wikipedia puts at 1.2 million men and 2,100 tanks. The Sixth Army at the southern end passed to Army Group A, which held the Crimea, and the northern end was held by the Second Army of Army Group Centre. 2 1 3
Even within the Soviet command opinions differed on how to strike. Georgy Zhukov, who coordinated the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts as representative of the Stavka, wrote in his memoirs that he did not agree with fronts ramming head-on all the way from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. His idea was to regroup and drive hard from the Kharkov–Izyum area towards Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye to cut off the Germans in the Donbas, and he says the deputy chief of the General Staff, Aleksei Antonov, privately agreed. According to Zhukov, Stalin rejected such an operation as taking too long, and with his blue pencil cut the men, tanks and ammunition Zhukov had asked for the two fronts by 30–40 per cent, saying that "the rest the Stavka will give when the fronts reach the Dnieper." English Wikipedia gives as Stalin's reason for haste the fear that unless the Red Army advanced quickly, German scorched-earth tactics would lay the region waste. 20 1

What was the "Eastern Wall", and what did the Germans leave behind as they withdrew?
From early 1943 the German army general staff and Manstein had urged a defence line along the Dnieper, but Hitler refused, for political reasons and because, he said, a well-built line behind them would tempt the troops to fall back to it. Only on 11 August, after Kursk, did he order it built. The line ran from Narva on the Baltic through Pskov, Vitebsk and Gomel, followed the Dnieper downstream from near Kiev, then left the river north of Zaporozhye and ran along the Molochnaya river to Melitopol and the Sea of Azov. North of Zaporozhye it was the "Panther" line, south of it the "Wotan" line, and propaganda called the whole the "Eastern Wall" (Ostwall). The southern end was kept east of the river so as not to give up or isolate the Crimea. 5 3
Construction actually began only on 8 September, using tens of thousands of civilian labourers. Since so long a line could not be finished in a few weeks, the works were concentrated where a Soviet crossing was expected, such as Kremenchug, Zaporozhye and Nikopol. Georg von Küchler, commander of Army Group North, would not even use the name "Panther line" for fear of raising false hopes among his men. Construction had barely begun when Army Group South was already falling back on it. In Zhukov's account German propaganda advertised the line as a wall on which the Red Army would break. 5 1 20
The Germans emptied the land as they went. From early 1943 Hitler had ordered that weapons and equipment must not fall intact into enemy hands, that all villages and shelter be destroyed, and that men from 15 to 65 be taken along to dig fortifications. On 7 September the SS and the Wehrmacht were ordered to strip the areas they abandoned of anything the Soviet war effort could use. The Germans called the procedure "ARLZ measures", from the German initials of thinning out, evacuation, paralysis and destruction. Livestock was driven off, machinery dismantled or wrecked, towns, villages and grain fields burned, and the population deported in large numbers. Those able to work were sent to forced labour in the Reich or, against international law, made to serve as porters and diggers for the Wehrmacht. Russian Wikipedia, following Soviet sources, says the Germans withdrawing from the Donbas drove off all men of military age, carried away more than 2,500 trainloads of property and burned most villages. 6 1 7
Konev, commander of the Steppe Front, wrote in his memoirs that the Germans, following a plan worked out in advance, wrecked towns, villages, factories and bridges, burned the crops, drove off the livestock and carried people away. Against Manstein's admission in his own memoirs that he had ordered only the important military installations of the Donbas destroyed, Konev replied that he and his men had seen the "scorched earth" zone and the bodies of tortured people with their own eyes. In Kiev, at the Babi Yar ravine where 33,771 Jews had been massacred in September 1941, the Germans, just before withdrawing, used prisoners from 19 August to 28 September 1943 to dig up and burn the bodies under "Sonderaktion 1005". After the liberation Soviet officials took Western journalists to the site to meet survivors. Kiev had been occupied for 778 days; at its liberation only about 80,000 people, 20 per cent of the pre-war population, remained, and 7,000 buildings, including 1,000 factories, had been looted or destroyed. 24 19 13

How was Left-Bank Ukraine retaken: Chernigov, Poltava and the Donbas
In the south the Donbas operation had already begun in mid-August. Chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevsky, who coordinated the Southwestern and Southern Fronts as Stavka representative, wrote in his memoirs that the plan was for the two fronts to converge on Stalino (today's Donetsk) from the north and east. On 18 August the Southern Front broke the strongly held German line on the Mius, and with landing parties of the Azov Flotilla it retook Taganrog on 30 August. A corps of the German Sixth Army was briefly cut off and broke out with heavy losses. On 8 September the 5th Shock Army liberated Stalino, the heart of the coalfield, and on the 10th, helped by a landing, the steel city of Mariupol. According to German Wikipedia the Red Army lost 273,522 men and 886 tanks and assault guns in the Donbas operation. 7 21 3
On 26 August the Chernigov–Poltava operation opened in the north. In Rokossovsky's account the main thrust of the Central Front, Pavel Batov's 65th Army, was held up before Sevsk by fierce counterattacks of the German Second Army and gained only 20–25 kilometres in four days. He then had Ivan Chernyakhovsky's 60th Army make a supporting attack on the left flank, which found a weak spot. When the 60th Army liberated Glukhov on 29 August Rokossovsky shifted his main forces and the 2nd Tank Army there, and by the 31st the breach was 100 kilometres wide and 60 deep. Konotop was liberated on 6 September and Nezhin on the 15th, opening the road to Kiev. 23 4 3
At that point the Voronezh Front to the south was 100–120 kilometres behind. Rokossovsky proposed using his advanced 60th and 13th Armies to strike the Germans facing the Voronezh Front from the flank and take Kiev together, but the proposal was not accepted, and he was instead rebuked because Chernyakhovsky had occupied Priluki, outside the boundary. In the second half of September the Stavka moved the boundary between the two fronts north, giving Kiev to the Voronezh Front. Rokossovsky writes that he phoned Stalin to ask why, and Stalin answered briefly that "comrades Zhukov and Khrushchev insisted; they are there, they know better." Nikita Khrushchev was a member of the Voronezh Front's military council. Rokossovsky notes that the answer explained nothing, and regrets that had he been allowed to strike the flank, the Germans could not have withdrawn behind the Dnieper. 23
In the centre the Steppe Front advanced on Poltava. In Konev's account the Germans doubled the Poltava garrison and turned every stone building into an all-round strongpoint. The 5th Guards and 53rd Armies crossed the Vorskla at dawn on 22 September at the very spot where Peter I's army had crossed to fight the Swedes in 1709, and retook Poltava on the morning of the 23rd. Konev then liberated Kremenchug on 28–29 September. Shtemenko writes that the Voronezh Front's plan was to cover 160–210 kilometres to the Dnieper between 18 and 26–27 September at 20–30 kilometres a day. Russian Wikipedia judges that since most Soviet tank armies were refitting after Kursk and only the 3rd Guards Tank Army could be committed, the more mobile Germans on the whole won the "race to the Dnieper". Most German forces got across and took up positions on the western bank, but they had no time to prepare them properly. 4 24 20 26
How did the Germans get back behind the river?
About three weeks into the offensive it was clear that the numerically superior Red Army could not be held on the open steppe. Manstein asked for twelve new divisions, but German reserves were exhausted. On 8 September Hitler came to Army Group South's headquarters at Zaporozhye; according to German Wikipedia it was his last visit to a field headquarters on the Eastern Front. He belatedly allowed the Kuban bridgehead to be given up and the Seventeenth Army withdrawn to the Crimea, but insisted on keeping east-bank bridgeheads at Nikopol and Zaporozhye as springboards for retaking the Donbas. On 15 September Hitler at last permitted Army Group South to fall back to the Dnieper line. 2 1 3
The withdrawal had to pass through very narrow gateways. Fifteen corps headquarters and 63 divisions with their equipment had within weeks to cross, mostly by six bridges, and redeploy on a new front 700 kilometres wide. Along with about a million soldiers went some 200,000 wounded, as many civilians, 153,000 horses and 270,000 sheep. The Fourth Panzer Army crossed through Kiev, the Eighth Army by the bridges at Cherkassy and Kremenchug, the First Panzer Army at Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. According to the army group report Manstein quotes in his memoirs, only 37 infantry divisions were available to hold 700 kilometres of the Dnieper, so each had to cover 20 kilometres, and the average front-line division numbered only a thousand men. Not one of the 17 panzer and motorised divisions was at full fighting strength. 3 2

How did Manstein explain the scorched earth and the removal of the population, and how did the 1949 trial judge it?
Manstein, commander of Army Group South, explained the retreat to the Dnieper and the scorched earth from his own point of view in his memoir Lost Victories. According to him, to stop the Soviet army from pressing on without a pause once it reached the river, the Germans destroyed, wrecked or carried to the rear everything in a belt 20 to 30 kilometres deep in front of the Dnieper that could give the enemy shelter or quarters or help his supply, above all his food supply. At the same time, on a special order of Göring's economic staff, stocks and machinery usable for war production were removed; he wrote that the army group applied this only to military machinery, non-ferrous metals, grain and industrial crops, horses and cattle, that "plunder" was out of the question, and that what was removed was state, not private, property. On the population, he claimed that because the Soviets at once mobilised every man up to 60 in the areas they retook and used the whole population for military labour, the OKH ordered the local population to be moved across the Dnieper as well, but that in practice compulsion applied only to men about to be called up, that many people followed the troops of their own will out of fear of the Soviets, and that they were not "driven off." 30
He recorded that the retreat moved about 200,000 wounded and some 2,500 trains, and that the civilians who came along numbered "probably several hundred thousand." He concluded that it could not be denied that the war brought the population "much suffering and unavoidable hardship," but that this could not be compared with what German civilians suffered from "terror bombing," and that "all the measures taken on the German side were explained by military necessity." Other sources tell the same events differently. According to the German Wikipedia, the retreating German troops destroyed on a large scale and broke the ban on plunder more and more often, and because of the 1941 jurisdiction decree commanders had little means of court-martialling their own marauding troops. Removing the population was also meant to deprive the enemy of its labour. People able to work were sent to forced labour in Germany or, against international law, made to serve as porters and to dig positions for the Wehrmacht; at the end of April 1943 the 253rd Infantry Division, for example, kept 853 forced labourer women in barracks besides 1,381 Soviet citizens serving as "Hiwis" (auxiliaries). Evacuees were sent west on foot in treks of several tens of thousands, often without enough food or shelter. The devastation of the land drove many more people into the partisans. 30 31 6
This retreat became one of the charges against Manstein at the British military court in Hamburg in 1949. Of the seventeen charges, the sixteenth comprised fourteen counts of ordering the deportation of civilians as slave labourers, and the last, the seventeenth, thirteen counts of issuing scorched earth orders during the retreat while ordering the deportation of the civilians of the affected areas. The prosecutor, Arthur Comyns Carr, explained that these orders included the deportation of all civilians and their livestock and the destruction of houses and anything else of economic value that could not be taken along, and that the population was driven for hundreds of miles without adequate food and clothing, with uncounted deaths. In his summation the Judge Advocate, Charles Collingwood, pointed out that Manstein's scorched earth had not been a matter of military necessity but had been planned and ordered well in advance. Defence counsel Reginald Paget called the atrocity charges Soviet propaganda and questioned whether the Hague Convention, which the Soviets had not signed, applied to Russia. On 19 December 1949 the court found Manstein guilty on nine charges, among them failing to ensure the safety of civilians in his area of command by issuing scorched earth orders, allowing the deportation of civilians for slave labour, and using Soviet prisoners of war to build fortifications. He was sentenced to eighteen years and was released in 1953. 32 31
What was "crossing on the march", and why were there 2,438 Heroes of the Soviet Union?
Stalin repeatedly stressed that the Dnieper must be crossed "on the march": units reaching the river were to cross straight away without halting to regroup, so as to win a foothold before the Germans settled on the western bank. To spur this the Stavka issued a directive on 9 September: commanders who forced a large river such as the Desna were to be recommended for the Order of Suvorov, and those who forced the Dnieper below Smolensk, or rivers as difficult, for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The directive's wording named the commanders of armies, corps, divisions and regiments, but the actual awards went far wider. According to Vasilevsky, 2,438 people were made Heroes of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper: 47 generals, 1,123 officers and 1,268 sergeants and soldiers. Russian Wikipedia notes that this was more than all holders of the title up to then put together, and that no single operation of the war produced so many. 22 20 2
Crossing equipment was badly short. Regular pontoons and boats lagged behind, and the retreating Germans had destroyed every boat and scrap of raft material along the river. Soldiers crossed on fishing boats, on rafts lashed together from logs, empty barrels and planks, on anything that floated. The first to set foot on the western bank, on 22 September, was the Central Front's 13th Army in the north, at the confluence of the Dnieper and the Pripyat. Rokossovsky writes that Nikolai Pukhov's 13th Army gathered village boats, rafts and barrels and crossed on a broad front under covering fire from guns and tanks on the shore, holding a bridgehead 35 kilometres deep by the 23rd. By the end of September Soviet troops had 23 bridgeheads on the western bank. But most were narrow strips, perhaps 10 kilometres wide and 1–2 kilometres deep, where the men dug into the clay ravines of the bank and held on. 23 20 1 2
The Germans counterattacked almost every bridgehead, hoping to wipe them out before heavy equipment came across. Konev recalls the crossing of Mikhail Shumilov's 7th Guards Army at the village of Domotkan on the night of 25 September. Next morning Shumilov reported that tank counterattacks and incessant bombing had cost heavy losses and he would have to pull his troops back to the eastern bank. Konev flew to his observation post and found German Heinkel bombers striking the bridgehead and the ferries in wave after wave, unopposed. He writes that he rebuked his own air corps commanders for failing to organise cover, ordered fighter patrols and attacks on the tanks, and had artillery drawn up along the bank; once the aircraft and hundreds of guns and Katyusha launchers came properly into action, he recalls, the Borodaevka bridgehead was held. 24 1
All the bridgeheads were held, but at great cost. English Wikipedia says most divisions were down to 25–50 per cent of establishment by early October; Russian Wikipedia says many had only 20–30 per cent left. The crossings were helped by Soviet partisans fighting behind German lines. According to Russian Wikipedia 17,332 Ukrainian partisans took part in the battle, raiding German units, scouting and guiding the units that crossed. German Wikipedia records that partisan formations from Chernigov prepared several crossing points for the 60th and 13th Armies, and considers the partisans no small part of the reason the Dnieper never hardened into a defence line. The "Rail War", a concentrated campaign against the railways in September and October, badly shook German supply. 1 2 3

Why did the Bukrin airborne operation fail, and who was blamed?
The Voronezh Front chose to cross at the Bukrin bend, where the river loops sharply east south of Kiev. At dawn on 22 September a motor rifle battalion of Pavel Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed first, and Kirill Moskalenko's 40th Army won a small bridgehead near Rzhishchev. The plan included dropping two airborne brigades across the river to hold ground until the main forces arrived. Shtemenko points out that the area the paratroops were to hold, 110 kilometres wide and 25–27 deep, was far beyond the strength of two brigades. According to Russian Wikipedia the Stavka directive was issued on 17 September and Zhukov approved the plan on the 19th, without either the airborne corps commander or the commander of the airborne forces taking part in the planning. No reconnaissance was made, and meanwhile divisions of the German XXIV and XLVIII Panzer Corps were moving into exactly that area. 26 8 9
The drop began on the evening of 24 September and went on through the night. Units reached the airfields late, forcing a day's delay, and company commanders heard their changed missions only hours before boarding. Short of fuel trucks, only 296 of 500 planned sorties flew, the aircraft going singly in file. Meeting flak, pilots dropped from 2,000 metres at high speed. Paratroops meant to land within 10 by 14 kilometres were scattered over 30 by 90; thirteen aircraft returned without dropping, and one dropped its men into the middle of the river, where all drowned. Of 4,575 men dropped, 230 came down on the Soviet side, and 2,017 men and the anti-tank guns never left at all. The German 19th Panzer Division, which happened to be passing through, was waiting for them. 8 1
According to German records 692 paratroops were killed and 209 captured on the 25th alone. The survivors slipped away into the woods in small groups. Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Sidorchuk, commander of the 5th Airborne Brigade, gathered about 1,200 men in the Kanev forest, joined local partisans to raid railways and garrisons, and on 13 November helped the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 52nd Army force the river near Cherkassy from behind. The paratroops were withdrawn from the line only on 28 November; more than 60 per cent never came back. German officers judged the operation a sound idea ruined by the amateurism of planners without expert knowledge. German Wikipedia argues that until the afternoon of the 23rd, a day earlier, the German XXIV Panzer Corps was still on the eastern bank, so a drop on the Kanev bridge that day might have cut it off. It was the Red Army's last large airborne operation, and official Soviet history long passed over it in silence. 8 1 3
In a directive issued in the early hours of 3 October Stalin declared that the operation had caused "massive needless losses", and blamed not only the air officer responsible, Nikolai Skripko, but also "comrade Yuryev" and Vatutin. Yuryev was Zhukov's code name. The directive stated that "dropping a mass airborne force at night shows the ignorance of those who organised it," and took the remaining one and a half airborne brigades away from the front into the Stavka reserve. The memoirs treat the episode very differently. Sergei Shtemenko, then in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, describes how the drop scattered and quotes the rebuke about "ignorance", but leaves out the names the directive gave. Zhukov's memoirs, both the 1975 edition and the later uncut edition of 2002, do not mention the airborne operation at all. 8 26 20


Why was Kiev liberated from Lyutezh in the north rather than Bukrin in the south?
After the airborne failure the Germans massed several divisions, including panzer divisions, in front of the Bukrin bridgehead. Shtemenko writes that the General Staff then concluded that an offensive from Bukrin was unlikely to succeed: surprise was lost, and the gullied, hilly ground was very bad for tanks. According to him Zhukov also reported to Stalin on 25 September that ammunition was badly short and a new bridgehead was needed, but Stalin replied, "You haven't yet tried to attack properly and you already want to give up," and ordered a breakthrough from the bridgehead they had. The Voronezh Front attacked towards Kiev from Bukrin twice, on 12–15 and 21–24 October, and was stopped both times. By the count Russian Wikipedia cites, the Bukrin operation of 12–24 October alone cost the Red Army 27,938 killed and wounded. According to German Wikipedia Vatutin admitted on 22 October that the offensive had failed. 26 9 3
In the north another road was opening. Since the river directly opposite Kiev was blocked by a strong German bridgehead, Nikandr Chibisov's 38th Army shifted north and crossed near the village of Lyutezh at dawn on 26 September. According to German Wikipedia the first across were 22 men of the 240th Rifle Division led by Sergeant Pavel Nefedov; by evening ten were left, having beaten off counterattacks by platoons and companies, and the next morning 75 more joined them. Zhukov also names Nefedov's group in his memoirs. With the capture of Lyutezh on 7 October the bridgehead grew to 15 kilometres wide and 10 deep. In October two supporting attacks from here failed as well, and by the count Russian Wikipedia cites, the fighting for the bridgeheads around Lyutezh from 1 October to 2 November cost the Red Army 85,064 killed and wounded. The same article notes that this figure refutes the idea that Lyutezh was an easier battlefield than Bukrin. 10 13 20 26
On the night of 24–25 October Stalin signed a directive moving the main effort to Lyutezh. As Shtemenko quotes it, the directive attributed the Bukrin failure to "not having taken into account in time the conditions of the terrain, which make offensive action difficult there, especially for a tank army." According to Zhukov, from the 25th Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 7th Artillery Breakthrough Corps moved some 200 kilometres along the German front to Lyutezh, travelling only by night, and the weather happened to be too poor for flying, so there was almost no German air reconnaissance. At Bukrin deliberate radio traffic and bustle kept German eyes fixed there. Zhukov wrote that the Germans never detected the move, but English Wikipedia reports that the war diary of the German Fourth Panzer Army called the northern attack on 3 November "the offensive we have been expecting", and that the Germans correctly identified the sector and sent armour there. 26 22 20 12
On 1 November the 27th and 40th Armies made a diversionary attack from Bukrin but gained only 1.5 kilometres. On the morning of 3 November the real attack opened from the Lyutezh bridgehead, led by the 38th Army, now commanded by Moskalenko, who had taken over from Chibisov in October, and Chernyakhovsky's 60th Army; German Wikipedia says the artillery density at Lyutezh, a gun every three metres, was the highest of the war. The first two days were slow. Zhukov decided on the 4th to commit Rybalko's tank army, which on the morning of the 5th cut the road from Kiev to Zhitomir. According to Zhukov, at four in the morning of 6 November the 38th Army, together with Andrei Kravchenko's 5th Guards Tank Corps, liberated Kiev; English Wikipedia gives 06:50 as the time the city was fully taken. The 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade of Colonel Ludvík Svoboda, armed by the Soviet Union, also entered the city through the western suburbs, and Zhukov writes that 139 of its men received Soviet decorations. Entering the city at nine that morning, Zhukov recalled, he could not recognise the Khreshchatyk, once Kiev's finest street, so complete was the ruin. 11 20 12 13

Was the liberation of Kiev timed for the 7 November anniversary?
Kiev was liberated on the very eve of 7 November, the 26th anniversary of the October Revolution. According to Zhukov, right after the liberation he and Vatutin telegraphed Stalin that "the task of taking our beautiful city of Kiev has been fulfilled." On 6 November Stalin issued an order of the day to Vatutin announcing the capture of Kiev, and that evening, reporting to the anniversary session of the Moscow Soviet, he said: "Now the Red Army is successfully smashing the enemy on the far side of the Dnieper." The report was printed in Pravda on the 7th. That the news of the liberation was delivered together with the anniversary celebrations is plainly on record. 20 27 28
Hence the criticism that the attack on Kiev was rushed to meet the anniversary, at a heavy price in lives. In a 2018 article for the 75th anniversary of the liberation, the Ukrainian state news agency Ukrinform wrote that by Stalin's "unspoken order" the liberation of the capital had to coincide with the anniversary of the October Revolution, and that Soviet troops suffered huge losses as a result. As the phrase "unspoken order" shows, the claim does not rest on a document setting the date. 29 10 9
There is another side. The directive moving the main effort to Lyutezh came on the night of 24–25 October, and according to Zhukov it took a week or so to move the tank army and the artillery corps, so the forces were assembled at Lyutezh only by 1 November. The date of the attack in effect followed from the end of that move. As for losses, the heaviest price was paid in October rather than November: by the counts Russian Wikipedia cites, the October attacks from Bukrin and the fighting around Lyutezh together cost the Red Army more than 110,000 killed and wounded, against 15,491 losses of the German Fourth Panzer Army over the same weeks. English Wikipedia, following Frieser and colleagues, gives Soviet losses in the November battle of Kiev as 118,042 and German losses as 16,992. That the date coincided with the anniversary is a fact, and so is Stalin's use of it in propaganda; whether the timing and the losses were driven by the anniversary cannot be settled from the sources now available. 26 20 10 9 12

How was the south fought: Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Melitopol and the sealing of the Crimea
In the south the problem was the Zaporozhye and Nikopol bridgeheads the Germans had kept on the eastern bank, and the "Wotan" line on the Molochnaya. On 28 September the Stavka ordered all German bridgeheads on the left bank eliminated, the Zaporozhye bridgehead first of all, since from there the Germans could strike the flank and rear of Soviet troops who had crossed. Vasilevsky writes that on 2 October he and Malinovsky visited Vasily Chuikov's 8th Guards Army and found it had less than half a basic load of ammunition. They decided to halt the attack on Zaporozhye for five or six days to build up ammunition, and the Stavka approved on the night of the 3rd. 22
The Zaporozhye operation opened on 10 October. After four days of fighting, on the night of the 13th, Malinovsky proposed, against the conventions of war, to storm the city by night. At ten that night more than 200 tanks and self-propelled guns attacked from three directions, with the 8th Guards Army delivering the main blow. At two in the morning the 23rd Tank Corps burst into the southern outskirts, and by the end of the 14th the city was free. Russian Wikipedia counts it as the first night assault on a city by a large force in the Second World War. Looking back a year later, Chuikov called it "a daring operation, but it was precisely its daring that made it succeed, and it was done with little blood," and wrote that the street fighting moved so fast that the Germans had no time to blow up the city and the Dnieper dam. Russian Wikipedia says the swift advance saved the Dnieper hydroelectric station "from complete destruction", implying that it was partly wrecked. 16 25
The "Wotan" line on the Molochnaya was a position on heights above the river, with two or three lines of trenches 3–6 kilometres deep and anti-tank ditches. Vasilevsky writes that prisoners told him the Germans had driven local people to build it. The Southern Front attacked on 26 September at the Stavka's insistence, with no pause and little preparation, and in five days of costly fighting gained only 2–10 kilometres. Renewing the attack on 9 October, Tolbukhin saw that the German Sixth Army had moved forces north and switched his own main effort south. According to Vasilevsky Hitler promised the Melitopol garrison triple pay, but on the 13th the 51st Army broke into the town from the south and after street-by-street fighting retook it on the 23rd. 22 17
When the Wotan line broke, the Germans withdrew across the whole Nogai steppe on 24 October. Soviet cavalry-mechanised groups swept across the steppe, and on 1 November the 51st Army crossed the old "Turkish Wall" on the Perekop isthmus. The German Seventeenth Army and the Romanian troops in the Crimea were now cut off from the mainland by land; they would be destroyed the following spring in the Crimean offensive (1944). Meanwhile on 25 October the 3rd Ukrainian Front liberated Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk. The Germans, however, held an east-bank bridgehead south of Nikopol until February 1944. The 2nd Ukrainian Front pushed from its bridgehead below Kremenchug towards Pyatikhatki and Krivoi Rog, but according to Zhukov a German counterattack on 24 October drove it back to the Ingulets. By the end of December the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts had built a large bridgehead 300–400 kilometres wide between Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug. 22 17 3 20

Why could the Germans not retake Kiev, and how did the fighting end?
Having taken Kiev, the 1st Ukrainian Front drove west and southwest. It liberated the railway junction of Fastov on 7 November, Zhitomir on the 12th or 13th (sources differ) and Korosten on the 17th, advancing 150 kilometres in ten days and opening a gap 100 kilometres wide between Army Group Centre and Army Group South. Manstein pleaded with Hitler for forces to retake Kiev. The German 25th Panzer Division, newly arrived from France without full training or equipment, was thrown in at Fastov and broke. 12 13 11
In mid-November Hermann Balck's XLVIII Panzer Corps, assembling panzer divisions including the SS "Leibstandarte", counterattacked. Zhukov wrote that the Germans opened the counterstroke with 15 divisions on the 13th, retook Zhitomir and pushed 30–40 kilometres. The Germans recovered Zhitomir around 17–19 November and Korosten on the 27th, but their final thrust to swing round southwest of Kiev bogged down in mud. When the ground froze again they attacked once more on 6 December and tried to encircle a large Soviet force east of Meleni. But a map taken from a dead Soviet major showed three tank corps and four rifle corps gathered inside the pocket, and fearing that they themselves would be cut off, the Germans abandoned the encirclement around 22–23 December. Manstein claimed some 5,000 Soviet prisoners and 600 tanks in November, but the Germans did not achieve their aim of regaining the Dnieper at Kiev. 13 3 20 14
Hitler held the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army, Hermann Hoth, responsible for losing Kiev, removed him and gave the army to Erhard Raus. On 24 December the 1st Ukrainian Front opened the Zhitomir–Berdichev operation from its bridgehead west of Kiev and retook Zhitomir on the 31st. Zhukov wrote that by the end of December the front lay 150 kilometres west and 50 kilometres south of Kiev. Cherkassy too was liberated on 14 December. Vasilevsky regarded the Battle of the Dnieper as effectively over by then. In the spring of 1944 the Dnieper–Carpathian operation went on to sweep the rest of Right-Bank Ukraine. 13 12 20 22

Why could the Germans not hold the river?
The Dnieper was a hard river to cross, but too long a line had to be held by too few men. The wall had to be used as soon as its construction began, and divisions shrunk to a thousand or so men each held 20 kilometres. English Wikipedia sums up that the Germans' failure to roll back the bridgeheads once they were established is why the line could not be held. Russian Wikipedia points out that because the Soviets made dozens of bridgeheads, the Germans could not concentrate to destroy them; conversely, because those bridgeheads were narrow and made without heavy equipment, the Soviets too were dragged into long attrition. 5 4 3
Events on other fronts added to this. According to German Wikipedia, after the successful summer defence of the Mius several panzer divisions were pulled out, not least because of the heavy fighting in Italy, leaving the Sixth Army in the Donbas with few usable tanks. According to German figures Army Group South lost 165,253 men in the single month from 20 September to 20 October. In the rear the partisans cut the railways. The Soviet side, by contrast, could make good its losses: as Zhukov notes, in 1943 alone it produced 35,000 aircraft and more than 24,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. 3 20 15

Why were the people of the left bank sent straight to the front: the "black infantry"
On the road to the Dnieper the Red Army took the men of liberated villages straight into the ranks. The basis was People's Commissar of Defence Order No. 089 of 9 February 1942, which told the military councils of the armies at the front to mobilise men aged 17 to 45 in liberated areas who had not yet been called up, and to form a reserve regiment in each army to screen and train them. The improvised bodies that did this are commonly called "field recruiting offices". According to Russian Wikipedia, in September 1943 120,000 men from the Donbas alone entered units of the Southern Front. 18
Mobilisation in the middle of the fighting often broke the rules. Recruits without uniforms went straight into the attack with only a rifle, and people called these men in a mix of black quilted jackets and coats "jackets", "black coats" or the "black infantry". A German report states that when the Soviets first retook Kharkov in spring 1943 they sent 15,000 men aged 15 to 45 to the front without training, in civilian clothes and with one rifle to every five to ten men. As such cases piled up, the Stavka laid down the procedure for conscription in liberated areas anew in Order No. 0430 of 15 October 1943, followed by Order No. 00141 of 16 November. 18
A story has also spread that this mobilisation was meant to punish those who had lived under occupation, especially Ukrainians. Russian Wikipedia says the view comes from journalism and feature films; the writings of the author Yuri Kovalenko usually cited for it report a conversation in which Zhukov called these men "traitors" and argued against arming them, but no document has been produced to support it. The same article also records the counter-argument that the mobilisation was not selective by nationality and was not an instrument of revenge. What can be confirmed is that local conscription was laid down by order, that many untrained and unequipped recruits died in it, and that the command knew of the problem and revised the procedure in October. The retreating Germans, for their part, tried to drive off men of military age, so the people of the left bank were treated by both armies as labour and manpower. 18 7

How great were the losses, and why do the figures differ?
Losses in the Battle of the Dnieper vary widely with what is counted as part of the battle and who did the counting. English Wikipedia sets three estimates side by side. Grigori Krivosheev's count, based on the Soviet defence ministry archives, puts Soviet losses at 1,285,977 (348,815 killed or missing, 937,162 wounded or sick). Karl-Heinz Frieser and colleagues of the German military history institute put them higher, at 1,687,164 (417,323 killed or missing). Robert Forczyk estimates Soviet killed and missing at about 290,000 and the total at over a million, and German killed and missing at about 102,000, with total German losses over 372,000. 1 3
Operation by operation, the Red Army lost 427,952 men (102,957 of them irrecoverable: killed, missing or captured) and 1,140 tanks in the Chernigov–Poltava operation (26 August–30 September). Russian Wikipedia gives German losses in the same operation as about 321,000, without saying whose count it is. In the Lower Dnieper operation in the south (26 September–20 December) the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts lost 754,392 men (173,201 irrecoverable) and 2,639 tanks and self-propelled guns. To these come the 273,522 of the Donbas operation, the October fighting at Bukrin and Lyutezh, and the battle of Kiev in November. 4 15 5 3
Figures from memoirs and unit records need more caution. Vasilevsky wrote that 118 German divisions were smashed in five months, a Soviet assessment. Russian Wikipedia notes that the 3rd Guards Tank Army reported destroying 229 German tanks and self-propelled guns on 3–10 November but captured only eight self-propelled guns, and that the German panzer divisions in the area had no more than 200 tanks between them, and so doubts the objectivity of such claims. Conversely, the Soviet losses Manstein claimed in the defensive battle for Kiev are a German assertion. The same article reads the fact that Soviet wounded in that defensive battle outnumbered the killed and missing more than twofold as a sign that, unlike in 1941, the Red Army retreated in good enough order to carry its wounded back rather than abandon them. 22 11 14

What did the Battle of the Dnieper change?
The river on which Hitler had hoped to hold the Red Army for a long time was breached on a broad front within four months. The large bridgeheads at Kiev and Cherkassy, below Kremenchug and towards Dnepropetrovsk became the starting points of the 1944 offensives into Right-Bank Ukraine, and the German forces in the Crimea were cut off by land. With the Donbas coal mines and the steel region of southern Ukraine back, the Soviet Union mined 21.1 million tonnes of coal there in 1944. At the Tehran Conference, held from 28 November to 1 December, Stalin met the British and American leaders with these victories behind him. Vasilevsky saw autumn 1943 as the time when the "radical turn" of the war was completed. 2 7 1 22
But the manner of it drew criticism at the time and later. Assessing the Chernigov–Poltava operation, Russian Wikipedia writes that the success of the Dnieper crossing owed more to the mass heroism of the soldiers than to tactical coordination between the arms, and that the Stavka's plan to liberate Right-Bank Ukraine before winter was not achieved. Zhukov recalled that the Germans in the Donbas should have been cut off rather than pushed back head-on, and Shtemenko wrote that only at Bukrin did everyone realise that one should never have prepared only a single way of crossing the Dnieper. 4 20 26
The memory of the bridgeheads was deeply etched into Soviet literature. Yuri Bondarev's novella The Battalions Request Fire (1957) told of a battalion abandoned on a Dnieper bridgehead, and became the basis of "Breakthrough", the second part of the 1969 film series Liberation, and of a 1985 television film. Viktor Astafyev described the horrors suffered by the soldiers who crossed the Dnieper in "The Bridgehead" (mid-1990s), the second book of his novel The Cursed and the Slain, and Georgi Vladimov's The General and His Army (1996) also dealt with this fighting. 2 9
Consequences
The Red Army retook Left-Bank Ukraine, the Donbas and Kiev, established large bridgeheads on the western bank of the Dnieper, and cut off the German forces in the Crimea by land. The German attempt to retake Kiev failed. Soviet losses ran to roughly 1.29 to 1.69 million by different counts.
Timeline & Map
- 11943.08.11Eastern Wall ordered
Hitler ordered an "Eastern Wall" built from Narva along the Dnieper and the Molochnaya to the Sea of Azov.
- 21943.08.26Chernigov–Poltava operation opens
The Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts opened their offensive towards the Dnieper.
- 31943.09.08Stalino liberated
The Southern Front's 5th Shock Army liberated Stalino (today's Donetsk), the heart of the Donbas coalfield. The same day Hitler visited Army Group South's headquarters at Zaporozhye.
- 41943.09.09Directive on crossing awards
The Stavka directed that commanders who forced the Dnieper be recommended for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
- 51943.09.15Withdrawal to the Dnieper permitted
Hitler permitted Army Group South to fall back to the Dnieper line.
- 61943.09.21Chernigov liberated
The Central Front liberated Chernigov.
- 71943.09.22First crossing
The Central Front's 13th Army crossed at the confluence of the Dnieper and the Pripyat and made the first bridgehead. The same day units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army crossed at the Bukrin bend.
- 81943.09.23Poltava liberated
The Steppe Front's 5th Guards and 53rd Armies liberated Poltava.
- 91943.09.24Bukrin airborne drop
Two airborne brigades were dropped at night around Kanev but scattered widely, and most were killed or captured by the Germans.
- 101943.09.26Crossing at Lyutezh
Units of the 38th Army crossed the Dnieper near Lyutezh north of Kiev. The same day the Southern Front began its attack on the Molochnaya.
- 111943.10.14Zaporozhye liberated
After a night assault launched the evening before, the Southwestern Front liberated Zaporozhye.
- 121943.10.20Fronts renamed
The Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern and Southern Fronts became the 1st to 4th Ukrainian Fronts, and the Central Front the Belorussian Front.
- 131943.10.23Melitopol liberated
The 4th Ukrainian Front's 51st Army retook Melitopol after ten days of street fighting.
- 141943.10.24Main effort shifted to Lyutezh
Stalin signed a directive moving the main effort against Kiev from Bukrin to the Lyutezh bridgehead.
- 151943.10.25Dnepropetrovsk liberated
The 3rd Ukrainian Front liberated Dnepropetrovsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk.
- 161943.11.01Crimea cut off by land
The 51st Army crossed the "Turkish Wall" on the Perekop isthmus, cutting off the German forces in the Crimea by land.
- 171943.11.03Attack on Kiev opens
The 1st Ukrainian Front opened the main attack on Kiev from the Lyutezh bridgehead.
- 181943.11.06Kiev liberated
The 38th Army, the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 1st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade liberated Kiev.
- 191943.11German counterstroke
In mid-November the German XLVIII Panzer Corps counterattacked in the Fastov–Zhitomir area and retook Zhitomir a few days later.
- 201943.12.14Cherkassy liberated
The 2nd Ukrainian Front's 52nd Army liberated Cherkassy.
- 211943.12.24Zhitomir–Berdichev operation
The 1st Ukrainian Front opened a new offensive west of Kiev and retook Zhitomir on the 31st.
Related people 23
Soviet Union (Red Army and 1st Czechoslovak Brigade)19
Implementers & commanders7
Proposed cutting off the Germans in the Donbas rather than attacking head-on, without success. Coordinated the attack on Kiev, and was named in Stalin's directive as responsible for the Bukrin airborne failure.
Chief of the General Staff; Stavka representative (Southwestern and Southern Fronts)Aleksandr Vasilevsky1895–1977Coordinated the liberation of the Donbas, the fighting at Zaporozhye and Melitopol, and the sealing of the Crimea. His memoirs give the breakdown of the 2,438 Heroes of the Soviet Union for the Dnieper crossing.
Commander, Voronezh Front (1st Ukrainian Front from 20 October)Nikolai Vatutin1901–1944Attacked twice from the Bukrin bridgehead without success, then liberated Kiev from Lyutezh, and held off the German counterstroke in November.
Commander, Steppe Front (2nd Ukrainian Front from 20 October)Ivan Konev1897–1973Liberated Poltava and Kremenchug, crossed the Dnieper below Kremenchug and held the bridgeheads under German counterattack.
Commander, Central Front (Belorussian Front from 20 October)Konstantin Rokossovsky1896–1968When held up before Sevsk he shifted his main effort to the 60th Army and advanced on Chernigov, making the first crossing on 22 September. Kiev was assigned to the neighbouring front.
Commander, Southwestern Front (3rd Ukrainian Front from 20 October)Rodion Malinovsky1898–1967Proposed the night assault that liberated Zaporozhye, and retook Dnepropetrovsk.
Commander, Southern Front (4th Ukrainian Front from 20 October)Fyodor Tolbukhin1894–1949After liberating the Donbas he broke the "Wotan" line on the Molochnaya, retook Melitopol and cut off the Crimea by land.
Participants10
According to Zhukov, privately agreed with his idea of cutting off the Germans in the Donbas.
Member of the military council, Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) FrontNikita Khrushchev1894–1971According to what Stalin told Rokossovsky, insisted with Zhukov that Kiev be assigned to the Voronezh Front.
Commander, 3rd Guards Tank ArmyPavel Rybalko1894–1948Crossed first at Bukrin, moved by night to Lyutezh in late October, and cut the road from Kiev to Zhitomir.
Commander, 40th and then 38th ArmyKirill Moskalenko1902–1985Crossed near Bukrin with the 40th Army, and with the 38th Army, which he commanded from October, liberated Kiev on 6 November.
Commander, 60th ArmyIvan Chernyakhovsky1907–1945Broke the German front at Glukhov to open the Central Front's advance, and took part in the November attack on Kiev.
Commander, 13th ArmyNikolai Pukhov1895–1958Made the first bridgehead at the Dnieper–Pripyat confluence on 22 September.
Commander, 7th Guards ArmyMikhail Shumilov1895–1975Crossed the Dnieper below Kremenchug on the night of 25 September and, with Konev's support, held the bridgehead.
Commander, 8th Guards ArmyVasily Chuikov1900–1982Delivered the main blow in the night assault on Zaporozhye.
Commander, 5th Guards Tank CorpsAndrei Kravchenko1899–1963Entered Kiev together with the 38th Army.
Commander, 1st Czechoslovak Independent BrigadeLudvík Svoboda1895–1979Led the Czechoslovak brigade formed in the Soviet Union in the liberation of Kiev.
Germany (Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS)4
Implementers & commanders1
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32